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This research proposes to examine the process of
urbanization in Guyana, South America. In particular, the
objectives of this research are threefold. The first is to
2identify, describe, and evaluate some of the historic and
current causes of urban growth and urbanization which have
taken place in a peripheral capitalist state that was under
the plantation mode and that illustrates a legacy of "uneven
development." The second objective is to attempt to assess
planning responses, through attempts by the state to
formulate policies to deal more effectively with
urbanization. And the third objective is to contribute to a
dialogue between planning practitioners and
dependency/world-system theorists. Although any urbanization
process has a variety of endogenous and exogenous variables,
the major premise of this study is that the world system
affects the political economy of the state and hence its
pattern of urban development. That is, urbanization in
Guyana can be largely attributed to its colonial legacy
after a prolonged period of Dutch, French, and British
tutelage, and to the general influence of metropolitan
economic dictates.
In surveying the components shaping urbanization, the
study discerns outcomes which essentially confirms the
expectations of dependency/world-system theory. Following
its incorporation into the modern world system, Guyana has
reproduced many of the patterns of development that are
expected of a dependent peripheral economy.
Core power hegemony led to the stimulation 3nd growth
of the port town of Georgetown and the secondary port of New
3Amsterdam. Georgetown, the capital, in particular was used
not only to evacuate economic surplus, but also to provide a
market for core-manufactured goods.
Whilst dependency/world-system theory allows one to
demonstrate how surplus value was extracted from Guyana via
the circulation of primary commodities, it failed to
adequately address the manner in which labor was utilized
and reproduced.
Urbanization in Guyana is contingent not only upon the
class struggle, but also ethnic/racial conflict. Throughout
the study, the historical evidence has supported the notion
that race has been a dominant factor in the internal
political economy. Racial considerations have been most
important in determining legislation, the allocation of
economic surplus, planning, and development policies which
have impacted urbanization.
Guyana today appears to conform to the postulates of
dependent urbanization. Among the observed characteristics
of the urban structure are urban primacy, unemployment and
underemployment, a burgeoning informal sector, intra-urban
inequality, shanty towns and squatter settlements, and
retardation in rural areas. These dependent urbanization
features have also been accompanied by a number of
conditions that appear to be common to all countries which
have experienced dependent development. Within the economic
structure, there is an overwhelming primary export
4orientation with product elaboration in the core, low rates
of GNP and per capita incomes, a stunted manufacturing
sector, a lack of diversification, low-productivity and low-
wage labor, excessive dependence, a deepening divergence
between what is consumed and what is produced, and the
absence of an internal dynamic and coherence. within the
political and social structure, the study has noted
perceived racial and ethnic divisions, a high degree of
social segmentation, residential separation along racial
lines, profound inequalities, instability, bureaucratism,
and authoritarian tendencies.
Finally, this study of the Guyana experience
demonstrates that dependency/world-system theory can be a
powerful heuristic tool in organizing, understanding, and
explaining the nature of the urbanization process in a
peripheral capitalist state. The research further suggests
that when the theory is supplemented with a realist
perspective that places a premium on internal dynamics, the
dialectical relationship between external and internal
forces will ensure a more complete analysis of urbanization
in peripheral social formations.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
This research proposes to examine the process of
urbanization in Guyana, South America. In particular, the
objectives of this research are threefold. The first is to
identify, describe, and evaluate some of the historic and
current causes of urban growth and urbanization which have
taken place in a peripheral capitalist state that was under
·the plantation mode of socioeconomic organization and that
illustrates a legacy of "uneven development." The second
objective is to attempt to assess planning responses,
through attempts by the state to formulate policies and
create institutions to deal more effectively with
urbanization and urban growth. And the third objective is to
contribute to a dialogue between urban and regional planning
practitioners and dependency/world-system theorists.
Although any urbanization process has a variety of
endogenous and exogenous variables, the major premise of
this study is that the world system affects the political
2economy of the state and hence its pattern of urban
development. That is, urbanization in Guyana can be largely
attributed to its colonial legacy after a prolonged period
of Dutch, French, and British tutelage, and to the general
influence of metropolitan economic dictates.
IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY
since the aftermath of the Second World War, much
progress has been made in elucidating the components behind
urban growth and urbanization, especially the patterns now
visible the world over. This has been due largely to a
problem-oriented, analytical approach to urban studies.
However, what has been said of and for urbanization in other
developing areas may not be relevant to Guyanese society.
Consequently, there is an overriding need to undertake an
in-depth historical case study. This is especially
critical, for there has been a seeming neglect of the study
of urbanization in the Commonwealth Caribbean in general. l
certainly there has been a paucity of pUblished material;
most other developing regions have been covered in some
detail in the literature, but studies on urbanization in the
Caribbean are still woefully lacking. A computerized
literature search conducted on August 18, 1989, and
I Although it is located on the northeast coast of
South America, Guyana is usually included as part of the
Anglophone Caribbean, with whom it shares a common social,
cultural, economic structure, and historical experience.
3utilizing a variety of databases (including Sociological
Abstracts, Public Affairs Information Bulletin (PAIS), and
Dissertation Abstracts) failed to uncover even a single
source that was devoted to the topic. This will therefore
be the first detailed study of urbanization in the country.
Furthermore, I believe that it is imperative that
development planners and dependency/world-system theorists
begin to communicate with each other. Unfortunately,
development planners in general have chosen to ignore
sociopolitical variables and have paid the price with a
legacy of failure. On the other hand, dependency/world-
system researchers, whilst elucidating a clear conception of
the urbanization process, have dismissed urban development
planners, believing them to be aligned with the ruling class
and employing the tools of planning against the interests of
the working class. Consequently, over the years they have
provided little guidance to planning practitioners.
certainly the clamor for socialist revolution and "selective
closure" indicates an ignorance of the spatial problematic.
The main point here is that structural reforms must meld
with spatial-allocative planning if any desirable social
change is to be achieved in the developing countries.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
As with any case study, the present one is written in
the context of the literature. The aim here is to provide a
4general picture pf the existing literature on urbanization.
Despite the fact that there is no universal theory of
urbanization, th~ social science literature is replete with
general statements of a historical disposition which attempt
to describe and/or explain the causes and effects of the
urbanization process~ This literature, though diverse,
falls under the pmbi1t of two competing "theories" -
modernization an~ dependency/world-system.
Modernization Th~orYI
The histor~cal:antecedentsof modernization theory
stem from the wo+ks of sociologists such as Compte, Maine,
Spencer, Toennie~, Durkheim, Weber, Redfield, et ale These
scholars speculated that all social phenomena were the
product of socia~ evolution. That is, societies are said to
move along a lin~ar continuum, from "traditional" to
"modern", from a "primitive, undifferentiated and
pre-rational social entity (Gemeinschaft) to a modern,
differentiated and bureaucratically rational social entity
(Gesellschaft)" (Rimmer and Forbes, 1982:199). In the 1950s
and 1960s, theortsts:who subscribed to the evolutionary
model of social Ghange came to dominate development and
urbanization res~arch. The theory of modernization was
widely discussed by a variety of social theorists, including
political scient~sts,: sociologists, and to some extent
economists. App~ying an inductive approach, this
perspective argu~d quite optimistically that developing
5countries were charting a course already undertaken by
Western Europe and North America. Development, and its
concomitant urbanization, resulted exclusively from
endogenous conditions, be they social-psychological or
structural factors.
Social-Psychological. In the mid-twentieth century,
more emphasis than in the past (e.g., the works of Weber,
Durkheim, and Marx) was centered on social-psychological
variables as integral factors in the development process.
The personality of the individual abruptly became the most
important source of modern economic growth. Drawing from
Schumpeter (1934), who firmly ensconced the entrepreneur at
the core of his "theory of economic development," Everett
Hagen (1962) posited the view that development is dependent
on "innovative personalities." These personalities
(entrepreneurs) come disproportionately from "blocked
minorities", who are prevented from rising to conventional
sources of power in traditional societies and thus are
driven to become wealthy through entrepreneurship.
MCClelland (1961), also exploring causal connections that
give rise to entrepreneurship and socioeconomic change,
proposed the concept of "need for achievement"
(lin-achievement"). He suggested that societies with large
numbers of their populace who are desirous of "getting
ahead" will experience economic development. In 1974,
Inkeles and Smith, in a massive study that included the
6countries of Argentina, Bangladesh, Chile, India, Israel,
and Nigeria, provided corroborative empirical evidence for
the social-psychological perspective. The authors found
that modern individuals possessed remarkably similar
personality traits across countries and that
underdevelopment did not necessarily arise from structural
problems but from the attitudes and values of citizens.
Industrialization as the impetus to economic growth, Inkeles
and smith maintain, can be achieved with relative ease in
the developing world (1974:313-314). Once capital-intensive
technologies are available, developing countries will be on
the road to modernity; the only major obstacle is "becoming
modern in spirit" (1974:315).
structural Perspective. Whilst the social-
psychological perspective of modernization theory has
received a modicum of attention, much of the focus has been
on the structural component. The structuralist
modernization approach is perhaps best exemplified in the
work of Walter Rostow (1962). In his partially titled
"non-communist manifesto," Rostow presented the concept of
"stages of economic growth" through which all nations must
pass in the transition from underdevelopment to
industrialization. According to Rostow (1962:4):
... it is possible to identify all societies, in
their economic dimensions, as lying within one of
five categories: the traditional society, the
preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the
drive to maturity, and the age of high mass
consumption.
7It was Rostow's goal, of course, to formulate a
"gradual non revolutionary model of development based on a
belief in progress, rationality and mechanization or
industrialization" (Rimmer and Forbes, 1982:200). The
theory was eminently suited to the times. After all, it
provided an alternative ideology to counter-insurgents
during the cold war of the 1950s and 1960s (Mehmet, 1978;
Rimmer and Forbes, 1982). Furthermore, it drew nourishment
from the success of the American-backed Marshall plan.
Reasoning was that if Europe could recover from the
devastation of the Second World War and modernize its
economy within a short period of time, it was entirely
feasible to expect the developing world to do the same for
their "devastated" economies (Todaro, 1985). As is
customary to those in the modernization school, the belief
was propagated that the "tricks" to economic growth can be
accomplished with relatively little effort. However, unlike
those who stress the social-psychological component,
structuralists are concerned with "vicious circle"
arguments, in which low income leads to low savings, low
savings to low investment, low investment to low
productivity, low productivity to low income, and so on.
Breaking the "circle" can be achieved by injections of
foreign aid and/or private foreign investment. Thus,
Browett (1980:61) notes:
... economic growth and development in less
developed areas will eventually be achieved
8through the transmission of growth impulses .••
from the more developed areas via aid programmes,
financial institutions, trade and multinational
corporations. Hence, increasing interaction and
integration between less and more developed areas
will, at some stage, lead to the onset of
development in the former areas.
Implicit in the theory is the presumption that
developing countries must be incorporated within the
capitalist system if they are to improve their standards of
living. They must follow the western model, in which
industrialization, urbanization, capital intensive
technology, and representative democracy are seen to be
indispensable to socioeconomic development. Urbanization is
especially important to "traditional societi.es,1I since the
growth of cities provided the impetus towards modernization.
Urban areas are held to be modern enclaves whose gradual
expansion and spread effects will eventually trickle down
and raise the country to a higher level of development.
Disparities between population groups in rural and urban
areas, problems posed by urbanization, etc., were simply
teething problems and were expected to disappear as
developing nations blazed their way to modernity. Ergo,
urbanization should be encouraged (Reissman, 1964; Berliner,
1977) .
A great deal of criticism has been levelled at the
modernization perspective. Theoretical objections have
become so familiar that Bach (1980:290) considers them to be
"unmercifully redundant." Nevertheless, in the same
9paragraph, he continues to list a number of the
perspective's drawbacks. In deference to Bach, I will
proceed in a similar fashion. A first objection to
modernization theory is its lack of historical specificity
(Mabogunje, 1981; Skocpol, 1977; Slater, 1986; Valenzuela
and Valenzuela, 1978). It is Eurocentric and falls into the
trap of propounding an image of universal development
without considering the historical reality of Third World
nation states. Second, the analysis tends to be
superficial, based on an idealized ahistorical and non-
materialist ideology (Skocpol, 1977; Slater, 1986). Third,
its simplistic assumptions failed to provide an "adequate
explanatory framework for examining city-countryside
relations ... and consequently key processes such as changes
in the territorial division and socialization of labor could
not be identified and comprehended" (Slater, 1986). Fourth,
the perspective is devoid of an analysis of class. Third
World societies are expected to "develop" in a non-
conflictual and consensual manner. The inherent
contradictions often associated with capitalism are expected
to be rather benign (Mabogunje, 1981). Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, the empirical evidence gathered over the
last thirty years does not seem to square with the theory
(Smith, 1985; Light, 1983; McGee, 1971; Slater, 1974;
Santos, 1979; Nemeth and Smith, 1985; smith and Nemeth
1986;). A closer examination of the nature of the
10
urbanization process revealed that "urbanization,
industrialization and modernization are at best unreliable
expressions of each other and should not be confused"
(Smailes, 1975:4). In most developing countries, the three
processes simply did not parallel each other. As Abu-Lughod
and Hay (1977:6) observe:
Earlier it was believed that such high rates of
urbanization were healthy, since they indicated
economic growth and progress. It was assumed that
industrialization and urbanization went together.
The fallacies of this perspective have now been
amply exposed. For while the gap between levels
of urbanization ... of the developed and developing
world has been closing rapidly, the gap between
their levels of economic prosperity .•. has grown
progressively wider at the same time. This more
than any other anomaly in the field, has forced a
reconsideration of the theory of economic
development (modernization) ... and the role of
cities in the process of industrialization and
economic growth.
Pursuing this issue further, Light (1983) discusses a
number of ways in which the urbanization process now taking
place in the developing world differs from the historical
experience of the West: 1) in the developing countries, the
pace of urban growth is rising much more quickly than it did
during the peak industrializing years of the so-called
advanced nations; 2) the gains in urban population have not
occurred alongside increases in industrial production; and
3) regional develQpment has been more unbalanced in the
developing world than it was in the West.
11
Dependency/World-System Theory
IDependency theory encapsulates a paradigm rather than
• • I • •
a speclflc theory. Substantlally a post-World War II Latln
i
American construct, early articulation stem largely from the
writings of sociologists and economists in Brazil, Chile,
I
Mexico, and Peru. A list of notables would include:
Fernando Cardoso, Gonzalez Casanova, Theotonio Dos Santos,
I
Enzo Faletto, Andre Gunde~ Frank, Celso Furtado, Gino
I
Germani, Helio Jaguaribe, James Petras, Osvaldo Sunkel, and
Francisco Weffort. Although there l was little genuine
I
consensus among these authors, alII were clearly disenchanted
I
with the non-Marxis~ stag8s of growth and modernization
I
theories, which were in vogue at the time. The
dependentistas, as they
directly challenge this
,
b~came known, therefore
I
dominant perspective.
sought to
Perhaps it was
should have received
America, rather than
inevitable that dependency theory
I
its intellectual awakening in Latin
I •
elsewhere ln the developing world.
I
Social scientists on the continenti were confronted with
independent countries, which possessed abundant natural
I • •
resources and reasonably tralned wbrk forces but WhlCh
remained underdeveloped. In the absence of any obstacles on
which to cast.the blame, they feltl it necessary to
,
concentrate on the underlying soci~l forces. Much of the
I
early dependency formulations have I been attributed to the
I
work of Gunder Frank (1967, 1969, 1972). His classic
I
12
text "Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America" was
the first significant dependency publication to reach
Western audiences. In this publication, Frank laid out what
was for many years the standard dependency approach to the
theory of underdevelopment.
The Development of Underdevelopment. Frank (1969:4)
contended that underdevelopment is not an original state,
because "the now developed countries were never
underdeveloped, though they may have been undeveloped." It
is the structure of the capitalist world economy that has
influenced the "development of underdevelopment" in the
developing nations (Frank, 1967, 1969). The process of
underdevelopment commenced when European countries began to
penetrate the social and economic structures of the Third
World during the mercantilist and early capitalist
expansionist phases. Ironically, underdevelopment is
created through capitalism, the very mode of production
which was responsible for the development of the now-
industrialized nations. Thus, development and
underdevelopment are the result of the same process, or two
sides of the same coin. Or as Hermassi (1978:249) puts it,
they are "opposite phases of the same historical process."
The world, according to Frank (1969:128), is dominated
by a "single world embracing capitalist system" that has
incorporated and integrated all peoples. These people are
linked by an economic process whereby national and regional
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metropolises exploit their economic satellites. This is
accomplished through a chain of exploitative relations that
extracts surplus towards the center by a series of
metropolis-satellite links. This basic dependent structure
has created an exchange or transfer of resources that has
distorted and hindered the growth of the periphery, whilst
enabling the center to accumulate and prosper. Frank
rejected the modernizationists' idea that economic
development in the Third World can be accomplished within a
peripheral capitalist mode of production. External market
constraints have created an international division of labor
that allows core countries to determine terms of exchange.
Peripheral countries, therefore, have little or no chance of
attaining mobility within the system. The choice is stark
"stagnation or socialist revolution" (Ehrensaft, 1976:61).
A number of critiques have been launched against
Frank's early formulation of the underdevelopment thesis,
including criticisms from those who are associated with the
evolution of the dependency perspective. Perhaps the most
vitriolic assault was launched by Laclau (1971), who
disputed Frank's generalization that all modes of production
were capitalist in the modern world. The notion that Latin
America has been a capitalist society since the beginning of
the sixteenth century is erroneous and poses a number of
theoretical problems for Laclau, since it seemingly
contradicts Marx's historical analysis of the times. Much
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of the problem, asserts Laclau, stems from Frank's
inaccurate definition of capitalism. Frank deviates from
Marxist interpretations by stressing exchange and commercial
relationships, rather than means of production. In
particular, Frank confuses participation in the global
capitalist economic system with the dominance of the
capitalist mode of production in Latin America.
Analysts were also concerned that Frank's argument was
rather static, leading to "stagnationism" without a proper
appreciation of the varying levels of relations of
exploitation between the Third World and those in the
center. By arbitrarily dividing the world into core and
periphery or metropolis and satellite, Frank obfuscated what
was essentially a more diversified global economy. The
above criticisms are not without merit. However, in defense
of Frank, I must state that he has continued to respond to
the critics and has altered a good deal of his thinking
since 1967. Perhaps Foster-Carter (1976:176) most aptly
sums up Frank's contribution when he states: "what is in
danger of being forgotten is that it was only because of
Frank that we can supersede him."
Plantation Dependency. Dependency theorists in the
Caribbean have analyzed development and underdevelopment by
explicating a theory of the "plantation economy." A variant
of the dependency perspective, this theory declares that the
most important medium of capital accumulation in the modern
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world system has been the plantation, which emerged in the
Caribbean in the seventeenth century and which has continued
to operate to the present day. Plantation economies are
said to have exhibited the first form of capitalism in the
New World (Beckford, 1972). They have been defined as being
dependent on the export-oriented production of a single
crop, located largely in the tropics, and possessing a
strict division among races and between laborers and
management (Jones, 1968:54; Beckford, 1972:13). The two
earliest exponents of the plantation thesis, Best and
Levitt, divide the historical development of the West Indian
plantation economy into three eras: 1) Pure Plantation
Economy - from 1600 to the abolition of slavery in 1838; 2)
Plantation Economy Modified - from 1838 to the onset of
World War II; and 3) Plantation Economy Further Modified -
from 1938 to the present (cited in Payne and Sutton,
1984:2).
The first phase is especially important, for early
dependency led "to burgeoning inequalities of both a social
and spatial kind", which have persisted into the
post-independence era (Cross, 1979:26). Plantations were
almost exclusively owned by metropolitan interests, who
failed to promote the economic development of th~ host
country. The relationship between the local economy and the
faraway metropole was therefore a parasitic one. In the
post-World War II era, this relationship has been maintained
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by transnational corporations. 'The mixture of foreign
ownership of capital, an~ exporb-oriented production and
accumulation, has served to hinder self-sustaining economic
development.
The plantation dep~ndency Itheory suffers many of the
same deficiencies of ear;Ly dependency formulations. Much of
the problem can be attributed to its structuralist
framework. consequently~ the approach was static,
over-economistic, and al~ost devoid of an analysis of class
and the state. For example, Bedkford (1989:163) recently
noted:
My earlier analysi~ of plantation society .•. has
several weaknesses •. ~specifically, its handling of
the class question w~s overshadowed by the emphasis
on race, whereas what is needed is a synthesis of
how race and class m~kes plantation society a
"special case" in th~ histor:y of social formations.
An exception to th~ above was the work of the
University of Guyana eco~omist, Clive Thomas. Building on
the historical race/clas~ analysis of Walter Rodney (1981)
and incorporating a neo-~arxist approach, Thomas situated
the Caribbean, in the in~ernational division of labor, as
purveyors of raw materia~s and procurers of manufactured
goods. He noted that th~re is aldivergence between domestic
resources and domestic d~mand - that is, production and
consumption patterns do not reflect societal needs (Payne
and Sutton, 1984:6). Whilst Thomas' analysis clearly
specifies the importance of class and politics in production
relations, he too falls into the "stagnationist" trap by
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harboring the idea that "peripheral capitalism" was doomed
to failure in the Caribbean.
Unequal Exchange. Another variant, and a more
sophisticated form of dependency theory, is associated with
the "unequal exchange" concept of Emmanuel (1972), and later
Amin (1976) and Mandel (1975). Emmanuel's concept of
"unequal exchange" is derived from Ricardo's theory of
comparative advantage; however, in this case trade serves to
transfer value from the underdeveloped to the developed
countries. Unequal exchange occurs due to wage
differentials that cause a transfer of value from the low
wage (peripheral nations) to the high wage (core nations).
This process takes place even though both regions may employ
the same capital-intensive forms of production and have the
same productivity levels. Wage rates in the periphery are
kept artificially low by institutionally determined income
levels at the center. Unfortunately, the argument suffers
from many of the deficiencies attributable to Frank's
underdevelopment thesis. It lacks explanatory power, since
it separates circulation from production. Also, it is
static, since it precludes the possibility of independent
development of productive forces in the Third World.
Amin (1976), whilst subscribing to the unequal
exchange theory, goes beyond it by attempting to incorporate
class analysis. Amin's methodology recognizes capitalism as
a world system that is based on exploitation and class
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relations, rather than a system of relations between
nations. Amin (1976:360) internationalizes the class
struggle by stating that:
The main contradiction between productive
forces and production relations, is expressed,
on the social level in the contradiction between
the two opposing classes of the system: the
bourgeoisie and the proletariat ... the
contradiction is not between the bourgeoisie and
the proletariat of each country considered in
the isolation, but between the world bourgeoisie
and the world proletariat.
Amin perceives the domestic bourgeoisie as inconsequential,
and the periphery to be largely undifferentiated. This is
unfortunate, as the analysis ignores the wide variation of
countries confined to peripheral status.
Dependent Development. Cardoso (1973), Cardoso and
Faletto (1979), Bonilla and Girling (1973), and Evans (1977,
1979b) demonstrate that it is possible to have mobility in
the global capitalist economy through "dependent
development". According to this formulation of the
dependency theory, monopoly capitalism and development are
not mutually exclusive terms; as a matter of fact, dependent
capitalist development has arisen to be a new method of
monopolistic expansion in the developing world.
Cardoso and Faletto (1979) dispute the early Frankian
assumption that economic relations between nations are
"static". They suggest that "forms of dependency can
change" (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979:X). This point is
illustrated by Dos Santos (1970), who distinguishes several
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versions of dependency: colonial dependency, financial-
industrial dependency, and technological-industrial
dependency. The "new dependency" (Dos Santos, 1970), in
effect since the end of World War II, is characterized by
the investments of transnational corporations (TNCs). These
TNCs are said to be responsible for limiting the development
of Third World countries. The crux of the argument is that
although some developing countries experienced rapid
industrialization, they nevertheless exhibited signs of
dependent development, owing to a lack of internal control
over economic decisions. As Cardoso and Faletto (1979:XX)
state:
From the economic point of view a system is
dependent when the accumulation and expansion
of capital cannot find its essential dynamic
component inside the system.
It makes little difference whether or not firms are owned
locally, since "they are linked to market investment and
decision making structures located outside the dependent
country" (Cardoso, 1973:146). According to Evans (1979a,
1979b) there is a "triple alliance" of foreign capital
around which dependent development is maintained. In the
Third World, so the argument goes, capitalists are not
interested in the pursuit of national development, because
they make their living from existing patterns and do not
want competition from newer ones. Neo-Marxists criticize
these theorists as simply describing the transition to
capitalism that is occurring in the Third World. What is
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seen as dependent development is merely one form of this
transition.
World-System Theory. An offshoot of dependency
theory, the world-system theory has been widely identified
with the work of Wallerstein (1974, 1976, 1977, 1979, 1980,
1984). Although generally in agreement with the dependency
approach, it differs from its progenitor by providing a
wider interpretation of the world economic system from which
development and underdevelopment arise. It succeeds in this
aspect by recognizing the world system as "dynamic,"
allowing countries the possibility of mobility through a
three-tiered hierarchic world economy of core,
semiperipheral, and peripheral countries (Nemeth and smith,
1985; Timberlake, 1985). Furthermore, the world system
shifts the unit of analysis from the dependent nation to the
global economy.
If there is one thing which distinguishes a
world-system perspective from any other, it is
its insistence that the unit of analysis is a
world-system defined in terms of economic
processes and links, and not any units defined
in terms of juridical, political, cUltural,
geographical, etc., criteria (Hopkins and
Wallerstein, 1977:123, cited in Bach, 1980:295).
Despite the possibility of movement within the global
economy, the world-system perspective concurs with
dependency interpretations that the economic ties between
the hierarchic tripartite world division of labor serves to
"block" and "distort" Third World development. The core
countries are dominant; they play a powerful and decisive
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role in economic exchange and international relations
(Cohen, 1981; Chase-Dunn, 1984). They are comprised of
wealthy societies with high degrees of economic diversity
that control the world division of labor through foreign
investment, aid, and other economic mechanisms. Peripheral
countries are to be found at the opposite end of the
spectrum from the core, "with not merely unequal exchange
between them but also persistent trade imbalances, a
multiplicity of state-structures ..• and the development over
time of two principal world class-formations" (Wallerstein,
1976). They are dominated and have been forced into a
subservient position as a result of their historical
exploitation by the core. Control of economic processes has
meant a reliance on, and an overspecialization in, the
production of primary products (Roberts, 1978:15). Finally,
the semiperiphery can be defined as a middle stratum that
lies between the core and the ~eriphery. It is comprised of
countries that are more diversified than those in the
periphery, but which have not achieved the types of economic
diversity associated with the core. It is said to act as a
buffer between the core and the periphery, for the
semiperiphery, while exploiting the periphery, is in turn
exploited by the core. This arrangement serves to ensure
poverty in the periphery and at the same time prevention of
any alliance between the semiperiphery and the periphery.
Wallerstein's world-system approach, although an
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advancement on early dependency formulations, suffers from
many of the same weaknesses associated with the latter
perspective. One problem with the dependency/world-system
analysis is its emphasis on external relationships between
social systems at the expense of internal dynamics
(Hermassi, 1978; Portes, 1979; Nemeth and smith, 1985;
smith, 1985). The focus on external relations "leads to an
incapacity to differentiate the different moments of capital
development, the specific configuration of types of
capitals, the particular class relationships and conflicts
engendered between capital and labour" (Petras and Trachte,
1979:1~6). Another criticism leveled against the
dependency/world-system approach concerns its preoccupation
with exchange relationships. By concentrating on the world
market at the exclusion of social formations and state
structures, proponents of the theory are accused of
constructing an economically deterministic argument
(Brenner, 1977; Skocpol, 1977; Forbes, 1984). By focusing
on the circulation of commodities, critics contend,
dependency/world-system analysts are "oblivious to the mode
of production in underdeveloped countries II (Weaver and
Jameson, 1981:100). The debate between the so-called
"circulationists" (Frank, 1966, 1967, 1978a, 1978b, 1980;
Emmanuel, 1972; Amin, 1974, 1980; Wallerstein, 1974, 1979,
1980) and "productionists" (Meillassoux, 1972; Terray, 1972;
Palloix, 1975; Rey, 1975; Shivji, 1976; Seddon, 1978;
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Taylor, 1979; Wolpe, 1980) has become rather acrimonious, so
much so that Tilly (1984:68) describes the polemic as being
played out on a "bloody field". Naturally, it is not
possible to resolve the debate at this juncture. However,
it does seem rather apparent that international and social
relations do not operate in isolation, but dialectically.2
Dependency/World-System Theory and
Dependent Urbanization: A Synthesis
Although the dependency/world-system perspective was
overwhelmingly devoted to territorial referents larger than
cities, the approach was instrumental in advancing the study
of urbanization in the Tnird World. As Timberlake
(1985:3-10) states:
... processes such as urbanization can be more
fully understood by beginning to examine the many
ways in which they articulate with the broader
currents of the world economy that penetrate
spatial barriers, transcend limited time boundaries,
and influence social relations at different
levels ... urbanization must be studied holistically -
part of the logic of a larger process of socio-
economic development that encompasses it, and that
entails systematic unevenness across regions of the
world. The dependence relation is an important
2In the last several years the trend in development
theories appears to be towards synthesis. New modernization
studies are now paying greater attention to historical
analysis, concrete case studies, external forces, the
positive role of tradition and religion in determining
social change, and an acknowledgement that development is
far from unilinear (Almond, 1987; Banuazizi, 1987; Davis,
1987; Wong, 1988). On the other hand, dependency/world-
system theorists, without jettisoning the need to pursue
analysis of the cyclical rhythms of the capitalist world
economy, have begun to explore the connection between global
dynamics and internal factors in shaping development
trajectories (So, 1986; Chaichian, 1988).
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theoretical concept used to pry into the ways in
which the processes embodied in the world-system
produce various manifestations of the unevenness
including divergent patterns.
Castells (1977) was the first to make the connection
between dependency and urbanization in the form of
"dependent urbanization." Within this construct, the city
is seen as the outgrowth of capitalist penetration. It is
established to extract a surplus, to expand the market for
goods manufactured under advanced monopoly capitalism, to
serve the needs of elites and to spatially concentrate
production (Harvey, 1973, 1978, 1982; Friedmann and Wulff,
1976; Lojkine, 1976; Walton, 1976, 1977; Roberts, 1978;
Mingione, 1981; Safa, 1982; Chase-Dunn, 1984). Castells
(1977:47-8) proposes that:
... dependent urbanization causes a super-
concentration in the urban areas (primate cities),
a considerable estrangement between these urban
areas and the rest of the country and a break in,
or the non-existence of, an urban network of
functional interdependencies in space.
In addition to the macrocephalic nature of urban
growth, the disparities between urban and rural areas, and
the spatial fragmentation of the urban system, it is further
hypothesized by dependency/world-system theorists that
urbanization under peripheral capitalism should be
characterized by a number of supplem8ntary features. These
include, unemployment and underemployment, tertiarization
and the absorption of a large percentage of the urban labor
force by the so-called "informal sector," the growth of
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shanty towns and unregulated settlements, and the increasing
segregation of class, status, ethnic, and racial groups
(Portes and Walton, 1976; Roberts, 1978; Lubeck and Walton,
1979; Gilbert and Gugler, 1982; Safa, 1982; Walton, 1982;
Armstrong and McGee, 1985; Timberlake, 1985; smith and
Nemeth, 1986). Given the macropatterns associated with
dependent urbanization, dependency/world-system analysts for
the most part have focused on the issue of urban primacy
(Hardoy, 1975; Quijano, 1975; Vapnarsky, 1975; Gilbert,
1980; D. smith, 1985; Walters, 1985). Despite certain
advantages (such as a location that has easy access to
global markets, or the presence of a large labor pool), a
great deal of evidence has been accumulated with respect to
the potential "parasitic" effects of primate cities (Frank,
1969; Cornelius, 1975; Portes, 1976; Walton, 1976). These
authors contend that primacy "is both a sign and a result of
the economic dependency that is causing underdevelopment"
(C. Smith, 1985:97). Primate cities draw a disproportionate
share of rural-urban migrants; they monopolize professional
and skilled personnel, leaving other areas without badly
needed services; they siphon rural resources whilst
returning little if anything to these areas; and they
command more than their fair share of the national income,
leaving behind the rest of the country. Lipton (1977:19)
notes that this disparity occurs because there is an
implicit "urban bias" between the rural and urban sectors.
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Urban bias rests on convergent interest.
Industrialists, urban workers, even big farmers,
all benefit if agriculture gets squeezed - provided
its few heavily subsidised resources are steered to
the big farmer to produce cheap food and raw
materials for the cities. Nobody conspires, it is
not necessary, all the powerful are satisfied whilst
the small scale peasant farmer remains poor and
powerless. Meanwhile, the planners often in the
blinkers of industrial determinism, congratulates
all concerned on resolutely extracting an
agricultural surplus to finance city development
and industrialization.
On the other hand, at the international level, the
association between the primate hinterland city and the
industrial metropole is biased in favor of the latter.
Primate cities in the developing world have applied command
over resources from their rural periphery; and via
migration, trade and monetary flows, and external movement
to the metropole, they have been incorporated into the
global pattern of relationships. Internally, the widespread
inequitable association between city and country in
developing nations has resulted in the retardation of the
rural areas; in other words, urban development has occurred
at the expense of rural areas. This has resulted in a swift
demographic transformation from the country to the primate
city in particular.
The result of this rural-urban migration process often
does little more than effect a transfer of rural poverty to
urban areas. When there are only a few unskilled, poorly
remunerative jobs and an oversupply of workers vying for
them, the effect is to lower incomes even further. Large
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numbers of unskilled laborers and service workers are
perpetually finding their low wages bid even lower by the
hordes of new migrants who are migrating from depressed
rural areas and congregating in the cities. The result is
severe unemployment and underemployment. In most developing
countries, the modern sector of the economy is only a tiny
fraction of the whole. Thus, in spite of some gains in
industrial productivity and some increases in per-capita
incomes, the rate of unemployment and underemployment
remains high and continues to advance more rapidly than that
of urbanization.
Geographers describe the majorIty of urban employment
as residing within the tertiary or service sector. However,
the dominance of service employment within these cities does
not arise from the production of some massive surplus of
wealth fashioned by high-productivity industries, as was the
case in Europe and North America. Rather, it is predicated
on the maintenance of low-productivity jobs, which are
unable to generate the required surplus for most families.
In addition, the types of jobs classified as belonging to
the service sector cover a decidedly wide terrain, from a
doctor to a street vendor. It is almost a residual
category, a "chaotic abstraction" that can merely allude to
the problem at hand (Sayer, 1984). It is believed that the
term "informal sector" or "petty-commodity production" more
accurately portrays what is happening to labor in the
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developing world.
The informal sector is composed of unregulated,
small-scale, self-employed "entrepreneurs" utilizing labor-
intensive methods with minimal remuneration and limited job
security. Whilst there are conflicting views on the role of
the informal sector, dependency/world-system analysts assert
that this form of petty-commodity production stymies
national development and further underdevelops the Third
World (Portes and Walton, 1981; Portes, 1985; Safa, 1986).
This sector is perceived as SUbsidizing the formal sector in
the periphery by providing cheap goods and services,
lowering wages throughout the urban economy, and
facilitating social reproduction. Furthermore, the
international economy benefits from the growth of this
sector. Transnational corporations (TNCs) are able to
reduce their costs so that "the apparently isolated labor of
shanty town workers can be registered as gain in the
financibl houses of New York and London" (Portes, 1985:62).
I
The problem of informal sector labor in a peripheral
I
i
capitaltst city is intimately linked with another
inescap+ble urban problem, the proliferation of shanty towns
and squatter settlements. In addition to swamping the labor
market, depressing wages, and augmenting the ranks of the
unemployed, rapid urbanization has had a detrimental effect
on the capacity of Third World governments to provide such
basic services as housing, public health, and education for
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their citizens. Their populations reflect severe intra-
urban inequality. They are crammed into high-density
settlements that are unplanned and bereft of essential
services such as potable water and sanitation. Insofar as
these settlements are peripheral or segregated ecologically,
it is more a reflection of dire necessity than conscious
choice. Whether or not one subscribes to the "dependent
urbanization" thesis, one is compelled to acknowledge that
since the sixteenth century, mercantilism and later
industrial capitalism have largely influenced urbanization
patterns the world over. Thus, Gilbert and Gugler (1984:13)
suggest:
... it is possible to argue that without the
intrusion of industrial capitalism and imperialism
some Third World societies would still lack major
cities. In major parts of America and Africa urban
development was superimposed by capitalism on
essentially rural societies.
METHODOLOGY
Having reviewed the theoretical literature and its
relevance in providing an explanation for social change and
development, this section will specify the researcher's
method of analysis. Given the fact that all social science
endeavors are ideological in the sense that they represent a
particular vision of the world, I have chosen to couch my
analysis within a framework that might be considered
radical, but which I believe most appropriately explains
patterns and processes of urbanization in Guyana. That
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methodology is the international political economy of the
dependency/world- system perspective. The schematic
discussion of "dependent urbanization" in the previous
section is intended as a series of implicit hypotheses,
which are explored in the course of this thesis. That is,
dependency is expected to affect urban primacy, unemployment
and underemployment, informal sector employment, intra-urban
inequality, the growth of shanty towns and squatter
settlements, retardation in rural areas, and accelerated
rural-urban migration. Given these features, a key issue is
the extent to which urban areas in Guyana conform to this
"dependent urbanization" schema at various stages of its
history. Can Guyana be characterized as a classic case of
dependent peripheral capitalism, with all that implies? I
am aware that it would be foolhardy to try to force Guyana
into a teleological and deterministic framework. Hypothesis
testing is not a "sine qua non" for history. Instead, the
dependency/world-system perspective is utilized as the
study's point of departure.
The theory of "dependent urbanization" serves to bring
some order to the complexities of urbanization under
peripheral capitalism, but it cannot and should not be
reified to become reality. Cognizant of the differ1ng
versions and the deficiencies of this perspective, I should
state the outlines of my approach. The thrust of the study
is historical-structural. Thus, it analyzes the urban
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system in Guyana as an open one, which interacts with a
wider national and international system. Furthermore, it
perceives urbanization as a holistic societal process, which
must be explained by societal and intersectoral models
within a historical perspective. Not only will a historical
method enhance comprehension of urbanization and its
institutional framework in Guyana, but it will also assist
in grasping the relevance and the justification of the goals
and actions of planners and decision makers. This point is
illustrated by Beckford, (1972:v) who writes:
In every society the institutional environment
is a legacy of historical forces and it is through
institutions that human activity is organized.
More recently, Abbott and Adler (1989:467) have
demonstrated the importance of "historical analysis" to
planning praxis. They suggest:
Approaching planning situations with historical
questions provides a practical way for defining
and exploring the institutional and theoretical
settings of those situations.
There is no doubt that a historical approach provides
us with a clearer understanding of the present, for in
Guyana and elsewhere, the mode of life today is deeply
rooted in the past. The socioeconomic structure, and the
urban system it has produced, can be thoroughly grasped only
by situating them in historical perspective. As Castells
(1977:7) observes:
... a study of the history of the process of
urbanization would seem to be the best approach
to the urban question, for it brings us to the
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heart of the problematic of the development of
societies ...
Dependency/world-system theory speculates that
urbanization processes take a considerable amount of time to
unfold, and the only way to determine the factors that are
important is through a historical approach. Therefore, the
origins of Guyanese urbanization must be understood by a
thoroughly grounded understanding of history over the last
400 years. That is, urban growth and patterns in the
country can be better understood by the timing and
incorporation of Guyana into the capitalist world system.
In addition, this historical research will consider the ways
in which distinct factors such as state, race, class,
gender, and the environment have combined to shape the
process of urbanization. The goal here is to attempt to
link the unnecessarily polarized debate between the
"productionist" and "circulationist" viewpoints, as well as
to provide a more synthetic theory. The thesis, as a
result, considers urbanization as a dependent phenomenon
that stems from various "internal" and "external" components
influencing one another and the society within which the
process takes place. Clearly, external conditions alone
cannot explain everything. Although, in step with our
dependency/world-system framework, I do acknowledge that the
global capitalist economy constrains development and
distorts urbanization in the developing world. More
emphasis, therefore, should be bestowed on those internal
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elements that can influence urbanization. I concur with
those who profess a realist epistemology that internal
conditions are important (Cooke, 1983; Sayer, 1984;
corbridge, 1986). Third World countries are not simply
passive victims waiting for history to unfold. To quote
Sayer (1984:22), "history not only happens to people but is
made by them, consciously or unconsciously. II Or, as
Zimbalist (1980:28) notes:
Dependency theory treated underdeveloped
countries largely as putty, uniformly moulded and
deformed at will by foreign capital.
Researchers must journey beyond their narrow
perspectives and throw off the yoke of barren typologies.
The occurrence of aberrant individual cases is perhaps
inevitable, given the uniqueness of historical experiences.
Careful evaluation must be made of the reasons for the
anomalies and any peculiar circumstances and specific
conditions which may be discerned. It is erroneous to
explicate the urbanization process as being completely
asymmetrical, for there is a dynamic interaction between
external and internal forces. What we are endeavoring to
accomplish is to formulate an approach that is flexible
enough to study the external and internal dynamics, in order
to comprehend the political, economic, geographic, and
cultural relationships which have conditioned urbanization.
The emphasis is on linking changes in Guyana's pattern of
urbanization with the historical context in which the
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country was incorporated into the global economy. What has
been the role of external factors and indigenous forces in
shaping the urban system? Why did settlements spring up in
particular locales? What functions did they perform? Why
did they expand in particular ways? I will begin by
suggesting that Guyanese urbanization cannot be understood
without consideration of the external economic orientation
that Dutch, French, and British colonialism has imposed
since 1580. Guyana's urbanization patterns have been
contingent on the nation's incorporation into the world
economy. This will help to explain some of the present
settlement configuration.
A key issue throughout this study is the role of the
state over time. I hope to show that the state has played
an essential part in Guyanese urbanization. I will pay
particular attention to specific urban policies that have
been pursued through the course of the nation's history and
how these policies have maintained or altered the
urbanization process. Specifically, I will attempt to tie
in the provision and distribution of infrastructure (roads,
railroads, shipping, electrification, running water,
hospitals, and institutions of higher education) in
Georgetown as a major contributor to its continuing primacy.
Does Georgetown receive governmental resources that are
commensurate with its output and in proportion to its size,
or as a percentage of its share of the national population?
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Most importantly, in the course of the thesis, I will
be examining the generation and allocation of economic
surplus as a crucial element in accounting for Georgetown's
supremacy. By examining the state's revenue and
expenditures I hope to determine the extent to which
economic surplus is being concentrated in the urban areas.
I will look in some detail at how the economy operates, and
at the proportionate importance of the various sectors.
Given the wide array of infrastructural facilities, I will
consider in particular, the development of the
transportation/communication systems and how they have
sustained the spatial structure. The transportation network
in Guyana can be best described as "dendritic". That is,
like a river, the transportation system consists of many
feeder roads connected to the only major road leading to the
capital, with no direct links between the feeders. This is
not a random occurrence, as Suret-Canale (1971:193), writing
of French West Africa, observes:
Each economic region corresponds to a "one-line
economy," an axis based externally on a port where
import and export were conducted and comprising a
series of adjacent branches which sub-divide in
turn until they peter out in the bush ... each region
resembled a kind of lung with its system of veins
and arteries running parallel, receiving its oxygen
at the level of agricultural production. But the
heart was placed outside, far beyond the seas, the
impulses that regulated the nature and intensity of
the flow were external ones.
I will pursue an analysis of the class structure,
especially those in political power, in order to determine
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why certain features of the economy have been accentuated
and why surplus has been concentrated in particular areas.
By utilizing class analysis, one endeavors to define the
economic interests of various power groups within the
socioeconomic structure. This allows one an insight into
the society in order to evaluate what forces are at work in
determining events. Which classes benefit from
developmental policies and which classes are exploited? Are
policy outputs rendered according to public need, pUblic
interest, or something other than consumer demand? Does
implementation of policies serve the needs of the elite?
with the advent of independence, the initial cause of
Georgetown's primacy (i.e., its external orientation) was
supposedly ended as old mechanisms were restrained or
removed. Development of Guyana is now the responsibility of
the Guyanese people and its government. Why then has the
city continued to dominate the urban hierarchy in the modern
period? Explanations that attribute the present situation
to social inertia or initial advantage are inadequate.
However as soja (1976:27) states:
Institutions and policies may change, but it
is difficult to begin shifting around railways,
processing factories, and the whole urban
settlements to suit changed objectives and
altered ideologies.
Rather, we must investigate the manner in which the
class of elites, located in Georgetown, have formulated
policies to enhance their power base. It is argued that
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despite all the posturings and socialist rhetoric of the
post-independence regime, there have been no real changes in
the structure of any of the nationalized industries (sugar
and bauxite being the major enterprises). Instead, what we
expect to find is a replacement of the colonial elite by an
indigenous elite. Throughout Guyana's history, agriculture
has been the main productive base of the economy, and the
rise and fall of various urban settlements can be more fully
understood in the context of changing conditions in the
rural areas. The argument here is that structural causes of
urbanization reside in both rural and urban structures. In
the agricultural sector, the plantation has been the
dominant system of production, with sugar as king. The form
and tempo of urbanization have been determined to a large
degree by the fortunes of sugar plantations. Many of the
early settlements evolved mainly around plantations.
Georgetown, New Amsterdam, and several other urban centers
were originally plantations which were transformed into
villages. As a result, it is essential to the understanding
of contemporary urbanization to trace the evolution and
development of the plantation system, and its relationship
to the rest of the rural economy and to the wider society.
It would, however, be erroneous to magnify the contribution
of the plantation. It was, after all, merely a part of the
institutional framework of the Guyanese economy, one form of
production.
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The rice and bauxite mining industries have also
played important roles in Guyana's demographic and economic
history. Accordingly, I will integrate the contribution of
each into my analysis. I am also aware that urbanization is
a spatio-demographic process (Slater, 1978). The spatial
concentrations of agricultural and mining pursuits have
generated settlement and urban patterns and processes.
Unfortunately, dependency/world-system has virtually ignored
the relative importance of these urbanization components and
has placed too much significance on socio-political
variables. From a spatio-demographic orientation, we need
to incorporate demographic growth into our study of
"dependent urbanization" in Guyana. For example, what has
been the impact of state policies on population growth?
Furthermore, we must begin to appreciate that the
geography of resources does matter (Corbridge, 1986). The
physical environment must be assessed in a comprehensive
urbanization study such as the one at hand. How and in what
ways has the country's physical geography influenced
settlement patterns? Why does 90 percent of the nation's
population reside on 4 percent of the available land mass?
An unsophisticated environmental-determinist view of urban
growth is, of course, untenable. There has been uneven
development. Some of the reasons can be attributed to local
ecology, but the differential allocation of capitalist
investment and the capacity of the society to utilize the
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environment must be readily acknowledged. Thus,
environmental-determinism and scale cannot be considered as
the sole explanatory factors for the concentration of
population and economic activities leading to capital-city
primacy.
What I am endeavoring to do principally is to offer a
coherent account of the urbanization process in Guyana, an
account that serves to explain rather than describe this
intricate process. I am aware that a dogmatic adherence to
the dependency/world-system perspective is inadvisable. As
a result, I have sought to incorporate human agencies,
possible politics, and demographic and environmental
variables into the analysis. I would hasten to add that
this approach is not a retreat from theory. Rather, it is
an appreciation of the fact that urbanization in a
peripheral capitalist state is a historically variable
event. My approach could be criticized as "crude
eclecticism." Nevertheless, I firmly believe that the
pursuit of a broad analytical base in order to allow a
greater synthesis of several approaches has merit.
Obviously, complete synthesis is well nigh improbable, if
not downright impossible; however, it is only by such an
approach that one may adequately study urbanization and be
able to prescribe policies that are sUfficiently
comprehensive in nature. Dependency/world-system theory has
been roundly criticized as a guide to effective action.
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However, this study ought to alert indigenous planners that
before any planned intervention can succeed, they must take
into account external economic dependence, externally
propelled value systems, internal politico-social variables,
and the usual demographic and environmental characteristics
that drive the process of urbanization.
DEFINITIONS
This thesis is concerned with "urbanization in a
peripheral capitalist state"; accordingly, one needs to
clarify the concepts that will be utilized throughout the
study.
Urbanization
The concept of "urbanization" has been described as a
balloon into which each social scientist blows his own
meaning (McGee, 1971:10). For this study's purposes I have
adopted the definition proposed by Roberts in his
path-breaking classic, cities of Peasants: The Political
Economy of Urbanization in the Third World. Roberts
(1978:9) declares:
•.. we must broaden our focus to take in the
whole process of urbanization and not simply that
of contemporary urban growth ... cities are the
products of broader socio-economic changes, they
cannot be considered in isolation from them.
Urbanization in its most formal sense merely
constitutes the increase of the urban population
as compared with the rural one, but it includes
and results from far-reaching economic
transformations on the national and international
plane.
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Roberts' definition has the advantage of combining the
"demographic" expression of urbanization (i.e., natural
increase, migration, and urban transformation) with the
"socioeconomic" dimension. It connotes urbanization as a
social process rather than simply a rise in the proportion
of the total population living in places deemed urban.
Peripheral capitalist state
This term denotes a society which, by its insertion
into the world-system, has a couple of peculiar features.
First, a capitalist mode of production is juxtaposed with
non-capitalist forms, with the former being dominant. And
second, the core has hegemonic influence and power to
perpetuate this type of development.
Dependency
Dependency is viewed as an asymmetric form of
integration into the world economy. It is "a situation in
which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the
development and expansion of another economy to which the
former is subjected" (Dos Santos, 1970:231).
EVALUATION OF SOURCES
The research aspires primarily to provide a
qualitative analysis of the chosen theme. Much of the
description is selective, drawing from a range of primary,
secondary and tertiary data. Guyana's legacy of
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underdevelopment is also reflected in the limitations in the
material base for historical reconstruction. There are no
reliable statistical series although the first census was
taken in 1841 and the registration of vital statistics can
be traced back to 1869. Censuses were taken regularly in
ten year intervals until 1901 when a shortfall in revenue
caused a postponement until 1911. The second World War also
prevented collection of the 1941 census, whilst in 1980 the
government chose not to publish the results. The lack of
quantitative data required some creativity on our part.
However, the situation is not entirely hopeless. A
reconnaissance trip was made to Guyana in September, 1989 to
evaluate the adequacy of available data and to forge links
with the State Planning Secretariat, the Central Housing and
Planning Authority, and other government departments. The
trip proved to be a fruitful one; generous amounts of
contemporary data was furnished including annual reports and
development plans. Although researchers in the past have
found administrative records difficult to access, a large
amount of primary data was made available. The University
of Guyana Library and Geography Department also proved
somewhat useful as sources of secondary data. A number of
unpublished papers, journals, and books not found outside
Guyana were consulted. However, because of a poorly
developed historiography, much of the information that is
salient to us occurs in a disparate fashion and had to be
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pieced together. More dated materials were located at the
Guyana National Archives (GNA). The GNA has conserved a
number of bound volumes and miscellaneous papers. The
series of bound volumes allows for scholarly reference.
These include, Blue Books, Official Gazettes and copies of
many decennial censuses. Finally, I drew from a wide array
of sources, including the works of anthropologists,
demographers, historians, sociologists, economists,
political scientists, and urban planners. The resultant
study is thus an interdisciplinary approach.
ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This study is divided into six chapters. Chapter I is
the introduction. It sets the stage by describing the scope
of the study, its rationale, and its organization. An
in-depth literature review is pursued, to make explicit and
comprehensible the theoretical framework of the thesis.
The first section of Chapter II presents the
contextual framework by laying the foundation for our
investigation. It presents background information on the
geographical characteristics of the country. The country's
economic and cultural history has profoundly influenced
population growth characteristics and distribution. For
orderly and chronological treatment, the discussion of these
factors is structured into four historical phases. These
are, respectively:
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1. Early colonialism and slave plantation society
(1580 to 1838);
2. Post-emancipation and indentureship (1838 to 1917);
3. Twentieth-century colonial rule (1917 to 1966);
4. Post-independence (1966 to the present) .
A cursory glance at the above periods reveals that
they are of unequal duration. However, such a structure
allows one to analyze the changes which occur when one
socioeconomic arrangement is altered or supplanted by
another. The periodization of history is not meant to
suggest a past devoid of process. Many of the key
historical processes identified by this study have their
roots in earlier phases; likewise their legacies overlap
strict chronological boundaries. In this thesis, the four
phases will be presented in four chapters representing well-
defined eras in the political economy of urbanization in
Guyana. Any such discussion of the evolution of society is
axiomatically a discourse of historical events. Therefore,
chapters II through V are largely historical, with the
analytical accentuation on the demographic,
spatial-ecological, and politico-economic factors of
urbanization. I will delineate the developments leading to
the primacy (demographic, political, social, and economic
dominance) o~ the capital, Georgetown. special attention is
placed on the national political arena, with emphasis on the
policies of the elite class as they relate to
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infrastructural development in particular. This will
provide us with some understanding of the major factors
which fashioned the current pattern of settlement and which
still continue to have important effects on urban
development. Each of the four chapters (i.e.,II through V)
roughly follows an order of delineating:
1. Global Linkages. According to world-system theory, a
social process such as urbanization must be understood in
its international context. The whole idea behind dependent
urbanization is that it is closely associated with
capitalist penetration and expansion. Therefore, in this
section, I will be looking at external economic dependence.
What are the economic processes that link Guyana (an
economic satellite) to the core? The chain of metropolis-
satellite links are especially important because it does not
only help to explain underdevelopment but it also throws
light on the country's urban history. In the early colonial
period the national transfer of economic surplus occurred
directly between the plantations and metropolitan centers.
It was only later that the extraction of economic surplus
was accomplished through a chain of exploitative relations
which flowed from the countryside (plantations), to
Georgetown, and finally to Western metropolises. The
linkages between core and periphery are presented by
demonstrating import and export concentration (a reflection
of dependence and openness of the economy), trade patterns,
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port traffic (arrivals and destinations), and international
relations.
2. Industrial structure. One of the most important
influences on urbanization is the nature and location of
employment. Consequently, when the settlement pattern is
considered, the type of industrial structure is extremely
important. During each particular era, I will look at the
proportionate importance of the various sectors
(agriculture, manufacturing, mining, and services).
3. Demography. A study of urbanization cannot proceed
without an analysis of demographic trends in the area under
investigation. Accordingly, throughout the various periods,
I will present basic demographic data such as natural
increase (i.e., the difference between the number of births
and deaths), migration, racial composition of the
population, gender ratio, etc. In addition, I will include
the number, size, distribution, hierarchy, growth, and
structure of the urban areas - primarily Georgetown and New
Amsterdam.
4. Infrastructure and Urban Development. The provision of
infrastructure is an important causal agent in shaping land
use and settlement patterns. A basic assumption of this
thesis is that people move where resources and opportunities
are concentrated. Accordingly, in this section, I will
concentrate on infrastructural allocations (roads,
railroads, shipping, electrification, water supply, sea
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defenses, educational institutions, and hospitals) and
development expenditures as they relate to urban and rural
areas.
within the urban areas, I will address the problems
posed by urban growth and urbanization, and the extent to
which urban areas in Guyana conform to a dependent
urbanization scheme - urban primacy, unemployment and
underemployment, petty-commodity production, intra-urban
inequality, squatter settlements, and accelerated rural-
urban migration.
It is through the political and social structure that
infrastructural developments and other policies affecting
Guyanese urbanization are formulated and implemented. As a
result, I will discuss the role of the state, race, class,
gender, and elite interests. Have the dominant groups in
the society exerted an "urban bias" over the political
system? How are government resources allocated with respect
to infrastructure? How has the tool of planning been used
in influencing land use? What are the institutional roots
behind settlement patterns? I will also discuss how the
dominant class has utilized the rule of law, particularly
Crown Lands legislation and labor laws, to promote their
interests and those of.the dominant classes in the core
capitalist countries. Chapter VI, the conclusion,
summarizes the findings of the dissertation.
CHAPTER II
EARLY COLONIAL,ISM AND SLAVE PLANTATION SOCIETY 1580-1838
GEOGl~PHICAL CONTEXT
Guyana is situated on the northeastern coast of South
America between 1° and go north latitude and 57° and 62°
west longitude (Figure 1). It is bordered by the Atlantic
Ocean on the north, surinam on the west, Brazil on the south
and southwest, and Venezuela on the west. with an area of
83,000 square miies (215)000 square kilometers), it is
slightly smaller than Great Britain, although it is by far
the largest country in the Commonwealth Caribbean.
Guyana can be divided into three broad geographical
regions - the coastal plain, the highland and forest region,
I
and the savannahs. The coastal plain, containing the bulk
I
of the country's populat~on, stretches 270 miles along the
Atlantic coast and varies in width from 10 to 40 miles. It
I
is a flat, low-lying area, most of which lies below sea
level at high ti~e, and has to be protected from the ocean
by a complex and expensi~e system of sea defenses and
drainage canals. Composed of rich alluvial soils, this
.ca.... _ ..................... -
--_.-._-
..-nn' p; ..-0.1."""
.."
toLO .....1
.....=-'Y:
GUYANA
o
..~--_ •...
-:..~.~"'~
.- =::::-::-
I· ----
49
~\. 1IIOl.*1....~
[ "',.'a... \
......... -.a&Jiltr"I. ..... ·
~ Ml"OItc..~.-uo ... '
.,.. 1)000 ,.. 11,.1
:~
~ ..... -
" . -
~~_::t':~
Figure 1. Guyana.
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narrow coastal ribbon is the most fertile region of the
country. It is Guyana's agricultural center, and it is
where the sugar and rice industries are to be found.
Extending southward from the coastal plain, there is a
broad belt of undulating land that is characterized by dense
equatorial forests. There are several mountain ranges
including the Pakarimas, the Imatakas, the Kanukus, and the
sierra Akarais. The most significant range is the
Pakarimas, which extend along the Venezuelan and Brazilian
borders. Here one finds Guyana's highest peak in Mount
Roraima - 9,094 feet above sea level. Numerous rivers cross
the region, but navigation is generally hampered by
cataracts, rapids, and waterfalls which frequent the
courses. This region also boasts the mighty Kaieteur Falls,
which at 741 feet is one of the largest single-drop falls in
the world.
While the highland and forest region covers
approximately four-fifths of the country, it is largely
undeveloped and unpopulated. The soils are sandy and
infertile for the most part. However, the region is thought
to have extensive reserves of minerals including bauxite,
gold, diamonds, manganese, and columbite. In addition, the
forests contain valuable strands of hardwood including
greenheart, mora, crabwood, wallaba, and other timbers.
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There are two savannahs - the Rupununi and the
Intermediate. The largest, the Rupununi, is located in the
southwestern part of the country and comprises an area of
approximately 6,000 square miles. This is the country's
major cattle-rearing area, but because the quality of the
soil and grasses is poor, the number of cattle per acre is
rather low. The Intermediate savannahs, located 60 miles up
the Berbice River, covers an area of some 2,000 square
miles. Although it is more accessible than the Rupununi,
the grass here is of poorer quality, and as a result fewer
cattle are reared.
The country is traversed by four major rivers
(Essequibo, Demerara, Berbice, and Corentyne) flowing north
from the southern interior to the Atlantic. Essequibo,
Demerara, and Berbice also represent the names given to the
three counties into which Guyana is divided. Each of the
three was also a European colony. The Corentyne forms the
border with surinam.
Population estimates in Guyana are a matter of some
conjecture. However, in 1989 the country's statistical
Bureau estimated the population at 755,200. Of the
population, Indians and Africans comprise the majority,
although there are smaller groups of Amerindians, Chinese,
and Portuguese and other Europeans. The Amerindians are the
only group which are indigenous to Guyana. All the other
groups were introduced into the country as a result of
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Guyana's incorporation into the modern world system. Most
were brought in as slaves, indentured and free laborers by
the Europeans, to provide the necessary labor for cotton,
coffee, and sugar plantations. Thus, Guyana's population
and settlement history is a product of the development of
the Atlantic world and a reflection of the expansion of
capitalism, and European colonialism in particular, on a
world scale.
The population is found largely on the easily
accessible coastal plain. All principal urban centers are
concentrated along this narrow strip of land. Georgetown,
the capital and only city in the country, is the financial,
commercial, and administrative center, and the chief port
(Figure 2). It is located on the East Bank of the Demerara
River estuary, and with its suburbs it has a population of
150,368 (1986).
New Amsterdam, which in 1980 had an estimated
population of 19,287, is situated on the East Bank near the
mouth of the Berbice River (Figure 3). The town, which has
a relatively small port, is mainly an administrative center
for Berbice, although it does provide some central place
functions for people living on the eastern part of the
coastal plain between the Berbice and Corentyne Rivers.
Linden, with a 1986 population of 29,036, is the
country's second-largest urban center. It is located on the
Demerara River, some 65 miles upriver from Georgetown.
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Formerly known as Mackenzie, the town is the country's most
important bauxite mining center.
Corriverton lies on the West Bank at the mouth of the
Corentyne River. stretching for some seven miles along the
Corentyne highway, the town is rather elongated. It was
formed through the amalgamation of a number of villages and
was declared a town in 1970. The town's port of Springlands
is of some importance, and its proximity to Surinam has
assisted its development as an important commercial center.
In 1980, it had an estimated population of 15,000.
The town of Rose Hall was also established in 1970.
Situated some 18 miles east of New Amsterdam, along the
Corentyne highway, it is a commercial center and in 1980 had
a population of 5,311.
GLOBAL LINKAGES
This section profiles Guyana's incorporation into the
modern world system. Through discussion of trade links, and
flows of capital and primary products (sugar, cotton,
coffee, and tobacco) from the periphery to the metropolitan
economies, it seeks to demonstrate the importance of export
specialization in the formation of the space economy. In
addition, it emphasizes Guyana's tenuous position in the
midst of international geopolitical rivalries.
Guyana was one of Europe's earliest colonial
territories and consequently can be regarded amongst the
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modern world system's oldest peripheries. The country was
thoroughly subsumed into a colonial stratagem that has
resulted in a dissonant history, one in which the indigenous
population, Amerindians, predominantly Arawak- and Carib-
speaking groups, were largely marginalized through a policy
of benign neglect, and replaced by immigrant peoples,
emergent creole cultures, and new systems and forms of
production and exchange.
Guyanese settlement history did not commence with
European expansionism, despite the fact that Europeans
regarded Guyana as a virtual tabula rasa at the time of
contact and colonization. The Amerindians had no urban
settlement of any significant size. At the time of contact,
indigenous populations practiced shifting cUltivation,
fishing, hunting, and gathering. They occupied villages
usually situated in relation to water sources; they engaged
in long-distance trade.
Europeans first became aware of Guyana when they began
charting the northeast coastline of South America during the
waning years of the fifteenth century. I It is unclear
whether Columbus sighted the Guyana coast during his 1498
voyage of discovery to the New World, but there is little
doubt that Spanish and Portuguese explorers were cognizant
of its existence by the early sixteenth century. Impelled
IGreat Britain. Central Office of Information. 1966.
Guyana. London: H.M.S.O., p. 5.
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by a mercantilist philosophy that emphasized the control of
trade and territory, the explorers soon attempted European
settlement on the Guyana mainland. European settlement of
the country quickly transformed the existing production
patterns of the Amerindians and replaced them with new forms
of production relations. 2 Amerindians were forced to occupy
more marginal regions of the interior.
Early European settlement was largely an outgrowth of
the trade the Dutch had developed with the Amerindians.
Annatto dye, letterwood, cotton, and tobacco were obtained
by the Dutch in exchange for axes, knives, fish hooks,
glass, pottery, and other merchandisable articles. 3 As the
Amerindians were largely nomadic, the Dutch were often
confronted with severe delays in acquiring commodities from
them. with a view towards efficiency, they established
depots to allow greater contact with their trading
partners. 4 These trading posts were manned by a few
i
Dutchmen, and they became the nucleus of European settlement
in the colony.
2 i . . .Thiompson, A. 1987. Colonlallsm and Underdevelopment ln
Guyana.! Bridgetown: Carib Research, p. xvi. According to
Thompson, the social system of the Amerindians was "basically
egalitarian" during the pre-European era.
3Goslinga, C. 1985. The Dutch in the Caribbean and in the
Guianas, 1680-1791. Dover, New Hampshire: Van Gorcum, p. 432.
Smith, R.T. 1962. British Guiana. London: Oxford university
Press, p. 15.
4Rodway, J. 1891-94. History of British Guiana, from the
year 1668 to the present time. (3 Vols.). Georgetown: J.
Thomson, p. 3.
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The first depot was established in the Pomeroon
district in 1580. 5 From tHis base, expeditions were mounted
into the interior in search of Amerindian trade, as well as
gold and silver. It was the lure of gold that brought Sir
Walter Raleigh to Guyana's shores in 1595 in his quest for
El Dorado, the mythical city of gold. Raleigh was so
enamored of the country that he constituted a plan of a huge
English empire extending from the Amazon to the Orinoco. On
his return to England, he ~ublished his book "The Discoverie
of Guiana," in which he gushed:
Guiana is a country that hath yet her maidenhead,
never sacked, turned: nor wrought, the face of the
earth torn, nor the virtue and salt of soil spent
by manuarance, the graves not been opened for gold,
the mines not broken with sledges ...
Those commandlers and Ichieftains, that shoot at
honour, and abundance, Ishall find here more rich
and beautiful cities, more temples adorned with
golden images, more sepUlchres filled with
treasure, than either Cortez found in Mexico, or
Pizzarro in Peru.. I
I never saw a more beautiful country, nor more
likely prospects, hills so raised here and there
over the valleys, the niver winding into divers
branches, the plains adjoining without bush or
stubble, all fair greeri grass, the ground of hard
sand easy to march on, leither for horse or foot,
the deer crossing in every path, the birds towards
the evening singing on ,every tree with a thousand
different tunes J cranes and herons of white
crimson and carnation perching on the river's
side, the air fresh with a gentle easterly wind,
and every stone that we stopped to take up
promised either gold on silver by his
complexion. 6
6Raleigh, sir Walter. JL966. Discoverie of Guyana. In New
World (Guyana Independence Issue), Georgetown: New World Group
Associates, p. 21.
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Raleigh's flight of fancy was more than enough to excite
countless adventurers to Guyana's shores. The expenditure
of lives, energy, and capital was immense, on what was
essentially a blatant prevarication.
The spaniards who had claims to Guyana immediately
evicted the Dutch from their fledgling Pomeroon settlement
in 1596. 7 Undeterred, the evicted settlers moved to an
island at the junction of the Essequibo, Mazaruni, and
Cuyuni Rivers, where they established Fort Kijkoveral
(literally, "see-over-all") some thirty miles inland. The
settlers' territorial claims were bolstered in 1609 when
Hugo Grotius, a Dutch international jurist, pUblished his
"Mare Libirum" denouncing Spanish claims of rights to the
seas and a monopoly of trade· with the caribbean. 8 Propped
by Grotius' treatise, the settlers organized smaller trading
posts deep in the interior of the country. Even the Pilgrim
fathers toyed with the idea of settling in Guyana in 1620
before prevailing upon the North American continent.
To invigorate the Guyana trade, the Dutch granted a
charter to a group of merchants who established the Dutch
West India Company (DWIC) in 1621. The DWIC was allotted
exclusive control over all the area and settlements along
7Great Britain. Colonial Office. 1960. Annual Report on
British Guiana. London: H.M.S.O., p. 218.
8Report of the united states commission on the Boundary
between Venezuela and British Guiana. 1897. Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, p. 9.
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the Eastern American and West African seaboards from the
Tropic of Cancer to the Tropic of Capricorn. Besides
engaging in commerce, the DWIC was also authorized to
plunder Spanish and Portuguese vessels, and to exercise its
monopoly over the African slave trade to secure a supply of
cheap labor for its settlements on the American continent.
In 1627, the DWIC issued a license to Abraham van
Pere, a Dutch merchant, to settle on the Berbice River. Van
Pere brought sixty male settlers with him to Berbice, where
they built Fort Nassau, roughly fifty-five miles up the
Berbice River. 9 Berbice was allowed to operate as a
separate colony from Essequibo, with its own civil and
criminal jurisdictional privileges. Van Pere was assigned
the title of "patroon" and he and his fellow colonists had
the right "to do all ... things which they shall jUdge good
and profitable for their colony •.. "w Despite the apparent
wide-ranging powers allotted to van Pere, the DWIC placed
restrictions on internal development and fostered dependence
by stipulating a number of restrictive conditions. For
example, under the conditions van Pere signed with the DWIC
on June 12, 1627:
The Company [i.e., DWIC] shall transport all
the necessaries of the colonists, their arms, and
agricultural implements, likewise their provisions
... The Colonists shall not trade with any other
nation, or transport their goods by any other than
9Great Britain. Colonial Office 1960, op. cit., p. 218.
IOReport of the U.S. Commission 1897, op. cit., p. 47.
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the company's vessels •.. The Colonists shall not
manufacture any woolen, linen or cotton, or weave
any other clothing materials, on pain of being
prosecuted for perjury ...AII merchandise and
products of the colony shall be sent by the
Company's vessels. 1I
Economic growth, as a result, was painfully slow in both
colonies.
The Berbice colony, like its sister colony of
Essequibo, was committed to trading pursuits. The colonies
were seen to be little more than trading outposts. Each
colony would annually receive a ship laden with merchandise,
and it was customary for each ship's captain to accept
control of one of the colonies whilst his forerunner would
return to Holland with the previous year's commodities. 12
The profits were particularly meager, and little was done to
promote the development of the settlements.
In 1664 Major John Scott took Essequibo for the
British. The occupation was for only a few short months,
but it highlighted Guyana's fragile position in Europe's
struggle for commercial and political dominance. It was a
measure of the country's robustness that just four after the
IIRodway, J. and T. Watt. 1888. Chronological History of
the Discovery and Settlement of British Guiana, 1493-1796.
Georgetown: Royal Gazette, pp. 97-98.
12Rodway 1891, op. cit., vol. I, p. 4.
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war, 60,000 pounds of sugar and 20,000 pounds of letterwood
were exported to Holland. 13
upriver locations were the most desirable sites, but
despite the colonists' precautions, they could not escape
the fact that they were part of an inextricably connected
system in which European rivalries dictated events. 1708
witnessed the pillage of the Essequibo colony. French
privateers led by Captain Antoine Ferry forced the colony to
surrender and extracted a ransom of 50,000 guilders from the
settlers. M The following year the Essequibo colony was
visited by two more French privateers, who sacked and
destroyed four of the DWIC's plantations and a good number
of the private ones. After they had departed, only two
sugar mills were said to be in operation. 15 Essequibo's
sister colony of Berbice suffered a similar fate in 1712
when it was plundered by another group of French privateers.
A ransom of 300,000 guilders was levied on the House of van
Pere, but the local commander was unable to satisfy the
demand. A bill of exchange was drafted and taken to
Holland, where it was paid off by a syndicate of merchants
led by Nicolas van Hoorn. After nearly a century, the van
13Netscher, P. 1888. History of the Colonies, Esseguibo,
Demerara and Berbice. Tr. W.E. Roth. Reprinted, Georgetown:
Daily Chronicle, 1929, p. 37.
14Daly, V.T. 1975. A Short History of the Guyanese People.
London: Macmillan, p. 66.
15Rodway 1891, op. cit., vol. I, p. 53.
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Peres' association with Berbice had finally corne to an
end. 16 Despite these setbacks, both Essequibo and Berbice
rebounded quickly. The resilience of the colonies was
partly a reflection of the impressive economic potential of
the territory.
Meanwhile, in the colony of Berbice, the colonists in
1723 had begun a movement of another kind. No longer under
the leadership of the van Peres' they fought the DWIC to
allow trade with North America. The North American trade
gave a fillip to the burgeoning Fort Nassau settlement, as
it provided the settlers with desperately needed livestock
and a market for their own products. They were, however,
prevented from completely breaking dependence on Holland,
being required to export their more lucrative commodities -
such as sugar, cotton, coffee, and tobacco - to the horne
country. 17
Sugar was not the only crop in production; cotton and
annatto were regularly being exported. Coffee did not reach
Essequibo until 1725, when 30,000 plants were imported from
Surinam and planted in the neighborhood of Kijkoveral. 18
Export figures lend support to the widening of the export
base. In 1764 Essequibo, and the newly opened Demerara
16Daly 1975, op. cit., p. 66.
17Dalton, H.G. 1855. The History of British Guiana.
London: Longman, Brown, Green & Longman, p. 187.
18King, K.F.S. 1968. Land and People of Guyana. Oxford:
University of Oxford, p. 38.
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region, exported 2,956 hogshead of sugar, 31 barrels and 211
bags of coffee, and 2 bales of cotton, whilst in 1766 we
find 4,120 hogshead of sugar, 37 barrels and 2,532 bags of
coffee, and 101 bales of cotton being shipped to Europe. 19
Economic progress in the colonies was hampered by the
short-sighted policies of the directors. They were
primarily interested in repatriating profits into their
mercantile houses in Europe. Accordingly, they instituted
orders which prohibited shipping and trade with all foreign
countries except Holland.
Each plantation was a self-contained unit, with little
or no internal linkages with the domestic plantation
economy. External orientation meant that each plantation
kept its own boat or other vessel for the transhipment of
its produce to metropolitan ships anchored off shore. 2o Dr.
George Pinckard, a physician to the British armed forces in
the final decade of the eighteenth century, disclosed:
There be no market in the colony, each planter's
abode must furnish all within itself, every
necessary, every comfort, all that is given, or
enjoyed, must be found in the house or upon the
plantation. 21
19Rodway 1891, Ope cit., vol. I, p. 22l.
20st. Clair, T.S. 1947. A Soldier's Sojourn in British
Guiana, 1806-1808. Edited by V. Roth. Georgetown: Daily
Chronicle, p. 29.
21Pinckard, G. 1942. Letters from Guiana. Extracted from
Notes on the West Indies and the Coast of Guiana. Ed. V. Roth.
Georgetown: Daily Chronicle, p. 95.
65
Lines of internal communication were neglected. The
colonies remained dependent, little more than appendages to
the metropolis, devoid of all forms of association with
neighboring colonies.
International geopolitical rivalries during the
American War of Independence plunged Britain and Holland
into direct conflict, and in 1781 the British captured
Essequibo, Demerara, and Berbice. 22 For the first time the
three colonies were controlled as a single entity.
Lieutenant Colonel Kingston was entrusted the reins of
government and in a relatively short time opened the
colonies to British settlers. British rule was short-lived,
for in 1782 the colonies were seized by the French, with
whom the British were also at war. The Compte de Kersaint
assumed the post of governor of the three colonies and began
vigorously undertaking a variety of settlement projects,
including the creation of a new town - Longchamps, at the
mouth of the Demerara River. A measure of free trade was
encouraged and, according to a French census, authorized by
Kersaint; the colonies were in a healthy position.
Plantations in the three colonies totalled 387, whilst
exports stood at 500,000 francs annually.D
Despite their high civic-mindedness, French rule was
unpopular; settlers disliked the increase in taxes
UDalton 1855, op. cit., p. 238.
DGoslinga 1985, op. cit., p. 437.
66
considered necessary to underwrite all of Kersaint's
projects. As a result, many were thankful when the colonies
were restored to the Dutch at the Treaty of Versailles in
1783.~
In the aftermath of the geopolitical chess games of
the early 1780s, it was generally accepted that Demerara was
the most advanced of the three colonies. The Dutch sought
to consolidate Demerara and Essequibo with the transfer of
the seat of government for both colonies to Demerara.
Longchamps, now renamed Stabroek, was chosen to be the
capital. The move appears to have been a good one, because
by the end of the decade, exports of coffee, cotton, and
sugar were all in ascendancy.~
The DWIC, besieged with problems, did not share in the
colony's good fortune. It was an anachronism; its
organization and methods were more suited to the days of
raiding and plundering. Constrained by a restricted
monopolistic corporate culture and unable to attract good
personnel to its colonies, the company wound up its affairs
in 1792 and passed control of Demerara and Essequibo to the
Dutch government. 26 The downfall of the company provided a
fillip to the plantation economy of Demerara and Essequibo.
Investor confidence was bolstered and the restrictions on
MDalton 1855, Ope cit., p. 239.
~Rodway 1893, Ope cit., vol. II, p. 57.
Mlbid., p. 60.
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the importation of African slaves revoked. Settlers were
now allowed to trade with neutral vessels, and in 1795 this
trade was extended to include commodities which were once
confined solely to the Dutch markets. Trade with the
Americas was the biggest gainer in the new alignment.
Cotton exports increased from 1,000,000 in 1793 to 3,000,000
pounds in 1794, and sugar from 3,000,000 pounds to an
impressive 10,000,000 pounds. Coffee, however, registered a
slight decline, falling from 5,000,000 million pounds in
1793 to 4,000,000 pounds in 1794. Berbice's exports in 1794
were also striking, with sugar totalling 1,000,000 pounds,
cotton 190,000 pounds, and coffee 2,000,000 pounds. 27
Hostilities broke out between the Dutch and English in
1796, and the colonies once again fell into the hands of the
British. 28 The capitulation was made on generous terms,
with the inhabitants being guaranteed "their ancient laws
and usages." 29 The transition to British rule failed to
hinder the economic expansion engendered over the previous
twenty years. Indeed, development was intensified as
additional British capital found its way to Guyana.~ The
27Thompson 1987, op. cit., p. 63.
28Rodway, J. and J. Stark. 1895. Stark's Guide-Book and
History of British Guiana. Boston: Stark Publisher, p. 20.
29Dalton 1855, op. cit., p. 243-244.
30Schomburgk, Robert. 1840. A Description of British
Guiana, Geographical and statistical: Exhibiting its Resources
and Capabilities, Together with the Present and Future
Condition and Prospects of the Colony. London: Simkin,
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newly available capital meant that a much larger area of
land could be empoldered. Many Dutch landowners sold out to
the British and left. Guyana was being drawn tighter into a
world system dominated by British interests and markets.
Although sugar, coffee, and cotton all showed signs of
export-increases, it was cotton that benefitted the most in
the early years of British rule. There is some speculation
that it was the cotton lobby in Great Britain which
pressured the British government to retake Guyana so that
mills in the north of England would be assured of a supply
of cotton. 31 The spinoff of the trade was the growth of
many industrial towns in Britain. Bristol, Liverpool,
Manchester, and Glasgow all profited from the increased
activity; and many other ports, including London, served as
important distribution centers.
High prices for sugar at the turn of the nineteenth
century increased sugar production on a world scale. Cuba
entered the market as a major exporter, and the sugar-beet
industry in Europe had just begun to take off on a large
scale. The resulting overproduction on the world market
soon sent prices into a downward spiral. 32 In Guyana the
cry of "ruin" echoed around the plantations of the once-
prosperous industry. However, the·overall effect on the
Marshall. Reprinted, London: Frank Cass, 1970, p. 61.
31Dalton 1855, Ope cit., p. 243.
32Daly 1975, Ope cit., p. 54.
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Guyanese economy was not entirely disastrous. The success
of Guyanese cotton and coffee in the British marJcet served
to dampen the overall effects of a potential depression.
The event did, however, shine a light on future dependency
relations and the likely consequences of relying on a narrow
range of exports.
with the transfer of political control, dependence on
Holland was quickly replaced by a dependence on Britain.
This shift can be illustrated by the number of British ships
plying Guyanese waters during the latter part of the
eighteenth century. In 1797, 197 ships visited Essequibo-
Demerara, with the figure rising to 285 in 1800. D
Meanwhile, Berbice witnessed the arrival of 32 British ships
in 1797 and 94 in 1798.~ The considerably lower number of
ships trading with Berbice was a reflection of the colony's
decline relative to that of Essequibo-Demerara. Another
possible reason for the dearth of ships may have been
related to the shallowness of the river. Larger ships had
severe difficulties navigating the sandbars associated with
the Berbice and Essequibo Rivers. The Demerara had thus
developed as a transhipment point catering to ships from the
other two rivers. Van Batenburg, the Governor of Berbice,
saw the danger of the practice to -his colony, believing that
DThompson 1987, op. cit., p. 64.
~Ibid.
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the spillover trade to Demerara would eventually be very
detrimental to Berbice."
Between 1799 and 1801 exports to Great Britain
witnessed a threefold increase. For plantation owners, the
links to Great Britain were proving to be quite profitable.
However, on March 25, 1802, political developments in Europe
sent shock waves throughout the plantation community in
Guyana. The signing of the Treaty of Amiens restored
Essequibo, Demerara, and Berbice to the Dutch. 36 The new
Dutch authorities at once ordered the British planters to
give up their properties and vacate the country.37 Land
values which had been appreciating during the six years of
British rule began a rapid decline. Dutch creditors who had
extended loans to planters during the previous Dutch
administration flocked to Guyana demanding compensation now
that the country was once again flying the Dutch flag. The
British, in 1796, had forced planters to sever their
connections with Dutch mercantile houses. Many had
therefore turned to British financial houses in Bristol,
Liverpool, Manchester, and London to garner the resources
required to establish plantations in Guyana. In
desperation, the planters and their lobby in Great Britain
"Ibid., p. 66.
~Webber, A.R.F. 1931. A centenary History and Handbook of
British Guiana. Georgetown: Argosy, p. 122.
DDalton 1855, Ope cit., p. 259.
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waged a campaign for the restoration of British rule. Their
appeals quickly bore fruit, and on September 19, 1803, a
naval squadron led by Commodore Hood and General Grinfield
captured Demerara and Essequibo for the British.~ Five
days later Berbice also was forced to surrender. Once again
the terms of capitulation were extremely generous.
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Nicholson was appointed acting
Governor of the united Colony of Demerara and Essequibo, and
of Berbice. In the language of world systems analysis, the
call for British intervention was simply an attempt to
control the vagaries of the sugar market by encouraging
capitalist penetration and the peripheralization of Guyana.
The Dutch officially ceded to the British all
territorial claims to the colonies in 1814. D The final
passing of the colonies into British hands guaranteed a
large measure of political security to the British planter
class in the colony. Their economic security had been
fostered earlier in 1812 by a moratorium on Dutch
creditors. 4o The future appeared to be bright in spite of
the abolition of the slave trade in 1807.
The union of Berbice, and Demerara and Essequibo
finally took place in 1831. The merger into the single
38Ibid., p. 26.
39Clementi, Sir Cecil. 1937. A Constitutional History of
British Guiana. London: Macmillan, p. 30.
40Ibid., p. 50.
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colony of British Guiana had been long in coming. On the
grounds of economy, the British had long felt that Berbice
did not warrant a separate governor and its own retinue of
civil servants. Proprietors of the plantations now began to
leave Guyana, preferring to return to Britain to flaunt
their newly acquired wealth. 4\ Social status and acceptance
in the metropolis were being eagerly sought to complement
the planters' newfound affluence. Some sought entry into
the landed gentry class, whilst others, who perhaps were
more socially advanced, used their wealth to buy titles back
home. Unlike the British, the Dutch planter regarded Guyana
as his home. Plantations were individually owned and
administered - the planter solely in charge of all
plantation matters including planting, harvesting, shipping,
marketing, and finance. Some of the early British planters
were also of the Dutch mold, but as the sugar industry began
to assume greater importance a new class of owners became
prevalent. These absentee owners were much wealthier than
their predecessors; they resided in England, while the
affairs of their estates were turned over to attorneys who
managed the properties for a percentage, usually between
five and ten percent of the estates' net profits. In 1817
roughly one-half of all the estates in the country were in
41Dalton 1855, Ope cit., p. 319.
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the hands of attorneys.42 Attorneys for the most part
resided in Georgetown and were often members of the most
influential commercial houses in the city,43 a fact which
exemplifies the close association between the plantocracy
and the merchant class in nineteenth-century Guyana.
Ensconced in their homeland, the absentees frittered
away the surpluses derived in Guyana. Very little money
made its way back to the colony. Since proprietors did not
reside in Guyana, they had little interest in the
development of the colony. As long as profits could be made
quickly and without hindrance, little thought was given to
internal development. Guyana was but an agricultural
periphery of the British, its population dependent on
approximately 200 proprietors who owned all the land in
CUltivation, of whom only about 75 were domiciled in the
country.44
Surpluses were siphoned out of Guyana on such a scale
that there was no requirement for financial facilities in
the colony. During Dutch rule a bank was established in
Amsterdam to advance money to proprietors in the country.45
42Ragatz, L. 1928. The Fall of the Planter Class in the
British Caribbean, 1763-1833. London: Oxford University Press,
p.303.
4311Landownerll 1853 . British Guiana; Demerara after Fifteen
Years of Freedom. London, p. 36
44Dalton 1855, op. cit., p. 357.
~Webber 1931, op. cit., p. 69.
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This meant that all financial transactions took place
abroad, with capital formation strictly the preserve of the
metropole. The first domestic bank did not open its doors
until February 16, 1837, when the British Guiana Bank
commenced business. 46
INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE
Attention now turns to the country's industrial
structure. Agriculture constituted the main productive base
of the economy, and this section follows the development of
the three most important crops - sugar, coffee, and cotton -
in light of their influence on settlement configurations.
In 1621, Kijkoveral became the administrative center
of the Dutch colony. Some small-scale cultivation of
vegetables47 was undertaken at Cartabo Point, a short
distance from Kijkoveral; but since the DWIC was chiefly
concerned with trade and not colonization, scant attention
was paid to agriculture. Crops were planted only as a
supplement to the food supply for those in employ at the
fort.
Increasingly, however, the Dutch found agriculture to
be a rewarding activity. Tobacco proved to be a profitable
cash crop, and the first Guyanese plantations were devoted
to this commodity. It was only later that sugar cane was
46Ibid., p. 186.
fiRodway 1891, op. cit., vol. I, p. 4.
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introduced as a cash crop to satiate the growing European
demand for sugar. 48 For instance, whilst Essequibo was able
to send 28,000 pounds of tobacco to Holland as early as 1623
it was not until 1636 that sugar cane cultivation commenced
in the vicinity of Kijkoveral. fi The Dutch introduced the
Arab type of sugar cane to Guyana, and by 1637 they had sent
two kegs of syrup to Holland to be reduced into sugar. 50
In 1656 the DWIC published prospectuses which
presented exaggerated accounts of the wealth that could be
achieved by cultivating sugar cane in Guyana. To sweeten
its inducement, the company offered potential Dutch
colonists grants of land and the opportunity to purchase
slaves on favorable terms. 51 Settlers streamed into the
colony; many were Dutch and Portuguese Jews from Brazil who
sought religious freedom under Dutch rule.~ They brought
with them a technical proficiency in sugar, which greatly
assisted the development of the industry in Guyana. Most of
the Brazilian colonists brought their slaves with them and
48Rodway, J. 1912. Guiana: British, Dutch and French.
London: T. Fisher, Unwin, p. 230.
49Jeffrey, H. and C. Baber. 1986. Guyana: Politics,
Economics and Society: Beyond the Burnham Era. Boulder, Colo.:
L. Rienner, p. 10.
50Shahabuddeen, M. 1983. From Plantocracy to
Nationalization: A Profile of Sugar in Guyana. Georgetown:
University of Guyana, p. 11.
51Rodway and Watt 1888, op. cit., p. 136.
~Daly 1975, op. cit., p. 43.
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settled on the Pomeroon River, in Essequibo, where they
began the first large-scale cultivation of sugar cane in the
country.53 A number of plantations were also established
adjacent to Kijkoveral and on the west bank of the Essequibo
River.~ Rapidly sugar cane began replacing tobacco as the
main crop cultivated in the country. However, Essequibo and
Berbice remained overwhelmingly trading posts, reflecting
the colonizers' desire for quick profits.
The first sugar mill was introduced into Guyana during
1664." Established in Essequibo at Plantation
Brouwersboek, in the vicinity of Kijkoveral, the mill was
driven by horses; the horse-driven method greatly
outperformed the previous manual method of crushing canes
with two rollers. The advances in the industry soon caught
the attention of the governor of the neighboring British
colony of surinam, who in 1665 declared Guyana to be the
greatest Dutch colony in all of the Americas. 56 And by 1670
the Essequibo colony could boast three company plantations
with approximately fifty-eight slaves on them. Berbice too
53Ibid., p. 48.
~Netscher, P. 1888. History of the Colonies, Esseguibo,
Demerara and Berbice. Tr. W.E. Roth. Reprinted, Georgetown:
Daily Chronicle, 1929, p. 34.
"Bronkhurst, H.V.P. 1890. A Descriptive and Historical
Geography of British Guiana and West India Islands. London, p.
54.
56Clementi 1937, op. cit., p. 17.
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was improving, and in 1672 five sugar estates were in
cultivation in the colony.~
In 1720 five sugar mills were already operating in
Essequibo,58 whilst Berbice began to layout its first
coffee plantations in 1721.~ Essequibo's a~d Demerara's
economic success largely rested upon "King Sugar."
Gravesande in 1750 proclaimed that it was virtually the only
crop of any import. w No doubt sugar's high price during
the Seven-year War (1756-63) in Europe provided some impetus
towards its cultivation. The coastal fringes, however, were
considered too saline for sugar cane, whilst cotton proved
to be ideally suited to the conditions. 61 Sugar's
domination of the plantation economy was thus postponed and
some measure of diversification assured, albeit only
temporarily.
Much of the increase in agricultural development has
been attributed to the influx of English planters from
Antigua, Barbados, and other West Indian islands where soils
were overworked and exhausted. Q Gravesande observed in
57Van Berkel, A. 1941. Adrian van Berkel's Travels in
South America Between the Berbice and Esseouibo Rivers and in
surinam, 1670-1689. Georgetown: Daily Chronicle, p. 95.
58Netscher 1888, Ope cit., p. 46.
59Webber 1931, Ope cit., p. 28.
WDaly 1975, Ope cit., p. 77.
61Dalton 1855, Ope cit., p. 224.
~Netscher 1888, Ope cit., p. 53.
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1760 that the English were in a majority in Demerara,~ but
according to GoslingaM only one-third of the plantations
I
were owned by citizens of the United Kingdom. It is
I
possible that some of the English immi~rants may have acted
I
as attorneys or managers for Dutch-own~d plantations.~
Agricultural production in DE~merClra continued to
I
improve. 66 Nevertheless, with a grE~ater quantity of land
I
under cUltivation, Essequibo's production continued to
,
outperform that of its rival.~ Ber~ice Isimilarly had
witnessed increased production,~ b~t the colony's progress
I
was hampered by the short-sighted policies of its directors.
,
,
The slave uprising of 1763 W2lS anlother blow which
I
befell Berbice.~ It took an additionaL six years before
the colony was able to reach the production figures it had
achieved in 1749. Berbice failed to recover from the
63Harris, C. and J. Villie!rs.' 1911. storm van's
Gravesande: The Rise of British I Guiana. London: Hakluyt
Society, p. 68.
MGoslinga 1985, op. cit., p. 447.
~smith, R.T. 1962. British Guiana.; London: Oxford Univ.
Press, p. 16.
66Rodway 1891, op. cit., vol. I, p.1 230.
67Ibid., p. 139.
~Thompson 1987, op. cit., p. 41.
69Rodway (1892:174) is "unsure! of, the causes"; Webber
(1931: 59) attributes the uprising ,to t!he "cruelties of the
planters"; whilst Daly (1975:143)suggests that the major
causes were a shortage of provisions, cruel treatment,
injustice, and an indomitable spiri~ ofl freedom.
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catastrophe, forever assuming the role of a poor cousin to
Demerara.
Plantation cultivation was devoted mainly to coffee
and sugar in Essequibo and Demerara. In Berbice, on the
other hand, cultivation was almost exclusively restricted to
coffee and cotton. w
Cotton production increased from 1,079,325 pounds in
1793 to 3,054,757 in 1794, and sugar from 3,187,000 pounds
to an impressive 10,063,829 pounds (Table I). Coffee,
however, registered a slight decrease, falling from
5,388,030 pounds in 1793 to 4,475,605 pounds in 1794.
Berbice's production in 1794 were equally impressive, with
sugar amounting to 1,116,800 pounds, cotton 194,889 pounds,
and coffee 2,762,264 pounds. 71
TABLE I
COMPARATIVE PRODUCTION OF SUGAR, COF~F.E AND COTTON,
ESSEQUIBO AND DEMERARA 1793-1798
Year Sugar (lbs) Coffee (lbs) Cotton (lbs)
1793 3,187,000 5,388,030 1,079,325
1794 10,063,829 4,475,605 3,054,757
1798 6,427,162 6,730,210 3,158,886
Source: Thompson 1987, p. 63.
Although the export-import sphere constituted the
primary focus of the plantation economy in Guyana, this
7OWilliams, J. F. 1950. " The Development of the Cane Sugar
Industry in British Guiana." Timheri 29, p. 124.
71 h 'tTompson 1987, Ope Cl ., p. 63.
80
domain was complemented by a subsistence sector. This
sector did not become firmly entrenched in Guyana until the
American War of Independence, when sizeable supplies of
consumption goods were cut off from the Guyanese market.
This led to the emergence of subsistence production and
marketing, which contained the impetus for the sUbsequent
growth of a free peasantry, potentially antithetical to the
dominant plantation mode.
The peasant marketing system was dominated by free
persons of color and slaves who also participated. These
people operated through a system of local "huckster"
markets, which supplied the plantations and free citizens
with a variety of foodstuffs. Hucksters were commercial
intermediaries, often women, who travelled about the
countryside buying produce from small farmers for resale at
the nearest market or collection point. Despite the
acknowledged importance of this sector, production for the
home market accounted for only a fraction of the total
agricultural output. There was still an overwhelming
dependence upon imported consumption goods. The success of
subsistence production and marketing as a source of
independent income for the enslaved and freed population
generated considerable anxiety among the planters. As a
result, they promulgated a series of laws which proscribed
the economic activities of the enslaved population. For
example, in 1793 the Court of Policy prohibited slaves from
81
selling a wide range of commodities, whilst their masters'
written permission was required for the sale of other goods.
The Guyanese coast appeared to be an idyllic location
for the cultivation of the salt-tolerant sea-island type of
cotton. Cotton cultivation on the coast immediately took
root, for in 1796 Dr. Pinckard observed:
The estates now in cultivation upon the sea-
coast, from the Demerara river to the boundary
of the colony of Berbische, are one hundred and
sixteen; all producing cotton except the "Kitty"
...which has been recently planted with sugar .••
It is scarcely necessary to remark that coffee,
cotton, and sugar are the great, and almost only
commercial productions of the colony.72
Cotton plantations were also established along the
banks of the Mahaica and Mahaicony Creeks. 73 Coffee estates
were to be found on both banks of the Demerara river,
including those on which present-day Georgetown is located,
along the banks of Canals Nos. 1, 2, and 3, and on
Demerara's west coast. 74 As the eighteenth century drew to
a close, Guyana was said to be the world's "greatest cotton
producer and the greatest coffee grower in the British
empire. ,,75 Sugar's hegemony was broken, and cotton
temporarily surpassed it as the principal staple from
72pinckard 1942, op. cit., p. 330.
nDalton 1855, op. cit.~ p. 248.
~Rodway 1893, op. cit., vol. tI, p. 93.
75Adamson, A.H. 1972. Sugar without Slaves: The Political
Economy of British Guiana. New Haven: Yale University Press,
p. 25.
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Demerara and Essequibo. Whilst sugar's reversal of fortune
could be attributed to economic forces set in motion in the
core, it should be recalled that the planters generally
believed that the saline coastlands of Guyana were
unsuitable for the cultivation of sugar cane. By 1798,
sugar production in Demerara-Essequibo had declined to
6,427,162 pounds, whilst cotton and coffee production had
increased to 5,158,886 pounds and 6,730,210 pounds,
respectively. In the same year, Berbice experienced a mini
coffee boom with a production figure of 8,989,460 pounds.
Cotton also increased its market share by posting a record
production of 791,526 pounds. n
The nineteenth century opened with a general sense of
optimism in Guyana. Although sugar production had
experienced some setbacks, its decline in Guyana was a
relative rather than an absolute one. The general
prosperity in the country was evident, so much so that
Dalton referred to the period as a "Golden Age." A
combination of British capital and slave labor resulted in a
total of 490 estates stretching along the Guyanese littoral,
from the Pomeroon to the west bank of the Corentyne River. 77
There was a general increase in the major staples, and
production in 1801 were nearly triple those in 1799 (Table
II) .
76 h . tTompson 1987, Ope Cl ., p. 63.
77Pinckard 1942, Ope cit., pp. 184-185.
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TABLE II
COMPARATIVE PRODUCTION OF SUGAR, COFFE~ AND COTTON,
ESSEQUIBO, DEMERARA AND BERBICE 1797-1802
Year Sugar (lbs) Coffee (lbs) Cotton nbs}
1797 4,320,155 12,001,063 2,907,798
1799 3,717,216 4,378,030 3,593,053
1801 10,643,504 15,995,760 7,662,942
1802 17,520,000 11,539,497 7,623,900
Sources: Rodway 1921, p. 294; Daly 1975, p. 102.
Agricultural production registered a slight hiccup
when the colonies were returned to the Dutch in 1802, but
with the link to Britain restored, following the British
invasion in 1803, Guyana's industrial structure was
relatively diversified. Sugar's hold on the economy had
been challenged by cotton and coffee, which were being
successfully cultivated along the fertile alluvial coast.
The prosperity derived from these three major export crops
indicated that the economy was robust. A change in the
industrial structure of the economy was set in motion by the
abolition of the slave trade in 1807. The results of
Parliament's fateful decision in London was not immediately
felt on the estates in Guyana. Naturally, the price of
slaves rose considerably, but the structure of the economy
initially remained intact. It was not until around 1810
that cracks in the economy became noticeable. Cotton and
coffee were the greatest losers in the new system. Cotton's
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decline was attributed mainly to competition from the
American cotton industry.78 American producers with their
greater efficiency and lower production costs flooded the
world markets. Guyanese planters failed to compete and
subsequently declined.
Coffee's pre-eminence in Guyana and the world market
was quashed by competition from Brazil and by the
"continental system," operated by the British, that
restricted Guyanese planters' access to the lucrative
American market. 79 The weakening of coffee and cotton
resulted in sugar becoming the dominant crop of the
plantation economy. Some of the abandoned estates were
converted into sugar estates, and a few were turned into
cattle farms. w The coastal transition to sugar was made
possible because of the decrease in the salt content of the
soils, a situation brought about by European agricultural
practices which had rendered the soil open to rain, thereby
allowing the salt to leach away. Between the years 1809 and
1824 a total of 111 cotton plantations were abandoned, 14 of
which, were sUbsequently converted into sugar. Twenty-one
coffee estates went out of business, and five of these were
replaced by sugar. 81
nDalton 1855, Ope cit., p. 327.
nAdamson 1972, Ope cit., p. 25.
WDalton 1855, Ope cit., p. 329.
K1Rodway 1893, Ope cit., vol. II, p. 270.
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The production data also illustrates the three export
staples' reversal of fortunes (Table III). In 1810,
Demerara and Essequibo produced 9.2 million pounds of sugar,
19.2 million pounds of coffee and 5.8 million pounds of
cotton; in 1814, sugar increased to 31.3 million pounds,
whilst coffee output fell to 8.3 million pounds and cotton
rose to 6 million pounds. By 1824, coffee production
dropped to 4.7 million pounds and cotton to 1.9 million
pounds; conversely, sugar continued its recovery and
production now stood at 34.9 million pounds.
TABLE III
COMPARATIVE PRODUCTION OF SUGAR, COFFEE AND COTTON,
ESSEQUIBO AND DEMERARA 1810-1824
(MILLIONS OF POUNDS (LBS))
Year Sugar Coffee Cotton
1810 9.2 19.2 5.8
1814 31.3 8.3 6.0
1824 34.9 4.7 1.9
Sources: Rodway 1893 (Vol II), p. 214;
Webber 1931, p. 141. .
A tremendously important factor in the rapid
development of the sugar industry was the technological
innovation taking place in nineteenth-century Guyana. The
first sugar mills in the country were powered by cattle and
water, but migration to the coast resulted in a reliance on
the wind. In time, every sugar estate had at least one
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windmill.~ However, planters quickly discovered that
although sea breezes were adequate for the most part,
oftentimes at critical points in the manufacturing process
there would be insufficient wind to power the mills. Thus,
the introduction of the first steam engines in 1805, to
power the mills on plantations Belle Vue and Hague, was a
major event in the history of the sugar industry in
Guyana. 83 steam power became the major motive force, and by
1829 the horizon was reported to be dotted with chimney
stacks. 84
Guyana's international competitiveness in sugar was
alsu aided by its late arrival as a major West Indian
producer. Consequently, planters were able to adopt new
technological innovations much more quickly than their
Caribbean counterparts. Guyana also benefitted from
specific geographical factors which made it possible to
cultivate and harvest two sugar crops annually. As a
result,1 machinery and capital equipment could be used more
I
intenseQ~, and for longer periods of the year, than
I
elsewheit"e. 85
D~sPite all the forecasts of doom and destruction that
would follow emancipation, the transition was noticeable for
82Dalton 1855, op. cit. , p. 229.
83Rodway 1893, op. cit. , vol. II, p. 282.
84Shahabuddeen 1983, op. cit. , p. 28.
85Shahabuddeen 1983, op. cit. , p. 26.
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its relative calm. Apprenticeship, from the planter's
circumscribed economic viewpoint, could be declared
something of a triumph for King Sugar. Sugar production
actually increased for the period 1834-38; coffee also
witnessed a slight increase, though cotton declined
appreciably (Table IV).
TABLE IV
COMPARATIVE PRODUCTION OF SUGAR, COFFEE AND COTTON,
GUYANA 1833 - 1838
(MILLIONS OF POUNDS (LBS))
Year Sugar Coffee Cot.ton
1833 99.1 4.5 0.9
1834 81.1 3.0 0.9
1835 107.6 3.1 0.8
1836 107.8 5.9 0.6
1837 99.8 4.1 0.8
1838 88.7 3.1 0.6
Source: Blue Books 1833-38.
Obviously, apprenticeship failed to hinder the growth
of the plantation economy. Planters were able to weather
the storm by successfully adapting to the new system. Aided
by a guaranteed supply of labor, they responded further by
utilizing improved technologies in field and factory
methods, and by the consolidation of small estates into
larger production units. Nevertheless, progressive
production increases were brought to a halt by full
emancipation in 1838. By this time sugar and its associated
products, rum and molasses, had already come to dominate
Guyana's industrial structure.
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Labor Supply
An important dynamic of the industrial structure has
been the labor supply. Through the movement of labor,
plantation agriculture has profoundly affected the country's
urban history. This sub-section focuses on the supply of
African slave labor, which the plantation system
necessitated.
As cultivation began to spread in the seventeenth
century, the necessity for an adequate supply of labor
became acute. The system of large-scale sugar cane
production as introduced by the Dutch required a large,
cheap, labor force. Initially the Dutch attempted to
enslave the local Amerindian population, but these efforts
were unsuccessful. Since they were well acquainted with the
environment, it was not difficult for the Amerindians to
escape into the interior;86 furthermore, once captured, many
succumbed to European diseases or resorted to suicide.
Resistance of Amerindians in Guyana as elsewhere in the
Caribbean took many forms, including the resettlement of
rebel (maroon) communities. Furthermore, European settled
laborers were difficult to attract. To fill the void, the
DWIC, with its monopoly of the African slave trade, cast its
attention to the African continent.
uJeffrey and Baber 1986, op.cit., p. 10.
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Caribbean plantation society was based on a slave mode
of production. This meant that production was organized by
a class of property owners who owned not only the land and
other means of production but slaves as well. Slavery was
to become the linchpin of the economy. It was an economic
response by the Europeans to solve the labor problem of
plantation agriculture. Incorporated into the modern world
system, Guyana and other Caribbean colonies became a theater
where European capital and technology combined with African
slave labor and Amerindian lands to produce a new form of
economy based on the large-scale production of a staple
commodity - sugar.
Beginning in the late seventeenth century and
persisting with slight alterations into the early nineteenth
century, the Guyanese economy was part of a state-sponsored
and -controlled world economic system. In this Atlantic
system, goods were carried from Europe to West Africa, there
to be exchanged for slaves, who were in turn taken to the
Caribbean as laborers. Europe was also the source of a
variety of manufactured goods and food sold to Guyana.
The large-scale importation of African slaves,
commencing in the 1660s, resulted in favorable profits being
made in the country. The planter now had at his disposal
the necessary labor to respond to all of the critical
periods of the planting and harvesting seasons. For the
next one hundred and seventy years Guyana was a slave
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plantation society, specializing in the export of tropical
staples to Europe and North America.
The colony's economic growth was held in check for
much of the period by a severe shortage of slaves. The
labor power of African slaves was an essential component in
early sugar plantation agriculture, and their scarcity was
especially debilitating to the fledgling economy. The DWIC,
with its monopoly on the slave trade, was unable to supply
the requisite numbers of slaves on the plantations. Many
planters, with tacit approval from governors such as
Gravesande, resorted to smuggling slaves from the
neighboring colonies.~
Integration into the embryonic world capitalist system
had failed until emancipation to change the pre-capitalist
outlook of the planters. Hitherto, productivity and
efficiency had been met by the acquisition of more labor and
more land. Investments in technological innovation were
being retarded under a slave mode of production that gave
little incentive for improvements in factory production.
The planter class initially failed to grasp that sugar
production is a manufacturing as well as an agricultural
process. Once sugar cane is harvested, the juice must be
extracted immediately and processed into sugar. But with
the increasing cost of labor and the constraint on the labor
supply after 1807, industry-wide technological developments
~Netscher 1888, op. cit., p. 60.
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became more pronounced. In 1814, triple-effect evaporating
machines used for distilling cane juice began to replace
inefficient fire-heated tayches. 88 A more important
innovation was the introduction of the vacuum pan in 1830. 89
Guyana was the first British colony to adopt the vacuum pan.
It permitted the extraction of more sugar per unit of juice
and also provided a superior quality of sugar. Through this
innovation, the now world-famous yellow Demerara crystals
were produced.
By the 1830s the inadequacies of slave~y as a mode of
production had become self-evident across the Caribbean.
Since the abolition of the slave trade, production costs had
grown appreciably. Planters were now compelled to be
concerned with the reproduction of iabor power to maintain
their labor force.
Attention to reproduction involved increases in the
level of subsistence and a reSUlting decline in the rate of
exploitation. Furthermore, coercion and costs of
supervision were relatively high and served to cut deeper
into profits. The system was inherently unstable; however,
not every planter immediately recognized the benefits of a
free labor market in which laborers would compete for jobs
and be responsible for their own subsistence. In Guyana,
the plantocracy feared that once slaves were emancipated
88Williams 1950, Ope cit., p. 11
6Webber 1931, Ope cit., p. 158.
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they would leave the estates en masse and regress into a
life of idleness and barbarity in the interior. They were
convinced that former African slaves would work only under
the whip. To be separated from the estates therefore would
not only be economically disastrous for planters, but they
argued in the racist dialogue of the day that it would also
isolate Africans90 from the "civilizing influences" of
industry.
The institution of slavery officially came to an end
in Guyana on August 1, 1834. Ex-slaves, however, were
compelled to serve a period of "apprenticeship" before they
were finally allowed to savor complete freedom. Field
workers (praedials) were required to work for six years; and
house and factory hands (non-praedials), whose hours of work
were longer, were commanded to serve for four years.
Compensation awarded to Guyanese planters totalled a little
over 4,000,000 pounds sterling for the colony's 84,915
slaves or nearly 51 pounds per slave, less than one-half the
price at which slaves were being sold in the 1820s. 91
Immigration
Hoping to ameliorate the labor situation, the planters
immediately sought to save their industry and to redress the
90That is, the descendants of slaves who were brought from
Africa to labor on the plantations.
91Great Britain. Colonial Office. 1949. Report of a
commission of Inquiry into the Sugar Industry of British
Guiana. London: H.M.S.O., p. 14.
93
imbalance in the country's black/white population
composition by importing indentured laborers from Europe.
During the apprenticeship period (1834-38), sporadic
attempts were made at introducing immigrants from various
corners of the globe, but these proved to be most disastrous
(Table V). The majority died on their arrival in the
country, and the remainder were forced to return to their
countries of origin.~
. In 1835, a concentrated effort was made to introduce
Portuguese immigrants from Madeira, and although the 429
indentures who carne were not a success, this source was to
become all important supplier of labor at a later date."
The general failure of European immigration led
planters to scour the, nearby West Indian islands. Between
1835 and 1838,' 5,926 indentured laborers were brought to
Guyana, of which some 5,000 came from the West Indian
islands of Antigua, Barbados, st. Kitts, Montserrat, and
Nevis. The islands, however, could not meet the numbers
demanded by the Guyanese planters, who were also meeting
stiff opposition from island planters who were none too
pleased to see their labor supplies decimated by their
southern counterparts. Determined to secure an indentured,
and the~efore malleable, labor force, the Guyanese
plantocracy cast its eyes towards the east and to India.
~Dalton 1855, op. cit., p. 448.
"Webber 1931, op. cit., p. 177.
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TABLE V
GUYANESE IMMIGRATION 1835-1838
Year West Indies Madeira India Africa Total
1835 157 429 586
1836 1,427 1,427
1837 2,150 2,150
1838 1,266 396 91 1,753
Total 5,000 429 396 91 5,916
Source: Webber 1931, p. XVIi Nath 1970, p. 219.
DEMOGRAPHY
Because there was little significant rural-urban
migration during the period prior to emancipation, this
section chiefly highlights the effects of fertility and
mortality on Guyana's demographic composition. It provides
population estimates for the fledgling urban settlements
(Kijkoveral, Ft. Nassau, Stabroek/Georgetown, and New
Amsterdam), and it assesses the repercussions of the
abolition of the slave trade and slavery on the urban
hierarchy.
Population estimates are extremely difficult to
ascertain during the early colonial period. One
conservative estimate places the Amerindian population in
the 1660s at about 50,000 and the slave population at
2,500.~ The European population was generally believed to
be less than 100. Even amongst Caribbean slave societies,
~Webber 1931, op. cit., p. 16.
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such ratios (non-European/European) were unusually high. 95
The population of Guyana during the slave plantation era was
overwhelmingly rural. Settlements were little more than
transshipment points oriented towards the metropole; and
because of the tenuous nature of Dutch activity and the
general lack of interest in the country, both Kijkoveral and
Ft. Nassau were very small settlements.
Population increase in the settlements was remarkably
slow. In the early 1680s, Kijkoveral is reported to have
had forty soldiers and twelve slaves stationed there,
besides the commander, the secretary, the clerk, and the
predicant and his wife. Eleven years later, Commander
Beekman reported to the Directors of the DWIC that at
Kijkoveral and on the company's three plantations in
Essequibo there were forty-eight Europeans, including
soldiers, fourteen colored96 persons, and two hundred and
twenty-three slaves.~
The liberalization of settlement requirements
stimulated an upsurge in Essequibo's population during the
1700s, and this increase was reinforced by the opening of
the Demerara region in 1746. The Berbice colony also
experienced a mini boom, and in 1762 the official population
~More typically 13:1.
%For the most part descendants of African slaves and
white settlers.
97Rodway 1891, Ope cit., pp. 43-48.
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estimate returned a total of 4,423 persons, excluding free
Amerindians. According to the count there were 346
Europeans, 244 Amerindian slaves, and 3,833 African slaves
constituting the bulk of the population. As would be
expected, most of the colony's inhabitants resided on the
plantations. Ft. Nassau and the adjacent settlement of New
Amsterdam accounted for only 150 African slaves, 10
Amerindian slaves, 30 European officials, and a handful of
soldiers.% However, in the following year Berbice was the
scene of a great slave rebellion that brought over thirty
years of planter prosperity to a shattering end. The
uprising began at Plantation Magdalenburg on the Canje
Creek; and when it was over a year later, the colony had
been reduced to a shambles. The bureaucracy was completely
destroyed, and many of the officials either were dead or had
departed. The official returns for 1764 showed that the
total population had declined by almost one-quarter to 3,486
persons. The slave population suffered the greatest losses,
but the Europeans witnessed a more severe proportional
decline in numbers; of the 346 whites in 1762, only 116
remained.~
Stabroek, the capital of Essequibo and Demerara, in
1784 contained 88 houses and a total population of 780
inhabitants. Of these, there were 466 Africans - comprising
Rlbid., pp. 172-173.
~Clementi 1937, Ope cit., p. 75.
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the bulk of the population - 238 Europeans, and 76 persons
of mixed ancestry.IOO The return of slaves for Berbice, for
the year 1790 was only 5,862, a little over the pre-1763
level, but the numbers increased to 6,709 by 1792 and to
8,232 in 1795. In the latter year the entire population of
Berbice was estimated at 10,000 persons, whilst the total
for Essequibo and Demerara was put at 60,000. 101
Direct growth of the capitals of Essequibo/Demerara
and Berbice was due almost exclusively to immigration (as
opposed to internal migration or natural increase); this in
turn was an indirect response to the importance of Stabroek
and New Amsterdam as places of security as well as
administrative, commercial, and social centers. However,
some inter-urban migration did occur as a result of the
shift of the capitals from Ft. Nassau to New Amsterdam, and
from Borsselen Island to Stabroek.
Fertility in the towns and in the countryside remained
low and mortality high. contemporary accounts clearly
indicate that arduous living conditions killed many whites
who came, encouraged some to leave, and discouraged other
who might have come. Malaria, smallpox, yellow fever,
dysentery, and other tropical diseases were common causes of
IOOSancho, T.A. 1966. Highlights of Guyanese History.
Georgetown, p. 15.
IOIClementi 1937, Ope cit., p. 78.
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illness and death. For example, in 1792, smallpox was
reported as "prevalent" in the colonies. lOO
Those who survived illness often found it difficult or
impossible to adapt to insects and the tropical climate.
Although Africans were more accustomed to life in the
tropics, the rigorous working conditions exacerbated the
effects of the diseases peculiar to Guyana. The toll was
tremendous. Some estimates claim that roughly one-twelfth
of the plantation labor force was continuously
incapacitated. 103 Such was the mortality that the life
expectancy of newly-arrived slaves was estimated at only
22.8 years .Il»
The natural decrease that typified the demography of
Guyanese slaves can be attributed to a high level of
mortality and a low level of fertility. Much of the
mortality took place during the period of "seasoning" (one
to three years) of newly imported slaves. In addition to
those who died during passage, many who landed already
suffered from one disease or another. Furthermore, slaves
were immediately sUbjected to an extremely difficult life
under alien conditions. Mistreatment came not only from
IOORodway 1893, Ope cit., vol. II, p. 59.
lillDaly 1975, Ope cit., p. 134.
Il»peek, P. and G. Standing. 1982. State Policies and
Migration. Studies in Latin America and the Caribbean. London:
Croom Helm, p. 256.
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white overseers, but sometimes from already-established
slaves.
Malnutrition was common in some periods of drought and
on certain plantations. Although slaves could and, indeed,
were expected to grow their own food, some plantations
supplied insufficient provision grounds for a very large
labor force. Planters did not particularly encourage their
slaves to reproduce, since they considered it more costly
(in food and in time that might be taken off work by a
pregnant or postpartum mother) to breed slaves than to
import them. Reproduction was also hampered by the
unbalanced sex ratios in the country. It was the custom for
slave ships to transport two-thirds men and only one-third
women. 105 Also, mortality among children under the age of
five was very high. Toward the end of the eighteenth
century, after the abolition movement had gathered steam and
especially after the slave trade ended in 1807, reproduction
was encouraged, with limited success at first. In any
event, the conditions of slave women seemed to have been
such that childbearing was difficult. Hard labor in the
fields, venereal disease, and a variety of illnesses and
mistreatment all had negative effects on fertility.IM
ImNetscher 1888, Ope cit., p~ 139. Much more recent work
on slavery and statistics confirms that African societies
increasingly favored exploiting female slave labor, preferring
to export males.
1MNath, D. 1970. A History of Indians in British Guiana.
London: The Author, pp. 2-3.
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Furthermore, some slave women, particularly creoles, were
believed by Europeans to be unwilling to bear children since
it made them unattractive to whites and therefore lost them
privileges that accrued to those who had sexual relations
with their masters. It is also likely that women controlled
reproduction as a form of resistance. ,
with the British occupation in 1796, the colonies
experienced an influx of population through the arrival of
British West Indian planters and their slaves from the
circum-Caribbean region. 1OO The colonies were returned
briefly to the Batavian Republic following the signing of
the Treaty of Amiens on March 25, 1807. Eleven years of
British rule resulted in a twofold increase in the slave
population in Berbice from 8,232 to 17,885. A similar
increase was noticeable in Demerara-Essequibo as slave
importations increased in volume.~ The abolition of the
slave trade in 1807 stemmed the flow, but slaves continued
to be imported in limited numbers under certain restrictions
and regulations. Given the disparity in the composition of
the sexes, the slave population in Berbice had increased to
25,169, a figure which, according to Rodway, was the highest
ever registered in the colony.1~ By 1812, five years after
IOORodway 1893, op. cit., vol. II, p. 152.
ImRodway 1893, op. cit., vol. I, p. 266.
Irnlbid., p. 273.
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the abolition of the slave trade, the Guyanese slave
population amounted to 100,000. 110
The population of Georgetownlll in October 1819 was
10,519, including, 1,683 Europeans, 2,756 coloreds, and
6,080 slaves. 1I2 A decade later the town's population
amounted to 12,604, viz., 1,620 Europeans, 4,368 coloreds,
and 6,616 slaves. 1I3 Whilst the increase in population was
negligible, most of the expansion occurred within the
colored population.
In 1831, Georgetown, with a population of 12,604
accounted for 12.5 percent of the country's total population
and over 78 percent of the urban population. Georgetown was
four-and-a-half times the size of New Amsterdam, the only
other urban center (Table VI).
TABLE VI
POPULATION DISTRIBUTION 1831
Guyana Georgetown N/Amsterdam Urban
1831 100,536 12,604 12.5 2,800 2.8 15,404 15.3
Sources: M.C.P 1832; B.B. 1832.
IIOWebber 1931, op. cit., p. 134.
IIIThe name given to Stabroek by the British in 1812.
112Dalton 1855, op. cit., p. 337.
113Schornburgk 1840, op. cit., p. 24.
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Following the abolition of slavery and the Act of
Apprenticeship on August 1, 1834, Dalton described the scene
in Georgetown thus:
The town was like a hive swarming with
inhabitants. From all parts of the country they
flocked to the metropolis, and that movement so
simple, so natural in itself, established a
principle which was injurious to the more remote
districts .114
For most, the move to Georget~wn was but a brief
sojourn. Although slavery had been abolished, each of the
former slaves was required to serve a period of
apprenticeship with his erstwhile employer. Many therefore
returned from the urban areas to the plantations.
The number of slaves for whom compensation was paid in
1834 totalled 84,915. This reflected a decline of 15,085
over the aforementioned 1812 population estimate. For the
next 100 years augmentation of the country's demographic
structure would be entirely dependent on immigration.
INFRASTRUCTURE AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
The following section of this chapter sketches the
development of the country's pre-emancipation capitals -
Georgetown and New Amsterdam in particular. It assesses the
responses of planters and merchants in the distribution of
infrastructural resources (roads, schools, hospitals, and
water supply) over space; and it demonstrates how the
114Dalton 1855, Ope cit., p. 397.
103
domination of merchants and professionals in the Combined
Court during the first quarter of the nineteenth century
spurred infrastructural activity in Georgetown. In
addition, this section discusses the role of the pass laws
and fire regulations in shaping urban areas during the
period under review.
Economic and politico-social considerations have
ultimately fashioned the settlement pattern in Guyana.
Settlements which existed prior to complete slave
emancipation in 1838 were created to serve the needs of a
plantation economy. Of course, the earliest settlements
were mainly those of the Amerindians, but these have not had
much influence on the present pattern since Amerindians were
compelled to survive the impact of European colonization by
retreating further into the interior of the country. During
the early Dutch period the emphasis was mostly on trade, and
settlements were nothing more than trading depots. The
first depot was built on the Pomeroon in 1580, but in 1596
the Dutch were driven out from the site by Spaniards and
Indians. 115
with the destruction of the Pomeroon settlement,
settlers were forced to move further into the interior, and
on an island at the confluence of the Essequibo~ Mazaruni,
and Cuyuni, they established Kijkoveral. A little later Ft.
115 b· dI 1., p. 128.
104
Nassau, fifty-five miles up the Berbice river, was chosen to
be the trading center of the Berbice colony.
Ft. Nassau was a rather small place in both area and
population. The site was protected by a rectangular
palisade ten feet high and by light artillery.1I6 within
the palisade a church, a brick building utilized as a
council house, and the governor's residence were erected. 1J7
In time a village developed in the vicinity of the fort. It
housed those who could find no room at the fort - lesser
company officials and officers, carpenters, coopers,
blacksmiths, etc. The village was given the name of New
Amsterdam, and in 1733 it had gradually grown to include
nearly thirty houses, a Lutheran church, and a clergyman's
house. liS To facilitate the increase in construction
activity, the OWIC built a brickery in 1722, and in 1734 it
opened the Land's Welfare Inn to provide accommodation for
new colonists. The inn also doubled as a coffeehouse and a
club. 119
Repeated sackings of the settlements by French and
English naval expeditions in 1664, 1689, and 1708 clearly
demonstrated that upriver locations were not immune from
European incursions. Private settlers began to agitate for
116Netscher 1888, op. cit., p .. 80.
1170alton 1855, op. cit., pp. 138-139.
IIsBronkhurst 1890, op. cit., p. 47.
119Netscher 1888, op. cit., p. 81.
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a new center of administration in the Essequibo colony. The
DWIC also recognized that Kijkoveral was much too inadequate
to accommodate the increasing number of company
functionaries. In 1716 the company granted permission to
build a colony house at Cartabo Point in the vicinity of
Kijkoveral. The structure was completed in 1718, and
Essequibo's administration was effected from there, whilst
Kijkoveral ostensibly became an exclusive military garrison.
The commander of the Essequibo colony was emboldened
to make the move to Cartabo Point as a result of events in
Europe. Most notably, trepidation of enemy attacks had
declined appreciably following the Treaty of Utrecht in
1713. Moreover, internally it was discovered that the soil
around Kijkoveral had been deteriorating and was nearly
exhausted. Rodway presents figures for the fall in sugar
cane output for a typical plantation at the time (Table
VII) .120
TABLE VII
DECLINE IN SUGAR-YIELDS ON INTERIOR LANDS
Yields Per Acre (Pounds)
1st crop
2nd crop
3rd crop
4th crop
5th crop
Source: Rodway 1891, p. 67.
3,000
2,000
1,500
1,000
800
120Rodway 1891, Ope cit., vol. I, p. 67.
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The decline in yields did not go unnoticed by the
DWIC, and in 1721 Commander Laurens de Heere laid out a new
company plantation at the mouth of the Bonaisca Creek. 121
The plantation was given the name "Pelgrim", and it was the
first significant plantation approaching the Guyanese
littoral.
The settlers remained uncomfortable with the new
arrangements. Migration to the coast was in its infancy,
and colonists were demanding greater downstream protection.
since the new colony house was still a good way upriver they
petitioned the states-General for a new downriver fort and
capital. The company relented, and in 1739 the seat of
government was transferred from Kijkoveral to Flag Island
near the mouth of the Essequibo River. situated near the
mouth of the Essequibo River, Flag Island, later renamed
Fort Island, presented the administration with some badly
needed space for the erection of buildings and the
cultivation of provision plots for company personnel. ln A
few years later, a fort, Zeelandia, was erected on the
island .123
The transfer of the seat of government from Cartabo
Point to Flag Island confirmed that commitment to coastal
development was inescapable. Furthermore, it was a shift
121Clementi 1937, op. cit., p. 27.
122 h . tTompson 1987, op. Cl ., p. 44.
123Great Britain. Colonial Office 1951, op. cit., p. 3.
107
which confirmed the virtual cessation of interior trade with
the Indians.
The private planters in Berbice also began to make
demands for a fort to be constructed at the mouth of the
Berbice River, and shortly after Zeelandia was built in
Essequibo, permission was received to erect Ft. st. Andries.
Unfortunately for Berbicians, the fort was of inferior
quality, barely affording the residents a minimum of
protection.
Settlement activity greatly accelerated after the
colony was thrown open to settlers. The pace became
frenetic after 1746, when the Demerara region was opened and
plantations were established along that river. As
plantations began to spread towards the coastal reaches, a
brandwagt (guardhouse) was erected in 1748 at the mouth of
the Demerara River; to prevent smuggling and to give warning
of impending attacks. Many English settlers had found their
way to Demerara and by this time the region was clearly
outstripping Essequibo. By 1753, Demerara had become a
colony in its own right, and its administrative headquarters
was to be found on Borsselen Island, the middle of three
small islands, some twenty miles up the Demerara River. IM
Borsselen was the preferred location, partly on account of
its convenience to the commander's plantation and partly
INRodway 1920, op. cit., p. 7.
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because there was a general consensus that the brandwagt was
too far down the river.
In 1755, Borsselen Island, some seventeen miles up
river was selected as the site and the capital of the
embryonic Demerara colony.1~ Borsselen's location was far
from ideal, and Webber has suggested that the choice of the
site was influenced· by its proximity to the plantation of
Jonathan Gravesande, son of the governor, Laurens storm
van's Gravesande. 126
In 1759, a survey of what is now Georgetown was
undertaken by Laurens Lodewijk Bercheyck, indicating how the
land was divided and to whom it was leased. 127 The layout
of the plantations followed the typical Guyanese plan, which
was influenced by their siting on the heavy clay soil
between the river or sea frontage and the "pegasse" land
which was located roughly ten miles inland. The plantations
formed long parallelograms dissected by dams and drainage
canals running from east to west. A series of sluices or
"kokers" were built to keep out the waters of the river and
sea at high tide and to allow the internal accumulated water
to discharge at low tide.
The planned city of Georgetown is basically an
extension of the above plantations. The plantation drainage
125Thompson 1987, op. cit., p. 45.
126Webber 1931, op. cit., p. 50.
127Rodway 1891, op. cit., vol. I, p. 128.
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systems were retained, and the dams were converted into
roads and streets when the town was first proclaimed in the
1780s. The "damstreets" were complemented by a number of
intermediary parallel streets and cross streets running
parallel to the Demerara River. The result was a gridiron
network of straight thoroughfares which intersected at right
angles.
The gridiron of straight and wide thoroughfares, and
the system of rectangular blocks interspersed by canals, was
directly associated with Dutch town-planning. Given the
fact that the land was flat with virtually no relief, the
gridiron layout was a logical choice. However, the gridiron
pattern of the town was not of a uniform nature. In
general, the Dutch were of the opinion that there was ample
land to be had, and this attitude gave rise to a spacious
and well-Iaid-out town. In some areas the canals, streets,
and grass embankments were more than 100 feet wide from one
property line to another. But since the plantations on
which the town was. built were of varying widths, this
variation resulted in dissimilar block and lot sizes in
several parts of the town. The original size of lots in the
town was 100 feet by 200; but in time, as subdivisions
occurred, the lot sizes decreased and lots of just over 60
feet in width became the more common practice.
Despite the coastal migration of settlement and the
corresponding concentration of population in the mid-
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eighteenth century, there was still a complete lack of roads
in the country. The only means of travelling was by tent-
boats, rowed by Amerindians or African slaves. 128 Since
communication was chiefly by water and all commerce
conducted with Holland, the inhabitants did not pressure the
DWIC to construct road networks. Administration for
Essequibo and Demerara were centered on two small islands -
Flag Island and Borsselen. The fact that both these
colonies were administered from places not requiring roads
only served to compound the absence of this particular form
of infrastructural development. The importance of overland
networks, however, was brought to the fore during the
Berbice slave rebellion in 1763. The absence of adequate
routes rendered it virtually impossible to quickly pursue
slaves who had escaped into the bush. Essequibo and
Demerara found themselves powerless and unable to lend
support to the Berbice planters.
Following the 1763 rebellion, most of the colony's
plantations were destroyed, and recovery was to prove a long
and tortuous process. Ft. Nassau and New Amsterdam did not
escape the onslaught, and though the settlement was
partially restored, it never fully recovered after the
insurrection.
The misfortune that befell Berbice did not appear to
deter the developments being made in Essequibo and Demerara
lUWebber 1931, Ope cit., pp. 226-227.
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in particular. Ft. Kijkoveral was torn down in 1764,129 its
location no longer warranting a military garrison. In
Demerara, questions were also being raised as to the
suitability of Borsselen Island. The commanders favored the
site since it was close to their plantations, but the
planters argued that the site was much too inconvenient.
They pointed out that all ships in the colony were required
to use Borsselen as their port of entry and disembarkation,
but that because of the river's shallow depth and swift
current at this point, it was a difficult and time-consuming
operation. Furthermore, they argued that since the colony
was in an expansionary period it was bound to require more
government buildings and establishments, and that these
could not possibly be accommodated on the island. 130 The
company was unconvinced, and the commanders continued to
refuse to relocate the capital.
In 1775, the private planters lobbied for and were
granted new lands in Demerara. Canals Nos. 1, 2,. and 3 were
dug specifically to enable private planters to acquire more
land on the fertile coast. Two years later, with the canals
nearing completion, the governor, van Schuylenburg, turned
his attention to the development of public roads. He
ordered the planters to make up a roadway, across the front
of their estates, on which every person should have a right-
I~Bronkhurst 1890, op. cit., p. 42.
130Netscher 1888, op. cit., p. 63.
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of-way. The planters who had eagerly supported construction
of the canals adamantly resisted van Schuylenburg's
scheme. 131 In contrast to the canals, they perceived little
benefit to themselves from having roads across their land.
After all, their trading links were primarily overseas.
Development of the colony was of no interest to them. As
long as their enterprises did not suffer, they had no
incentive to invest in costly infrastructure. In any case,
many plantation owners at this time were absentees who were
not concerned with the overall economic health of the
colony. This meant that the colony's social and political
leadership was largely absent. No educational facilities
were developed, as the wealthy preferred to send their
children to Europe for schooling. There is some evidence
that a school of sorts was established in Essequibo in
1685. 132 However, the first undisputed evidence of a school
in Guyana was not until 1800, when Elizabeth Goddard opened
a coeducational boarding school in Stabroek. 1D
In 1781, the Dutch had surrendered the colony to the
British. Berbice, which had slowly began to recover after
131Rodway 1891, op. cit., vol. I, p. 25.
InThe school simply provide religious rather than formal
education for children of settlers. See, Bacchus, M.K. 1980.
Education for Development or Underdevelopment?: Guyana's
Educational System and its Implications for the Third World.
Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, p. 7.
133Thomas, c. Y. 1984. The Rise of the Authoritarian State
in Peripheral Societies. New York: Monthly Review Press, p.
75.
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the 1763 rebellion, was also captured by the British in the
same year. Ft. st. Andries, a flimsy structure at the mouth
of the Berbice River, was razed to the ground, and Ft.
Nassau was unable to resist the attack. It was at this time
that a proposal to move Ft. Nassau to the mouth of the river
and build a new town was first broached. Meanwhile in
Demerara, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Kingston, the British
Lieutenant Governor, was persuaded to remove the seat of
government from Borsselen to an area adjacent to the
Brandwagt at the mouth of the Demerara River.l~ Plans were
progressing when the colony was surrendered to a French
naval squadron on January 31, 1782. The absence of a
recognizable urban center made a great impression on the
French commander, the Compte de Kersaint. He bemoaned the
lack of a town, and in a proclamation issued on February 22,
1782, he declared:
This is perhaps the only instance of a European
colony, among thousands throughout the world,
which has arrived at some magnificence without the
establishment of either a town or village. l"
Kersaint argued:
That it is considered necessary to establish a
capital, which would become a business centre;
where religion would have a temple, justice a
palace, war its arsenals, commerce its counting
I~Guyana Heritage society. 1986. A Guided Tour of
Historic Georgetown. Georgetown, p. 1.
I"Clementi 1937, Ope cit., p. 42.
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houses and industry its factories; where also the
inhabitants might enjoy the advantages of social
intercourse. 136
In response to this glaring societal deficit, Kersaint
proceeded to establish a town on the site of the Brandwagt,
on the east bank of the river. A fort, Le Dauphin, was also
built on the site; and on the west bank of the river a
smaller fort, La Reine, was erected to provide protection
for the town's proj ected inhabitants. 137
As an inducement to urban development, the French
issued grants of land in the town at an extremely attractive
price. Lots were to be had at an annual tax of five stivers
per half a square rood providing the recipient built a house
within six months of the grant. 138 Slaves requisitioned
from a less-than-enthusiastic plantocracy were ordered to
dig two canals. The canals were unimaginatively named the
North and South Canals, and between them was essentially the
town - a dam with two rows of houses on either side,
retaining the canals as their rear setbacks. Boats were
still the preferred mode of transportation, and it was
expected that the canals would be utilized to move goods and
merchandise to the store-rooms located at the back of each
house. The new town was called Longchamps, and sometimes La
Nouvelle Ville by the French. It was less than a mile long,
136Rodway 1893, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 7-8.
1TINetscher 1888, op. cit., p. 125.
DB d . t
-Ro way 1920, op. Cl., p. 9.
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with several of its lots reserved for government buildings.
The annual tax on house lots was expected to be applied to
the maintenance and improvement of the embryonic town. The
transfer qf the seat of government from Borsselen was
completed, and the new town became the administrative
headquarters for the colonies. The centralization of
administration gave Demerara and Longchamps/La Nouvelle
Ville a clear advantage over their competitors. In January
1783, a post office, the first in Guyana, was established in
the capital, enforcing the settlement's unique role as a
provider of urban-type services. 139
The colonies were restored to the Dutch in March 1784,
and by a resolution of the home government on September 14,
1784, the town was named Stabroek after the President of the
DWIC, Nicholas Geelvink, Lord of castricum, Backum, and
Stabroek. 140 The Dutch on their return were astonished to
find that an urban community of some note had developed in
i
their ahsence.
There is some evidence that the French also made plans
I
to relo~ate Ft. Nassau, the capital of the Berbice colony.
I
i
However; it was not until 1785 that the final decision was
made to abandon Ft. Nassau and to move the capital to a site
at the confluence of the Berbice River and the Canje
139Rodway 1893, op. cit., vol. II, p. 20.
140Rodway 1920, op. cit., p. 10.
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Creek .141 The site selected appears to have been in the
neighborhood of the former Ft. st. Andries. The future town
was expected to provide the colony with a port that would
maintain a vital maritime link with the metropole, as well
as perform the role of an administrative center for Berbice.
Construction of the new capital, named New Amsterdam after
its counterpart upstream which had been in decline since
1763 and was now virtually abandoned, did not commence in
earnest until 1790. The transfer of the capitals breathed
new life into the colonies. Prosperity in the colonies was
at the highest point it ever reached under the Dutch, and
both ~tabroek and New Amsterdam were benefiting as a result.
A number of laws and controls were promulgated to
influence the urban form and image of the towns. As early
as September 1781, the Court of Policy pass~d a law that all
kitchens in Stabroek should be made of brick, to prevent the
spread of fire.~ Four years later the court decided that
no buildings roofed with troolies l43 or thatch could be
erected at Stabroek and that property owners in the town
would be required to supply slaves to cut grass and clean
the trenches and dams. 144
141Netscher 1888, Ope cit., p. 125.
1GRodway 1893, Ope cit., vol. II, p. 11.
1CLeaves from the troolie palm.
144Ibl'd. , 44 45pp. - .
117
The physiognomy of the town was Dutch colonial in
character. All of the buildings were constructed of timber,
which was well suited to the low bearing capacity of the
soil. The construction in all of the wards followed a
similar pattern, that is, rows of houses were built with
large gardens or yards on rectangular lots of land, with
wide intervening streets and canals. As the town grew and
the wards began to encroach on one another, they were able
to become amalgamated into a coherent network as though the
entire town had been planned at the same time.
The town was structurally unpretentious, though the
wooden buildings gave Georgetown a distinctive character.
Houses were raised from the ground by stilts, to prevent
flooding; they possessed steep roofs, wide eaves, verandas
which often extended the full width of the buildings to
catch the northeasterlies, accentuated roof overhangs, and
open staircases in the fronts and sometimes the sides of the
houses. Many were adorned with carved decorations, small
checked windows, Demerara shutters, and towers.
The Dutch influence and the general appearance of
stabroek were captured by Pinckard. On his arrival in the
town in April 1796, he stated:
I could have fancied myself in Holland. The
land appeared as one wide flat, intersected with
dykes and canals; the roads mere banks of mud and
clay, thrown from the ditches at their sides; and
the houses bedaubed with tawdry colours, like
Dutch toys, giving the whole a striking resemblance
to the Mother Country. The town is simply two long
rows of houses, built very distant from each other,
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with a wide green in the middle, by way of street.
It is more than a mile in length, running in a
line from the river back to the forest - the most
inconvenient form that could have been contrived,
as it places most of the buildings far away from
the river, and deprives them of the great
advantages, for trade, which they might have had
by being erected parallel with the course of the
water. To remedy this defect canals and ditches
have been cut, at the backs of the houses, which
are perhaps the worst neighbours the inhabitants
could have near them, for, being the receptacles
of mud, and all the filthy drainings of the town,
and only partially emptied by the reflux of the
tide, they become highly offensive, and tend to
generate disease. The causeway of bricks is
continued throughout the whole length of the
street; but the carriage road is mere clay and
mud. 145
The Dutch spent time building canals to enable
colonial exploitdtion of the country. They were not
committed to road building, although attempts were made to
persuade planters to build and maintain a portion of the
public road that traversed the coastal edges of their
plantations. The British, upon their arrival in 1796,
recognized the need to improve and expand the existing
transportation network. Immediately after taking possession
of Demerara and Essequibo, they were forced to send troops
by sea to capture Berbice. This inconvenient and time-
consuming mode of transporting troops was grudgingly
adopted, owing to the impassability of the coastal road.l~
Hoving captured the colonies, the British conceived plans to
establish a proper road linking together the coastal
I~Pinckard 1942, Ope cit., pp. 10-11.
I~Dalton 1855, Ope cit., p. 247.
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plantations. The main purpose of the road was not to
transport agricultural commodities or to facilitate
commerce, but, to enable troops to move quickly to stifle
rebellions and attacks. As a result, the focus was on
coastal communications whilst the hinterland was completely
ignored.
The colonies continued to flourish in the wake of the
British capture, and this was reflected in the urban
expansion of Stabroek. The upsurge in commercial activities
and trade resulted in several important mercantile firms
being established in Stabroek. The town was extended along
the river incorporating a number of plantations as it began
to spread outward. A number of "towns" began to evolve in
the vicinity of Stabroek as the demand for housing, wharves,
and businesses increased. cummingsburg, Robb's Town, New
Town, Werk-en-Rust, and Kingston allowed their existence to
the British conquest of 1796.
cummingsburg, to the north of Stabroek, began life as
a warehouse and business district catering to the overseas
trade dominated by British merchants. The town also boasted
a residential district, almost two miles in circumference,
which was neatly laid out into large and convenient lots. 147
Robb's Town, initially known as Albinus or Bridgetown,
was primarily the residence of free coloreds and former
I~Bolingbroke, H. 1941. A Voyage to Demerary, 1799-1806.
Ed. V. Roth. Georgetown: Daily Chronicle, p. 54.
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slaves from Barbados. A good number of hucksters who plied
their trade in the colonies also lived here. Located north
of Stabroek, the town was a ramshackle of slums and
shanties. 148
New Town, also to the north of Stabroek, functioned as
a bustling retail business center. Businesses ranging from
goldsmiths to "slop-sellers" could be found here, and almost
every item desired could be purchased on one of its four
principal streets .149
The town of Kingston, built by the British army to
house its officers, soon became the residence of Guyana's
elite. Professionals, wealthy merchants, and planters were
drawn to this northern coastal location to take advantage of
the site's refreshing trade winds. situated at the mouth of
the Demerara and directly on the coast, the town had a
salubrious reputation that was not entirely unwarranted.
Houses here were in direct contrast to those in Robb's Town.
They were large and well-built on solid brick foundations,
each having its own garden. 150
Werk-en-Rust was the only town south of Stabroek. The
former plantation was mainly the residence of timber
merchants and those who traded with the North American
continent. In 1799, Werk-en-Rust became the first of these
148Ibid., p. 56.
I~Ibid., pp. 56-57.
150Ibid., p. 54.
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small "towns" to be incorporated into Stabroek. 151 Indeed,
expansion of the "towns" was proceeding at such a rate that
Bolingbroke, an English merchant, could scarcely comprehend
the dizzying pace:
New buildings are erecting every day, and I am
really at a loss to know where the inhabitants
come from to fill them; as most planters reside
on their estates. 152
Warehouses, quays, careenage yards and other repair
and maintenance facilities for ships, fortifications,
churches, taverns, g~ming-houses, and cook-houses all
contributed to the bustling port.
In a short time the price of land had advanced so much
that those with meager resources were compelled to purchase
lands at a considerable distance from Stabroek, where lower
prices prevailed. Additional testimony to the expansion of
towns in the colonies can be seen in the growth of New
Amsterdam. In 1785, having supplanted its upriver namesake,
the construction of the town was initiated; but progress at
the onset was painfully slow. When Pinckard visited the
town in 1796, it was still a fledgling settlement. He
reported:
The town is yet· in embryo. According to a
plan ... for its construction it is to be built
upon the angle, or peninsula, between the rivers
berbische and kannye, extending along the bank of
the former. The land on which it is to be erected
is in part cleared of its wood, and divided into
151Rodway 1920, op. cit., p. 16.
InBolingbroke 1941, op. cit., p. 56.
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lots ready for building, but, at present, only
here and there a scattered house is to be seen.
Beyond the prepared land, and not half a mile from
the government-house, the bush still overhangs the
river kannye; but those destructive engines, fire
and the axe are now directed against it. 153
Despite its early stage of development, Pinckard was
captivated with the government-house, which he described as
"beyond comparison" and the "handsomest" and most "spacious
edifice" he had ever seen in South America. But, when
Bolingbroke laid eyes on the town a few years later, in
1802, he was greatly impressed by the well-Iaid-out town and
the fact that New Amsterdam possessed two taverns whilst
none could be found in Stabroek.l~ The layout reflected a
conscious attempt to foster health and convenience:
Each allotment appears an island within itself;
the ditches, round the houses, fill and empty
themselves every tide, by which means all the
filth and dirt is carried off before it has time
to stagnate, or occasion unhealthy sensations.
Each lot is a quarter of an acre of land,
separated as before mentioned from the adjoining
one; which not only leaves a free circulation of
air, but allows to every house a kitchen garden,
which produces vegetables sufficient for the
family. The house$ are different from those
of Stabroek, in this respect, they are not more
than a storey and a half high, very long and
narrow, with galleries on either side for the
purpose of walking and smoking in the shade;
they are mostly covered with troolie and
plantain leaves, a species of thatch in
preference to shingles, as being considered
much cooler; but the quantity of vermin and
insects which they harbour, does away every other
consideration with English men, whose houses in
New Amsterdam may be distinguished by being
153Pinckard 1942, op. cit., p. 74.
I~Ibid., pp. 111-112.
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shingled. 155
Planters in Berbice were incensed by the fact that on
May 17, 1803, the Court of Policy resolved to clear the
forest behind Stabroek and to light a street in the town at
night. 156 However, it should be made clear that most of the
improvements taking place in Stabroek at this time were met
by assessments on the value of buildings and lots in the
town. For instance, in July 1805, the residents of Stabroek
were charged a three percent special assessment to pay for
improvements on the La Penitence Road and the middle dam. 157
In July, Camp street, a major thoroughfare in Stabroek, was
laid. The improved roads were a great advantage to trade
and commercial activity. st. clair, a soldier of the
occupying British army, in 1806, commented on the
improvements of the once treacherous roads in Stabroek:
The roads and streets throughout the town are
covered with bricks, which becomes consolidated
and makes a dry pathway even in rainy weather. 158
In April 1806, the coastal road planned by the British
in 1796 was completed. The road facilitated the inter-
plantation movement of goods and people, although this was
not quite the rationale behind its construction. The new
highway stretched from Demerara to Berbice, and though it
InBolingbroke 1941, Ope cit., p. 111.
156M.C.P.,1803.
157M.C.P., 1805.
158St. Clair 1947, Ope cit., p. 12.
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remained impassable in the rainy seasons, it was
instrumental in creating a ribbon-like settlement network
from what had been independent plantations exclusively
oriented towards the metropole.
British influence was pervasive, and in a move to
stamp their identity on the country, they renamed the town
called Stabroek as Georgetown, after the reigning British
monarch, King George III, on May 5, 1812. 159 Georgetown at
this time encompassed an area extending from Kingston in the
north to Albouystown in the south, and the tract eastward
from the Demerara River to Camp street. Several of the
small "towns" such as Cummingsburg, Robb's Town, New Town,
Kingston, and Werk-en-Rust, therefore, became wards
(districts) in the newly named town.
within Georgetown, the wards of New Town, Robb's Town,
and Werk-en-Rust were perhaps in the most deplorable
condition. They were covered with shanties belonging to the
poorer classes, between which ran dangerous and cramped
alleys. The lack of fresh water was a persistent problem to
all who lived in Georgetown, but for the poorer folks the
situation was much worse. Without vats or cisterns, they
suffered much privation during the dry season. Fortunately,
in 1825 the Lamaha Canal project was launched to bring water
to the town's population. 160
159Webber 1931, op. cit., p. 134.
160Gazette, Nov. '3, 1825.
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The ascension of merchants and professionals to the
Combined Court stimulated a number of pUblic works in
Georgetown. In 1825 the stone work for a sea dam was
commenced to resist coastal erosion of the northern part of
the town. The same year saw the commencement of the
construction of the Lamaha Canal, bringing fresh water from
the Lamaha Creek a distance of about fifteen miles for the
supply of the population of Georgetown. 161 A mere nineteen
years earlier, st. Clair had remarked:
As no springs are to be met with, except in the
interior of the country ..• each house is provided
with vats or cisterns and pipes to conduct the
rain-water from the roof, but, as this supply is
inadequate to the wants of families during the dry
season, they are obliged to send, at an enormous
expense, a considerable distance up the country
for clear water: but this is so strongly
impregnated with vegetable matter as to be of a
yellowish tint, and it is very pernicious to the
stomach which is unaccustomed to it. 162
Fire regulations were bolstered in 1803 with the
establishment of a fire service. Two engines were placed in
the northern and southern sections of the town, and every
householder was requested to provide two leather buckets to
assist fire fighters. The regulations were far from
adequate, and in 1828 two disastrous fires occurred which
levelled parts of Charlestown and almost completely
destroyed New Town. The whole of Nev Town, from Water
street to High street and Croal street to South Street, was
161Blue BooK (B. B), 1828.
l~st. Clair 1947, op. cit., p. 13.
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razed to the ground, the fire destroying goods and property
worth over 1, 000, 000 dollars .163
As a result of the 1828 fires, Charlestown and New
Town were rebuilt afresh; roads and lots were laid out and
several improvements made. An ordinance was passed to
prevent the future development of crowded shanties, and this
ordinance was reinforced in 1838 by the "Consolidated
Ordinance for the Better Regulation of Georgetown."I64 The
law contained rules regarding the construction of buildings,
stellings, and other structures in the capital. These
fires, and in later years other like it, necessitated
rebuilding and thereby indirectly stimulated urban planning
in Guyana.
In 1828, the main road through Georgetown was extended
two-and-a-half miles, at a cost of four hundred pounds, with
ballastlM bought from incoming ships, and stone brought
from one hundred miles up the Essequibo RiYer.l~ Africans
were being hired and charged with weeding and rep~iring the
roads, and cleaning the trenches in the town. The
government also now began to contribute to a special
Georgetown fund mandated to maintain the general appearance
and welfare of the town. Aid donated amounted to over 400
163 d . t 1Ro way 1894, op. Cl ., VO • III, p. 252.
16-lM.C.P.,1838.
165Usually stone.
166B.B, 1828.
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pounds in 1828.1~ Georgetown, by gaining a degree of
service not available elsewhere, was beginning to be set
apart from surrounding areas, resulting in increasing
differentiation between town and country.
A scouring of the minutes of the Combined Court and
the Blue Books from 1812 to 1831 clearly reveals that
members of the Court determined levels of taxation as well
as expenditure of funds, including those earmarked for
Georgetown. The estimated expenditure for Georgetown in
1831 included some of the following: hire of laborers -
30,000 pounds, lighting of town's lamps - 8,400 pounds,
stone ballast for streets - 18,000 pounds, medical
attendance - 880 pounds, etc. Some of the expenses were to
be met by a tax of two percent on the 980 lots and buildings
in the town, amounting to 6,259 pounds. Another paltry
amount was expected from market fees and rental of
stalls. 168 In the same year the entire Amerindian
population of the country were allocated, 66 pieces of
salenpores, 600 fish hooks, 7 tinder boxes, 24 looking
glasses, 6 hoes, 100 needles, 24 knives, and 24 combs!l~
Within Georgetown, members of the colored group as a
rule resided in the poorer wards of the town, and as a
result the growth of shanties became more intense in these
167Ibid.
168M.C.P., Feb. 18, 1831.
169M. C. P ., Feb. 3, 1831.
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districts. sanitary arrangements were most inadequate
throughout Georgetown, but in the poorer wards the situation
was virtually intolerable. All refuse was dumped into the
canals, which soon became stagnant, posing a health hazard
to those who lived near them and to the slaves who were
compelled to clean them from time to time.
New Amsterdam provided a stark contrast to the squalid
conditions in the poorer sections of Georgetown. The town's
population had yet to reach 3,000, but according to Dalton:
About this period [1830s], the town had resumed
an air of prosperity and rising importance; there
were several fine buildings, the old court-house
especially, which together with the lively and
clean private houses, prettily surrounded by
lovely tropical fruit-trees and shrubs, presented
an aspect of striking beauty to the visitor. lm
On JUly 21, 1831, Berbice, Demerara and Essequibo were
merged to form the united colony of British Guiana. nl A
capital and a port were required to provide administrative,
trade, commercial, and service functions. Since Georgetown
with its developed infrastructure had already been supplying
these functions, it was selected over New Amsterdam, and
from this date the importance and consolidated growth of the
town was assured. The effect of the decision was to
relegate New Amsterdam even further in Guyana's immature
urban hierarchy. with no intermediate towns, Georgetown had
begun to dominate the two-tiered urban network.
170Dalton 1855, op. cit., pp. 378-379.
171M. C. P ., Aug. 3, 1831.
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Under slave plantation society, urban development was
restricted and towns small. The vast majority (85 percent)
of the population were residing on estates or in plantation
villages. The society was defined by forced confinement of
slaves on the plantations and forms of development which
were centered around sugar. Few possibilities were
available for wholesale migration to towns or for the
creation of significant urban employment, as was the case
with European industrialization. Guyanese society was to
remain agrarian, and town life was to remain constricted for
Africans during this period. This was especially so since,
under "normal" conditions, towns tend to increase
interaction and communication; and this could have permitted
a good deal of association between races in a color-based
socioeconomic system in which fear of the socially dominant
class was an important component. Therefore, there was
every reason to have slaves confined on the plantations and
in rural areas. Those of the plantocracy clearly desired
such a situation; but in a society dependent on the labor
power of slaves, workers were also required in Georgetown
and New Amsterdam as perquisites to accumulating power and
affluence.
Population increases in Georgetown and New Amsterdam
resulted primarily from two streams of migration -
immigration from Europe, Africa, and the West Indies and the
in-migration of both whites and non-whites from sugar
130
plantations. The latter movement was only partly influenced
by the demands of these towns' economies and the desires of
the rural population. For while free whites were able to
live anywhere, slaves and indentured servants were confined
to sugar estates unless their owners resided in the two
towns or gave them permission to move there. Conversely,
the free colored population and free Africans were
encouraged to live in Georgetown and New Amsterdam. And
since it was believed that they would incite the slaves to
rebellion, they were largely denied employment on the
plantations.
The mobility, and hence the migratory tendencies, of
slaves was drastically curtailed by law; even a slave who
visited the Sunday market in Stabroek was obliged to carry a
pass signed by a white person. Although this legislation
was seldom enforced, it unquestionably restricted movement
to Georgetown and New Amsterdam, and transformed the estates
into more easily controlled social cells. Nonetheless, the
only sizeable group of mobile slaves, the runaways,
frequently sought anonymity in Georgetown, specifically in
the poorer wards, where the regimentation of plantation life
was supplanted by a more confused liberal order. Some
runaways even ventured to establish a settlement behind
Peter's Hall, just a few miles from Georgetown, from which
they were able to launch raids on nearby plantations. ln
172Rodway 1920, Ope cit., p. 51.
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The final days of slavery was marked by the
incorporation of Georgetown in 1837. Superintendence of the
town was placed under a mayor and town council. Eleven
councilors were appointed, corresponding to the eleven wards
into which the town was divided, namely Kingston, N.
cumingsburg West Ward, N. cumingsburg East Ward, Robb's
Town, Columbia and Lacy Town, New Town, Stabroek, Werk-en-
Rust, and Charles Town.
Land Use
This sub-section describes land use during the period
and highlights the dominance of plantation agriculture over
the space economy. It details the search for fertile
agricultural lands and the importance of the ecology in
determining settlement.
During the early colonial era plantations clung
tenaciously to the higher reaches of the rivers. All were
located on the banks of the rivers, between thirty and
fifty-five miles from their mouths. In Berbice, most
plantations were located around Fort Nassau. similarly, in
Essequibo, most plantations were in the vicinity of
Kijkoveral. Up river locations were preferred to the
coastal locations for cultivation and settlement, because
they offered some degree of protection from enemy incursions
and marauding pirates who regularly terrorized the "wild
Coast" (i.e., the area between the Orinoco and the Amazon).
Unlike the low-lying swampy coastal areas, the upriver
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locations were well drained, easily worked, and above high
tide; and they were considered to be much more
salubrious. 173
Movement to the coast was fuelled in 1729 with the
opening up of Essequibo to settlers from other countries
besides Holland - in rapid time, West Indian planters were
flocking to Guyana to take possession of land being given
free of charge with exemption from taxes for ten years.
Settlers were allowed to bring their own slaves, and each
settler was granted a fixed amount of land. Land was set at
1,000 acres for the cUltivation of sugar and at 500 acres
for other crops. By 1745, all the available first-depth
land, suitable for crop production in Essequibo, had been
allocated to colonists. Even the islands at the mouth of
the Essequibo and on the banks of the Iturbisi and Supenaam
Creeks were allowed to be settled by the wave of new
colonizers. 174
Berbice also benefitted from the developments taking
place in Essequibo. Between 1733 and 1735, a total of
fifty-eight land grants amounting to 42,300 acres were
allotted. u5 In the latter year the DWIC operated twelve
plantations in Berbice -- nine sugar, one coffee, one
173 h 'tTompson 1987, op. Cl 0' p. 35.
INWilliams 1950, op. cit., p. 9.
175 h 't
-T ompson 1987, op. Cl ., p. 41.
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cotton, and one cocoa -- and one hundred and twelve were in
the hands of private owners. 176
In 1746, Laurens storm van's Gravesande, the Governor
of Essequibo and one of the colony's most capable Dutch
administrators, threw open the Demerara region to
settlement. ln Thus far, Demerara had been virtually
ignored. At the onset of Gravesande's administration, it
was nothing more than a trading area patrolled by the
company's traders, distinguished by two trading posts, and
only haphazardly governed from Kijkoveral. ln Furthermore,
the river was not as navigable upstream as either Essequibo
or Berbice. u9 This was an important point, given the
safety concerns of the settlers; however, with the lull in
European rivalry, Gravesande felt it an opportune moment to
establish settlement in this part of the country.IW No
doubt his hand was also forced by the fact that all
available land in Essequibo had already been awarded.
The first Demerara concessions were granted in April
1746, and by the following year eighteen large sugar
176King 1968, op.cit., p. 38 and Netscher 1888, op.cit.,
p. 68.
InHarris and Villiers 1911, Ope cit., p. 26
178Ibid., p. 66.
I~Dalton 1855, Ope cit., p. 223.
lWIbid., pp. 223-224.
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plantations and a few smaller ones had been occupied. lSI
Gravesande immediately recognized that the future of the
colony rested with Demerara and expressed his views to the
DWle's Directors in Holland: "I doubt not but that this
River Demerary will in a few years be as populous, if not
more so than Essequibo."I~ Two years later, in a despatch
of December 2, 1748, Gravesande informed his superiors of a
sugar cane harvest "beyond all his expectations" and
reiterated his prediction that Demerara would supersede
Essequibo. ID The colonists initially purchased land in the
higher reaches of the river, some fifteen to twenty miles
from the estuary, as their predecessors had done in
Essequibo. This may appear surprising, since from
experience in Essequibo they must have been aware of the
potential richness of the coast; but, the fear of naval
attacks, the high costs involved in empoldering and draining
the coastal lands,IM the lack of fresh water downriver, and
the availability of creeks which could be utilized to
generate power were outweighing factors in the settlers'
calculations.l~ To ease fears and to offer some degree of
protection for the new colonists, Gravesande built a
181Netscher 1888, op. cit., p. 54.
182Ibid., p.55.
1DHarris and Villiers, op. cit., p. 67.
J~Williams 1950, op. cit., p. 9.
I~Shahabuddeen 1983, op. cit., p. 13.
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brandwagt or guard house/signal station at the mouth of the
river .186
Thus Essequibo's decline had begun. The DWIC's indigo
plantations in the colony were abandoned; and Kijkoveral,
having been allowed to deteriorate, was finally
demolished. 187 By 1752 settlement on the Demerara was
outstripping that of the older colony. Plantations on the
east bank were stretching as far down as the Garden of Eden,
by the following year (1753) they had reached Diamond, and
by 1759 the area now known as Georgetown was occupied by the
following plantations: Vlissengen, La Bourgade, Eve Leary,
Ruimveldt, La Peni-tence, ana Jerish Hope (Werk-en-}{ust). i88
Cultivation continued to spread, and by 1769 all the
land on both banks of the Demerara River were occupied and
under some semblance of cultivation. Demerara could now
boast of 130 plantations, whilst only 70 could be found in
Essequibo. 189
In Demerara the number of acres under cultivation was
only a fraction of the total available acreage. Land
speculation had been a problem since Gravesande had opened
up the Demerara region in 1746, on generous terms to members
of all nations. Poll tax exemptions on slaves and generous
186Netscher 1888, op. cit. , p. 54.
187Webber 1931, op. cit. , p. 44.
188Rodway 1891, op. cit. , vol. I, pp. 146-147.
189Rodway 1891, op. cit. , vol. I, p. 230.
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quantities of land were a windfall to European capitalists,
many of whom had no interest in cultivating their holdings.
Fearing a moribund agricultural economy, the DWIC in July
1752 determined that no one could acquire a 2,000-acre
concession unless a sugar mill was added within three years.
Grants of land were generally no more than 1,000 acres for
cane or 500 acres for other crops, with each owner being
required to build a house on the property and to begin
planting within eighteen months. In 1761, it was resolved
that no individual could sell his estate until it had been
in his possession for five years. 190
Berbice similarly had attracted speculators, and the
colony was purported to have between 113 and 125 estates in
1749, some of which were idle. 191 In an effort to curb
speculation, the directors sought to limit concessions to
500 acres and to charge a fee of ten guilders per acre.l~
As a result, speculation was curtailed.
The quest for fertile agricultural lands in Demerara
reached such a pace that in 1775 the DWIC began the
excavation of Canal No. 1 on the west bank of the Demerara
River. A little later, Canal No. 2 was completed on the
west bank and Canal No. 3 on the east bank. Demerara's
190Ibid., p. 139.
191 h 'tTompson 1987, Ope Cl ., p. 41.
192Ibid.
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appeal was such that the newly open lands were immediately
taken up. 193
Europeans of all nationalities arrived to seek their
fortune, but the majority of newcomers were English
speculators from the West Indies.1~ Downriver and
northwards from Canal No.3, the following plantations were
in existence on the east bank by 1777: Zorg-en-Hoop,
Ruimveldt, La Penitence, Le Repentir, Werk-en-Rust, La
Bourgade, and Eve Leary. 195 At the end of 1783 the entire
area from the Demerara River eastward to Mahaica along the
coast had been allotted. Eight years later the entire coast
from the Pomeroon in the west to the Abary in the east had
been alienated and planted with coffee, cotton, or sugar
cane. 196
Downstream migration was to be pivotal in the
country's economic and settlement history. Movement to the
more fertile coastal lands, which frequently lie below sea
level at high tide, presented some severe difficulties. The
lack of adequate natural drainage necessitated a tremendous
expenditure of capital and labor to construct and maintain
the elaborate system of drainage and irrigation needed to
keep out the murky waters of the Atlantic. Thus, only the
I~Netscher 1888, op. cit., pp. 67-68.
I~Dalton 1855. op. cit., p. 238.
195K ' 1968 't 38. lng , op. Cl ., p. .
196Rodway 1893, op. cit., vol. II, p. 57.
138
wealthiest planters were able to shoulder the requisite
outlay of capital. And it is from this group that the
plantocracy, which was to play such a vital role in Guyanese
urbanization, emerged.
The geographic nature of the coastlands resulted in a
change in the class of proprietors. Small-scale peasant
farmers simply did not possess the resources needed to
cultivate land on the coast. Planters who ventured to the
coast were compelled to increase the size of their
undertakings by utilizing large areas of land, and to
concentrate solely on staples for export to recoup capital
expended on sea defense and reclamation. capital and other
inputs were provided by European merchants whose basic
association with the planter was a client-debtor
relationship. ultimately it was the indebtedness of the
planters to the merchants which ensured the fall of the
planter class.
Political and Social structure
A social process such as urbanization is the
manifestation not only of economic relationships, but also
of political and social ones among groups within the
society. These relationships produce a specific urban
history among several possible histories. A grasp of the
political and social structure, therefore, is vital for
understanding urbanization, particularly as it relates to
infrastructure and urban development. As a result, this
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sub-section discusses how the political and social structure
developed and examines the changes during the early colonial
and slave plantation period.
Governmental organization in Guyana began as a system
of administration designed for the regulation of trade
depots in the colony, with strict emphasis being placed on
the production of dividends for the DWIC. Kijkoveral was
designated as the administrative center of the colony of
Essequibo, and it was here in 1639 that the DWIC assigned
Jan van der Goes the title of "commander" of the
settlement.l~ The commander was merely the chief DWIC
officer in the colony, entrusted to manage the affairs of
the company. In 1690 the company's estates had increased to
such a point that each required its own manager. An
organization known as the Council, consisting of the
commander, managers, and a secretary was formed to handle
the additional responsibilities of an expanding community.
"Free" planters had steadily been increasing in numbers, but
they were excluded from the colony's decision-making
body. 198
The name of the Council was changed in 1718 to the
council of Policy and Justice. The free planters, who now
InReport of the u.s. Commission 1897, op. cit., pp. 96-
97.
19KClementi 1937, op. cit., p. 26.
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numbered fifteen, were still unrepresentedilW their
interests were deemed to be subservient to those of the
DWIC, which firmly maintained that its officers must be
completely in command of the colony. Supreme authority
remained in the metropole, and the local body was bound to
faithfully execute even the most trivial instruction.
Berbice appears to have been generally ignored by the
DWIC until 1627, when its charter expired and a new one was
granted by the Dutch government to Abraham van Pere.
Throughout the seventeenth and early eighteenth
centuries, Berbice was administered as a proprietary colony
without any semblance of a representative assembly.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that inhabitants of the
colony ever agitated for representation. It was not until
1732 that the States-General of the Netherlands finally
promulgated a constitution for Berbice. The constitution
provided that the affairs of the colony were to be
administered by a governor commissioned by the States-
General. The governor was to be assisted by a Council of
Government, consisting of six persons, three of whom were to
be chosen by the governor from a number of names submitted
to him by inhabitants with a certain property qualification.
The Council of Government was charged with performing·both
executive functions and criminal justice. civil cases were
to be handled by a Council of Justice, with the governor as
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president and at least six other members nominated by the
governor and the council of Government. 2OO
Bernard Waterman was appointed Berbice's first
governor on March 24, 1733. Upon his arrival in Berbice, he
established the Council of Government and the Council of
Justice. Both of these institutions were located at Ft.
Nassau, the seat of government.~ with improvements in
the colony's administration, many settlers found Berbice an
attractive prospect. Grants of free land may have also
played a part in luring prospective settlers. Such was the
demand that it soon became necessary to set a price of ten
florins per acre. 2m
Essequibo, similarly, was at this time experiencing an
influx of private planters. Since they were proprietors,
members of the militia, and taxpayers, it was understandable
that private planters should demand access to an institution
in which their views could be entertained. 2m As a result,
the political structure was modified in 1739 to allow
settler representation. The DWIC enacted legislation
requiring the Council of Policy and Justice to increase its
200Im Thurn, E. 1883. "Essequibo, Berbice and Demerara
under the Dutch." Timheri II, p. 337.
2oIIbid., p. 337.
~nClementi 1937, op. cit., p. 89.
203Rodney, W. 1981. A History of the Guyanese Working
People, 1881-1905. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press,
p. 120.
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membership from four to six, one of whom was to be chosen by
the governor from amongst the private planters.2~ Thus,
the Council of Policy and Justice was transformed from an
administrative institution to one which was additionally
concerned with representation, legislation, and
adjudication. At the same time the seat of government was
moved from Cartabo Point to Flag Island (renamed Fort
Island) on the Essequibo River.
In 1743 storm van's Gravesande, who had recently been
appointed commander, created a College of Kiezers, or
electors, for the singular purpose of nominating
representatives of the private planters to the Council of
Policy and Justice. 2M Membership in the College of Kiezers
was for life, and members were elected by the resident
planters possessing more than twenty-five slaves.2~
Although Berbice and Essequibo were under the umbrella
of the Dutch government, they remained separate political
units. In 1746 Gravesande opened the Demerara region and a
third colony entered the fray. The growth of Demerara was
so rapid that by 1750 the Dutch felt obliged to assign the
colony a separate commander. However, the two colonies
continued to share a Council of Policy and a Council of
2~Rodway 1891, op. cit., vol. I, p. 102.
20sCl t' 1937 . t 28. emen 1 , op. C1 ., p. .
2~Great Britain. Colonial Office. 1951. Annual Report on
British Guiana. London: H.M.S.O., p. 5.
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Justice (both formed by a separation of the Council of
Policy and Justice). The primary purpose of the Council of
Policy at this time still related to the development of the
company's business and the granting of land concessions.
Among the regulations passed during this period was
one which prohibited slaves from traveling about the river
without passes. 2W Restriction on movement was an attempt
to prevent slaves from forming independent settlements and
communities.
The early eighteenth century witnessed an increase in
plantation agriculture and a corresponding decline in
trading activities. Migration towards the coast resulted in
widespread improvements in the plantation economy, and the
need for drainage and irrigation. However, the large outlay
of capital necessary to empolder the coastlands made it
prohibitive to the small planter. As a result, the
plantocracy was transformed. Only the wealthiest planters
were able to cultivate estates in the colonies, and these
soon began to agitate for a greater involvement in
government decision-making. In 1767 the constitution of the
council of Policy was altered to enable two representatives
of the private planters to take up seats in the council. 2M
Demerara's increasing importance was acknowledged, and the
colony was granted a separate Council of Policy and a
200Rodway 1891, op.cit., vol. I, p. 132.
2MShahabuddeen 1978, Ope cit., p. 22.
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council of Justice. In Essequibo and Demerara, each council
of Policy included four private planters and four DWIC
,
representatives, wH::h the Director-General having the
casting vote. The aldditiona,l private planter representation
I
on the council was a clear indication of the increasing
, I ""lnfluence and wealth of the ~lantocracy.
, ,I ,
Rellglous and moral structures and sanctlons were
almost nonexistent in the colonies. Much of the profits
from the plantations was directed overseas to these absentee
I
landlords, who could not persuade themselves to live in
'I
Guyana any longer than was necessary. They came primarily
to make their fortunes and had little interest in
maintaining or devel'oping the country's political structure
or social life.
in the ensuing years, ~ontrol over expenditure became
a bone of contention between I the private planters and the
representatives of the DWIC.I Taxes levied on the private
i ,I
planters were deposlted into I an account known as the Company
Chest, but the increasing cost of administration made it
The conventional
I
therefore supplemented by a customs duty of two
Ipercent, which barely offsetlthe increase in company
I I
necessa~y to raise additional revenues.
I
i
poll ta~ was
I
expenses.2~ The DWle, as a result, developed a system in
I
which additional taxes for s~ecial purposes could be raised
209Lutchman, H. 1974. From Colonialism to Cooperative
Republic: Aspects of Politieal Development in Guyana. Rio
Piedras, Puerto Rico, University of Puerto Rico, p. 13.
I
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with the consent of the planters. Taxes levied in this
manner were deposited into a separate account known as the
Colony Chest. Periodic efforts by the DWIC to increase
taxes for either chest were strenuously resisted by the
planters, though in time agreement to increases in taxes for
the Colony Chest proved to be less contentious than for its
counterpart.
The British and French invasions in 1781 and 1782
interrupted the rift that was evolv~ng between the planters
and the company. The French compla~nedl that the company was
too greedy and that it took no inte+est in the colonies. 210
French rule, however, was deeply unpopular. Planters felt
disenfranchised; the councils were +arely consulted, and the
fact that the French installed offi9ials of their own
nationality in all chief positions 9nly:served to increase
hostility.
In the aftermath of the occup~tions, in 1784 the
states-General in the Netherlands r~solved to unite the
Councils of Policy of Essequibo and Dem~rara. The councils
were linked, and the inhabitants in~tructed to hold all
meetings at Stabroek, the new seat qf gcwernment. 211
Essequibo, however, was to retain i~s own Court of Justice
at Fort Island, the capital of that settlement.
21ORodway 1893, op. cit., vol. I~[ I pl. 14.
211Cl t' 1937 't 24emen 1 , op. Cl ., p. . O.
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The 1780s proved to be a period of intense conflict
between the planters and the DWIC and its officials in the
colony. Planter resentment was brought to the fore by the
decision to raise the poll tax on slaves from two-and-a-half
guilders to six guilders, and by a proposal that their
representatives to the Council of Policy and Justice be
reduced to three. The planters responded by failing to
attend council meetings when summoned, and by withholding
all increases levied. The result was that the company was
unsuccessful in recovering taxes for the years 1784 to
1786. 212
Planter complaints became so insistent, and the number
of petitions to Holland so numerous, that a committee was
formed to investigate all grievances. 213 The committee
formulated its recommendations in a report known as the
"Concept Plan of Redress." The report provided that there
should be a single Court of Policy for Essequibo and
Demerara, to consist of the Director-General, four ex-
officio members, and four colonists (two from Essequibo and
two from Demerara). This provision restored some degree of
leverage to the planters, but the casting vote was retained
by the Director-General.
The elected members of the Court of Policy were chosen
through a College of Kiezers, from among colonists
212Ibid., p. 44.
213Ibid., p. 243.
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possessing twenty-five or more slaves. The size of the
College of Kiezers was increased to seven in both Essequibo
and Demerara, and members were elected for life by colonists
having at least twenty-five slaves in their employ.2~
Qualification requirements for both the Court of Policy and
the College of Kiezers ensured that political decision-
making would be in the hands of a relatively small planting
oligarchy. Economic muscle in the planting realm was
utilized to concentrate power in the political realm. The
identity of interest, in turn, reinforced a social structure
founded on the plantation, and one which confined Guyana to
a history of uneven development.
Shortly after the Concept Plan was put into operation,
the States-General revoked the charter of the debt-ridden
DWIC. On December 31, 1791, after 175 years in Guyana, the
company finally wound up its operations. 215 At the start of
the new year, the two colonies were amalgamated under the
title of the "united Colony of Demerara and Essequibo," with
a single administration over which the States-General
exercised executive and legislative power. The designation
Director-General was changed to Governor, and Baron van
Grovestnis assumed the new position.
Following the outbreak of the French Revolutionary
Wars, the Batavian Republic was established in Holland in
214rbid., pp. 44-45.
215rbid., p. 47.
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1795. The Governor, van Grovestnis, an ardent supporter of
the Prince of Orange, relinquished his position in protest
of the Court of Policy's decision to support the
Republicans. During the upheaval, a slave insurrection
occurred which necessitated raising funds to quell the
disturbance. without a governor, it was decided on June 3,
1795, following a joint session of the Court of Policy and
the College of Kiezers, that the Colony Chest should be
regulated by a special combined council comprised of the
"unofficial" members of the Court of Policy and four
Kiezers, two each from Demerara and Essequibo. In somewhat
difficult circumstances, the planters were able to manoeuvre
themselves into a situation whereby control of taxation
became their responsibility.
When the British invaded the colony in 1796, they
agreed to uphold the "ancient laws and usages" of the
colony.216 The planters demanded that the Combined Council
should be a part of the new constitutional arrangements.
However, the British felt that the institution was not an
integral part of the Plan of Redress. They ruled against
the planters, but sought to soften the blow by formulating a
proposal for the election of six Financial Representatives.
The Financial Representatives were allowed-to sit with the
members of the Court of Policy in a "Combined Court," and
216Palton 1855, op. cit., pp. 243-244.
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were granted the right to vote on matters relating to the
raising of taxes and the examination of accounts. 217
Financial Representatives, unlike their counterparts
in the Court of Policy, were to be elected on an at-large
basis by residents possessing twenty-five or more slaves. 218
Once again the plantocracy had managed to mold the colony's
constitutional framework so as to maintain its hegemony.
The inaugural meeting of the Combined Court was held
on November 2, 1796. 219 It soon became apparent that the
plantocracy, by virtue of its powers in the newly
established court, occupied a position from which it could
dominate the economic structure of the colony. They
possessed the ability to decide whether money should be
raised to keep the capital in good repair; maintain roads
and bridges; construct sea defenses; provide education; and
improve the water supply, pUblic health and welfare. 22o
Members of the court, however, were reluctant to raise
revenue unless they could profit from the outcome: for
example, several times the Court of Policy had pUblished
regulations for roads and bridges, but these regulations
were only partially complied with. The roads, up to the
nineteenth centurYr were only bridle paths, which were all
217 It' . tC emen 1 1937, op. Cl ., p. 54.
218Lutchman 1974, op. cit., p. 15.
219Ibid.
22Ur1inutes of the Court of Policy (M.e.p.), July 15,1814.
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that the planters wanted, since goods were invariably
transported by water. 221 The towns too were virtually
ignored. Only a few retail traders lived there, and they
were virtually powerless. Most of the colony's supplies
were brought in by the planters themselves. Such
professional people as there were appear to have been of low
social standing; for example, the surgeon was also the
barber. In short, the only importance of the towns arose
from the fact that they were the centers of political
activity and administration. The governor and colonial
officials resided in them; and when there was legislative
business, the elected members of the Combined Court or Court
of Policy gathered there. The civil and criminal courts
were also held in the towns. 222 Thus, in the Combined
Court, one was hard-pressed to find support for urban
development.
In Berbice the constitutional arrangements were not as
democratic as those of its sister colony. The planters were
not as powerful, and councilors were not elected but
assigned their positions by the governor. Nevertheless,
Berbice towns also received scant attention, primarily
because during periods of occupation the colonies were
administered jointly, with Berbice playing the role of a
junior partner.
nlRodway 1891, Ope cit., vol. I, pp. 57-58.
222Im Thurn 1884, Ope cit., Part III, p. 22.
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Berbice and Demerara-Essequibo were returned to the
Batavian Republic after the Treaty of Amiens in 1802. The
return of the Dutch created a good deal of civil and
political chaos. Many of the British and some of the Dutch
planters were unhappy at the new turn of events. Pressure
was brought to bear on the British government, which
responded by finally taking back the colonies in 1803. 223
Such were the feelings in the colonies that the resistance
offered was little more than perfunctory.
Under the terms of the 1803 capitulation, the British
guaranteed to the residents of the colonies that:
..• the laws and usages of the colony shall
remain in force and be respected, the mode of
taxation now in use be adhered to and the
inhabitants shall enjoy the pUblic exercise of
their religion in the same manner as before the
capitulation. 224
The transition to British rule therefore did not
involve any great changes in the social and political
structure of the colonies. The existing constitutional
framework remained intact. The planter-dominated Combined
Court preserved its right to raise taxes, whilst the Court
of Policy remained the legislative and executive body
controlled by the governor and officials of the British
government.
223Clementi 1937, Ope cit., p. 259.
224Ibid., p. 57.
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Planters in Berbice were not entirely happy about some
of the new developments. They complained that the port of
New Amsterdam, the capital of Berbice, was being deprived of
shipping trade by the fact that supplies were being shipped
to Britain via Stabroek, Demerara, and not New Amsterdam.
The Financial Representatives of the Combined Court in
time began to agitate for an extension of their power and
privileges. They urged that they be given control over
expenditure as well as taxation, and in September 1812,
they were inadvertently granted this prerogative by
Lieutenant Governor Hugh Lyle Carmichael. 225 Carmichael, a
fervent British nationalist, sought to eliminate Dutch
political influence in the College of Kiezers by combining
that institution with the Financial Representatives, and
extending the sUffrage to include those who paid taxes on an
income of 10,000 guilders, this being deemed equivalent to
the slave-owning qualification. Carmichael hoped to squeeze
out the Dutch by adding to the voters' list members of the
professional and commercial classes who were mainly
Bri tish. 226
Carmichael's revamping of the constitution had
profound repercussions which the governor probably failed to
anticipate. The combination of Financial Representatives
and Kiezers resulted in the elective members of the Combined
225 t h . t
-Lu c man 1974, op. C1 ., p. 15.
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Court outnumbering the official section ten to four. The
elective section now had control not only of taxation but
also of expenditure. The home government was not consulted
prior to Carmichael's actions; and when word of the changes
reached England, Lord Bathurst, the Colonial Secretary,
severely admonished the Lieutenant Governor. Carmichael was
instructed not to introduce any new constitutional changes
without consulting the metropolitan government and was
informed that his actions were unconstitutional.
Nevertheless, Bathurst did not move immediately to repeal
the new law. 227
The newly enfranchised merchant class had begun to
make their presence felt to such an extent that Governor
D'Urban, a supporter of the planters, recommended to the
Colonial Secretary the removal of the income qualification.
On March 5, 1831, approval was granted to restore the
franchise to its pre-Carmichael days, that is to say,
ownership of twenty-five or more slaves.
Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo were finally united
as a single colony on July 21, 1831. In a despatch to Sir
Benjamin D'Urban on March 18, 1831, the secretary of state
of the colonies outlined the metropolitan government's
rationale for the union of the colonies:
The Ministers of the crown are persuaded that
they could not advise a more useful exercise of the
Royal Prerogative, which has been retained in these
227Ibid., p. 62.
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colonies, than in combining the whole body of
inhabitants into one society, connected by common
laws and institutions, as they are already
connected by a community of origin, language and
rural economy. 228
The constitution, which unified "British Guiana" in
1831, derived its characteristics from Demerara and
Essequibo and thus favored the plantocracy. The income
qualification introduced by Carmichael was abolished and the
Court of Policy was enlarged to include a member from
Berbice, as well as one official member. 229 Given their
lack of representation, the union of the colonies did not
gain unqualified support in Berbice. A general feeling
existed that Berbice's interests would be relegated to those
of Demerara in particular. The union had already resulted
in Georgetown becoming the center of "administration.
Slavery as a legal institution was abolished on August
28, 1833, when it received the royal assent, but the law did
not come into effect in Guyana until August 1, 1834. The
ex-slaves, however, did not gain their complete freedom.
Children under six years of age were immediately freed, but
all those who were older were required to serve an unpaid
period of apprenticeship for their former masters. A seven-
and-a-half hour work day was arranged for all apprentices,
with praediaIs commanded to serve six years and non-
228M.C.P., Aug. 3, 1831.
229Ibid.
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praedials four years. The remainder of the working day,
apprentices were allowed to work for wages. no
According to the planters, apprenticeship was meant to
prepare the ex-slaves for freedom. In reality, it a was
traumatic period for the Africans. Planters used the time
to get as much as they could out of a labor force which they
firmly believed would retreat into the bush, or appropriate
vacant coastal lands, once complete freedom was attained.
During the first month of apprenticeship, 70 men and 135
women were gaoled. The greater number of women sentenced
sterns from the fact that men were usually whipped and
returned to the plantations. nt Government officials,
especially the judiciary, were closely aligned with the
plantocracy. Many jUdges simply ignored grievances filed by
the apprentices. During November 1837, 129 complaints were
lodged, charging planters with assaults, destruction of
property, inadequate housing, ill treatment of pregnant
women, and a variety of other crimes. Of these only twenty-
five guilty verdicts were returned, and fines ranging from
thirty shillings to five pounds imposed. An astonishing 102
cases were found to be "frivolous" and were thrown out. 232
Slave society revolved around the planter. Slaves of
course were completely subservient to him; tradesmen and
230 1 t' . tC emen 1 1937, op. Cl ., p. 103.
D1Rodway 1894, op. cit., vol. III, p. 21.
232Ibid., p. 38.
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merchants depended on him to purchase their goods;
professional persons looked to him for employment; whilst
government officials found his patronage to be irresistible
and therefore were anxious to maintain a cozy relationship
with him. Efforts to attain the social status of a planter
often led members of the professional and merchant classes
to engage in agricultural pursuits - such was the standing
of the planter in the colony.
Emancipation rendered a change in the Guyanese
constitution. Hitherto the franchise had been confined to
those owning at least twenty-five slaves; but with slavery
outlawed, the qualification was altered to include all males
who paid taxes on an annual income of 143 pounds or who paid
five pounds in direct taxes. The change was not as
revolutionary as might be expected. Taxation in Guyana was
mainly through customs duties and indirect; therefore,
franchise qualification levels were set at a rate which
effectively excluded the vast majority of the population. 233
Though the British government was generally supportive
of the plantocracy, there were instances of conflict between
the colonial state and the planters. A major constitutional
crisis erupted following emancipation in 1834. Prior to the
abolition, a chief source of revenue was the King's Chest,
formerly the Company's Chest, a poll tax on slaves. Since
this method of financing was now redundant, the metropolitan
D3M.C.P., Dec. 2, 1838.
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government formulated a plan to combine the King's Chest and
the Colony Chest, and to place this fund under the auspices
of the Combined Court. In return, the British government
requested that the Combined Court pass a civil List for
seven years which would cover the salaries of government
officials. The Combined Court rejected the proposal and
declined to authorize a Civil List for two years. A
compromise was eventually reached in 1836 when the Combined
Court was given the right to examine annual expenditures as
well as taxation, a function it had performed after
Carmichael's reforms of 1812 but had relinquished after the
union in 1831. The Combined Court in its turn agreed to
pass a civil List to run until 1840.
The Amerindians had been utilized as an interior
police force geared to the capture of runaway slaves, but
now that slavery had come to an end the meager annual
expenditures allotted to them were canceled. Amerindians
were no longer regarded as part of the body politic and from
this instance were largely ignored.
Slavery had been the cornerstone of the country's
social and political structure. Colonial society was
stratified via a fusion of race and class. At the top of
the social hierarchy was to be found the white planter and
his white entourage of government officials, professionals,
and merchants. In the middle were manumitted slaves
(generally mulatto) and white plantation overseers, clerks,
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and artisans. At the bottom, supporting the whole system,
were the African slaves, who were themselves separated by
class distinctions. The house slaves, the factory workers,
and those in the skilled trades - blacksmiths, coopers,
carpenters, masons and boat builders - occupied the apex of
this sUbsystem. At the base were the field slaves, who were
by far the most numerous element in society. Naturally,
field slaves were to be found on the plantation and away
from the fledgling urban centers. The key question was:
Where would they go once complete freedom had been attained?
SUMMARY
Throughout the period a policy of laissez-faire was
largely maintained. The growth of Georgetown and New
Amsterdam was by and large allowed to be accompanied by the
expansion of the built-up area. The Dutch initially paid
little attention to the development of the country and urban
areas in particular. Colonization centered on the
plantations. No encouragement was given to the growth of
towns and the development of manufacturing industry.
Planning was perfunctory and a wholly physical
exercise. Physical plans were drawn up for all the early
administrative centers. For example, after Kijkoveral was
found too inconvenient to accommodate company officials and
the military, Cartabo was surveyed and laid out into
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building lots. Likewise, Borsselen was laid out in twenty-
four lots.
As the period of slave plantation society was nearing
its end, the society was no longer markedly polarized into
white/planter-black/slave relationships. The urban
structure also mirrored the changing sociopolitical makeup
of the society. Most notably, there was an increase in the
number of coloreds. This group were rarely field hands;
most of them worked in the great houses of the estates and
in the towns. Consequently, as time progressed, political
and economic differences between town and country were
likely to take on racial overtones. A good many of the
relationships which were to typify twentieth-century
Guyanese society were formulated during this period of slave
plantation society. For example, there was the command of
white over black, planter over slave, core over periphery,
and towards the end of the period, town over country.
Georgetown was irrevocably consigned as the major
urban area due to an intensification of external trade and
accumulated riches via the production of sugar. Up to the
end of the period, Georgetown and New Amsterdam were the
only two identifiable towns. Mahaicony and Mahaica on the
Demerara coast and Aberdeen on the Essequibo coast were the
only villages in the entire country. In reality these three
settlements were tiny fishing villages, local community
service centers, and military outposts created in a period
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of impoverished internal communications. On the whole, the
country was outward-looking, with urban development confined
to Georgetown.
CHAPTER III
POST-EMANCIPATION AND INDENTURESHIP 1838-1917
GLOBAL LINKAGES
This section on the post-emancipation and
indentureship period details how dependence on Holland was
exchanged for dependence on Great Britain, and to a lesser
extent the united states during the period from about 1838
until the First World War. It considers the changes in the
destinations of exports and the influence of port traffic on
Georgetown's and New Amsterdam's development trajectories.
The outbreak of World War I disrupted the country's link
with the core and created new market opportunities which are
detailed in this section.
Guyana's dependent economy and its incorporation into
the modern world system economy meant that sugar, and hence
the entire society, was subject to external events,
particularly conditions at the center. Unstable markets,
price fluctuations, foreign wars, and metropolitan political
and economic policies dominated events in Guyana. For
example, in the 1840s, just when the sugar industry was
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recovering from the setback of emancipation and attendant
labor problems, the Government of Great Britain passed the
Sugar Duties Act of 1846, which removed preferential tariffs
on colonial produce and allowed slave-produced sugar from
Brazil, Cuba, and other foreign countries to compete with
Guyanese sugar in the British market. Then in 1847, bumper
sugar harvests were reported throughout the West Indies and
Mauritius, and this surplus resulted in a serious glut of
sugar in a British market that was already being swamped by
foreign-grown sugar. The depression which ensued was one of
the most serious in the history of the country. According
to a contemporary writer, Dalton, "the panic of 1847 will be
long remembered and long felt."!
In the post-emancipation and indentureship era
Guyanese exports were almost exclusively sugar and its by-
products, rum and molasses; and these in turn were shipped,
almost without exception, to the united Kingdom. Over 90
percent of the country's exports were destined for the
British market. Dependence on Britain was at times
alleviated through exports to the united States, Canada, and
the British West Indian Islands, but these were only
significant in the latter part of the nineteenth century.
For instance, the united States represented a possible
alternative for Guyana's sugar in the 1840s, but exports
into that country were curtailed by the American tariff of
(Dalton 1855, Ope cit., vol. II, p. 24.
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1846, which imposed duties of 30 percent on sugar and 75
percent on rum. As a result, Guyanese exports to that
country failed to rise above 1 percent of total exports
between 1838 and 1851. Guyana was, however, importing a
large amount of food from the united states at this time.
According to a 1850 report to Governor Barkly:
A great trade in provisions is carried on with the
united states of America, upon which this colony is
almost entirely dependent for food notwithstanding
that the villagers could with ease not only raise
sufficient for home consumption, but could also
supply the neighbouring islands. 2
The introduction of cheap American food into the
colony was an important weapon, utilized by the plantocracy,
to hinder the development of a viable peasant-producing
economy in Guyana, and to keep emerging African-Guyanese
villages in a state of dependent underdevelopment with the
plantations. Effectively barred from the external market,
from which they lacked access and the necessary marketing
skills, peasant producers found themselves floundering in an
internal market that was dominated by cheap American beef,
pork, salted cod, and wheat.
In 1850, sugar exports stood at 26,146 tons; in 1851,
they reached 30,124 tons, and continued increasing annually
until they reached 50,643 tons in 1861. 3 The decade of the
2Report to His Excellency Henry Barkly. The Report of the
Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into and Report upon the
Condition and Prospects of the Colony of British Guiana. 1850.
In Dalton 1855, Appendix.
3B . B., 1850-1861.
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1860s witnessed widespread expansion of the sugar industry.
Exports of sugar in the period increased markedly, from
50,643 tons in 1861 to 72,943 tons in 1871. 4 In the early
years of the decade, the united Kingdom was still
responsible for nearly 90 percent of the country's exports;
but during the latter part of the 1860s, dependence on
British markets declined when the united states became a
major export outlet. The Guyanese planter preferred the
infant American market, because he was guaranteed cash on
delivery, whereas in England, payment was generally slow in
coming, and the laws governing sugar exports much too
cumbersome. By the late 1860s, the United states
represented almost 33 percent, and Britain 55 percent, of
Guyanese exports.
Changes in the destination of exports were accompanied
by a transformation in the structure of ownership in the
sugar industry. Family ownership of estates were replaced
by new corporate ownership, so that by 1871, only one-tenth
of the 136 estates left in the country were being managed by
resident proprietors. 5 The increased overseas domination
merely served to tighten the existing global linkages
between Guyana and the core.
In 1884 the world-wide slump in sugar prices, and the
depression which subsequently followed, meant that the
4B. B., 1861 and 1871.
50es Voeux Commission Report, 1871, p. 77.
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planters, fearing massive unemployment and unrest, were
forced for the first time to contemplate alternative
employment opportunities in Guyana. As a result, the rice
industry and gold mining were allowed to emerge to cushion a
potentially disastrous situation.
within the sugar industry, there was a marked decline
in the number of sugar estates in the 1880s. However, this
does not adequately apprise one of the state of sugar in
Guyana. Problems were being encountered on the demand side
(i.e., in the metropolitan markets), but the supply of sugar
had actually increased. between 1881 and 1891, rising from an
export figure of 92,323 tons to 116,968 tons. 6 The industry
had become more productive and yet it was in the midst of a
depression.
Georgetown's and New Amsterdam's development
trajectories were undeniably dependent on external trade
with the core. Exports from Guyana in 1884 amounted to
$2,322,032. 7 The Port of Georgetown in this year cleared a
total of 1,014 ships (668 British and 346 foreign), and New
Amsterdam cleared 42 (26 British and 16 foreign).8 Two
years later, with the recession firmly in place, exports
dropped to $1,842,585. 9 Meanwhile, the number of ships
6B. B. , 1881 and 189!.
7B. B. , 1884.
8Ibid.
9B. B. , 1886.
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clearing Georgetown's port fell to 742 (508 British and 234
foreign) and New Amsterdam's to 25 (6 British and 19
foreign).10 Consequently, both urban areas were unable to
undertake badly needed infrastructural projects.
The manufacturing base of Georgetown was simply too
inadequate to offset the malaise engendered by the events of
1884. Georgetown's entire manufacturing sector in 1885
consisted of three iron foundries and machines shops, two
steam saw mills, the gas works, two woodworking companies,
one steam bakery, and two match factories. 1I Manufacturing
partially served local needs in the towns and rural areas,
and because these were limited, the dependency on the
metropole for manufacturing goods was enormous.
New Amsterdam's decline was also attributable to the
slump in shipping traffic at its port. The town's status as
the country's second port suffered another severe blow with
the establishment of a port of entry at Skeldon, on the
Corentyne coast in 1898. 12 Ships could now leave Skeldon
without having to go to New Amsterdam for customs clearance.
In 1911, only 14 ships (1,471 tons) entered New Amsterdam,
whilst 952 (8,196 tons) entered Springlands (the port
serving Skeldon) .13
IOIbid.
IIB.B., 1885.
12M.C.C., March 11, 1898.
13B.B.,1911.
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The outbreak of the First World War rekindled a
measure of prosperity in the country, and in the sugar
industry in particular. High prices stimulated cultivation,
and by 1916 the sugar estates had 92,004 acres under
cultivation. 14 Canada was the major market for Guyanese
sugar, with exports totalling $6,647,063. The war had also
opened the French market· for the first time, and $1,319,673
of dark crystals (as opposed to yellow) were sent to that
country. The following year, the acreage under cultivation
increased to 92,721;15 but whilst Canada remained the most
profitable market, France no longer was in receipt of
Guyanese sugar. Guyanese economic dependence remained
strictly a canadian, American, and British affair.
The rice industry was also substantially aided by the
war. Rice imports from the Far East, the major supplier to
the West Indies, were severely curtailed by disruptions in
shipping transportation. Guyana quickly filled the niche,
and its cultivation and output rose appreciably. In 1914,
the area under rice cultivation was 44,889 acres, but by
1917 it had soared to 58,090 acres, with exports reaching
14,367 tons .16 One hundred and twenty-one rice mills were
operating in the country, 35 in Demerara, 19 in Essequibo,
and 67 in Berbice. The war had stimulated the rice
14B.B., 1916.
15B. B., 1917.
16B.B., 1913-14 and 1917.
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industry, and this in turn had opened up some degree of
regional trade between Guyana and its West Indian neighbors.
Rice exports went not only to the British islands, but to
the French and Dutch as well. Previously, regional trade
had been little more than marginal. Guyana was attached
exclusively to metropolitan markets, but the unexpected
conditions of 1914 rendered fresh possibilities.
INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE
Emancipation resulted in the decline of certain
industries in the plantation economy as well as the
development of new ones. This section charts the collapse
of cotton, the consolidation of sugar, and the emergence of
rice and gold.
The growth of the peasantry following emancipation,
accelerated the decline of the plantation economy. In
particular, cotton and coffee plantations collapsed in rapid
fashion. In 1828, there were 174 cotton and coffee
plantations; by 1843, the last exports of cotton were being
made; and by 1849, there were only 16 coffee plantations,
and these subsequently collapsed. A commission report in
1850 described the desperate position of certain parts of
the count~y.. 17 In Demerara, the district of Abary "once
blooming with fields of cotton" was "now a series of
pestilent swamps, overrun with bush, and productive of
17Report to His Excellency Henry Barkly 1850, op. cit.
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malignant fevers." From Mahaicony to Mahaica, the only
estate in cultivation was Plantation Farm; the remainder
were either abandoned or being used as pasture for cattle.
Roads and bridges throughout the county were in a state of
disrepair. In many places they were virtually impassable,
and as a result a number of estates were cut off, save
during the dry season.
Canals Nos. 1, 2, and 3 presented a scene of "almost
total desolation." In 1829, Canals Nos. 1 and 2 contained
30 coffee and plantain estates alone, which produced
1,027,120 pounds of coffee; but in 1850 there were only
eight. Of these, five were rented to African-Guyanese, who
had fragmented the estates into tiny holdings and were
concentrating on ground provisions. Meanwhile the total
production of coffee in Guyana amounted to 91,056 pounds in
1849 (Table VIII). This was a remarkable decline, since in
1829 the single plantation of Java alone had produced a crop
of 100,000 pounds. The decline was also significant when
compared with the country's 1848 production of 318,490
pounds.
Sugar production had also fallen during the 1847-49
period, although for sugar planters the situation was not
quite so bleak. Amongst the three counties, however,
Essequibo suffered the greatest reverses in agricultural
production. Coffee had virtually disappeared, and one-third
of the sugar plantations had ceased operations between 1829
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TABLE VIII
COMPARATIVE PRODUCTION OF SUGAR AND COFFEE
1847-1849
1847
1848
1849
Sugar
72,407,273
64,551,857
60,684,454
Coffee
117,021
318,490
91,056
Source: Report to His Excellency Henry Barkly, 1850.
and 1850. Berbice, which was once a thriving cotton-
producing region, had abandoned the crop. Sugar remained,
but coffee had virtually ceased to exist.
In 1884, following the price collapse of sugar, the
rice industry which had been actively suppressed by planters
since slavery days was acceded to, though somewhat
grudgingly. Rice emerged as a subsistence crop with the aid
of the sugar industry, which allowed rice farmers the use of
its drainage and irrigation facilities. In 1886, a firm
commitment was made to the rice industry when laborers were
encouraged to plant 200 acres of rice at Anna Regina, on the
Essequibo coast. From this date onwards, the industry
gradually expanded in acreage and production. Rice was also
grown on the savannah lands behind the estates on East Coast
Demerara, and on the east coast of Berbice. A new Crown
Lands bill also made provision for renting out C~own Lands
for the cultivation of rice at four shillings and two pence
per acre per annum. IK
IKB. B ., 1886.
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Planters who had surreptitiously thwarted the gold
industry in the early 1860s now welcomed the discovery of
gold in the interior in the 1880s. In 1884, the export of
gold was only 250 ounces, but by 1887 it had risen to ov~:
11,900 ounces .19 Large numbers of African-Guyanese ventured
into the interior as "pork-knockers",2° and by 1891 there
were at least 4,172 in the hinterland. 21
From 1881-1891, through amalgamation and
consolidation, the acreage under cane cultivation had
increased from 77,379 acres to 78,307. 22 In an effort to
remain competitive, many estates expended large outlays on
improvements in sugar machinery, chiefly in the direction of
evaporators, the adoption of which was said to contribute
exceptional savings in fuel and labor in an ostensibly
labor-surplus economy.
Indians living off the estates were chiefly self-
employed in the rice industry. Rice cultivation had been
steadily increasing. Between 1884 and 1893 an average of
2,500 acres was devoted to rice cultivation. Thereafter,
cultivation expanded to 7,490 acres in 1898, 17,300 acres in
1905, and 30,000 acres in 1911. By 1905 the country was
19Bronkhurst 1890, op. cit., p. 61.
2~iners cum prospectors.
21Census 1891.
22B. B., 1881 and 1891.
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self-sufficient in rice, and producers had begun to export
the staple to th~ nearby West Indian Islands.
Meanwhile, African-Guyanese who had followed the
fortunes of the gold industry into the interior in the 1890s
were faced with an industry that was in decline in the
1900s. Having already abandoned the villages, the miners,
pork-knockers, and mechanics returned from the interior to
Georgetown to look for employment opportunities. The city,
however, did not have the employment base to absorb this
segment of the population. Georgetown was but a colonial
city on the periphery, without an industrial base, dependent
on commercial, trading, and service activities.
Labor Supply:
Because labor was in short supply during most of the
period, this sub-section is devoted to some of the measures
taken by planters to retain the work force on the coastal
plain.
Subsequent to emancipation in 1838, labor was an
extremely precious commodity. Wages had risen considerably
as planters sought to employ scarce labor by bidding against
each other in a free labor market. D Many laborers, to the
chagrin of the planters, began to form task gangs and to
organize for higher wages. Negotiations were handled by a
23Report of the Select committee of the House of Commons
on the Commercial State of the West India Colonies. 1842. No.
479, p. 4.
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village headman, who contracted the gang out to the planter
posing the highest bid. These gangs travelled throughout
the coast, and would often hold out for all sorts of
inducements before accepting employment. Indeed, many
laborers began to withhold their labor by working for a
shorter period of time each week.~
The planters were in a severe bind, and unable to
afford the increased labor costs, they reduced operations.
This was reflected in the disappointing production figures
of the new post-emancipation era. By 1839 the production of
sugar had declined by roughly 30 percent over the previous
year, to 61.5 million pounds. It decreased to 54.7 million
pounds in 1841, when the planters decided to staunch the
downhill spiral. Putting forward a common front, they
advanced a plan to reduce production costs by lowering wages
to pre-emancipation levels. Furthermore, they revoked a
number of in-kind payments. These actions were implemented
in a nukber of ways: stoppage of food and medicine
allowances, prohibition of fishing in the trenches belonging
to the ~states, barring those who left the estates from
!
reapingithe crops they had planted, and destruction of
workers' pig pens kept on the estates. The few remaining
fruit trees, which provided the laborers with an additional
24Grey , Earl. 1853. The Colonial Policv of Lord John
Russell's Administration. London, p. 57.
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source of food, were cleared away.~ Fines were to be
imposed for non-compliance of work on the estate, and,
perhaps most importantly, laborers who did not comply with
any of the above rules faced expulsion from the estate.
strengthened by the discipline of the task gangs, the
workers were able to counter-organize and retaliate by
launching the first general strike in Guyanese history - in
January of 1842.
The 1842 strike occurred at the start of the crop
season. Given the limited labor supply and the fact that
indentured immigration was still in its infancy, the
planters quickly realized that the only way to avert an
impending disaster was to rescind the regulations. Within
six weeks, the planters capitulated and the strike was over.
For the first time in Guyana's colonial history, the white
power structure had been breached. However, the new
proletariat did not savor the success of its first
industrial action. Tenants on the estates recognized the
precariousness of their position vis-a-vis the planters.
Lacking the security of tenure, they immediately made plans
to leave the estates. This further stimulated the migration
from the plantations to the villages, which had been
underway since 1838.
25Milliroux, M.F. 1843. Demerara, Transition from Slavery
to Liberty. Tr. McFarlane, 1877, London, p. 46.
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In 1846, sugar prices in Britain fell from 18 pounds
to 10 pounds per ton, and this was followed by another
industrial cataclysm. 26 The planters responded to the
economic crisis by opting to reduce wages by 25 percent. A
strike ensued in December 1847, but in contrast to the
outcome in 1842, in this strike the workers were defeated
within a few months. The labor force had been augmented by
immigration, and this shift resulted in a lack of solidarity
amongst the workers.
Nevertheless, according to the 1850 commission report,
it appears that large numbers of African-Guyanese left the
countryside to become freeholders on the east coast and east
bank of the Demerara River, near Georgetown, where they
could benefit from the town's market and superior
facilities. Those who remained soon established their own
villages; this move quickly reduced the labor supply
necessary for the plantations. On the islands of Leguan and
Wakenaam, at the mouth of the Essequibo River, at least
2,000 people were estimated to be living in villages. 27
Berbice also faced a serious shortage of labor on the
plantations. Out of an estimated rural population of
18,000, almost 12,000 were dispersed over small freeholds or
were squatting in settlements up the creeks and rivers. 28
uWebber 1931, op. cit., p. 217.
27Report to His Excellency Henry Barkly 1850, op. cit.
2~Ibid .
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East Coast Demerara was considered to be the most
flourishing district in the whole country. This was partly
attributable to a number of peculiar circumstances. The
Demerara East Coast Railway had commenced in 1848 with a
line from Georgetown (Cummingsburg) to Plaisance. This new
rail line had attracted a large number of African-Guyanese,
who had established villages along the line to take
advantage of the improved communications with Georgetown.
Although these newcomers did not labor continuously on the
nearby estates, they did occasionally contribute to the
plantation work force. Furthermore, the estates were able
to draw labor from Georgetown to supplement shortages in
their supply. Estates such as Thomas, Kitty, Bel Air,
Enmore, Annandale, Lusignan, Mon Repos, Le Resouvenir, and
Ogle were able to continue production on a scale that was
comparable to pre-emancipation days. A similar situation
existed on East Bank Demerara, near Georgetown. Plantations
La Penitence, Ruimveldt, and Houston were able to utilize
labor from Georgetown to develop into "three of the finest
estates in the colony. ,,29
For Indians, out-migration from the plantations
escalated following the collapse of sugar prices in 1884.
Planters saddled with a labor surplus and declining returns
began to promote the development of the rice industry.
self-preservation rather than altruism governed the
29I bid.
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planters' remarkable volte face. Rice not only absorbed
surplus labor, but by promoting subsistence it also lowered
the cost of labor. Furthermore, sugar planters were able to
keep this supplementary labor force on the coast, and at the
same time dependent on the estates through their control of
drainage and irrigation. This was because rice farming did
not generate sufficient income to peasant farmers who were
forced to become a semi-proletarianized labor force on the
estates. The fact that sugar and rice crops did not compete
for labor at the same time meant that the estates were in a
position to tap this complementary labor supply should they
so wish.
Village Movement
Although migration to the towns was significant, it
did not account for the most important spatial transition in
the early years of post-emancipation Guyana. In situations
where their former owners were willing and able to pay
decent and regular wages, the freed slaves remained as
plantation laborers. Indeed, the British Government and the
plantocracy had intended for the newly freed slaves to
remain on the plantations to labor for wages, but the
majority of the ex-slaves were far more enterprising than
was anticipated. The ex-slaves were determined to avoid
further exploitation on the plantations. After
emancipation, they began to purchase land and to establish
villages of their own on the Guyanese littoral. This sub-
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section addresses the development and eventual demise of
what became known as the village movement.
Villages developed as a result of two distinct methods
of land acquisition. The first involved ex-slaves pooling
their resources to purchase abandoned plantations, primarily
cotton and coffee, in order to set up "communal" villages. 3D
In this type of village, land titles were vested in the form
of a single deed, and shares were allocated to the
purchasers. The land itself was undivided, and was
developed by the group in common. The second method of
acquisition resulted in the establishment of "proprietary"
villages. 31 Proprietary villages were formed by proprietors
who had purchased their land individually and held titles in
their own right. They were located on the front lands of
sugar plantations whose far-sighted owners had laid out
uncultivated lands into residential lots so that a regular
work force could be maintained nearby. The plots of land
were deliberately kept small, varying from one-quarter to
one-half an acre, so that peasant proprietors would find it
exceedingly difficult to be completely self-reliant. Houses
were built along the coastal road, and land remaining in the
back was used for farming. Hence, settlement morphology was
elongated, and this form has continued to the present day.
3DYoung, A. 1958. The Approaches to Local Self-Government
in British Guiana. London: Longmans Green, p. 13.
31Ibid., p. 11.
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The first communal village was formed in November
1839, when 83 laborers purchased the abandoned 500-acre
Plantation Northbrook, on the east coast of Demerara, for
$10,000. The new owners renamed the plantation Victoria,
after the reigning British monarch whom they erroneously
believed was responsible for their freedom. In the
following year, four more estates were purchased and
converted to communal villages on the west coast of Berbice.
Plantation Golden Grove, consisting of 500 acres, was
purchased for $1,716 by 14 laborers; 500 acres of Plantation
Litchfield was purchased, by 12 laborers for $3,000; 250
acres of the eastern half of Plantation Perseverance was
acquired, by 109 persons for $2,000; and 252 acres of
Plantation st. John was obtained, by 46 laborers for
$5,000.n
Communal villages were located for the most part on
the east coast of Demerara, the west coast of Berbice, the
west bank of the Berbice River, and the Corentyne region of
Berbice. In Demerara the explicit focus of village
development was within 20 miles of Georgetown, whilst in
Berbice a good deal of village development centered on New
Amsterdam.
Proprietary villages, on the other hand, were mainly
to be found on the Essequibo coast, the west coast of
Demerara, and the west bank of the Demerara River. The
nIbid., p. 220.
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first proprietary village was founded in Essequibo in 1840,
when the owner of Plantations Dageraad, Mocha, and Westfield
divided the front lands of these adjacent estates into lots
and sold them to the ex-slaves for up to $200 each. 33
within a short time a flourishing village had come into
existence, and was accorded the name of Queenstown, again in
tribute to Queen Victoria. Aside from Queenstown, other
notable proprietary villages included: Williamstown on the
Essequibo coast; Providence, Craig, and Supply on the east
bank of the Demerara River; Den Amstel and Good Hope on the
west coast of Demerara; and Cumberland, Fyrish, and Skeldon
in the Berbice region.
The land hunger of the ex-slaves did not go unnoticed
by the planters. Plantation Kitty, appraised for $265,000
in 1837, was on the market for $330,000 in 1840.
Speculation became rife, so much so that the price for an
acre of land almost doubled the pre-emancipation level. In
May 1840, Beterverwagting, a 400-acre estate, was sold for
$22,000, double the price paid for Northbrook, although it
was only four-fifths the size of the latter and was located
nearby.34
The high price of land failed to slow the demand by
the ex-slaves; and by 1841 the "village movement" was in
33Ibid., p. 1I.
3.IIbid., p. 14.
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full stride when it was unexpectedly stimulated by the
general strike of 1842.
Both migration to the villages and the formation of
coastal settlements benefitted directly from the strike.
with the sugar industry in chaos, land values declined
significantly, reversing the inflationary prices paid for
estates often a few months earlier. Some laborers were able
to purchase land at bargain-basement prices. Plantation
Plaisance, five miles from Georgetown on the east coast of
Demerara, was sold for $39,000 with all buildings and a
couple of mules. A year earlier, Plantation Friendship, an
estate that was abandoned but slightly larger than
Plaisance, was sold for twice the price. On the east bank
of Demerara, villages within easy reach of Georgetown were
commenced at Farm, Garden of Eden, and Peter's Hall. In
Berbice, Plantation Enfield was sold for $10,000, although a
decade earlier it had been worth $145,000; and Plantation
Port Mourant was sold for $35,000, although it had been
assessed at $175,000 during the apprenticeship period. The
county of Essequibo witnessed the emergence of the villages
of Danielstown and Bush Lot, and the trebling of the
population of the village of Queenstown. n By the end of
1842, over 15,000 acres of plantation had been purchased for
more than a quarter of a million dollars. An estimated
~Ibid., pp. 17-18.
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16,000 African-Guyanese were now residing in villages formed
in the post-emancipation era.~
Mimicking the events of 1842, the strike of 1847 was
followed by increased migration from the plantations to the
villages. More than 10,000 laborers abandoned the estates
for villages. The village population now amounted to 44,456
persons, whilst only 19,939 African-Guyanese remained on the
sugar plantations. 37 Land values declined precipitously,
and this led to increased purchases. For example, in
November 1848, Plantation Great Diamond was sold for $9,000,
although it had recently been valued at $150,000. 38 Between
June 1847 and December 1848, the population growth in some
of the established villages was quite remarkable. The
population of Victoria increased from 827 to 2,370;
Plaisance, from 131 to 1,372; and Queenstown, from 148 to
877. 39 Before 1838, there were only three villages on the
Guyana coast: Mahaicony, Mahaica, and Aberdeen. By 1848,
over 100 villages were strewn along this low-lying
plantation belt. Twenty-five communal villages consisting
of 9,049 acres had been purchased for $400,000; 7,000
persons were in possession of 6,413 acres of land worth
$631,000 in the proprietary villages; and 13 settlements
36 It' . tC emen 1 1937, op. Cl ., p. 280.
37 • tYoung 1958, op. Cl ., p. 23.
38Ibid., p. 21.
39Ibid.
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bought for $7,000 were to be found on Crown Lands. The
number of houses in the villages stood at 10,544, with an
estimated construction cost of one million dollars and
another half million dollars spent on land improvements.
Therefore, between 1838 and 1848, African-Guyanese had spent
two-and-a-half million dollars on the purchase of land,
housing, and improvements, in what can only be considered a
determined effort to gain their economic independence from
the sugar planters.
Pressured by the plantocracy and the Colonial
Government through political and legal maneuvers and
discriminatory taxation policies, the village movement,
which had reached its zenith only in 1848, was already
beginning to decline in 1851. Villagers had exhausted all
their savings on the purchase of land, the construction of
houses, and in a few cases machinery. In the early years of
the post-emancipation era, laborers had paid as much as $240
an acre for estates, but this exorbitant purchase price had
declined to less than $10 an acre by 1850. Consequently,
villagers had little or no working capital left to maintain
estates that required significant expenditure outlays for
the maintenance of drainage, irrigation, and sea defense
facilities.
Successful peasant agriculture on the Guyanese coast
required a combined and concerted effort to regulate the
elaborate system of dams, sea defenses, sluices, and
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drainage canals which controlled the flow of water on the
plantations. The villagers simply did not possess the
organizational ability, the technical skills, nor the
financial resources to cope with the overhead facilities
required to undertake this task. And since no individual
peasant proprietor could cultivate his plot unless the whole
estate's infrastructure was in working order, the villages
became little more than "pestiferous swamps". 40 Houses were
inundated by water, and the roads and dams became so
impassable that in 1850 the mail from Georgetown to New
Amsterdam was often delayed. 41 Sometimes the only means of
getting about a village was by boats or corials. Every
member of a village was obliged to keep the channels of the
main drainage system, as well as his own piece of land, free
from mud and other obstructions, but few were so inclined.
In some cases, white plantation owners who had control of
drainage and irrigation facilities used them to swamp
adjacent villages. Q
The horrid state of the villages was further
compounded by the tendency towards land fragmentation, which
under the existing Roman-Dutch law mandated the distribution
4~odway and Stark 1895, Ope cit., p. 48.
41Rodway 1912, Ope cit., p. 175.
QDanns, G. and L. Matthews. 1989. Perspectives on the
Development and Underdevelopment of Communities in Guyana: A
sociohistorical Analysis. In M. Martin and T. Kandal (eds.),
Studies of Development and Change in the Modern World. New
York: Oxford university Press, p. 181.
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of holdings amongst the heirs of the deceased proprietors,
unless they were specifically barred by some prematrimonial
settlement. Fragmentation militated against large-scale
production, and rendered impossible a viable subsistence
economy. Fragmentation further served to complicate
cooperative endeavors, by increasing the number of vested
interests in a village, and thus its organizational ability
to deal with village matters.
Related to the fragmentation of holdings was the
problem of titles to village lands. Communal villages had
been bought as single units, with titles being vested in one
or a few selected proprietors on behalf of all the
shareholders. This system of purchasing cooperatively soon
disintegrated with exposure to the dominant individualist
capitalist ideology of the times. Instead of owning lands
in common, shareholders sought to secure titles in
severality. This led to frequent disputes, since cadastral
surveys had not been made in many cases. Proprietors had
simply agreed on individual boundaries in demarcating their
parcels of land. Oftentimes land was distributed to
individuals throughout the estate, to ensure some degree of
equality with respect to fertility and other locational
benefits. The result was not only greater fra9~entation,
but substantial difficulties in ascertaining title, and
hence security of tenure.
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villages were also saddled with the burden of
I
maintaining the pUblic road and bridges which ran throu~h
I
their villages. Unlike the maintenance of drainage andl
I
other infrastructural works discussed previously, the
maintenance of the pUblic road, formerly the responsibility
of the European plantation owner, was now a legal oblig~tion
of the villagers. Failure to keep up the road not only
resulted in personal inconvenience, but under the law it
could result in the loss of the village itself. with a ,view
toward collecting the necessary funds to repair the road and
bridges, the Court of Policy passed a number of ordinan6es
to remedy the situation. For instance, Ordinance No. 10 of
I
1849 authorized the commissioners of the village of
Queenstown, Essequibo, to levy a rate of 2 percent on the
value of all lots and buildings in the village, 'to meet the
cost of road maintenance.
The villagers rallied against the new rates. Many saw
I
them as the final straw in the dissolution of the vlllage
I
movement. For whilst the villages were asked to meet the
full costs of pUblic works through the rates on property,
the Colonial Government was sUbsidizing the Plan~ers by I
I
financing up to one-third of the costs of immigration. IA
I
solution to the infrastructural problems of the villages
I
would have been to charge the general revenues of the
I
country with the maintenance of the requisite services. I
I
This, of course, would have increased pUblic expenditure,
I
187
and also would have shifted the burden from the villager to
the plantocracy. This scenario, could not be played out in
the planter-dominated Combined Court, whose members insisted
on the levying of local rates. Maintaining control and
improving its own position were the guiding principles of
planter policy. Emphasis was placed on those reforms
considered most beneficial for the plantocracy. Thus, items
not related to planting concerns were given scant attention.
In 1851, the unequal and discriminatory nature of
Guyanese society was blatantly apparent. At a time when
planters were benefiting from subsidized immigration,
Georgetown was receiving additional dollars from the pUblic
purse through various license arrangements, the villages
and the fledgling African-Guyanese peasantry were expected
to be self-supporting. In the face of major structural
features impeding village development, and enhancing rural
unemployment and underemployment, villagers were pushed to
the urban centers in search of work. Those who remained
became semidependent on the plantations, with only a
minority remaining an independent peasantry.
Immigration
Attempts to solve the colony's labor problem also
produced totally new migrants, new to the colony and from
new parts of the world. Another strategy pursued by the
plantocracy after emancipation was the quest for an
alternative labor force through indentured immigration.
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Indentured labor was certainly not new to the caribbean;
other colonies had sought to acquire European bondservants
for agricultural labor from the sixteenth century onwards.
Proving unsatisfactory and unreliable, European forced labor
was abandoned in favor of African slaves. Even before
August 1, 1838, the planters had sought to introduce a
malleable labor force into Guyana. Blinkered by centuries
of coercive labor practices, planters simply could not
conceive of a free labor market. During the apprenticeship
period (1834-38), they had already introduced laborers from
Africa, the West Indies, Madeira, and India. However, the
emancipation of 1838, the consequent development of the
village movement, and migration to the two urban areas only
served to magnify the acuteness of the labor problem. It
was widely felt that Africans should be prepared to work
cheaply, steadily, and consistently, whenever their labor
was wanted and for as long as it was wanted. According to
this point of view, both the migrants to Georgetown and New
Amsterdam and the peasantry had betrayed the planters in
their abandonment of the sugar estates. Salvation of
Guyana's economy, therefore, required imports of labor from
abroad to cultivate what remained of the plantations. The
planters turned to India for what they hoped would be a
cheaper and more reliable labor source.
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The system of indentured labor pursued by the planters,
although arguably legally defensible, was to all intents and
purposes a "new system of slavery." According to Ruhoman:
No trick of sophistry or twist of logic; no
adornment of rhetoric or contrivance of art; can
ever avail to defend, successfully, the system of
semi-slavery, paraded under the guise of indentured
immigration, under which Indians were brought to
the colony to labour on the sugar plantations, in
the interests of a powerful and privileged body of
capitalists. 43
Laborers were brought on contracts or bonds signed in
British India. Drought and famine produced a large labor
market throughout the Indian Ocean region.
The planters were successful however in convincing the
British Government that immigration was necessary, by
establishing that there was an identity of interests between
them and the public. The colony's very foundation was said
to be dependent on the sugar industry. Even the ex-slaves,
they argued, who were migrating to the villages would
prosper as the sugar industry prospered.
Indentured immigration was not without its critics in
the metropole. Abolitionists charged that the treatment
meted out to indentured immigrants was both brutal and
unjust. John ScobIe, the Secretary of the Anti-Slavery
society, on a fact-finding tour in Guyana in 1839, found
ample evidence of cruelty. contrary to their contracts,
43Ruhoman, P. 1947. Centenary History of the East Indians
in British Guiana, 1838-1938. Georgetown: Daily Chronicle, p.
118.
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laborers were ofteN flogged, and on one plantation it was
,
alleged that salt Was applied to the wounds. M Evidence was
1
also unearthed that many of the laborers were tricked or
coerced into coming to Guyana. This was exemplified by a
"
report in which a group of about 20 indentured laborers were
1
found trying to cut their way eastward, through the bush, in
1
the hope of reaching Bengal!45 Mortality amongst the group
1
was particularly high; of the initial batch of 396 who had
arrived in May 1838, 64 had died by September 1839.~
Furthermore, abolitionists argued that the immigrants were
1
providing unfair competition for free African workers by
depressing wages.
1
The furor ove!r Indian immigration led to its
suspension in July 11838, and prohibition during the fall of
1838. 47 The plantens were now faced with a catastrophic
situation, at a time when African-Guyanese were leaving the
plantations en masse and sugar production had declined by a
third. They despenately wanted pUblic aid to subsidize
their immigration enterprises, and in 1839 the Court of
Policy passed an ondinance granting a loan of 400,000 pounds
for the purpose of lintroducing immigrants into the colony.
MScoble, J'. 1840. Hill Coolies in British Guiana and
Mauritius. London, p. 16.
I
45Ibid., p. 20.
46Nath 1970, op. cit., pp. 22-23.
47Nath 1970, op. cit., pp. 22-23.
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The ordinance was opposed by the governor, and when it
reached the Colonial Office it was disallowed. The British
Government did not disagree with the idea of enlarging or
supplementing the labor supply; however, it was unsure
whether public revenue should be used to finance planters in
Guyana.
If the capitalists are anxious to enlarge their
agricultural and manufacturing operations, it seems
reasonable that the expense should be borne by
themselves, and that funds to which every member of
society is a contributor should not, for this
purpose, be diverted from their more legitimate
destination."
Undaunted by the rejection, the planters petitioned
the Queen to authorize the loan and to lift the embargo on
Indian immigration. However, Lord John Russell, who had
replaced Normandy as the Secretary of State for the
Colonies, also rejected the request:
I confess I should be unwilling to adopt any
measure to favour the transfer of labourers from
British India to Guiana, after the failure of the
former experiment. Admitting that the mortality of
the Hill coolies first sent may have been
accidental, I am not prepared to encounter the
responsibility of a measure which may lead to a
loss of life on the one hand, or, on the other, to
a new system of slavery.fi
A few enterprising planters had anticipated the
Colonial Government's decision and had established a
Voluntary subscription Immigration Society in December of
1839, through which subscribers were to be allotted
480fficial Despatch, Normandy to Light, Aug. 15, 1839.
fiOfficial Despatch, Russell to Light, Feb. 15, 1840.
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immigrants in proportion to their investment. The
undertaking proved to be a financial disaster.
Nevertheless, between April 1840 and February 1841, the
society did succeed in introducing into Guyana about 2,900
freed African laborers from Barbados, and about 70 African-
Americans from Baltimore, Maryland, in the united states.
Most of the immigrants from Baltimore returned home, whilst
the Barbadians were left to drift into the villages and the
towns. 50
Smarting from the Home Government's decision to
disallow the immigration loan ordinance, the plantocracy
sought to utilize their control of the Combined Court by
refusing to pass the civil List from which government
official salaries were paid, unless they could be guaranteed
loans for unfettered immigration. Faced with a stoppage of
supplies, the British Government appointed Sir Henry
Macleod, the Governor of the neighboring colony of Trinidad,
to arbitrate in the matter. Macleod quickly adjudicated a
settlement and on January 7, 1841, a civil List was passed
for seven years. In return, the Combined Court was allowed
to pass an ordinance on January 18, 1841, in which surplus
revenue was to be used to finance the importation of
immigrants. 51 During 1841 a total of 8,144 immigrants were
~Rodway 1894, op. cit., vol. III, pp. 100-102; Webber
1931, op. cit., Appendix, P. xvi.
)lClementi 1937, op. cit., p. 115.
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introduced - 4,297 Portuguese from Madeira, 2,745 from the
West Indies, and 1,102 from Africa. No Indians arrived,
since immigration from that country was still prohibited.
Mortality among the Portuguese was extremely high,
partly owing to an epidemic which decimated their numbers in
1841. As a result, immigration from this source was
suspended in May 1842. Bounty-aided immigration from the
West Indies had already been terminated in October 1841,
following complaints of poaching by West Indian planters.
Not for the first time, the Guyanese planters were faced
with what they considered to be an intolerable situation.
To illustrate their case, they pointed to the immigration
figures, which had declined to 2,767 persons in 1842.
Planting interests in the Combined Court took up the fight
and threatened once again to hold up the civil List. The
British Government, unwilling to invoke an Act of Parliament
in order to curtail the powers of the Combined Court,
capitulated to the plantocracy. Pressure was brought to
bear on the Indian Government to rescind the prohibition on
immigration, and by November 1844 emigration to Guyana was
reopened. At the same time the Combined Court was
authorized to raise a loan of 500,000 pounds for immigration
purposes. The success of the planters was now complete.
The village movement, emancipation, and restrictive
immigration laws had greatly threatened their stranglehold
on Guyana's economy; but with ample recourse to immigration,
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they had succeeded in circumventing the uncertainties of a
free labor market and had reasserted their economic
hegemony.
Following the policy reversals by the Indian and
British Governments, 816 Indians arrived in Guyana in 1845.
Large-scale immigration was now in full swing, and under the
auspices of the government. Between 1846 and 1848, 24,848
indentured laborers were brought into the country, of whom
11,025 came from India, 10,036 from Madeira, 3,359 from
Africa, and 428 from the West Indies.
After a temporary suspension during 1849-50, Indian
immigration was reopened in 1851. This was particularly
important to the sugar industry, for it resulted in
tremendous gains in the production and export of sugar and
its by-products. Between 1838 and 1917, when the indentured
system was terminated, 238,960 Indians were introduced into
Guyana (Table IX). Indian immigration far overshadowed all
other immigrant groups in the post-emancipation era.
Chinese immigration was inaugurated in 1853 when 647
immigrants arrived in the colony, but the difficulty of
obtaining an adequate supply meant that immigration of this
group was rather sporadic. Their numbers were never very
high, and by the time they stopped coming to Guyana in an
organized fashion in 1878, only 13,534 had arrived.
Portuguese immigration commenced in 1835 with a batch of 429
laborers, and ended in 1882, at which time 31,628 persons
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were brought to Guyana. By the time the indentured system
ended in 1917, these three groups were augmented by a total
of 40,883 West Indians and 13,355 Africans.
TABLE IX
GUYANESE INDENTURED IMMIGRATION 1835-1917
Origin Number Dates
India 238,960 1838-1917
China 14,189 1853-1912
Madeira, Azores,
Cape Verde 31,628 1835-1882
West Indies 40,883 1835-1917
Africa 13,355 1838-1865
England 21 1851
Malta 208 1839
USA 70 1840
Total 339,314
Sources: Webber 1931, p. XVIi
Nath 1970, pp. 219-220.
Note: Although Indian indentured immigration
ceased in 1917, 607 Indians returned from India
during the 1920s to become free settlers in
Guyana. An additional 1,729 West Indians also
arrived in the country during this period.
Therefore, between 1835 and 1928 a total of
341,650 recorded contract immigrants from all
corners of the globe arrived in Guyana.
Throughout the 1884 depression, planters never ceased
their strident calls for immigration. Although the rate of
immigration declined after 1884, 5,779 immigrants arrived in
1891. 52 state-aided immigration of the Portuguese had
ceased in 1882, and that from the West Indies had ended in
1886i therefore, all immigrants were now coming from the
nNath 1970, op. cit., p. 220.
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Indian sub-continent. In 1886, expenditure on immigration
was costing the colony $236,897; the cost of return passages
alone was $123,OOO.D
The sugar industry was once again flourishing during
World War I, but in the midst of its rediscovered glory, the
plantocracy was confronted with a new crisis. The Indian
government, pressured by pUblic opinion at home, abolished
the system of indenture in 1917. The government's
indictment of the system was on two counts. Firstly, the
recruitment system was deemed to be inequitable since
Indians were bound to go to a distant land where they were
prevented from choosing an employer of their choice, were
paid a wage less than that of a free person, were tied to an
employer for five years, and had to live on the estates
under very restrictive circumstances. Secondly, the
government concluded that conditions in the colony were not
conducive for the well-being of immigrants, and this was
evidenced by the large numbers of prosecutions brought
against them, their high mortality rates, high rates of
suicide, and immorality on the estates.~
DWebber 1931, Ope cit., p. 296.
~Official Despatch from Secretary of State for the
Colonies on the SUbject of the Total Abolition of Indentured
Immigration from India, M.C.C., 1916.
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DEMOGRAPHY
utilizing census data from 1851 to 1911, this section
examines the country's demographic structure, particularly
as it relates to Georgetown and New Amsterdam.
The Census of 1851, the first for which records are
readily available, enumerated a total population of 135,994,
or an increase of 37,840 from the figure for 1841 (Table
X)." The increase, however, must be attributed to
immigration, since during the intercensal period 43,314
persons, mostly Indians, and a fair number of Portuguese,
arrived in the colony. In 1841 the immigrant population was
only 14,328, or 14 percent of the population, but with their
increased numbers they had begun to irretrievably alter
Guyana's demographic as well as its spatial, political,
economic, and social structure.
TABLE X
RACIAL COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION 1851
Guyana % Georgetown 1 N/Amsterdam 1
Indian 7,682 5.6 871 3.4 153 3.3
African/Colored 108,428 79.7 20,907 82.0 3,978 85.9
White 3,630 2.7 3,730 14.6 499 10.8
Portuguese 7,928 5.8
Amerindians 7,000 5.1 3
Other 1.316
--ih.l
Total 135,994 99.0* 25,508 100.0 4,633 100.0
Source: Census 1851.
* Rounding accounts for deviations from 100 percent.
55Census 1851.
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In 1851, Georgetown boasted a population of 25,508, or
18.8 percent of the country's population (Table XI).~ Its
population had more than doubled since 1831, with much of
the growth stemming directly from the abolition of slavery.
The success of the village movement had deflected many
potential migrants to the urban areas.
TABLE XI
POPULATION DISTRIBUTION 1851-1911
Year Guyana Georgetown ~ N/Amsterdam ~ Urban ~
_0_
_0_
...2.
1851 135,994 25,508 18.8 4,633 3.4 30,141 22.2
1861 155,907 29,174 18.7 4,579 2.9 33,753 21.6
1871 193,491 36,562 18.9 5,437 2.8 41,999 21.7
1881 252,186 47,175 18.7 8,124 3.2 55,299 21.9
1891 278,328 53,176 19.1 8,903 3.2 62,079 22.3
1911 296,041 57,577 19.4 8,604 2.9 66,181 22.3
Sources: Census 1851-1911.
Schomburgk estimated the popUlation of Georgetown at
23,000 as early as 1843. n After that time the town's
growth was far from spectacular. Most of the growth which
occurred was concentrated within the city proper, but there
were also some noticeable developments in the sUburbs. 58
The suburbs of Freeburg and Newburg, Albertown, and Lodge
56Ibid.
57Schomburgk, Richard. 1847. Travels in British Guiana
1840-1844. Tr. W.E. Roth, 1922. Georgetown: Daily Chronicle,
p. 32.
5Kln 1842 Letters Patent were issued by Queen Victoria
ordaining Georgetown a City.
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contained 3,793 inhabitants, or nearly 15 percent of the
city's population. These three settlements were
overWhelmingly peopled by African-Guyanese (83 percent), who
had sought to build outside the wards, so as to take
advantage of lower land prices, lower taxes, and less-
stringent building regulations. Indeed, Georgetown as a
whole was predominantly African-Guyanese in 1851. Some 55
percent of its population was African-Guyanese, 27 percent
mixed,59 15 percent white, and 3 percent Indian. There were
no permanent Amerindian residents to be found in the city.w
When Schomburgk visited Georgetown in the early 1840s, he
observed that the "natives" were only very rarely seen in
the town. Perhaps their aversion to the place was partly
due to the deep schism that had developed between them and
the African-Guyanese population. Their role as slave-police
during slavery days had not been forgotten in a society
where stereotypes predominated the racial divide. According
to Schomburgk:
When such parties of Indians are noticed in the
city, the negroes do not let them out of their
sight but follow them like jackals or vultures
after a caravan in the desert, and as soon as the
vast quantity of liquor imbibed begins to take
effect, get hold of the remaining money or "trade"
already bought, either by fair means or foul. 61
~This group is most often identified with the African-
Guyanese population.
60Census 1851.
61Schomburgk 1847, op. cit., p. 61.
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In addition, their services were no longer required by the
white ruling class.
Before Emancipation, when the Colony still
particularly required the services of the Indians,
the authorities kept a large house or caravanserie
for them in the west end of the town, where they
could always find a camp on their temporary visits.
Now that their help is no longer required these
quarters have been allowed to go to ruin.~
The white population for the most part were composed
of the English. English merchants were predominant on Water
street, the commercial center of the city, where their
storehouses and wharves were accessible to the Demerara
River. Europeans resided mainly in Columbia and Lacytown ,
North and South cummingsburg, Kingston, Robbstown, and
Stabroek. The African and mixed populations were scattered
throughout the wards, but the highest number (3,305) were to
be found in Columbia and Lacytown. There were only 871
Indians in the city, and they were concentrated for the most
part in the wards of Stabroek and North cummingsburg. 63
Tha overall Indian population in Guyana numbered
7,682. No Indian immigrants arrived in the colony during
1849 and 1850. Those who were already in the country had
begun to leave the estates even before their contracts had
expired. III treatment and high mortality on the estates
convinced the Indians to head for the urban centers where
social services were more available. Failing to find
~Ibid.
~Census 1851.
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remunerative employment, many became vagrants, wandering
about the streets "or picking up refuse from the gutter". 64
Others simply died of want. Another possible reason for the
Indian immigrants leaving the estates was their observation
that patients treated in Georgetown's pUblic hospital had a
far greater chance for recovery than those who opted for
treatment on the estates.~ The pUblic hospital had been
built in 1843, as a result of a vote of 205,000 guilders
from the Combined Court.~ In addition, the urban areas
possessed more medical practitioners per population than the
rural areas where the immigrant was confined. Georgetown
boasted one doctor for every ~,319 persons; New Amsterdam,
one for every 1,158; and the countryside, one for every
4,409. 67
Hoping to restrict the Indians to the estates, the
plantocracy promulgated laws which prohibited an immigrant
from travelling more than two miles away from his or her
plantation without a pass. The power to arrest miscreants
was not limited to the police, but was also vested to
managers and overseers of the estates. As a further
precaution to prevent immigrants from entering Georgetown,
64Rodway 1912, op. cit., p.125.
65 d . tA amson 1972, op. C1 ., p. 49.
66B . B., 1843.
67Census 1851.
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pickets~ were strategically located at Vreeden HOOp and the
La Penitence Bridge at the outskirts of the city.
Immigrants with legitimate business in the city, including
those who were attempting to see their legal protector, the
Immigration Agent-General, were oftentimes arrested and
charged. 69
Portuguese immigrants were also moving off the
plantations, but their journey to the urban centers were
much different from those of the Indians. Portuguese
laborers were assisted by the Colonial Government, wholesale
merchants, and somewhat surprisingly, by the planters in
their efforts to withdraw from the plantations. The white
ruling class saw them as an integral component in the
continuation of white dominance, and as a means of stifling
the development of other racial groups. Portuguese
immigration peaked in 1846 when 5,975 laborers were brought
into Guyana. Rodway expressed the belief that the
portugulase received preferential treatment in order "to
!
drive the negroes into the fields. ,,70 By the mid 1840s,
i
i
wholesa~e merchants in Georgetown and New Amsterdam had
withdraln the credits they had previously offered the
i
African-Guyanese and colored population, and had in turn
extended them to the Portuguese, who rapidly utilized their
~Persons stationed to act as a deterrent.
WNath 1970, Ope cit., pp. 56-57.
WRodway 1894, Ope cit., vol. III, p. 103.
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newfound resources to oust the Afro-Guyanese from the retail
and huckster trade. The English merchants, however, were
careful to retain for themselves the colony's wholesale
trade. Consequently, Portuguese businessmen were absent
along Water street, although in 1851 they owned 173 (58
percent) of the licensed retail shops in Georgetown. 71 For
the country as a whole, the Portuguese petty merchant class
held 484 (62 percent) of the retail shops. In New Amsterdam
the figure was 28 (54 percent), and in the rural areas 283
(65 percent).72
There were nearly 500 merchants and shopkeepers in
Georgetown. One hundred and ninety-six, or 64 percent, of
the country's "public officers" were residents here.
"Mechanics and artizans," that is, those in the skilled
trades, numbered 2,063 persons. However, the bulk of the
city's population were classified as general laborers or
"variously employed." An interesting feature of the labor
force was the sizeable number (2,467) who were defined as
making a living as "agricultural laborers.,,73 Estates along
the East Coast and West Bank Demerara were the main
beneficiaries of this labor. That over 14 percent of the
capital's active labor force was engaged in agriculture was
71Census 1851.
72Ibid.
73Ibid.
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clearly a reflection of the dominance of that industry in
the country's economic structure.
New Amsterdam, in contrast, did not experience the
same kind of population surge during the 1831-1851 period,
although its population increased a healthy 60 percent, from
2,800 to 4,633. within the town, just over 50 percent of
the population were African-Guyanese, 35 percent mixed, 11
percent white, and 3 percent Indian. Merchants and
shopkeepers numbered 84, pUblic officers 17, and skilled
workers 417; and whilst there were 306 agricultural
laborers, they accounted for only 11 percent of the town's
active labor force. The largest segment of the economically
active population, 645 persons, were employed as domestic
servants, a clear indication that there were very few
productive jobs available in the town.~
According to the 1851 census figures, just over one in
five Guyanese were living in the urban areas (Table XI).
Since 1831 the rate of urbanization had been increasing, but
most of that increase must be attributed to the capital
city. Dependent urbanism was most notably characterized by
uneven urbanization, with the result that Georgetown had
become five-and-a-half times the size of New Amsterdam and
was plainly outdistancing its rival. Hardly any shipping
frequented New Amsterdam's port. Most of the produce was
sent to Georgetown for shipment to the United Kingdom.
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Colonialism merely required Georgetown, and its functional
port, to serve as the economic intermediary between the
metropole and the colony.
The population of Georgetown, according to the Census
of 1861, was 29,174, which represented an increase of 3,666,
or 13.6 percent over the 1851 figure (Table XI). Whilst the
growth in population was rather meager, it overshadowed the
plight of New Amsterdam, which registered a decline of 54
persons. For the country as a whole, the total population
amounted to 155,907, an increase of 19,913, or 13.8 percent
over the previous decennium. The increase was particularly
anemic when one considers that 39,207 immigrants were
brought into the country over the period. The majority,
23,381, came from India, with Chinese immigration having
peaked at a relatively modest level in 1861 when 3,368
laborers entered the colony. Given the fact that 4,040
immigrants were repatriated, the mortality rate during the
period must have been quite considerable. A yellow~fever
epidemic swept across the colony from 1851 to 1853, and this
was followed by outbreaks of smallpox in 1855 and cholera in
1856.
By 1861 Georgetown was six times the size of New
Amsterdam. Its port cleared 773 vessels during this year,
whilst its rival cleared a modest 62. The decline in the
level of urbanization during the decennium was matched by a
moribund urban economy that was dependent on capital
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infusions from the pUblic sector. In Georgetown, domestic
servants comprised the largest occupation group, accounting
for almost 25 percent of the employed population. Their
numbers had almost doubled, from 2,067 in 1851 to 3,892 in
1861. Agricultural laborers had also increased from 2,467
to 3,187. Workers in Georgetown were therefore largely
either supporting themselves in unproductive employment or
dependent on a living outside the city. In New Amsterdam,
the situation was strikingly similar, although agricultural
laborers experienced the most significant growth in numbers.
Most of the town's population were still domestic servants
(688), but the number of agricultural laborers had risen 59
percent to 517. Unemployment in both urban areas is
difficult to ascertain, but there is no doubt that the
figures were quite alarming. children and those classified
as having not stated an occupation accounted for 46 percent
of Georgetown's population and 47 percent of New
Amsterdam's. In 1851, the comparable figures were 33
percent for Georgetown and 43 percent for New Amsterdam.
The Chinese, at this time, were beginning to make some
inroads in the retail trade, but because of their relatively
small numbers they did not pose a threat to the dominant
portuguese. However, by 1865 there were 170 chinese-owned
shops in Georgetown alone, and many more in the rural
areas. n At the same time the Portuguese were beginning to
nB.B., 1865.
207
challenge the English wholesale merchants in Georgetown. A
number had already bought property on Water street, which
was once the exclusive preserve of the English. 76
The decennial census of 1871 revealed a population of
193,491 (Table XI). The net increase was 37,584 over the
1861 population, but during the decade 61,924 immigrants had
arrived in the country. since only 7,000 persons were
repatriated to their countries of origin, one must conclude
that mortality was once again very high, and that the
natural increase was negative. Yellow fever raged
continuously in the colony from 1861-66, and was the major
killer during the period.
The population of Georgetown in 1871 numbered 36,562,
and though the city's population growth was rather modest,
it was now nearly seven times the size of New Amsterdam.
The occupational structure of both urban areas suggests that
their economical problems had not abated. Forty-two percent
(15,378) of Georgetown's population were without work.
Those who were lucky enough to be gainfully employed were
confined to four principal occupational groupings including
agricultural laborers (4,317), domestic servants (3,667),
mechanics and artisans (3,377), and a catch-all category
variously employed (6,968). The situation in New Amsterdam
was roughly analogous to that of the capital city. Forty-
two percent of the town's people were unemployed, and those
nWebber 1931, Ope cit., p. 258.
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who were working were predominantly in the same
occupations - agricultural laborers (793), domestic servants
(573), mechanics and artisans (541), and variously employed
(787).
Overall, the rate of urbanization was negligible.
Rural areas were absorbing the influx of indentured
immigrants, which had peaked amongst the Indians in 1869,
when 7,168 workers arrived in the country. Since all
indentured workers went to the estates, some of these
estates were quite large. In 1871 Plantation Leonora, the
largest estate in the country, boasted a population of
1,442. Indeed, according to the census, 67,859 persons, or
35.1 percent of the population, were residing on the sugar
plantations. The remainder, 83,633 persons, or 43.2 percent
of the population, were inhabitants of the villages and
settlements. Plaisance, on the east coast of Demerara, was
the largest village, with a population of 3,169.
A notable aspect of the population distribution in
1871 was the nascent out-migration of Indians from the
estates to the urban areas, and especially to the villages
and settlements. There were 1,148 Indians in the two urban
areas and over 2,500 in the villages and settlements. since
it is unlikely that these numbers are the result of natural
increase, one must conclude that some degree of in-migration
was taking place amongst the groups. In accounting for the
migration, one needs to be cognizant of the dynamics that
209
shaped the process. Conditions on the estates were
deplorable. The hours were long and the work arduous. The
legislature had unilaterally devised a series of labor laws
so strenuous that the immigrant had little alternative but
to break them. The labor laws were consolidated in
Ordinance No. 4 of 1864, which contained provisions that
allowed employers to press criminal charges against workers
who did not accomplish a set number of tasks in a week,
those who failed to attend morning muster-call or were
absent from work, and those who refused or neglected work.
Planters had managed to introduce criminal sanctions for
matters tha~ were essentially civil in character.
Furthermore, they did not hesitate to use the law as a
weapon to coerce the immigrants. Between 1866 and 1870,
planters brought 31,900 cases to the courts for breaches of
the labor law. The unequal nature of the law is also
evident when one considers that during the same period fewer
than 100 cases were brought by immigrants against employers.
For example, in 1870 about 57 percent of the charges brought
against immigrants were withdrawn. TI And whilst the
immigrant could be sent to jail, the penalties against
employers - and these were rarely enforced - were
overwhelmingly monetary. Oftentimes employers utilized the
labor laws to threaten to reindenture immigrants and thereby
elicit promises of good behavior, etc. Managers commonly
TIDes Voeux 1871, op. cit., p. 50.
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boasted that indentured workers on their estates must be
actually at work, or in the hospital, or in the gaol. n
Planters were operating a most repressive state.
Expenditure on the police force had escalated from 20,924
pounds in 1851 to 51,142 pounds in 1871. By comparison,
expenditure on education had registered a decline during the
same period, falling from 3,212 pounds to 2,610 pounds. 79
At this time the plantation was, for all intents and
purposes, a "total institution" which encompassed all
aspects of the immigrant's life. Edward Jenkins offers the
following contemporary observation:
Take a large factory in Manchester or Birmingham,
or Belfast, build a wall around it, shut in its
work-people from all intercourse save at rare
intervals with the outside world, keep them in
absolute heathen ignorance, and get all the work
you can out of them, treat them not unkindly leave
their social habits and relationships to themselves
as matters not concerning you who make money from
their labour, and you would have constituted a
little community resembling in no small degree a
sugar estate in British Guiana. w
Living conditions on the estates were also far from
satisfactory. Housing in the barracks-l ike-blocks was
squalid, dilapidated, and overcrowded. Water, sewerage, and
sanitation facilities left a great deal to be desired, and
as a result mortality on the estates was severe. According
78Nath 1970, op. cit., p. 41.
~B.B. 1851 and 1871.
wJenkins, E. 1871. The Coolie, His Rights and Wrongs.
London, p. 63.
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to Adamson, the death rate per thousand immigrants resident
on the estates was as high as 44.8 between 1855 and 1872,
but sUbsequently declined to 27.8 between 1873 and 1884,
after the Des Voeux Commission lobbied for better conditions
on the estates. 81 Each estate had been required by law to
have a hospital on its grounds, but since facilities were
antiquated and doctors were beholden to the estates, the
system did not function to the immigrants' benefit.
Given the above, there was every reason for immigrants
to leave the estates; however, most importantly, by 1870 the
sugar industry had solved its labor problem, and for the
first time in -the post-emancipation era it experienced a
labor surplus.
The Census of 1881 confirmed the large-scale spatial
redistribution of population that was taking place amongst
the Indians (Table XI). The total Indian population was
79,929, of whom 52,418 were on the estates, 2,588 in
Georgetown and New Amsterdam, and 24,923 in the villages,
settlements, and farms. The number of Indians in Georgetown
and New Amsterdam indicated that not all immigrants were
remaining in agriculture, though the move to the urban areas
was still minimal.
Thp. tatal population of Guyana, according to the
Census of 1881, amounted to 252,186. This was a significant
increase over the population in the previous census. The
R1Adamson 1972, Ope cit., p. 145.
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population was growing at an average of 3.3 percent per
annum; however, much of increase was due to the 73,787
indentured immigrants who had arrived in the colony.
without their arrival, the country would have certainly
posted a decline in its population. Once again, the largest
majority of immigrants were those from India, although a
considerable number were introduced from the West Indies.
The peak year for arrivals in the post-emancipation era
occurred during 1873-74 when 10,589 immigrants landed.
Georgetow~'s population between 1871 and 1881 had
increased by over 20 percent to 47,175, but now the city was
less than six times the size of New Amsterdam. New
Amsterdam's population growth during the decade was
impressive. The town now registered a population of 8,124,
or a 67 percent increase from the previous census. It is
not difficult to explain the transformation of the town's
fortunes. Berbice, the county in which New Amsterdam is
located, was becoming a chief destination for immigrants,
since the sugar estates here were beginning to outperform
those in Demerara and Essequibo. Furthermore, indentured
workers who had served their time were buying lands along
the Corentyne coast, and at Adelphi, Cumberland, and
elsewhere in the canje area. Cumberland itself registered a
population of 1,131 and was the largest village in Berbice.
Indians selected lands in the vicinity of estates, in this
case Rose Hall Estate, on which they continued to work while
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they made the transition to peasant farming. As a result,
dependency on the plantations was maintained. The formation
of these villages neighboring New Amsterdam was giving
succor to the town, since it was in an established position
to fulfill the role of a higher service and administrative
center.
Despite New Amsterdam's growth, the rate of
urbanization scarcely increased over the period. The
economies of New Amsterdam and Georgetown were not conducive
to the kinds of employment generation that were likely to
pull migrants into the towns. Nearly one in four (6,958)
workers were unemployed in Georgetown. In New Amsterdam
only two percent of the labor force were out of work (i.e.,
those 15 years of age and older) but the vast majority of
the employed were in highly unproductive employment. The
occupational structures of both towns were relatively
unchanged. Agricultural laborers, mechanics and artisans,
domestic servants, and those variously employed continued to
be the major occupations. In Georgetown, however, the
number of agricultural laborers declined by 17 percent to
3,167, the fall in agricultural employment should not be
interpreted as a sign of movement towards a more typical
urban employment structure; rather, .it was the result of
plantation owners' use of fewer indigenous laborers and the
fall in the industry's wages. At the same time that the
number of agricultural laborers was declining, domestic
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servants increased by 62 percent to 5,916, and those
variously employed increased by 62 percent to 11,304. In
New Amsterdam, all occupational groupings registered
advances, but the most significant were the 72 percent
increase in the number of pUblic servants to 175, and the 68
percent rise in the number of merchants and shopkeepers to
163.
According to the Census of 1891, the total population
of the country was 278,328, an increase of 26,142, or nearly
10 percent of the 1881 figure (Table XI). During the
intercensal period, 34,266 immigrants arrived in the colony
and 16,849 emigrated, leaving a net immigration figure of
17,417. Since this number is insufficient to cover the
population increase over the decennium, we must conclude
that for the first time since its incorporation into the
modern world system, the colony was experiencing natural
increase, that is, the birth rate exceeded the death rate.
The increase, however, was only 9,725.
The occupational structure of the country was still
dominated by the sugar industry in 1891. Limited avenues of
employment resulted in some 105,444 persons being returned
as agricultural laborers. In the towns, the number of
workers employed in agriculture continued to decline.
Domestic servants and those in semi-skilled positions
continued to comprise the bulk of the laboring population.
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The population distribution was slightly altered in
1891. There was a marginal increase in urbanization, with
62,079 persons, or 22.3 percent, living in Georgetown and
New Amsterdam. Georgetown was unquestionably the center of
economic, social, and political life. It accounted for
53,176, or 19.1 percent, of the population and New Amsterdam
8,903, or 3.2 percent. In the rural areas there were 90,492
persons, or 32.6 percent, living on the estates, and
125,757, or 45.1 percent, in the villages and settlements.
villages were still comparatively small and tended to
decline in numbers with distance from Georgetown. The
largest village was Plaisance, with a population of 4,705,
on the east coast of Demerara. The number of Indians
residing off the estates and not in the towns had risen from
24,923 in 1881 to 28,412 in 1891. Although the increase was
not of great import, the trend was beginning to accelerate
during the latter part of the decade. In the urban areas
Indians amounted to 5,238 persons, compared to 2,588 in
1881.
At the turn of the century, Georgetown was in a
pitiful state. There was tremendous concern over the
alarming death rate in the town. According to the Surgeon
General, Georgetown had a death rate of 35.2, which ~as·over
11 points higher than that of the rest of the country in
1902. In accounting for the appalling rate, he noted that
sanitation and sewerage disposal in the city were abysmally
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poor, and that overcrowding was excessive, especially
amongst the lower classes.~
The Census of 1911 returned a population of 296,041,
or an increase of 17,713 over that of the previous census in
1891 (Table XI)." The excess of immigration over
emigration during the period was 29,748; therefore, had
there been no Indian immigration, the population would have
registered a 4.3 percent decrease from the 1891 population.
The country's spatial distribution of population
remained virtually unchanged, with 22.3 percent of the
population in the urban areas and 77.7 percent living in the
countryside. Georgetown's share of the colony's population
had increased from 19.1 percent to 19.4, and New Amsterdam's
had decreased from 3.2 to 2.9 percent. In the rural
districts the number of persons residing on the sugar
estates registered a decrease of 19,570, or 21.6 percent,
whilst the number of those living in villages and
settlements increased by 31,181, or 20.9 percent. The
spatial transformation in the rural areas meant that, for
the first time since 1838, the majority of the country's
population were living in villages and settlements. Much of
the increase in the villages and settlements was occurring
on the east coast and Corentyne coast of Berbice, where
Indians were migrating and taking up lands as rice farmers,
82Debates of the Combined Court (D.C.C.), 1904.
8JPor financial reasons, no census was taken in 1901.
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following the amalgamation and abandonment of estates as
well as the favorable inducements for obtaining land. This
area's population rose by 11,608, or 80 percent, which was
by far the largest individual increase of any area in the
country.
Georgetown's population of 57,577 represented an
increase of slightly over 7.6 percent in 20 years. Most of
the city's growth took place in the suburban areas of Kitty,
which had benefitted from the extension of the seawall, and
Albouystown, which rapidly became the sink of the landless
and casual laboring population. In both places, the
populations had doubled between 1891 and 1911. The
population of New Amsterdam, which had reached 8,903 in
1891, declined by 3.4 percent to 8,604. New Amsterdam and
Georgetown were the principal residences of the European,
Portuguese, and Chinese populations, and each of the three
groups suffered reductions in their numbers, which adversely
affected the population growth of the towns in particular.
Europeans, who comprised 1.3 percent of the country's
population, declined by 13.6 percent; Portuguese, who
comprised 3.4 percent of the population, decreased by 17.1
percent; and Chinese, who formed .89 percent of the
population, fell by nearly 30 percent.
The 1911 census does not provide information regarding
the occupational structure in the towns; however, for the
population as a whole, the largest employment sector
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remained agriculture with 106,514 persons, or slightly under
40 percent of the population. within the various
occupational groupings, little had changed since the
previous census - an indication of the country's economic
structure. The only notable shift occurred within the
agricultural sector itself. In the "landed proprietors,
agriculturalist and cattle farmers" group, there was an
increase of 5,090 persons, or 166.3 percent, with much of
the increase precipitated by enlployment in the rice
industry.
INFRASTRUCTURE AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
This section discusses the volatility of expenditures
and infrastructural allocations to the towns during the
period. The fluctuations in the towns' fortunes are shown
to be overwhelmingly dependent on the national and
international economy, and to a lesser extent on the
reluctance of planters and their allies in the Combined
Court to provide funding. Assessments are made to identify
the beneficiaries of the public purse throughout the country
and within the towns. The internal spatial structure, urban
expansion, and the regulations governing Georgetown and New
Amsterdam are also explored.
Following emancipation on August 1, 1838, many of the
former slaves left the plantations, and migrated to
Georgetown and New Amsterdam in pursuit of economic and
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social advancement. M Employment opportunities were rather
limited in the urban areas, and as a result some migrants
were obliged to pursue a number of nefarious activities.
Faced with a severe threat to their pampered urban life-
styles, the government almost immediately created a
permanent police force, and along with it the first urban
institution in the post-emancipation era, a prison in
Georgetown, in 1839. However, this newly created African-
Guyanese urban underclass proved to be resilient to the
erstwhile attempts at social control by the privileged white
minority.
Migrants who possessed specialist skills (for example,
blacksmiths, carpenters, coopers, masons, wheelwrights,
etc.) were able to secure employment related to their
particular trades. Migrant women, lacking opportunity to
acquire vocational skills, were confined to domestic
services. Those who had managed to save money during the
apprenticeship period were able to buy lots in the towns and
to erect houses. outside Georgetown, the future wards of
Albertown, Albouystown, and Lodge were laid out in 1839.
Building activity was initially restricted to Albertown,
which was purchased by a handful of ex-slaves from the
proprietors of Plantation Thomas.
The economic downturn following complete emancipation
resulted in a deterioration of the country's infrastructure.
UGazette Aug. 25, 1838.
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The 1850 commission report emphasized the deplorable
condition. The pUblic roads and bridges had deteriorated to
such a state that communications by land had been severed
between New Amsterdam and the Corentyne. owing to the lack
of roads, the villages were poorly serviced; and churches
and schools, so important to the laboring population, were
neglected.
The two urban areas in the country, Georgetown and New
Amsterdam, were also in the doldrums. Merchants were
complaining that their once-lucrative trade with the estates
had virtually ceased to exist. Given the economic
difficulties, purchases of imported commodities had steadily
declined following full emancipation. In addressing the
commissioners of the 1850 report on "the condition and
prospects of the colony," Mr. Duncan McDonald, a partner of
George Anderson and Co., one of the leading firms in
Georgetown, noted:
For some time after the emancipation, up to, I
may say 1845, the labouring classes purchased
largely of calicoes, muslins, clothing, boots,
shoes, hats, and indeed dry goods generally, as
also of malt liquor, hams, low priced wines ...
glassware, furniture, etc. During the period
stated they evinced an eagerness for articles of
improved comfort, and a desire to appear
respectable. In the last three or four years
various circumstances have combined to reduce the
demand and consumption of articles not of luxury
only, but of ordinary comfort. The labourers now
usually confine their purchases to the very few and
indispensable articles of clothing, and to articles
of necessary food.~
85Report to His Excellency Henry Barkly 1850, op. cit.
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As Georgetown's mercantile trade declined so did the
value of property in the town. Houses' and businesses'
valuations were 50 percent of what they had been four years
earlier. In New Amsterdam, the merchants were in much
poorer shape than their counterparts in Georgetown. Many of
Berbice's plantations had been abandoned, there was a high
incidence of squatting, and the few plantations that
remained were not able to keep many merchants solvent in the
town. Property values had fallen, but sales could not be
effected even for the most nominal of prices. New Amsterdam
was still the commercial center of Berbice, but its internal
spatial structure consisted of little more than three
principal streets. The merchants, and hence commercial
activities, were concentrated along the Strand, a street
which ran parallel to the Berbice River.
Public expenditure on infrastructure in Georgetown and
New Amsterdam up to this point had been kept at a bare
minimum. In Georgetown, finances for infrastructural and
other works were derived solely from a tax on land and
buildings, fixed and levied under the provisions of an
annual ordinance passed by the Court of Policy on a report
forwarded by the Mayor and Town council. At times various
licenses (cart, hucksters', porters', gunpowder, etc.),
fixed and raised by the Combined Court, were voluntary voted
as contributions to aid the town's funds. Between 1839 and
1844 the following contributions were made by the Combined
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Court to the Town funds: in 1839, the proceeds of cart and
hucksters' licenses; in 1840, the proceeds of cart and
hucksters' licenses; in 1841, half of the proceeds of cart
and hucksters licenses, plus a special contribution of
$4,895 for roads and stellings [harbors] was made to the
council; in 1842, the proceeds of cart and hucksters'
licenses; in 1843, the proceeds of cart, gunpowder, and
porters' licenses, plus a special contribution of $1,050 for
half the cost of repair of three stellings was made; and in
1844, the proceeds of cart, billiard table, gunpowder,
hucksters', and pUblic entertainment licenses. 86 The
appropriation of proceeds from the licenses amounted to
approximately $7,000 annually. During 1845 and 1846, the
minutes of the Court of Policy and Combined Court reveal
that the expenditures of Georgetown had outpaced revenues.
At a meeting of the Combined Court on March 22, 1845, a
memorial of the Mayor and Town Council was read, declaring:
That your Excellency and Honourable Court will be
pleased to recommend the Honourable Court of Policy
to place on their estimate the item for retail
spirit and liquor, and other Licence Monies raised
within this city, in order that the amount of said
licenses may be placed under the sole control of
the Municipal corporation for purposes of City
expenditure and improvements, etc. n
Peter Rose, manager of the Colonial Bank, whose
livelihood depended on the planters, moved "that the prayer
K6B. B., 1839 -18 4 4 .
K7Minutes of the Combined Court (M.C.C.), March 22, 1845.
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of this petition cannot be granted", and the motion was
carried. Thus, the court maintained its sole right of
levying and appropriating all taxes in the country except
taxes on lots and buildings in Georgetown and New Amsterdam.
The court, however, requested that the Town Council should
forward an estimate of its expenses for 1845. The measure
was complied with, and on March 25, the council laid over an
estimate indicating an estimated expenditure of $71,359 and
an estimated revenue of $25,823. After much discussion, the
Combined Court resolved that an item of $28,000 be placed on
the estimate in aid of the town funds, to remedy some of the
expected shortfall of $45,536. The vigorous debate which
ensued was summed up by the Royal Gazette, which noted:
There has been some skirmishing between the Mayor
and Town council of Georgetown and the Legislature.
The Corporation has been trying hard to gain
possession of the Spirit and Liquor Licenses,
issued for the City as a concession, not of favour,
but right. In this way they have been foiled by
the Legislature, who contend there is nothing in
the Town Council's Charter, of the nature of that
description of revenue, whereon a claim of
surrender can be fairly based by the Council.
Some warm debates in both bodies, and some rather
high toned petitions have ensued in consequence,
which have resulted in the Court of Policy
maintaining hold of the Licenses, but recommending
a public grant to the Town Council for the service
of the year out of the public funds to the extent
of $28,000. Good care, however, has been taken to
let their Worships clearly understand that they are
to look on this soon as.a free gift, emanating from
the pure generosity of the superior powers. 88
88Roya l Gazette, Apr. 3, 1845.
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The legislative proceedings of the year 1846 and
subsequent years indicate the volatility of annual payments
to Georgetown. In 1847, a sum of $20,000 was voted as a
grant-in-aid of the town; in 1848, the amount voted was
$10,000; and in 1849, the Court of Policy refused to place
on the estimates any grant-in-aid of the town funds. No
funds were voted in 1850, but in this year an important
question arose as to the cost of Georgetown's sea defenses.
Up to this time, the Sea Dam between Fort Frederick William
and the Thomas Lands had been maintained by the Colonial
Government, but in 1849, the military authorities refused to
shoulder the charge any longer. They contended that the dam
was as much a protection to the Kingston ward of Georgetown
as it was to its own Ordnance property. Since the very
existence of Georgetown depended on the security of the Sea
Dam, the British Government requested that the Town Council
pay for its upkeep, and on its refusal appealed to the
Combined Court, which declined to place the charge on the
colonial funds. In February 1850, the Secretary of State
informed the legislature that, unless the situation was
remedied, the Queen's troops would be removed. The threat,
however, failed to impress the planter-dominated court,
which sought to ignore the warning.
On April 4, 1851, the Mayor and Town Council of
Georgetown renewed their petition to the Combined Court,
requesting their claim to the allocation of the proceeds of
225
the carts, hucksters', and shop licenses, and the house and
carriage tax in the town. They also requested one-half of
the expense of keeping up the pUblic stellings and fire
engines, and a sum of $3,000 in reimbursement of the cost
for keeping up the main road. In reply to this petition, a
motion was filed in the court of Policy to place on the
estimate the sum of $10,000, as a grant-in-aid of town
funds, but this was defeated. However, it was decided that
the town's petition for the horse-and-carriage tax, the
cart, hucksters', and shop licenses, should be granted, and
that the proceeds of these taxes and licenses should be
handed over to augment the town funds. The proceeds of
these licenses were paid over accordingly to the council in
1851; they amounted to $12,900.~
Expenditure on pUblic infrastructure in Georgetown
received a significant boost in 1855 when the sea broke
through the flimsy sea defenses of mud used to protect the
area around Kingston. The entire northern area of the city
was inundated with water for two days. Immediately the
Court of Policy resolved to erect a permanent concrete
structure to keep out the sea. The seawall was commenced in
1855, and by 1861 it stretched from Fort William Frederick
~o Camp street. Much of the initial expenditure on the
wall, however, stemmed directly from the proceeds of
licenses that had previously been granted to the city. In
H9B • B., 1851.
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1855, $7,200 from licenses went towards the works undertaken
on the seawall. w This was a major portion of the proceeds
from licenses in this year. It was only at a later date
that the authorities relieved the city from contributing to
the protection of Georgetown from the sea.
In 1860 an ordinance91 was passed in which the
Combined Court agreed to guarantee Georgetown an annual
contribution of $10,000, in substitution for the
contributions made from the proceeds of certain licenses.
The system of 1860 was interpreted as an adjustment of the
unsatisfactory relations which had existed between the
colonial legislative assemblies and the city. In addition,
the city was granted the power to assess, levy, and raise
taxes, without the blessing of the Court of Policy.
The ordinance was an extremely comprehensive one that
also provided regulations for the city of Georgetown. The
city was divided into 11 "separate and distinct municipal
wards" with the incorporation of Albert Town. Within the
wards, sUbdividing lots into units smaller than halves was
prohibited, and the erection of houses and other structures
was to conform to specific siting regulations in order to
avoid high densities. The regulations against fire were
particularly stringent:
Every dwelling-house in Georgetown situated on
90S. S., 1855.
910rdinance No. 25, 1860.
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any lot or portion of a lot abutting on either side
of Main-street, High-street, Saffon-street or in
continuation thereof, and every dwelling house to
be hereafter erected to the west of such streets
and line, shall be provided with a fireplace or
hearth, and a brick chimney and the floor of such
kitchen shall be covered with stone, tiles, bricks,
or solid earth, and the roof thereof with tiles,
slates, or other incombustible material, and if
such kitchen is attached to the dwelling-house or
any other building the sides and ends of said
kitchen shall be of brick, stone, metal or some
other incombustible material, or lined therewith;
and any existing kitchen so situated not now built
in accordance with this section must be altered in
conformity therewith to the satisfaction of the
Mayor and Town Council within two years from the
taking effect of this ordinance; and the Mayor and
Town Council may cause any such kitchen to be
altered in conformity with the provisions of this
section, and may recover the cost thereof by
summary execution; and any person acting contrary
to the provisions of this section shall be liable
to a penalty not exceeding $500 to be recovered by
the Town Clerk in aid of the Town funds.~
The prosperous times in the sugar industry had also
begun to be reflected in the image of the city. In 1860, an
improved street-lighting system was introduced, whereby
kerosene was utilized and iron lamp posts newly erected.
The streets themselves were improved, widened, and
beautified. The impetus to beautification was initiated by
the laying out of the Promenade Gardens in 1853. Many
exotic species of trees and shrubs were introduced, and
these began to line the streets. The fortunes of the city
varied with the fortunes Qfthe national economy. Thus, the
increasing prosperity of the sugar-based economy undoubtedly
~Ibid.
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had an appreciable influence on the increasing fortunes of
Georgetown in the 1850s.
In 1861, public expenditure on Georgetown's hospitals
totalled $80,332, jails $21,174, and seawall $47,192.
Demerara, the county in which Georgetown is located,
received an additional $54,515 for pUblic buildings and
works, and $4,700 for public roads and bridges. New
Amsterdam's allocations were more modest; the town was
granted $31,564 for its mental hospital, and $7,457 towards
the upkeep of its jail. Berbice, the county in which it is
located, received an additional $17,456 for pubic buildings
and works, and $4,144 for pUblic roads and bridges. 93 In
the same bUdget, Essequibo, which had once been the most
prosperous region, was allocated the paltry sum of $12,527,
a clear indication of its loss of pre-eminence.
The primary beneficiaries of pUblic expenditure were
the estates. Even when the legislature began extending
loans to the villages for the repair of dams, seawalls,
roads, and new empoldering, those that benefitted most were
the adjacent estates, which reaped the rewards without
incurring any costs.
Planters were diligent in suppressing any enterprise
that was considered a threat to their industry.- The East
Coast Railway, the first railway on the South American
continent, which was opened up to Plaisance in 1848, took
93B.B.,1861.
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another two years to reach Buxton and 15 years to build the
20-mile line to Mahaica. The company had importuned the
government for funds to extend the line at a faster rate,
but the sugar planters consistently blocked loans intended
for the company. They had little need for the railway,
since all of their freight was transported by ship to
overseas markets. In addition, planters worried that
extending the line would encourage a self-sustaining
peasantry to settle along the route, with the Georgetown
market at their disposal. This in turn would deprive the
plantations of their requisite labor force. with a poorly
developed road and transportation system, the peasantry
favored the railway; but lacking a voice in the legislature,
they were unable to press their claim. In 1866, the Berbice
Gazette summed up the detrimental effects of the country's
inadequate internal communications system by asking, "What
is the use of a man expending his labour in growing articles
which he cannot get to market?,,94
Water street, the business center of Georgetown, was
destroyed by two fires in 1864. The first fire destroyed
virtually all of Robbstown including the Royal Agricultural
and Commercial society headquarters, the British Guiana
Bank, and stores along Water street. 95 Damage sustained by
the merchants and other proprietors, including damage to
94Berbice Gazette, June 2, 1866.
% d 'tRo way 1894, op. Cl ., vol. III, p.26.
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properties and goods, amounted to nearly three million
dollars. The second conflagration, though not quite as
devastating as the first, succeeded in destroying the
congested part of cummingsburg, and parts of Water street
spared by the first fire.
The response of the Court of Policy was immediate. On
April 26, 1864, the court passed an ordinance which resolved
to layout and rebuild on an improved plan the entire ward of
Robbstown.% The objective of the ordinance was to extend
and widen the streets so that the city might be safer
against future fires. It also endeavored to mitigate the
sanitary conditions of the city by authorizing improvements
in the infrastructure concerning drainage and sewerage.
Another result of the 1864 fires was the establishment
of the Georgetown Water Works at Camp and Church streets,
and the laying of water mains in the city, in 1866.
Merchants had been lobbying the legislature for such a
system for 30 years without avail, but the massive losses
and resulting disaster relief spurred the planter dominated
body into action. The business center of Water street and
the adjacent business centers was the first to receive the
newly laid street lines. Project costs were offset by a
city-improvement loan which advanced $64,000 in 1865,~ and
960rdinance No. 20, 1864.
970rdinance No.2, 1865.
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$33,100 in 1866. 98 New Amsterdam soon followed Georgetown's
example, and in 1869 the legislature granted the town
$25,000 to embark upon a water works scheme to ensure an
adequate supply of water in the town.~ By contrast, loans
for the improvement of villages were never very impressive.
In 1867, a sum of $4,182.56 was allotted to the villages,
with Mahaica receiving $250, Den Amstel $2,000, Cumberland
$900, Daniel's Town $881.40, and Golden Grove $151.16. 100
In 1868, village loans amounted to $14,929.16, with
Blvendaal receiving $100, Buxton $5,549,74, Friendship
$6,297.21, Nabacles $500, Plaisance $2,082.59, and
Queenstown $400. 1W The disbursements were most inequitable
when one considered that the combined populations of Buxton
and Friendship at this time rivalled New Amsterdam's, and
that the villages were plagued with many more formidable
problems than the urban centers.
The decade of the 1870s witnessed a number of notable
pUblic Jorks in the country's two urban areas. In 1872, the
gas mains were laid in Georgetown; and the city saw its
streets!illuminated by gas on January 31, 1873. Also, in
!
i
1872 a mudwall reinforced with stone was built to serve as
the sea defense from Camp street to the Kitty. This
980rdinance No. 17 and No. 20, 1866.
99B. B., 1869.
100B.B., 1867.
HlIB.B., 1868.
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structure was quickly washed away, and in 1874 a concrete
wall was commenced. Having reached Kitty, the wall was
extended to Turkeyen, a distance of almost three miles, by
Quintin Hogg, one of the country's wealthiest plantation
owners, at a cost of 80,000 pounds, to protect his estate,
Bel Air. lm A little later when Hogg encountered additional
problems with his sea defenses, this single individual was
able to garner a loan of 30,000 pounds from the Combined
Court to protect his estate. This was a considerable sum
when one considers the amount of aid granted to villagers,
and even the urban areas. For example, Georgetown's request
for a grant of 5,000 pounds to defray the ~ost of a proposed
new system of drainage was denied at a meeting of the
Combined Court in April 1876. lro
Municipal progress continued, however, and both
Georgetown and New Amsterdam did benefit from the pUblic
treasury. In 1873 New Amsterdam's Water Works commenced,
and two years later the government granted the town $10,000
to complete the project. IM Tram lines were laid in
Georgetown in 1877, and in the same year mule-drawn tram
cars were introduced into the city. The Botanic Gardens
were laid out in 1879 on the site of an abandoned sugar
estate in Georgetown. The 276 acres/ purchased at a price
lWWebber 1931, op. cit., p. 286.
1roM.C.C., Apr. 28, 1876.
w1B. B ., 1875.
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of $72,000, provided the city with a significant amount of
open space, which along with the tree-lined streets earned
Georgetown the appellation of "Garden city. ,,105
Urban development in Georgetown received a major boost
in 1876 with the creation of the Bourda Ward. The new ward
was formerly part of Plantation Vlissengen and had been
purchased by the Combined Court for $347,200 in 1874. IM
Ordinance No. 8 of 1876 provided the city with rUdimentary
developmental regulations concerning the urban plan for the
area .
... and such plan shall show the size and extent
of the roads, streets, drains, trenches, and of all
open spaces, whether between the said lots as laid
down or otherwise, which they may consider it
desirable should be made, dug, or left open so as
best to secure the thorough drainage; sewerage and
ventilation of the whole of the said lands, and the
proper laying out of the same. lm
The awareness of the benefits of sound urban planning
regulations had been brought to the fore following the
report of the Registrar General of Births and Deaths in
1875. His report stated that excessive mortality was the
result of:
... the mode in which people lodge, clothe, feed
and pass their time ... crowding together of numbers
of Ranges of cottages covering small spaces of
ground ..• want to proper clothing•.. to the quality
of food eaten, most of it being bought at small and
ill ventilated provision Shops, not infrequently
lillBronkhurst 1890, op. cit., pp. 86-87.
I~M.C.C., June 15, 1874.
ImOrdinance No.8, 1876.
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used as sleeping places, to the supply of water as
insufficient and bad, especially in dry weather,
when in Georgetown, the street taps are the sole
resource, and the water delivered through them from
the Lamaha is charged with mud and vegetable matter;
and in the country the canals and trenches resorted
to are in a somewhat similar state..• ln Georgetown,
defective sanitary arrangements are pointed at, and
the state of the drains and yards complained of,
but until some system of sewerage can be devised,
it is despaired of effecting any great change.l~
The effects of the 1884 collapse permeated the entire
Guyanese settlement hierarchy. The crisis resulted in a
number of Georgetown merchants becoming insolvent. 1w
Bankruptcies amongst the Portuguese middlemen were the most
severe since this group depended on trade with country
shopkeepers, who in turn were dependent on the estate
workers for their livelihood. Despite the onset of the
recession, urban development and planning were pursued in a
limited sense in Georgetown and New Amsterdam. On March 28,
1887, an ordinance authorizing the purchase of a portion of
Plantation Thomas for $75,000 was passed. The land, which
was later known as Queenstown, was to be laid out on a plan
denoting the size and extent of roads, streets drains,
trenches, and all open spaces. Terms of sale were set, and
a number of regulations instituted. These included:
A) Prohibiting the sUbdivision of lots and the
establishment of rum and provision shops in
certain parts of the district;
B) Regulating the number of such shops in other
108M.C.P., Nov. 11, 1876.
lWRodway 1894, op. cit., vol. III, p. 213.
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parts of the district;
C} Regulating the number, dimensions and general
character and style of houses to be erected on
the lots in different portions of the district. lIO
New Amsterdam abolished its Board of superintendence
in 1891, and a Mayor and Town council was incorporated to
handle municipal affairs. The council was entrusted to
assess and raise town taxes; to enforce sanitary
superintendence; to exercise control over the public market,
slaughterhouse, tanks, pound, and burial ground; and to
manage the public fire engines. Cooperages, foundries,
smithies, and bakeries were required to have Town Council
approval before they could be built inside the town's
boundaries. The town's boundaries were delineated to be the
Ordnance land in the north, Plantations Smythfield and
Vryheid in the east, Plantation Overwinning in the south,
and the Berbice River in the west. Restrictions were placed
on the subdivisions of lots and on certain roof-building
materials. The ordinance was quite a comprehensive one;
even the weeding and cleaning of lots and the use of water
were spelled out. The town jealously guarded its water. It
was an offense to:
Cause a wilful waste of water from any tap after
the vessel placed to receive such water has been
filled or by leaving the tap open ... or carries away,
or draws from any stand-pipe or tap, water in any
barrel or puncheon or other receptacle of a
similar nature, for consumption beyond the limits
1lOOrdinance NO.3, 1887.
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of the Town, unless such water has been paid for. III
Also in 1891, Ordinance No. 23 authorized the first
electric lights in Georgetown and in the country. In the
meantime, conditions on the estates were in a deplorable
state. In 1886, a report by Dr. A.D. Williams of the
Immigration Department noted that the houses, hospitals,
water supply, and drainage on the estates were far from
ideal and did not even meet minimum acceptable standards.
The planters took umbrage against Williams' report and in
1887, through their domination of the Combined Court,
reduced his salary to one cent in the following year. 112
In the villages a meager rural improvement grant of
$25,000 had been instituted for a number of years, but the
depression offered the Combined Court an excuse to reduce
the grant, and by 1892 the grant had been completely
eliminated. The planters could point out, with some
justification, that between 1884 and 1891 40 sugar estates
had become insolvent. 113
Public infrastructural expenditure allocations between
1886 and 1892 were also in favor of the sugar estates, and
to a lesser extent the towns. Adamsonll4 outlined the
following major allocations:
IIIOrdinance No. 15, 1891.
112M.C.P., Oct. 11, 1887.
113B.B., 1884 and 1891-
114Adamson 1972, op. cit., p. 246.
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1. Sea defenses, Plantation Bel Air (Q. Hogg) $109,440
2. Fresh water works (Lamaha, Boerasirie, and
East Demerara water supply commissions, all
concerned principally with the water supply
to sugar estates) $479,946
Total of principal benefit to sugar estates $589,386
3. Sanitary improvements (New Amsterdam and
Georgetown) and new market (Georgetown) $286,500
During the same period, Adamson remarked that the
amount spent on village water supply systems was a trifling
$31,271. 115
At the turn of the century, the deteriorating social
conditions in the city contrasted with the continued
deve~opment of its infrastructure. Georgetown was receiving
a significant amount of revenue from the government coffers.
For example, the principal items of expenditure for 1895-96
included $136,699 for grants in aid of sugar estate roads,
$54,254 in special grants for sanitary improvements in the
municipalities, a $505,996 loan to Georgetown, and a $89,496
loan to New Amsterdam. 1I6 Infrastructural expenditure in
the towns, however, must be assessed with some caution. One
cannot simply consider urban areas to be monolithic entities
and thereby reduce inequities to conflicts among the towns,
villages, and estates. within the urban areas themselves,
there were tremendous intra-urban inequalities, not only in
infrastructural allocations, but in housing, jobs,
115Ibid.
1I6B.B., 1895-96.
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education, social services, etc. In Georgetown, the
northern wards, peopled by the rUling class (merchants,
government officials, and representatives of the
plantocracy), were much better served than the poorer
southern African-Guyanese wards.
On August 1, 1900, the railway line from Georgetown to
Mahaicony was extended to Rosignol on the Berbice River.
Unfortunately, New Amsterdam's port sustained the loss of
its steamer service with Georgetown, following the
completion of the Georgetown-to-Rosignol railway. The
Governor, believing the steamer service was now unnecessary,
summarily suspended it in 1900. 117
The dawn of the new century witnessed the commencement
of the running of electric trams in Georgetown. The company
operating the trams was required by ordinance to have an
office in Georgetown. IIS It appears that at this time all
large companies operating in Guyana were obliged to set up
company offices in the capital city. The built-up area of
the city and its population were augmented by the
incorporation of wortmanville, one of the poorer southern
suburban areas, into the city.1I9
During World War I, increasing exports of sugar and
rice brought a measure of prosperity to the two urban areas,
117M.C.P., JUly 9, 1900.
1l80r dinance, No. 19, 1899.
119M.C.P., Aug. 19, 1902.
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and to Georgetown in particular. In 1913, Albouystown was
incorporated into the City of Georgetown, following the
pass ing of Ordinance No. 20. 120 In the same year the city's
water supply received a major boost when the pumping
capacity of the water works was increased and the mains were
extended almost 50 miles. The Combined Court secured
$20,000 to permit the drilling of artesian wells in the
country. The first well was sunk in Georgetown, at D'Urban
Park, which proved to be a success. Not to be outdone, the
plantocracy, citing the country's newfound wealth,
formulated a sea-defense scheme for the protection of their
estates along the coast. In August of 1916, construction of
permanent ferro-concrete seawalls and groynes was begun at
Plantation Lusignan on Demerara's east coast, and
subsequently at Plantation Clonbrook a few miles further
down. Schemes were also prepared for the west coast of
Demerara, the Essequibo coast, the Corentyne coast, and the
islands of Leguan and Wakenaam. All told, the estimated
cost of the project was put at $4,476,558. 121
Revenues, however, were deemed insufficient to
construct a railway line connecting Georgetown with Manaos
120B . B., 1913 -14 .
121British Guiana. 1919. Report on the Condition of the
Colony of British Guiana During the Great European War, and on
the Chief Local Problems Awaiting Solution. Georgetown: The
Argosy Company, p. 65.
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and Boa vista in Brazil. 122 Hinterland development and
penetration were still frowned upon for fear that the labor
force would abscond into the interior. In any case, the
soils, as the Dutch had discovered, were not conducive to
sugar-growing, and thus did not warrant pUblic expenditures.
No penetration roads were built; and Guyana, although
sharing a wide expanse of borders with Venezuela, Brazil,
and Surinam, was virtually isolated from these neighboring
countries. External communications with the core were
paramount - they were needed to evacuate exports - whilst
internal ones could be served by the 324 miles of coastal
roads from Pomeroon to the corentyne River. ln In total,
Guyana possessed a little over 400 miles of pUblic roads in
1917, and this total included the 47 miles of roads in
Georgetown and 12 miles in New Amsterdam. The amount is
extremely paltry when compared with that of the much smaller
British West Indian Islands. For example, Trinidad with an
area of 1,754 square miles possessed 2,255 miles of pUblic
roads, Jamaica with an area of 4,450 square miles 6,459
miles of public roads, and tiny Barbados with an area of 166
square miles 470 miles of public road. IM
122M • C. P., 19 14 •
123B. B., 1917.
1MBritish Guiana 1919, Ope cit., pp. 30-31.
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~and Use
Among the land use measures which were implemented by
the legislature and may be considered here, are the Crown
Lands regulations, land settlement schemes, assistance in
developing new towns such as Hopetown, and neglect of others
such as Bartica.
The plantocracy and the Colonial Government did not
anticipate the concentration of African-Guyanese in the
coastal villages. They feared that with complete
emancipation the ex-slaves would migrate en masse into the
interior of the country, where they might exist entirely out
from under any governmental control. Hoping to avert this
potentially disastrous scenario of total independence and
anticipated anarchy, the government sought to restrict
access to land in the interior. No such restrictions were
evident in the smaller Caribbean islands, where limited
territorial size restricted the capacity of ex-slaves from
completely severing their connection with the plantations.
Nevertheless, newly freed slaves in countries such as
Jamaica, were able to resist further exploitation by moving
into the interior and into the mountains. There they
established themselves as peasants and small scale farmers
growing and marketing ground provisions and other crops
independent of the plantations. ln
Incarnegie, c. (ed.). 1987. Afro-Caribbean Villages in
Historical Perspective. Kingston: African-Caribbean Institute
of Jamaica.
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All lands not privately owned in Guyana were known as
Crown Lands (i.e., land owned by the British Government).
After emancipation most of the country (including nearly all
of the interior) fell under this designation. Initially
Crown Lands were available free of charge, provided that
purchasers were willing to develop the land according to
certain stipulations. However, on March 5, 1831, the
Colonial Office required Crown Lands to be sold at five
shillings per acre, and restricted sales to grants of up to
100 acres .126 The set price was extremely low. As complete
emancipation approached, Governor Light felt it necessary to
issue the following warning:
If persons without capital will consider
themselves entitled to demand land, let them not
possess it without such restrictions as shall
induce them to pause before they quit the more
densely peopled regions for the interior. lv
with the commencement of the village movement in 1838,
the government felt that a bolstering of the Crown Lands
regulations was necessary. Consequently, on May 28, 1839,
the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Glenelg,
promulgated new Crown Lands regulations. The minimum size
of purchased lots was to remain at 100 acres; however, the
statutory upset price was raised to four dollars and eighty
cents per acre. The move· was intended to inhibit laborers
126oavis, O. 1888. "The Records of British Guiana."
Timheri 2, p. 346.
127parley, R. 1954. "The Rise of the Peasantry in British
Guiana." Social and Economic Studies 2, p. 97.
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from acquiring land in the interior beyond the coastal
plantations. In a sense, the government was successful;
there was little migration southwards. This was perhaps
more a result of other distinct conditions which prevailed
at the time, than it was a policy triumph.
Peasant proprietors had little intention of migrating
into the vast hinterland, when it was abundantly clear that
the coastal lands were more fertile, better drained and
irrigated: coastal areas possessed other infrastructural
works that were available at extremely competitive prices.
Even when prices began to skyrocket and land on the coast
was selling at a hundred times the cost of Crown Land, the
workers did not opt to bUy Crown Lands. To venture into the
interior would have, in addition, denied themselves access
to markets (especially for imported consumer goods),
churches, schools, and the sugar p)antations from which they
could supplement their incomes.
Besides migrating to the villages and establishing new
ones, African-Guyanese who could not afford to purchase
estates or land squatted on the Crown Lands in the interior.
The "Commission Report in British Guiana" noted in 1848:
There are great numbers too, who strictly
speaking squat up the rivers and creeks, that is,
settle themselves·on Crown land without any title
whatever. The forest teeming with game and the
rivers with fish, afford them plentiful subsistence;
and the ground with very little tillage yields them
an abundant supply of provisions. They carryon a
small trade in firewood, charcoal, etc., but by day
the greatest part of their lives is spent in
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absolute idleness. 128
Alarmed by this new development, the government
increasingly began to enforce the vagrancy laws.
Woodcutting and timber permits were increased, and in some
cases Amerindians were given preference on timber grants,
all in an effort to keep the African-Guyanese on the
plantation belt and to suppress settlement in the interior.
The spatial and economic subjugation of the African
population was exacerbated by the decision of the ruling
class to enact an ordinance in 1852,129 which prohibited the
collective purchase of land by groups of more than twenty
persons. This piece of legislation was supported Ly another
in 1856,130 which reduced joint purchases of land to 10
persons, and stipulated that the land so held was to be
converted into individually owned plots subject to monthly
rates for the upkeep of drainage, roads, bridges, and other
infrastructural costs. Naturally, no such levies were
applied on the sugar plantations. The effect was to further
stymie the village movement, and to make this segment of the
population more dependent on plantation labor.
Having ensured the demise of the village movement, the
legislature once again turned its attention to the Crown
128Augier, F. and S. Gordon. 1962. Sources of West Indian
History. Bristol: Longman, p. 160.
I290rdinance No.1, 1852.
1300rdinance No. 33, 1856.
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Lands of the interior. There was a certain amount of
apprehension among the rUling class that the failure of the
African-Guyanese coastal villages might fuel purchases of
Crown Lands, which did not require the kinds of heavy
capital investment associated with land development on the
plantation belt. Hence, in 1861, the authorities utilized
their legislative powers by stipulating that Crown Lands
could be purchased only in minimum parcels of 100 acres, and
at the prohibitive price of $10 per acre. This was roughly
five times the cost of land available elsewhere on the coast
and on some of the rivers. 131 Ref lecting on the
government's policy, the Administration Reports of 1881
concluded that the sale price of Crown Lands was an
effective deterrent to African-Guyanese settlement in the
interior .132
The policy of confining the population to the
plantations did not apply to all sections of the community.
The Portuguese had already been encouraged to leave the
plantations; and in 1865, the legislature sought to retain
chinese immigrants who had completed their indenture in the
country, by assisting them in establishing an exclusive
Chinese settlement. A loan of $2,262 was advanced to one o.
Tye Kim to survey and layout a settlement, Hopetown, on the
I3IVeness, W.T. 1867. EI Dorado: Or British Guiana as a
Field for Colonisation. p. 7.
1DAdministration Reports 1881.
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camoonie Creek. 133 The decision to accord the Chinese
favorable status was not a difficult one, since their tenure
on the plantations was not proving to be a profitable one
for the planters. As early as 1863, Governor Hincks,
referring to Chinese immigration, warned:
.•. it will be desirable to abandon it. There is,
I think, no reason to doubt, that the labour market
of this Colony can be sufficiently supplied from
India. 134
For a time Hopetown was quite a prosperous settlement.
It began with 25 inhabitants in 1865, and expanded to 567 in
1871 and 800 in 1874. The settlement subsequently declined
in 1881 when its population fell to 222, and by 1914 the
community numbered only 73. The failure of the scheme
stemmed from a number of factors including soil eXhaustion,
inadequate drainage, and the paucity of women in the
community. In addition, many left the settlement to join
their counterparts who had migrated to the urban areas or
had become small-shopkeepers in the rural areas.
In 1869, more than 30,000 Indian immigrants, by
completing their indentureships, had earned the right to be
returned to their homeland at the government's expense.
with an estimated repatriation cost of a quarter of a
million dollars, not to mention the expected depletion of
the labor force, the legislature was determined to keep the
133B.B., 1865.
I34M. C. C., April 14, 1863.
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Indians in the colony. 135 New Indian immigrants were still
being introduced into the country, but those who had
completed their terms of servitude were being pushed out of
the estates. Consequently, the planter-dominated
legislature required a strategy with which they could
alleviate the costs of repatriation, and at the same time
direct the Indian to specific locales where his labor could
still be of service at critical times and his presence near
the estates would serve to dampen wages. The solution was
found in the development of land settlements. Immigrants
were to be offered land in return for the commutation of
their rights to return home.
The first attempt at land settlement was the
government's purchase of Plantation Nooten Zuil on the east
coast of Demerara, in 1872, for $15,OOO.I~ The project was
a resounding failure. Indian immigrants refused to take up
allotments, and by the following year the settlement scheme
was abandoned. Indians complained that the site was
unsuitable, that the grant of two-and-a-half acres (later
increased to three) was inadequate, and that the
restrictions on cattle rearing were unacceptable. In
reality, immigrants preferred to choose their own land.
with a newfound freedom of movement, following the end of
reindenture in 1873, it was found that the Indians were
In h 'tRu oman 1947, op. Cl ., p. 149.
136B. B., 1872.
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moving off the estates at a rate of 3,000 per annum. ln
Settlements sprung up in an unorganized fashion along the
pUblic road of the coastal strip. Indians were purchasing
and renting lands from private individuals and in some cases
were occupying lands in the African-Guyanese villages. No
settlement at this time was exclusively Indian, and there is
no evidence to suggest that immigrants were attempting to
segregate themselves.
segregation, however, was fostered by the legislature,
which in 1880 once again revived the idea of land settlement
with the purchase of Plantation Huis T'Dieren on the
Essequibo coast. The land was drained, laid out into
cultivation lots, and offered exclusively to Indians.
African-Guyanese who had been residing on the front-lands of
the plantation were asked to leave. Given the difficulties
experienced by the Africans following the emancipation, and
their efforts at creating their own villages, many viewed
land settlement as a discriminatory practice. A petition
was presented to the Court of Policy by "artisans,
shopkeepers, peasants, and labourers" in which for the first
time they outlined their opposition to immigration, their
fear of the exodus of Indians into the settlements, and the
costs entailed.
That your petitioners are in a most lamentable
state of poverty, notwithstanding the ring of
fertility and vast extent of the colony. They
In 'tAdamson 1972, op. Cl ., p. 94.
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ascribe this almost universal state amongst them to
the unusual drain upon the colony during the last
35 years for the support of an altogether erroneous
system of immigration. A system wholly
incompatible with the principles of political
economy as recognized by Eminent statesmen;
incompatible with justice; and must therefore,
ultimately culminate in ruin •••
Your petitioners beg to be distinctly understood,
that they are not wanting in good will towards
these immigrants as a people; their complaint is
altogether against the manner in which they have
been introduced, and all the consequent evils. 138
Despite the appeasing tone of the petition, race had
become the bogeyman, obfuscating the struggle against the
plantocracy, and capital in general.
The Huis T'Dieren scheme attracted a large number of
applicants, but only 73 immigrants waived their rights to
return passages in order to settle there.
with Indians buying their own lands, a new strategy
was instituted by Governor Irving in 1882. He felt that
land settlements were a needless waste of public
expenditure, and that the government would be better served
by easing the restrictions on Crown Lands. Land could now
be purchased in two-and-a-half acre lots at a price of $25
per acre. However, the price was too high, since land
elsewhere could be bought privately for $5 per acre or less.
Thus, in 1885 a new Crown Lands Ordinance was passed,
stipulating that land within 10 miles of a pUblic road
(essentially the road along the coast connecting the
estates) was reduced to $10 and at the same time no one
13HM.C.P., Nov. 8, 1880.
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could buy newer than 100 acres, whilst the price for Crown
I
Lands elsewhere in the colony was maintained at its high
price. Ne±ther the government nor the planters were yet
prepared to sanction the possibility of settlement in the
I
interior. IThe effectiveness of the Crown Lands policy, from
the planterrs' point of view, can be discerned by the mere
I
fact that only 22 grants of Crown Lands were made to private
individuals between 1839 and 1885, and only two were issued
I
between 188:5 and 1890. 139
Irving further persuaded the Combined Court that it
was in their interest to facilitate the development of the
emerging village settlements. And in 1883 villagers were
relieved of the onerous costs associated with the
maintenance of public roads and bridges. Public
expenditures to the villages were increased, but most of the
funds were allocated to a few villages along East Coast
Demerara, between Georgetown and Mahaica.
Gold was discovered in the 1880s, primarily in
Essequibo, and in an effort to keep tabs on the industry, it
I
was found necessary to establish a town at Bartica on the
I
Essequibo River. The site was an excellent choice, for it
I
embraced three rivers, Essequibo, Cuyuni, and Mazaruni, from
whence muchl of the widely distributed gold was extracted.
I
It also permitted some riverain communication between the
I
coast and the interior. Ordinance No. 5 of 1887 was passed
I
139M . C. c:., 1898 .
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for the establishment and regulation of a town at Bartica.
The Crown Surveyor was asked to prepare a plan denoting the
size and extent of the roads, streets, drains, trenches,
wharves, stellings, and open spaces to be made or reserved,
and of the building lots and other lots to be sold. The
town was the first significant settlement in the interior
since the migration of estates to the coast over a century
earlier. Two years later, in 1891, Morawhanna, a settlement
in the North-West District was laid out, but the settlement
was never a success. In sketching the rationale for
Bartica's development, Henry Kirke, a government employee,
surmised:
... it was found necessary to establish some
central depot from whence the gold industry could
be regulated - a place where laborers could be
registered when going up to work, and searched when
coming down; where boats could be inspected and
licensed, and competent boat hands hired; where the
magistrates could adjudicate upon the gold disputes,
and the government officers could issue prospecting
and other licenses; where a hospital for the sick
could be established, and a lock-up for the
disorderly, where the dead could be buried, and the
living entertained; so Bartica was chosen and
founded, and is now able to meet all the
requirements detailed above. 140
In 1902, the Court of Policy met to discuss the idea
of making Bartica the capital of the country. One member
suggested that Bartica was going to be not only the capital
of the colony, but the "Liverpool of the western seas. ,,141
140Kirke 1898, op. cit., pp. 135-136.
141M.C.P., Nov. 28, 1902.
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Since its foundation, the town had been gradually rising in
importance, but its population was constantly fluctuating
depending on the fortunes of the gold-mining industry.
Furthermore, planter capitalists, and a number of Georgetown
merchants, steadfastly resisted hinterland infrastructural
expenditure. The proposal was quickly shelved, and Bartica
continued to be omitted from the country's transportation
network. There was to be no national integration of the
spatial economy.
The government never sought to allow the establishment
of settlement on the gold fields themselves. The interior
was useful because it provided a safety valve for unemployed
Africans, but permanent settlements in the interior were
never seriously contemplated. The fortunes of the country
and its population distribution were to remain a coastal
affair.
In 1894, the planters once again broached the subject
of granting lands to Indians in lieu of return passages. A
commission was appointed to enquire into the feasibility of
such a policy; and in 1896, following its recommendations,
Plantation Helena on the east coast of Demerara was
purchased by the government, and 1,206 Indian immigrants
commuted ~heir rights to return passages for grants of land
on the settlement. 142 SUbsequently three other estates,
Bush Lot on the west coast of Berbice, Whim on the Corentyne
142B. B., 1897-98.
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coast of Berbice, and Maria's Pleasure on the island of
Wakenaam on the Essequibo, were acquired for settlement.
The settlements progressed slowly, and although 2,300
immigrants had taken up grants by 1901, the government was
dissatisfied with the results and once again abandoned
settlement schemes in 1905.
The success of the schemes was probably hindered by
the countervailing effects of the government's Crown Lands
policy. This policy had been liberalized in 1898 so that
Crown Lands could be purchased in 25-acre lots at a price of
15 cents per acre, and the incidental expenses connected
with acquisitions were lowered at the same time. As a
result, Indians took advantage of the new regulations, and
began securing lands that were suitable for rice cultivation
in the Mahaica, Mahaicony, and Abary Creeks, and on the
Corentyne River. In addition, many private land sales were
concluded at this time. The number of Indians who were now
living off the estates and in the villages and settlements
had doubled from 28,412 in 1891 to 57,649 in 1901.
In 1912, land settlements were once again contemplated
by the government as a means of encouraging Indians to
remain in the colony. Between 1912 and 1913 the government
purchased Plantations Unity, Lancaster, and Clonbrook on the
east coast of Demerara, and Windsor Forest, La Jalousie, and
Hague on the west coast. The lands were drained, laid out
into cultivation plots, and sold to Indians. The increasing
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movement into rice cultivation meant that for the first time
since the Dutch era, crops other than sugar had more lands
under cultivation. During the 1912-1913 period, the sugar
estates were cultivating 74,544 acres, rice took up 41,722
acres, and ground provisions and other crops 34,492 acres.
Whilst this is important, one needs to bear in mind that at
this time the sugar estates (41 of them) had 77,424 acres,
or 51 percent of their land, idle. le Sugar estates
maintained a poli.cy of keeping lands fallow as part of their
crop rotation system, but this does not explain the vast
amounts kept by the industry. certainly the industry had
the most fertile land, and it is possible, given the
vagaries of world markets, that a healthy reserve was
required to take advantage of possible opportunities. In
any case, the custom of granting extensive tracts of land to
individuals and companies came to an end in 1913, and was
replaced by a pOlicy of granting leases.
Political and Social Structure
Politics is a key causal variable behind demographic
concentrations. Thus, expenditures and infrastructural
provision are analyzed as a function of the political power
of various groups in the society. For example, the ability
of planters or merchants to articulate their demands was
dependent on their control or influence over the Court of
1438.8., 1912-1913.
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Policy and the Combined Court. This sub-section assesses
the political power of these groupings during the period.
It looks at the way qualifications for the franchise were
used as a device to exclude certain segments of the
population, and at the efforts by the government to divide
the variegated ethnic groups.
Government expenditure had increased markedly
following emancipation. with the costs associated with
social control now absolutely in the hands of the state, and
with the introduction of education, health, and other social
services underway, public expenditure had almost doubled
from 130,017 pounds during the 1838-40 period to 214,043
during the 1841-43 period. 1M Naturally, the planters
ensconced in the Combined Court and the Court of Policy had
no intention of bearing the new costs; thus, pressure was
brought to bear on the African peasantry and their petty
commodity producer counterparts in the urban areas.
Villagers who sought to be subsistence farmers were coerced
into the wage economy by the government's shifting of the
tax burden onto the peasantry. For the sale of the smallest
quantity of provisions, laws were introduced requiring shop
and hucksters' licenses, porters' licenses, taxes on carts
for hire, etc. The substantial fee that was required
possibly served to underdevelop internal trade and to
strengthen the position of the large-scale merchants and
1MAdamson 1972, Ope cit., p. 243.
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traders in the country. Import duties were designed
specifically to fallon the peasantry, and at a later date
the indentured immigrants. Common items consumed by this
group (such as rice, pickled pork and beef, and corn) were
assigned steep duties. The plantocracy calculated that high
taxation and import duties on these items would force the
working class to labor on the plantations, and thus become
economically dependent on them. Meanwhile, articles thought
to be essential to colonial life were exempted. In 1850,
duty-free articles included sheep, hogs, cattle, fresh fruit
and vegetables, fresh fish, fresh meat, poultry, turtles,
manures, lumber and varnish, machinery, provisions for the
forces, ice, wines and spirits imported by the governor, and
higher-income consumer items such as coin, bullion, and
diamonds. Furthermore, the income tax fell directly on the
ruling class. It was introduced following the termination
of the poll tax on slaves, reduced from 2 to 1 percent after
1842, and abrogated in 1853.1~ Planters had previously
been exempt from taxes on income gained from cotton, coffee,
sugar, rum, and molasses.
Restricted from private enterprise, the African
population sought opportunities in other areas. The
education field became an important source of employment,
especially for those who had migrated to the towns.
Education was viewed by the migrants as a means of social
145B.B.,1853.
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and economic mobility. Some entered the teaching
profession, whilst others aspired to become lawyers and
doctors. The growth of the civil service and its
centralization in Georgetown meant that educated migrants
were soon being recruited for lower-grade clerical positions
in the city. In March 1852, a Central Board of Health was
created in Georgetown, with the responsibility of managing
smaller local boards in other parts of the colony. The
effort to educate the African population was met with a
certain ambivalence by the planters. On the one hand, they
felt that education might spur greater opposition to their
privileged position in the society; and on the other, they
recognized its socializing effect, in the sense that formal
education could foster obedience and an acceptance of the
unequal structures in the colony. As the 1850s progressed 4
it seemed that the latter view was in ascendance. Migrants
who wished to be educated in the city were assisted by the
establishment of Bishop's College in 1851 and Queen's
College Grammar School in 1853.
Guyanese merchants also fared poorly when the planter-
dominated Combined Court stopped supplies in 1840. The
curtailment of supplies meant that for nearly six months,
little business could be transacted in the urban areas where
the merchants were to be found. Merchants objected to the
narrow oligarchy which dominated the Combined Court.
Membership on the Court of Policy and Combined Court, and
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qualifications for the franchise, were overwhelmingly based
on the ownership of land. Thus, participation in the
political process favored the planters, although a monetary
value was included as part of the requirements following the
abolition of slavery.
Reforms of the franchise failed to increase
significantly the electorate, for in 1847 there were only
561 registered voters out of a population of 130,000. The
necessity for the broadening of the franchise was further
demonstrated on May 8, 1849, at an election for a member of
the College of Kiezers. When the votes were tallied, it was
found tllat there were only 169 votes, and that none were
from Berbice. At another election in August, 1849, the
number of voters in the colony were only 88. Absentee
voters numbered 181, of whom no fewer than 134 were
represented by five persons, who thus with their own votes
were able to determine the outcome. M6
In the fall of 1849, following some intense lobbying
by the merchants and a reassessment of the situation by the
Colonial Office, the franchise was extended to include the
following stipulations: 1) for rural voter - freeholders in
possession of three acres of land under bona fide
cUltivation, or ownership of a house or house and land with
a value of $96 per annum; or leaseholders of six acres of
land under bona fide cUltivation, or tenancy of a house or
I~Clementi 1937, Ope cit., pp. 187-188.
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house and land with a value of $192 per annum; 2) for city
or town voter - ownership of a house or of a house and
premises of an appraised value of $500; or leaseholders
paying an annual rent of $120; 3) for those not specified in
the above two categories - residence in an electoral
district for six months and an income or salary of not less
than $600 per annum; or persons paying $20 a year in direct
taxes .147
The first elections under the new constitutional
arrangements were held in 1851, but these resulted in an
increase in the number of voters to only 916.~ The
requirements were so stringent that few voters were able to
participate. Although there were 11,000 African-Guyanese
landed proprietors at this time, many owned relatively small
lots which did not meet the new franchise qualifications.
Moreover, those African-Guyanese who did meet the
requirements were excluded from the electorate by the
imposition of a sUbjective literacy test that was inserted
into the 1840 Ordinance at the insistence of the
planters .149 The vote of women, which had been in effect
since carmichael's proclamation of 1812, was also taken away
by Ordinance No. 15 of 1849.
I~Ordinance No. 15, 1849.
148B. B., 1851 .
1490 fficial Despatch, Barkly to Grey, Oct. 5, 1849.
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Planters further restricted membership in the College
of Kiezers and the College of Financial Representatives by
imposing property qualifications which were higher than
those required for voters. Prior to 1849, qualifications
for the colleges and the franchise were the same, but since
there was the danger that the lower franchise requirements
might introduce Africans into the legislature, new
eligibility standards were introduced. Membership into the
two colleges were set at ownership of not less than 80 acres
of land, of which 40 should be under cultivation; or the
possession of a house, or house and land, with an annual
rental value of $1,200; or possession of an annual income of
$1,440 derived from any other kind of property, or from the
profits of any trade or profession. Siding with the
planters on this point, Governor Barkly reasoned that the
high qualifications were necessary "in order to secure as
high a standard of independence and mental cultivation in
the pol~tical colleges of British Guiana."· 150 Even the
clergy were banned from membership in the colleges. The
planters feared that the clergy would use their power in the
!
legislatlure to further the cause of the African masses.
Governor Barkly acknowledged this point and presented his
own convoluted ~rgument to keep the clergy out.
One class alone, the ministers of religion, are
excluded, however qualified in other respects, from
a seat in the legislature - an exception justified
1500 fficial Despatch, Barkly to Grey, Oct. 5, 1849.
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by its proposers on the analogy of the British
House of Commons, and acceded to on my part, not
from any jealousy of the influence exercised over
the Emancipated peasantry by their spiritual guides,
but from a conviction, on the contrary, that this
influence would be diminished by their interference
in secular affairs, instead of being, as I would
gladly see it for the interests of religion and
morality, extended tenfold. lSI
However, the new system did favor wealthy merchants
and professionals in Georgetown and New Amsterdam, since
there was no direct taxation or similar monetary remedy
which could enfranchise those in the rural areas. Voter
registration in 1849 clearly indicated that urban interests
had made significant headway under the new law. Nearly 41
percent of the registered voters were residents of
Georgetown, whilst New Amsterdam accounted for over two-
thirds of Berbice's voters. ln The plantocracy had feared
the likelihood of this new power alignment, and had cleverly
lobbied for the creation of electoral districts that would
give rural districts a majority of seats in the
constitutional assemblies. The result was that rural
districts were assigned four representatives each to the
College of Kiezers lB and the College of Financial
Representatives,l~whereas Georgetown was permitted two
ISIIbid.
152B. B., 1849.
IS3The body from which members of the Court of Policy were
selected.
IS4Members of whom, along with the Court of Policy,
constituted the Combined Court.
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Kiezers and one Financial Representative, and New Amsterdam
one of each. Consequently the merchants were, on paper,
outnumbered by the planters three to four in the College of
Kiezers, and two to four in the College of Financial
Representatives. The new alignment met with unqualified
support from the Colonial Government. In a despatch to
Governor Barkly, Earl Grey wrote:
My belief is that, in such a state of society as
now exists in Guyana, it generally happens that the
capital town is apt to exercise too much, rather
than too little, influence as compared with the
rural districts, even without the addition which
such a change would make to its power. 155
Corporate proprietorship further reduced the strength
of the old plantocracy, but the hold of the sugar industry
on Guyana's structures did not wane. When "gold fever"
broke out in Georgetown and elsewhere in the colony in
1864,1~ following the first organized attempt at mining in
the interior, it was rumored that the planting body, as well
as the Colonial Government, pressured the company's
geologist to present an unfavorable survey.ln The
authorities and planters had feared that thousands of would-
be miners would depart the coast, leaving the sugar industry
in ruins. It must be noted that no such uproar attended the
establishment of the cattle industry in the Rupununi in
InEarl Grey's despatch, Dec. 30, 1850. In Clementi 1937,
Ope cit., p. 219.
I~Royal Gazette, Oct. 14, 1864.
IflRodway 1894, Ope cit., vol. III, p. 189.
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1860, or the Balata industry elsewhere in the interior in
1862. The fact that these industries were not very labor-
intensive no doubt influenced planter response.
Planter hegemony of the country's political structure
was briefly challenged in 1863 by the election of six white
merchants to the Combined Court. Urban dominance was
further strengthened, since elected planters often had great
difficulty attending meetings in Georgetown. Merchants
quickly sought to flex their newfound muscles by attempting
to nominate a Georgetown lawyer to the Court of Policy,
although he did not possess the necessary landed-property
qualification. The merchants directly challenged the
planters by contending that membership on the Court of
Policy had never been defined since the days of slavery.
However, with matters at a head, the plantocracy skillfully
persuaded the Colonial Office to set a qualification
standard of 80 acres for membership on the Court. 15S This
effectively barred the merchants and other non-white groups
from membership on the court.
Planter domination was not confined to the political
structures of the colonial state. Members of the
plantocracy dominated just about all the statutory boards
including drainage, health, sea defense, and village
administration. Moreover, they exercised considerable power
over the local press, particularly the Royal Gazette, the
1580rdinance No.1, 1864.
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local militia, the police, and the judiciary. This is quite
apart from the fact that they also reigned supreme over the
country's social and economic structures through their
ownership of the plantations.
The plantocracy and colonial government were also
quite adept at exploiting the racial differences of the
various groups to solidify their hold on Guyanese society.
One plantation manager summed up the "competing races"
philosophy the following way:
I think the safety of the whites depends very
much upon the want of union in the different races
of labourers and I should be glad to see some more
Madeiranese and, if possible, Chinese, coming in;
the coolies [Indians] too would always hold by the
whites .159
The various racial groups were thus expected to form a
social buffer between the rUling class and the emerging
African population. Furthermore, the plantocracy reasoned
that a racially diverse population could easily be
translated into a divided labor force. The Portuguese,
perhaps because they were phenotypically white, received the
most favored treatment. Not only were they encouraged to
take over the retail trade, but even when they were laboring
in the fields, they were paid at a much higher rate than
their counterparts from other groups. The Portuguese
laborer was paid $28 a month, whilst the Indian was paid
159Quoted in Adamson 1972, op. cit., p. 157.
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$21, or 25 percent less. 1W The pro-Portuguese pOlicy in
time led to conflict between this group and the African in
particular. The first clash came in 1848, and this was
followed by the Angel Gabriel Riots of 1856, and further
strife in 1862, 1889, and 1891. African antipathy toward
the Portuguese stemmed primarily from economic
considerations. Many Portuguese retailers charged high
prices, and were guilty of fraudulent retailing practices in
their dealings with their African customers. However,
Rodway attributes the ill feeling of the African-Guyanese
towards the Portuguese to deep-seated racial prejudices.
In the opinion of the negro he [i.e., the
Portuguese] was a low fellow, not a "buccra," or
gentlemen, nor the ideal white man. Then he was a
Roman Catholic, whilst most of the blacks were
rabid Protestants; this was an offence. Beyond
everything he had driven out almost every peddlar
and small shopkeeper of the coloured race by
underselling, and could get credit where a black
man's application would have been treated with
contempt. It was the oft-recurring complaint
against the foreigner, for the negro was the native
or creole who alone had the right to prosper in his
own country. 161
Africans also clashed with Indians and Chinese, but
these skirmishes were never serious in the nineteenth
century. The introduction of greater numbers of white women
also contributed to the widening gulf between the races in
the late 1800s. According to Kirke, white women regarded
with disfavor relationships between whites and non-whites,
16°Webber 1931, op. cit., p. 220.
161Rodway 1912, op. cit., p. 127.
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and the "touch of the tar brush" became less acceptable to
the English colonists. 162
During the 1890s, Africans in particular, were making
considerable advances in a number of areas, including
professional occupations such as teachers, lawyers, doctors,
and the clergy. They were also making strides in
occupational areas, such as bookkeeping and clerical work,
that were the province of the middle class. Persons who
were employed in these occupations tended to reside in the
towns, particularly Georgetown.
The social progress made by the Africans and the
subsequent growth of the middle class were beginning to
engender some notable structural changes in the society.
Merchants, particularly the portuguese and the emergent
African and colored middle class in the towns, were
increasingly challenging the plantocracy. Political
disenfranchisement became increasingly incompatible with the
growing economic advances and political consciousness of
urban interests. The incipient political class struggle
also found support in some sections of the local press. The
Daily Chronicle, caught up in the reformist zeal of the
times, demanded:
Is anyone bold enough to stand up in this colony
and say reform is not needed? In this democratic
age when in every country of any importance the
people have a choice in the election of their
I~Kirke 1898, Ope cit., pp. 45-46.
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governors, we here have not even the semblance of
Representative Government ...
We should not wonder if soon we shall be nick-
named across the water, "The stick-in-the-mud
colony". Here we are with a government about as
suitable to modern times as a wheelbarrow is for
locomotion in comparison with the steam engine •..
and sUbjects of freedom-loving England, living
under a "Despotism sweetened by sugar! ,,163
Widespread popular resentment against the plantocracy
motivated Governor Irving to pressure the Home Government
for reform of the constitution, and in 1891 a new
constitution was approved following the passing of Ordinance
No.1, "To alter and Amend the Political constitution of
this Colony." The ordinance abolished the College of
Kiez8rs (the electoral college) and instituted direct
elections for the unofficial members of the Court of Policy.
The Court of Policy was retained, and the body enlarged with
the addition of three appointed (official) and three elected
(unofficial) members. Thus, the Colonial Government kept
its majority through the casting vote of the governor. The
newly elected members were to be drawn from Georgetown (two)
and New Amsterdam (one). This distribution was designed to
give greater representation to the mercantile and middle
classes in the urban areas. But with five elective members
coming from the rural constituencies, the planters were able
to maintain their majority in the unofficial section of the
Court of Policy. Qualification for election to the
legislature was to be the ownership of not less than $7,500
IMDaily Chronicle, July 10, 1889.
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of immovable property besides land, and the franchise was
lowered from $600 to $480 per annum. An executive council
was constituted to assume the executive and administrative
functions of the Court of Policy. It was composed of the
governor, a number of public officials, and the unofficial
members appointed by the governor, all of whom were
planters.
The first general election under the new constitution
took place in January 1892, but the effects were negligible.
The plantocracy firmly retained its hold on Guyana's
political structure. The number of registered voters
increased slightly from 1,973 in 1890 to 2,046 in 1891, and
to 2,375 in 1892 following the enactment of the new
constitution. IM The narrow representation favored the
planters. However, when secret balloting was allowed in the
1897 elections, only one planter was returned to the court.
In 1915, Africans constituted over 62 percent of the
electorate, and Indians 6 percent. 1M The political
hegemony of the sugar planters had been broken, and white
dominion over Guyanese political institutions was challenged
by representatives of the African and colored middle class.
Nevertheless, economic dependence on the sugar industry
remained a steadfast reality.·
IMB.B., 1890-1892.
IMoespres, L. 1967. Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist
Politics in British Guiana. Chicago: Rand McNally, p. 39.
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sugar's absence from the legislature was not quite the
expected catastrophe for the plantocracy. The newly elected
middle class were not antithetical to capital, or the sugar
industry for that matter; but neither were they
representatives of the working class, indeed, middle-class
pOliticians bought into the idea that a healthy sugar
industry was essential for the prosperity of the country.
Oftentimes they strove to preserve or introduce legislation
that was beneficial to sugar. For example, Patrick Dargan,
a middle-class colored politician, scheduled a motion
censuring the governor for tabling a bill that would give
him the authority to remove immigrants from estates where he
believed they were treated improperly.IM In 1894,
following another price slump on the world market, the
planters persuaded the legislature to absolve them of the
responsibility to maintain the roads on the sugar estates,
to reduce their share of the costs associated with medical
facilities from one-half to one-third, to reduce their share
of the costs of immigration from two-thirds to one-third, to
extend their credit on the costs of water supply loans, as
well as to pass some other minor legislation that was
intended to provide assistance to the sugar industry. The
costs of the subsidies were to be met by an increase in
taxes on the general population. 167
I66Adamson 1972, op. cit., p. 253.
167M • C • C ., 1894.
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SUMMARY
Emancipation resulted in the evolution of small-scale
villages along the Guyanese littoral. The formation of a
free peasantry set in motion the village movement which
flourished until the 1850s. Paradoxically, the end of the
village movement came at a time when the sugar industry was
witnessing a distinct revival of fortunes. The industry had
adapted itself to the markets of the world system by means
of amalgamation of estates, technological improvements, and
reduction of wages through the introduction of indentured
labor. incorporation into the modern world system provided
an additional stimulus to sugar production in the colony
through the expansion of the metropolitan market for sugar.
The cessation of indentured immigration, at the end of
our period, cast a pall over the future of the colony.
Indian indentured immigrants had bolstered and augmented the
demographic structure since the abolition of slavery. By
1917, they had become the largest ethnic group, comprising
over 43 percent of the population.l~ Efforts to retain
them in the colony had stimulated the rice industry, and had
brought some measure of diversification to the country's
economic structure. This in turn had fostered increasing
residential and occupational segregation along racial
lines - Indians overwhelmingly confined to the rural areas,
IOB.B., 1917.
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laboring on the sugar plantations and rice fields, and
Africans dominating the occupational structure of the towns,
and the gold fields in the interior.
The economic changes engendered by the development of
the rice and gold industry, however, did not accompany
profound spatial changes in the country's urban structure.
The formation of a free peasantry, African and Indian,
increased the number of proprietors and small farms at the
expense of large estates, but it did not sever reliance on
the metropole for manufactured goods and a trading partner.
The country had been thoroughly peripheralized. As a result,
very little effort was made to institute non-sugar infant
industries in the urban areas, and to break Guyana's
dependence on sugar as the mainstay of the economy. Surplus
value needed for economic transformation was consigned to
the core. Investment remained at a low level, public and
infrastructural expenditures heavily favored the
plantations, and only petty-commodity production and
domestic, clerical, and administrative services provided
alternatives to rural underemployment for the surplus
population. So we find that although Georgetown and New
Amsterdam exhibited signs of urban growth in the post-
emancipation era, they were doing so without an industrial
and manufacturing base. Rather, they were essentially
nodes, where the economic and political strength of the core
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and its representatives were concentrated to facilitate the
chains of exploitation.
CHAPTER IV
TWENTIETH CENTURY COLONIAL RULE 1917-1966
GLOBAL LINKAGES
This section illustrates the continuance of the
colonial export economy, by charting the addition of bauxite
and rice to the country's export market. It also
demonstrates how the Second World War was instrumental in
extending Guyana's linkage with North America through an
increase in trade and the siting of U.S. naval and air bases
in and around Georgetown. It examines the impact of these
developments on the processes of urban change.
In 1917, the year indentured immigration was brought
to a close, the Demerara Bauxite Company (Demba), a
sUbsidiary of the Canadian-based transnational Aluminium
Company of Canada (Alcan), established the bauxite industry
in Guyana. Bauxite operations commenced very slowly. In
1917, only 2,037 tons of bauxite were exported, with all of
the ore destined for North America. I Thereafter, exports
fluctuated, and production actually stopped in 1922 as the
IB.B., 1917.
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company sought to overcome some initial problems. 2
Members of the sugar industry strongly opposed the
introduction of bauxite mining, but the British Government
was not swayed by the outcry. The government, worried
because of its dependence on France for bauxite, welcomed
the industry and clearly perceived the revolution that the
aluminum industry was expected to engender. 3
During World War I, the European sugar-beet industry,
which had competed with tropical sugar production, was
brought to an abrupt halt; as a result, the value of sugar
exports from Guyana increased considerably. In 1913, prior
to the outbreak of hostilities, the country exported 87,414
tons of sugar; however, by 1918 exports had climbed to
93,902 tons. 4 The ending of the war abruptly halted the
high prices that had prevailed during the conflict. High
prices world-wide had stimulated sugar production in many
parts of the globe, and this along with technological
improvements in the industry created a glut of sugar on the
world market. Consequently, sugar which was fetching over
50 pounds per ton in 1920 slumped to a little over 18 pounds
per ton in 1921. Interestingly enough, there was no
corresponding decline in the colony's export of sugar.
Technical efficiency, particularly the introduction of
2B.B., 1922.
3M.C.C., special session, 1917.
4Nath 1970, Ope cit., p. 249.
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crystallizers which increased the recovery of sugar from the
cane, contributed to almost a 33-percent increase in sugar
exports between 1920 (83,765 tons) and 1921 (108,270 tons).5
During the war, rice was becoming a major agricultural
concern when the governor stepped in to restrict exports in
1917. The governor, Sir Wilfred Collet, alarmed by the rise
in exports, was concerned that the local market would be
depleted of rice. Therefore, he introduced a licensing
system, whereby all rice exports would require special
permits issued only by him. The system was open to abuse,
and within a short while a thriving black-market license
trade had developed. The governor's response was swift and
dramatic. He summarily placed an embargo on all rice
exports from the latter part of 1918 until March 1919.
Collet's curious measures are open to some serious
questioning. Perhaps it would have been wiser to have
encouraged farmers to increase the acreage under rice,
rather than curtailing exports to solve the problem of food
shortages at home. Furthermore, there is a lingering
suspicion that the governor was restricting rice production
in order to provide additional labor to sugar's depleted
labor force. In any case, the effects of the embargo were
to stifle the overseas trade and to return the captured West
Indian market back to India and Burma.
Port traffic was seriously affected by the end of
5B. B., 1920-1921.
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indenture, the war, and Collet's embargo. Shipping
activities at New Amsterdam's port, which were already at a
perilously low level, came to a virtual standstill. In
1918, five ships (230 tons) entered the port, whilst 359
ships (297,139 tons) entered the Port of Georgetown; but two
years later New Amsterdam was frequented by a mere three
ships 0 (222 tons), and Georgetown by 137 (11,768 tons).6
Between 1921 and 1931, the sugar industry was faced
with the peculiar problem of increasing exports fetching
decreasing financial returns. The export of sugar from the
colony in 1931 was 119,346 tons as compared with 98,958
tons, the average for the preceding ten years. 7 Rice
exports in 1931 amounted to 23,632 tons, as compared with
22,480 tons in 1930. 8
Sugar and rice exports dominated Guyana's overseas
trade in 1931, with a notable contribution from the bauxite
industry. In total, the country exported $9,268,799 worth
of commodities, despite the economic depression throughout
the world and the slump in market prices. 9 There were
appreciable, and in some cases quite remarkable, increases
in the export figures of sugar, molasses, rice, and balata.
Most of the colony's exports were shipped to Canada, the
6B. B. , 1918-1920.
7B. B. , 1921-1931.
8B. B. , 1930-1931.
9B. B. , 1931.
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united Kingdom, and elsewhere in the British empire. The
united states and other foreign countries accounted for only
8.5 percent of the export trade. Virtually all of the
shipping was handled by the Port of Georgetown. The port
cleared 578 ships (759,136 tons), whilst New Amsterdam
cleared only one (268 tons), and springlands 393 (4,283
tons).
The British, in 1928, introduced a Crown Colony form
of government in Guyana, supposedly on the grounds that the
old constitution was an impediment to development. Once the
new constitution was in place, it was widely felt that
Britain would invigorate economic development in the colony.
However, in the following decade, little assistance was
provided by the home government. Commenting on the colony's
predicament, Webber concluded:
British Guiana cannot be said to have progressed
in the 350 years since it was brought into touch
with Europe. The indigenous people have
practically disappeared. The new immigrant races
have not yet commenced to increase and multiply.
As a country whose exports amounted to close upon
£1,000,000,000, her achievements have been
disappointing. 10
Furthermore, restrictions remained on the introduction of
foreign capital into the country; the argument was that
without restrictions the country would soon fall prey to
foreign capitalists, who would overwhelm the domestic market
just as they had done in Jamaica and elsewhere in the
I~ebber 1931, op. cit., p. 363.
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Caribbean. The lack of development in Guyana convinced the
local population that Britain had forsaken its only
dependency on the South American mainland. This
disillusionment and mistrust was compounded in 1939, when
it was rumored that the British Government had agreed to
settle German Jews in Guyana, and that it might indeed turn
the colony over to the Germans in order to reach some
accommodation with an expansionist Germany. II The calls for
attention would eventually be answered by the colonial
office.
The Second World War extended Guyana's linkage with
North America. Under an agreement with Great Britain, the
Americans acquired a naval base in Georgetown and built an
air base at Atkinson field, some 30 miles from the capital,
up the Demerara River. Guyana was strategically important
for the Americans, since it not only gave them a foothold on
the South American continent, but also served as a
refuelling site for American bombers en route to Africa.
The war also stimulated the export of bauxite to Canada.
conversely, dependence on North America for food decreased,
owing to difficulties experienced in shipping. Greater
self-reliance was placed on home production, and as a
result, Guyanese society begin to see the possibilities of
indigenous development and what could be accomplished
through partial delinking.
IIOfficial Despatch, Lethem to Stanley, Oct. 8, 1943.
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Indigenous development meshed with the report of the
West India Royal Commission in 1945, which urged a reversal
of British colonial policy for Guyana and its British West
Indian counterparts. The commission recommended that the
colonies be regarded as economic entities in their own right
and not simply appendages of the British market. 12 The
report was a harbinger of events to corne. It set in motion
the road to self-government, but economic independence and
the realignment of the unequal relationship between Guyana
and the core proved to be more intractable. The value of
the country's overall trade reached a new record level of
$47,553,571 in 1943, as against $23,422,387 in the pre-war
year of 1938. 13 Higher prices of commodities and increased
costs related to shipping and supply conditions were
responsible for the increases in imports (which amounted to
$24,368,598) and exports (which totalled $23,184,973) .14
Trade was overwhelmingly oriented toward the united states,
Canada, the united Kingdom, and to a lesser extent the
British West Indies. similarly, the range of exports was
confined to the usual narrow range of commodities. No
figures are available for bauxite exports, but 131,187 tons
12Report of the West India Royal Commission 1938-39. 1945.
London: H.M.S.O.
13B.B, 1938 and 1943.
14B.B., 1943.
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of sugar and 17,180 tons of rice were exported in 1943. 15
The role of the Guyana sugar industry's link to the
metropole cannot be over-emphasized. In 1938 sugar and its
by-products, rum and molasses, contributed up to 65 percent
of the value of the country's exports, with the actual
export figures for sugar being about $7,500,000 out of a
total of $12,500,000. 16 In 1946 the value of exports of the
sugar industry had shot up to approximately $13,000,000.
After World War II, British policy in Guyana was
extremely conservative. The government sought to maintain
Guyana as a plantation economy, although the indigenous
population were appealing for diversification and
industrialization. Exports of sugar in the post-World War
II period steadily increased, from an average of 163,331
tons during 1946-50, to 222,545 tons during 1951-55, and to
273,179 tons during 1956-60. 17
Rice exports, which had made rapid progress during the
war, also continued to increase. During 1946-50 average
annual exports were 23,197 tons; this amount increased to
37,300 tons during 1951-55, and to 43,300 tons during 1956-
60. 18 One interesting feature of rice exports was the
15Ibid.
16B.B., 1938.
17Mandle, J. 1973.The Plantation Economy: Population and
Economic Change in Guyana, 1838-1960. Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, pp. 72-73.
18Ibid., p. 77.
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opening of exports to Cuba once the People's Progressive
Party (PPP) achieved power in 1957. In 1962 a boom in rice
exports resulted in 90,000 tons going overseas, with over
one-third destined for Cuba. This linkage, however, was
severed in 1964 with the ascension of the People's National
Congress (PNC) to office. Guyana immediately ceased
exporting rice to Cuba. The expanding export market was
stalled, and the industry has never fully recovered since
that time. Exports were confined to Trinidad, Jamaica,
Barbados, and the smaller British West Indian islands.
Foreign trade was extremely highly concentrated. The
United states, Canada, and Great Britain were Guyana's chief
trading partners. In 1964, their overwhelming dominance of
Guyana's foreign trade was evident. Over 75 percent of the
country's exports and imports were associated with these
three countries. 19
Overseas capital had been important for a long time in
exploiting Guyanese resources. The sugar industry, the
fulcrum of the colonial economy, had been brought about
almost exclusively by foreign capital, and this was also
true of bauxite. In the immediate post-war period, there
was an increased flow of overseas capital. The sugar
industry was greeted with an infusion of new capital' to
pursue a mechanization program. The mining industry,
19Guyana. 1964. Annual Report Relating to External Trade.
Georgetown: Government Printery.
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particularly bauxite and gold, invested in new machinery.
Also, the 1953-57 period witnessed an attempt by the British
Government to increase spending related to development.
However, overseas investment capital dried up during the
Jagan years (1957-64); and it did not resume to any great
extent until 1965, when Forbes Burnham assumed power.
INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE
This section focuses on the emergence of bauxite and
its domination of the industrial structure along with sugar
and rice. It assesses the effects of the Second World War
on the country's major industries, and the imperial
government's reluctance to encourage fledgling domestic
manufacturing industries in the post-war period.
In 1910, the Director of Science and Agriculture
reported the discovery of bauxite deposits to the Combined
Court:
I have the honour to report for the information
of the Governor that I have examined specimens of
rocks obtained from the low hills at Christianburg
and at Akyma, Demerara River, and have found them
to largely consist of free alumina, 64 to 66%, in
the state of hydrate. w
Thereafter, a concession of 22,180 acres, consisting
of some 20 abandoned plantations in the Christianburg Akyma
district of the Demerara River, was granted to Demba to mine
2~.C.C., Second Special Session, 1917.
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or quarry the bauxite. 21 A new industry had been
introduced, but the externally oriented economy reflected
little structural change.
Guyana and the West Indies increased sugarcane
production appreciably during 1914-18, to take advantage of
the boom in prices that was set in motion by the ensuing
shortages in Europe. The area under cane cultivation
increased from 79,793 acres in 1914 to 89,970 acres in 1918;
but following the war, cultivation contracted from 87,612
acres in 1919 to 63,420 acres in 1921. u Also, after 1918
there was a slight decline in production, but during 1921
and 1931 the trend was once again upward. Production
advances resulted from an expansion in sugarcane acreage, as
well as increased efficiency in the industry that was
brought about by more intensive use of fertilizers and
improved varieties of sugarcane. continued consolidation
and amalgamation reduced the number of estates in the
country by six to 38, and the number of sugar factories to
20, in 1931. n It was at this time that Bookers, a
transnational company, commenced to purchase struggling
plantations and to consolidate them. Through an aggressive
acquisition program, the company began to solidify its hold
on Guyana's sugar economy and to make inroads into other
2lIbid.
22B.B., 1913/14-1921-
DB.B., 1921 and 1931.
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areas of the country's economic structure.
One important spatial effect of consolidation and
amalgamation was the virtual elimination of the sugar
industry in Essequibo, and the sUbsequent loss of population
in that county. In 1921, Essequibo devoted 8,620 acres to
sugarcane cultivation while registering a population of
55,276; but in 1931, only 890 acres of sugarcane were under
cultivation, whilst the county's population had declined by
nearly 11 percent to 49,830.~ The population structure and
settlement pattern of the county were forever transformed.
Some workers displaced from the sugar industry in
Essequibo moved into rice cultivation in the county.
Between 1921 and 1931, the acreage under rice in Essequibo
rose from 6,531 to 14,363. 25 Other Essequibo sugar workers
migrated to Berbice and Demerara to take up rice lands or to
labor on the sugar estates in the other two counties. The
shift into rice was initially hampered as a result of
Governor Collet's export embargo, which adversely affected
the country's overall rice production. Unable to export
their crop, rice farmers were compelled to reduce the amount
of land devoted to the staple. Consequently, the area under
rice cultivation declined from 60,32 acres in 1918 to 54,400
acres in 1921. 26 For most of the decade, Guyanese rice
~Ibid.
HIbid.
MB.B., 1918 and 1921.
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production continued its free-fall. In 1922 the number of
acres cultivated had fallen to 49,073, and the downward
trend continued until 1925 when only 29,333 acres were under
rice - a figure not seen since 1908, when the industry was
still in its infancy. After 1925 rice production and
acreage began to expand rapidly. By 1931, 73,647 acres were
devoted to the cultivation of the staple - the first year in
which the acreage under rice surpassed that of sugar. The
total yield of 47,056 tons was derived from 191 rice mills
dotted along the Guyana coastline. 27 The progress noted in
the rice industry occurred without much assistance from the
government. Unlike sugar, rice was expected to develop on
its own merits. Sugar was the colonial government's
darling. This preference was exemplified in 1923, when the
government attempted to reopen a sugar estate in Anna
Regina, Essequibo. Although no sugar plantation, once
abandoned, had ever been successfully restored, the
government was induced to throw scarce monies into a rescue
effort. Needless to say, the project was a resounding
failure. Officials had hoped that a successful venture
would rekindle sugar-growing on the Essequibo coast.
Bauxite mining operations resumed after a temporary
stoppage in 1922, and by 1925 production had reached a level
of 174,999 tons. Thereafter, production fluctuated,
declining to 165,423 tons in 1928, rising to a new record of
TIB.B., 1921-1931.
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185,151 tons in 1929, and falling again to 125,095 tons in
1931. 28
The decade of the 1930s was a troubling one for
Guyanese industries and those in the West Indies. The
period was marked by industrial unrest and deteriorating
economic conditions. In 1938, the British Government
appointed a West Indian Royal commission to investigate the
sources of the problems and to make recommendations on how
to alleviate the worsening conditions. The commission
proposals were comprehensive in nature and touched upon just
about every facet of Guyanese life. with respect to the
country's industrial structure, the commissioners accepted
the plantation economy and in fact suggested a greater role
for the sugar industry in the country's economic future.
World War II ushered in some significant developments
in the country's industrial structure. The war proved to be
a boon to the bauxite industry, which stepped up its
production at an unprecedented pace. In 1937 bauxite
production stood at 360,931 tons; by 1940 it was at 742,835
tons; and by 1946 it had risen to 1,120,015 tons, of which
1,095,129 tons carne from the Linden region and 24,886 tons
from the newly developed mine at Kwakwani, in Berbice. 29
The war virtually made Guyana an island; disruptions
in transportation and the shortage of imported goods
28Ibid.
298 . B., 1937; Legislative Council Paper No.11, 1948.
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encouraged local manufacturing and several minor industries.
In 1943 there were 347 industrial establishments, the
majority of which were located in Georgetown and the
Demerara region (Table XII).
TABLE XII
INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENTS 1943
Industry Georgetown Berbice Demerara Esseguibo Total
Aerated water 13 7 6 2 28
Rice mills 4 56 104 26 190
Dairy 1 1 2
Sugar factories 3 5 9 17
Confectionery 6 6
Machine shops 3 7 10 20
Sawmills 7 9 7 14 37
Woodworking
factories 7 4 11
Biscuit factories 2 2
Steam bakeries 2 2 10 14
Cigarette factories 2 2
Edible oil
factories 9 4 13
Match factories 1 1
Lime oil factories 1 1 2
Rum distillery __2 ~
Total 59 92 153 43 347
Source: Blue Book 1943.
In 1943 there were 190 rice mills in Guyana. The war
had stimulated the expansion of the industry just as it had
done in 1914-18. Imports of rice from the Far East and
India to the West Indies were curtailed. and Guyanese
producers quickly flocked to fill the breach. However,
unlike in 1914-18, the government did not place an export
embargo on rice. A rice-marketing board was established,
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and it became the sole authorized purchaser and seller of
rice for export and home consumption. The government made
investments in irrigation and drainage projects. New
varieties of seed were developed, and these combined with
the other changes to increase fields and improve quality.
Between 1938 and 1945, the area under rice increased from
49,159 acres to 63,015 acres. 30 A "grow more food" campaign
was also initiated to provide foodstuffs for the local
market. Emphasis was placed on expanding the supply of
ground provisions. Financial and technical aid, small-scale
drainage and irrigation schemes, and other measures were
provided. The success of the program was such that by 1945
the country was exporting plantains and cassavas. 31
In contrast, the sugar industry struggled during the
war. Shipping difficulties, labor shortages, and a lack of
fertilizers reduced the sugar production from 196,502 tons
in 1938 to 157,201 tons in 1945. n Fortunately for the
sugar industry, the British Government stepped in to avert
an impending disaster by agreeing to purchase all sugarcane
produced in Guyana, despite the aforementioned shipping
problems. The assistance was crucial for maintaining the
cultivation of sugar in Guyana.
30Nath 1970, op. cit., p. 257 (statistical tables).
31Mandle 1973, op. cit., p. 115.
nNath 1970, op. cit., p. 252 (statistical tables);
Legislative Council Paper No. 11, 1948, p. 172.
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After the end of World War II, the British Government
was faced with the choice of continuing the development of
the country's industrial structure that had been so
successful during the war or reverting to a system in which
the plantation economy domina"ted. The administration chose
the latter avenue. The encouragement given to the
development of an independent peasantry through the "grow
more food" campaign and assistance to rice farmers was
rescinded because it was thought to be too expensive. The
hegemony of the plantation economy would continue to be
unchallenged, regardless of the implications of this kind of
development policy on Guyana.
Very little was done to aid peasant production until
after 1953, when the British Government, because of
political considerations, attempted to win over rural
voters. Unfortunately, much of the government's effort
concentrated on social welfare expenditure, and this action
did vert little to alter the country's narrow industrial
I
structute. The election of the PPP in 1957 resulted in a
I
i
renewedlemPhasis on agricultural production. In particular,
the PPP!stressed improvement in rice production as a means
,
of raising living standards, and the creation of the
groundwork necessary for industrialization.
Between 1957 and 1964, when the PPP was in office, the
percentage of capital expenditure devoted to agriculture
increased from 33 percent in 1957 to 47 percent in 1964.
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Much of the investment was spent on drainage and irrigation,
land settlement, and other development schemes on the
coastal strip. The Boerasierie, Tapakuma, Land of Canaan,
and Mahaica-Mahaicony-Abary projects were all expected to
bring hundreds of thousands of acres under production
through the provision of elaborate water-control facilities.
The acreage under rice cultivation in 1957 was 152,500, in
1960 it reached 220,207, and by 1964 it had increased to
311,417. Meanwhile, production increased from an annual
output of 70,000 tons in the mid-1950s to 126,133 tons in
1960 and 164,000 tons prior to independence. 33
Although sugar did not benefit directly from
government expenditure under the PPP, the industry did
manage to forge production increases during the 1957-64
period. The period witnessed new marketing arrangements
with the core, which assured the industry's viability for
some time. The industry also continued the trend to
mechanize, amalgamate, and consolidate. After 1945,
Bookers' monopoly of Guyana's sugar industry had intensified
so that by 1960 the company was in control of 14 of the 19
estates in the country. In 1957, the production of sugar
stood at 280,177 tons. It rose to 334,441 tons in 1960
before declining to 317,137 tons in 1963, and 309,000 tons
in 1965. The declines in the early 1960s were the result of
33Jeffrey and Baber 1986, op. cit., p. 122; Annual Report
Director of Agriculture, 1960
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internal turmoil which led to labor unrest in the industry.
Bauxite mining, which had taken off during the war,
continued to gain strength in the post-war era with the
increasing demand for consumer durables in the core. By
1960, production amounted to 2,471,190 tons.
Guyana's dependency on sugar, rice, and bauxite was
evident when one considers that together their sectoral
contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was over 32
percent in 1960 (Table XIII). Sugar production alone
accounted for 17.6 percent of the GDP. The poor
contribution of the manufacturing sector, with only 5.2
percent of GDP, wa~ partly indicative of the government's
lack of attention to the sector, but more importantly it can
be seen as the result of Guyana's incorporation into the
modern world system which created production and consumption
patterns which did not reflect societal needs.
TABLE XIII
SELECTED SECTORAL CONTRIBUTION TO GDP 1960
Sector 1960(%)
Agriculture 24.2
Sugar (17.6)
Rice ( 5.3)
Mining 11.0
Bauxite ( 9.5)
ManUfacturing 5.2
Services 59.6
Source: Guyana Development Programme
1966-1972.
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The ouster of the PPP from office in 1964 resulted in
the reduction of capital expenditure on agriculture in the
two years prior to independence and in the consequent
reduction of this sector's output to the GOP. In the first
year of the post-PPP era, government investment in
agriculture declined by 48 percent from that of the previous
year.~ The new PNC regime, whose strength rested in
Georgetown, New Amsterdam, and the mining town of Linden,
was eager to repay its supporters in these areas. Change in
the nation's industrial structure was in the offing, with
all of its attendant spatial and socioeconomic implications.
Labor Supply
This sub-section notes the importance of the labor
supply as a function of demographic changes and the spatial
distribution of population. It is concerned with the
retrenchment of the labor force in sugar and the measures
taken by the government to cope with the country's labor
surplus.
The end of Indian indentured labor in 1917 meant that
from now on increases in the country's labor supply would no
longer be dependent upon immigration. Augmentation of the
plantation economy's labor force would have to come about
through natural increase, and this required significant
34Lakhan, V., D. Rawana and A. La11. 1987. Resource
Allocation in Agriculture: The Guyana Experience. Canadian
Journal of Development Studies, p. 242.
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changes in mortality and fertility rates. However, by the
time indentured immigration ended, improvements had already
begun to take place in the country's mortality and fertility
rates. Furthermore, the unbalanced gender ratios of the
previous era, which also accounted in part for the low rates
of reproduction, were gradually becoming more equal.
Confronted with a labor surplus in the colony, the planting
fraternity feigned some resistance to the termination of
immigration, but overall they felt assured that their labor
needs would be satisfied.
with respect to the country's occupational structure,
in 1931 74,603 persons, or slightly over 50 percent of the
working population, were engaged in agriculture. other
numerically notable occupations included: commercial
activities with 24,619 persons, domestics with 16,314,
mechanics and artisans with 15,617, and mining and quarrying
with 5,058. There was little change in the occupational
structure. Although bauxite was becoming an important
component of the country's industrial structure, this was
not reflected in the number of workers employed in the
industry. Hence, the spatial distribution of population was
little altered in 1931.
Initially, the sugar industry expressed some fears
about the fledgling bauxite industry, but these concerns
were quickly relinquished. Bauxite operations commenced
very slowly, and owing to its capital-intensive nature, very
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few workers were employed by the industry. The growth of
the rice industry, which planting interests encouraged, was
another indication that sugar had solved its labor-supply
problems. However, during the Second World War sugar was
once again faced with deteriorating labor supplies. Labor
was increasingly attracted to the resurgence in the rice
industry as well as the air and naval bases established by
the Americans. The expansion in the bauxite industry also
lured labor away from sugar. The country's occupational
distribution in 1946 indicated that the sugar estates were
the largest employers of labor. The rice industry was the
next largest, and this was followed by bauxite, gold and
diamonds, and timber. For all of bauxite's production
increases, estimates indicated that this industry directly
employed only 1,400 workers."
In December 1946, out of a total resident working-age
population of 45,917 on the estates, there were 11,735
persons engaged in the following private trades:
shopkeepers, shop clerks, priests, tailors, goldsmiths,
hucksters, housewives, bakers, butchers, domestics, barbers,
milk-vendors, cartmen, chauffeurs, fishermen, seamstresses,
teachers, and so on. 36 It was generally believed that most
of this group spent no time.in the fields and factories of
the estates. Thus, a paradoxical situation had developed on
35Annual Report 1946, p. 18.
36Legislative Council Paper No.11 1948, p. 311.
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the estates. They were sUfficiently populated, yet they
were suffering from a labor shortage and in many cases had
to supplement their work forces with supplies of non-
resident laborers.
From the above it is clear that not all of the former
immigrants remained in agriculture once their contract with
the estates had expired. Since the 1870s, a number of
Chinese and Indians who had completed their indentureship
were entering the retail trade as petty merchants in the
rural areas. Discussing the in-roads made by Indians in the
commercial field, Adamson notes that by 1882 there were 540
licensed Indian shopkeepers in the countryside and towns. 37
The challenge of the Chinese on the Portuguese monopoly of
the retail trade was no less formidable, and according to
Moore:
By the 1890s. the Chinese were well on their way
to breaking the Portuguese stranglehold of the
retail trade, and had established commercial bases
in the Lombard Street area of Georgetown and along
Main Street in New Amsterdam, quite apart from the
numerous shops and stores scattered in the villages
and plantations. B
uncertain as to the reliability of their labor, the
estates commenced a rapid mechanization program after the
World War II period. Mechanization was particularly
directed to field operations, where machinery replaced
TIAdamson 1972, Ope cit., p. 94.
3SMoore, B. 1987. Race, Power, and Social Segmentation in
Colonial Society. New York: Gordon & Breach, p. 175.
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workers in land preparation, drainage and irrigation works,
and transportation. Bookers, the country's leading owner of
sugar estates, cited the following rationale fo~ the
mechanization of the industry:
There was a greatly increased demand for pauxite
during the war and a great many skilled and
semiskilled men gravitated to Mackenzie [Linden]
(bauxite center in the interior of British auiana). I
A good many skilled and unskilled men were ~equired
for the construction of Atkinson Field (airpase).
The Mahaicony-Abary rice scheme required a great
many shovelmen in the initial stages. Ther~ was a
severe epidemic of malaria in 1943-44. Sho~tage of
imported foods stimulated local food production. A
shortage of consumer goods reduced the inceptive to
do more than a minimum of work. D
In 1953, 27 cane-field workers were neede~ to
cultivate 100 acres; by 1960, only 17 workers w~re required.
In 1953, 24 factory workers were needed to prod~ce 1,0001
tons of sugar; by 1960, only 13 persons were reguired.~ 1
These productivity advances contributed to a re~uction in
the number of cane-field workers from 20,501 in 1953 to
16,001 in 1960, and to 13,262 in 1966 (Table XIV). In 1953
there were 5,804 factory workers, but this numb~r declined
to 4,478 in 1960 and to 3,663 in 1966, the year of the
country's independence. Production advances in the factory
were the result of the introduction of new technologies such
as continuous juice clarifiers and crystallizer~,
modernization of existing plants, and improved $upervisi0n
39Quoted in MandIe 1973, pp. 134-135.
40Nath, D. 1975. A History of Guyana. Norwoqd, (vol.: 3),
pp. 41-42.
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of mechanical and process operations. Overall, the labor
force on the estates fell from 26,305 in 1953 to 16,925 in
1966.
TABLE XIV
SUGAR ESTATE EMPLOYMENT 1953-1966
Year Field Workers Factory Workers Total
1953 20,501 5,804 26,305
1960 16,001 4,478 20,479
1966 13,262 3,663 16,925
Sources: Sukdeo 1975 pp. 238-240; Reports of the
Statistical Bureau.
The retrenchment of the labor force in sugar was a
serious blow to an economy that was highly dependent on a
narrow range of industries. The situation was all the more
alarming when one factors in the demographic changes that
were occurring in the society at the time. Mortality
declines and fertility increases were not only augmenting
the country's overall population, but also introducing more
and more persons into the labor force.
What became of this labor stream is an important
element in Guyana's history of urbanization. The government
hoped that rice would absorb the surplus labor, and that
this absorption would in turn prevent rural out-migration.
Drainage and irrigation works, land settlement schemes, and
other projects were drawn up to open up new rice lands and
to ease rural population pressures. In 1956 there were
23,000 people growing, harvesting, and processing rice on
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some 136,000 acres. By 1964, there were 35,000 people on
311,417 acres. However, the rice sector was unable to cope
with the burgeoning population and to take up the slack
created by sugar. Bauxite, although the industry was making
great strides, was too capital-intensive to satisfy the
labor problem. Nevertheless, bauxite's success did result
in population movements to the mining town of Linden. A
look at sectoral employment from 1946 to 1965 illustrates
mining's poor contribution and the importance of agriculture
and services (Table XV).
TABLE XV
SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF LABOR FORCE 1946-1965
1946 1956 1960 1965
Labor force 147,481 164,600 174,997 193,048
Employed 143,750 135,000 161,202 165,912
Industries % % % %
Agriculture 42.0 42.5 37.1 34.9
Mining 2.8 1.3 3.8 3.1
Manufacturing 16.0 12.9 16.3 16.2
Services 38.7 43.3 42.8 45.8
None 0.5
Unemployment 2.6 21.9 8.5 16.4
Sources: Jameson 1980; Manpower Survey 1965.
The data illustrate the importance, and at the same
time the decline, of agricultural employment over the
period. Employment in manufacturing remained relatively
static, and its implications for the urban areas were
obvious. Furthermore, the weakness of manufacturing
employment, which is usually an urban phenomenon, was all
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the greater when one considers that the figures included
employment in sugar factories and rice mills, which were
located in the countryside. Mining also held relatively
steady through the period, thereby supporting the claim that
the sector was very much a capital-intensive one. The only
sector which showed any real growth was services, and much
of this growth was due to the increase in pUblic-service
employment, especially after 1964 when the PNC began to
reward its urban supporters with government jobs.
DEMOGRAPHY
This section highlights the pattern of population and
area growth throughout the country. It continues to
emphasize the demographic changes taking place in Georgetown
and New Amsterdam, and it touches on the emergence of the
bauxite-mining town of Linden.
According to the Census of 1921, Guyana's population
stood at 297,691, or an increase of barely 1,650 persons
over that of the previous census in 1911 (Table XVI). The
.56-percent increase reflected a miserly annual population
growth rate of 1 percent over the 10-year intercensal
period.
In 1918, the country was troubled by a severe influenza
epidemic which severely depleted the laboring population.
The death rate for the year was an astonishing
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TABLE XVI
POPULATION DISTRIBUTION
Year Guyana Georgetown ~ New Amsterdam ! Urban ~..2- ..2-
1921 297,691 59,624 20.0 7,651 2.6 67,275 22.6
1931 310,933 69,663 22.4 8,002 2.6 77,665 25.0
1946 375,701 94,036 25.0 9,567 2.5 103,602 27.6
1960 560,330 148,391 26.5 14,053 2.5 162,444 29.0
Sources: Census 1921-1960; Gyanchand 1964.
40.6 per 1,000 of the population. 41 In addition to high
mortality rates, much of the low level of population growth
must be attributed to the high levels of Indian emigration
following the curtailment of the indenture system in 1917.
Between 1911 and 1921, over 15,759 Indians departed the
colony. In 1920, three years after indenture was ended,
2,468 persons returned to India. Indeed, during the decade
the Indian population as a group decreased by 1.25 percent,
and their overall contribution to the country's demographic
composition declined from 41.0 percent to 40.7 percent. 42
In the urban areas the population increased from
66,181 in 1911 to 67,275 in 1921, or by 1.65 percent, whilst
the population in the rural areas declined by 1.13
percent. 43 However, it would be erroneous to assume that
the lower number of rural dwellers was the result of a
movement to Georgetown and New Amsterdam. Rather, the lower
418.B., 1918.
42Census 1921.
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rural figures more likely stem from the exodus of indentured
workers back to India.
Georgetown, with an increase of 2,047 persons (or 3.5
percent) over the decennium, wholly accounted for the
increase in urbanization. The city was now 7.8 times the
size of New Amsterdam, which once again had suffered a loss
of population.
The post-war depression had effected the dissolution
of a number of the smaller sugar plantations in the vicinity
of the town. These relatively small-scale operations were
dependent, in part, on labor resident in the town; and
following the demise of these operations, the number of New
Amsterdam's agricultural laborers decreased to 251 persons
in 1921. M Businesses were also adversely affected, and
some of these were forced into liquidation. The failed
sugar plantations, and a few of the liquidated businesses,
were bought out by Bookers. Unlike the labor-intensive
smaller plantations, Bookers' plantations were larger and
highly mechanized, they did not depend quite so heavily on
town labor, and they were not dependent on the town for
various services.
New Amsterdam's downward spiral was all the more
noteworthy when one considers that Berbice was the fastest-
growing region, with a 4-percent population growth rate over
the census period. Most of the county's growth can be
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credited to migration of ex-sugar workers from Demerara and
Essequibo. These migrants were primarily interested in
peasant-rice cUltivation, and therefore they sidestepped New
Amsterdam and headed for the Corentyne coast. In addition,
Indians were restricted from employment opportunities in the
urban areas. Discriminatory practices excluded them from
jobs in the private and public sectors, and this
discrimination served to reinforce their paltry
representation in the population composition of the two
towns. In 1921, Indians comprised 11 percent (6,418) of
Georgetown's population and 15 percent (1,294) of New
Amsterdam's. Since the census of 1911, the Indian
population had increased only by 400 in Georgetown and by
two (2) in New Amsterdam, whilst their share of the
population distribution had increased by 1 percent in
Georgetown and had remained the same in New Amsterdam. 4s
Thus, the racial division of labor resulted in a population
distribution which confined Indians to the countryside, and
African-descended peoples to the urban areas and the
fledgling mining operation in the upper Demerara River.
Increased bauxite production in the 1920s resulted in
larger numbers of African-Guyanese migrating from Georgetown
and the villages to the Demba company town of Linden,
formerly Mackenzie. At the same time, the mining of
diamonds had become significant and this success had
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attracted Africans into the interior, in particular into the
Mazaruni region. For the most part, it was the African male
who ventured into the interior, to prospect for several
months before returning home. African women remained in the
villages and towns, but in time they too followed their
partners into the hinterland, and microcommunities were
established in a number of areas.
In the course of the intercensal period of 1921-31,
the population of Guyana witnessed a net increase of 13,242
persons, or 4.4 percent, to stand at 310,933. 46 During the
decade, emigrants exceeded immigrants by 2,101, as compared
with an excess of arrivals over departures by i1,152 persons
between 1911 and 1921. While the birth rate of 31.9 was not
particularly high, the death rate of 264 was the lowest
recorded since the first census of 1841.
The gender ratios of earlier censuses revealed that
the population was a male-dominated one. Slavery and
indentured immigration had skewed gender ratios, mainly
because of the male labor requirements of the plantation
economy. However, the ending of labor importation through
indentured immigration, and male emigration during 1921-31
caused a steady decline in the gender ratio, and served to
normalize demographic condition~ (Table XVII).
Over the period (1921-1931) there was a noticeable
upturn in the rate of urbanization (Table XVI). The number
46Census 1931.
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TABLE XVII
GENDER RATIO 1881-1931
Year Male Female Total Gender Ratio
1881 140,134 112,052 252,186 1.25
1891 151,759 126,569 278,328 1.20
1911 153,381 142,324 296,041 1.08
1921 151,261 146,430 297,691 1.03
1931 155,381 155,552 310,933 1.00
Source: Census 1881-1931.
of persons residing in the urban areas increased from 67,275
in 1921 to 77,665, or by 5.7 percent, whilst those in the
rural areas increased from 230,416 to 241,032, or 4.6
percent. Within the urban areas, the population of
Georgetown was 69,663, as compared with 59,624 persons at
the previous census, representing an increase of 16.8
percent during the period. Georgetown accounted for 22.4
percent of the total population of the colony and 87 percent
of the urban population. The capital was 8.7 times the size
of New Amsterdqm. New Amsterdam's population was 8,002, or
2.6 percent of the total population of the country. This
was an increase of 351, or 4.6 percent, of the total
population of the town in 1921.
In the capital, the poorer southern wards registered
the largest gains over the decade. Albouystown led the way
with an increase of 2,309 persons, or 56.9 percent, and was
followed by Werk-en-Rust with an increase of 1,051 persons,
or 14 percent. Of the suburban areas of the city, Kitty's
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increase of 2,430, or 57 percent, was the most noteworthy.47
Between 1921-1931 there were increases in all of the
ethnic groups except Europeans, Portuguese, and Amerindians.
The largest numerical increase occurred among the Africans
(7,034, or 6 percent), Indians (5,602, or 4.5 percent), and
coloreds (3,213, or 10.5 percent). Of the groups that
declined, Europeans decreased by 35.4 percent to 2,127,
Portuguese by 6 percent to 8,612, and Amerindians by 8.8
percent to 8,348. Indians were the largest single racial
group, with 130,540 persons; however, they were closely
followed by 124,203 Africans, who when combined with the
colored group surpassed the Indians. These three groups
(Indians, Africans, and coloreds) when taken together formed
81.9 percent of the country's population. Indians were in
the majority on the Corentyne Coast, East Coast Berbice,
West Coast Demerara, and the islands in the Essequibo.
Africans predominated in New Amsterdam, West Coast Berbice,
and Georgetown, and up the Essequibo, Potaro, Cuyuni,
Mazaruni, and Puruni Rivers. Chinese, Europeans, and
Portuguese were clustered for the most part in Georgetown
and New Amsterdam. 48
In 1938 it was reported by the Moyne Commission that:
... the increase in rural under-employment and the
comparatively greater urban wage-increases have
intensified the drift to the towns which is a
47Ibid.
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characteristic of the West Indies .••
This tendency is vicious in its long term effect.
There is no economic possibility for large
agricultural populations to establish themselves in
conditions sUfficiently stable to enable them to
form and perpetuate a healthy community. Further,
each influx dilutes the amount of employment
available for the original inhabitants and drags
down standards of life for others than the
newcomers themselves.~
The description is largely reminiscent of conditions
in Georgetown in the middle of the nineteenth century. The
growth of the population of the city, including its suburbs,
between 1931 and 1938 was due mainly to migration from the
rural areas and to a lesser degree to returning migrants
from the interior.
Between the intercensal period 1931 and 1946, there
was an enumerated increase of 64,768 persons (TABLE XVI).
The annual rate of growth during the period was 1.3 percent
and was the result of declining mortality rates as well as
rising fertility levels, particularly in the Indian group.50
with 27.6 percent of the population residing in urban
areas in 1946, the census alluded to the fact that the
country was becoming more urbanized. Between 1931 and 1946
the urban population increased by 33.4 percent to 103,602,
although the rate of growth was unevenly shared by
Georgetown and New Amsterdam. In Georgetown, the number of
residents increased by 35 percent, from 69,663 to 94,035,
49Report of the West India Royal Commission, 1945, p. 33.
~Census 1946.
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while those in New Amsterdam increased by 19.6 percent, from
8,002 to 9,567. The divergence in growth between the two
towns was attributed, in part, to employment opportunities
on the American bases in the Georgetown area. Work on the
bases and the take-off of the bauxite industry led to the
development of a small migration stream to Georgetown.
In the course of the intercensal period of 1946-60,
Guyana's population increased by 67 percent to 560,330.
With improvements in curative and preventive medicine,
particularly the eradication of malaria from the coastal
areas, the population grew by 13,192, or 2.9 percent, per
annum. The birth rate rose from an average of 39.4 per
thousand in 1946 to 43.3 per thousand in 1960, whilst the
death rate fell from 14.4 to 10.4 per thousand. 51 The
decline in the death rate was most noticeable with respect
to the infant mortality rate, which dropped from 83.0 to
63.6 per thousand in the corresponding period. n
The rural Indian population were the main
beneficiaries of the coastal malaria eradication program,
for the sites of the anopheles mosquito were mostly to be
found in the rural areas where sugar and rice were
cultivated. Between 1936 and 1960, the Indian death rate
fell from 23.3 to 9.7 per thousand, whilst the African death
51Gyanchand. 1964. Annexure to the Report of the Three
Year Plan 1964-65-66 for British Guiana, Volume of Basic
statistics, (Table IV) p. 17; Census 1946 and 1960.
52Ibid.
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rate fell from 21.0 to 12.5 per thousand (Table XVIII).
TABLE XVIII
DEATH RATES OF INDIANS AND AFRICANS 1936-1960
Years Indian African
1936-1940 23.3 21.0
1941-1945 19.6 21.1
1946-1950 13.9 16.7
1951-1955 15.0 12.1
1956-1960 9.7 12.5
Source: Gyanchand 1964, Table IV, pp. 19-22.
To be sure, the eradication of malaria was not the
sole reason for the divergence in death rates between the
two groups, and by extension between urban and rural areas.
sugar estate workers were also the recipients of better
health care in the 1930s and an extra-nuclear housing
program which relocated Indians from the squalid and
overcrowded ranges to newer housing along the main road.
The housing program was accelerated following the
investigation by the 1949 Venn commission, which was very
critical of housing conditions on the estates:
We inspected many of these ranges. In quite a
number the corrugated iron roofs were lacking and
the fabric of the buildings was in a general state
of decay. In numerous instances temporary sheets
and awnings had been fixed over the beds to keep
off the rain. They had mud floors and consequently
with the rain dropping from the roofs these were
made slippery and dangerous; in many cases we found
bags laid over the floor to prevent slipping. They
are built without any plan on low-lying uneven
ground. There are few, if any, proper footpaths
and in rainy weather communication is difficult.
The common latrines, often built over a drainage
trench, are frequently in a bad state of repair
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with little privacy."
Indians were also primarily responsible for the
increase in the birth rate. From 1936 to 1960, the Indian
birth rate increased from 38.0 to 51.1 per thousand whilst
the birth rate among the African population increased more
modestly from 26.9 to 36.9 (Table XIX).
TABLE XIX
BIRTH RATES OF INDIANS AND AFRICANS 1936-1960
Years Indian African
1936-1940 38.0 26.9
1941-1945 40.6 28.4
1946-1950 46.1 33.4
1951-1955 49.3 35.3
1956-1960 51.1 36.9
Source: Gyanchand 1964, Table IV, pp. 19-22.
Despite the growth of the Indian population, only 22
percent of the population in the two main urban centers were
Indian, in 1960. The African and colored population, with
roughly 70 percent of the urban population, dominated the
towns. Africans, who comprised 32.8 percent of the
country's population, accounted for 48.5 percent of
Georgetown's population and 53.9 percent of New Amsterdam's.
Indians, who made up 47.8 percent of the population, formed
21.9 percent of the population in Georgetown and 24.7 in New
Amsterdam. In the rural areas the situation was reversed,
"Colonial Office. 1949. Report of a Commission of Inguiry
into the Sugar Industry of British Guiana. London: H.M.S.O.,
p. 120.
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with Indians in the majority.~
Indians, however, were inexorably moving into the
urban areas. Migration to the towns stemmed largely from
push components, although pUll components could not be
discounted. The most noticeable push was population
pressure, of which the rural manifestations were
unemployment and land shortages. Land shortage was
connected to the pattern of land ownership as well as to
population growth and distribution, since a large number of
the coastal lands were dominated by the sugar companies and
large-land owners. Land hoarding and shortages of land
existed alongside each other, as they had since
emancipation, with the former ensuring the latter. The
outcome of this induced population pressure was that few
peasant farmers could buy or rent a suitable amount of land
on which to support themselves and their families without
recourse to additional wage labor. In many cases the
problem was compounded by seasonal unemployment on the sugar
estates. Furthermore, the wages of casual agricultural
laborers were usually so low as to be practically
unacceptable. Among pUll components, unemployment rates in
the urban areas were now lower than those in the
countryside, and this difference may have been an additional
~Census 1960.
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spur to migration. 55
Of the population enumerated in 1960, a total of
162,444, or 29 percent, were living in Georgetown and New
Amsterdam. A good deal of the increase in urbanization
since the 1946 census can be attributed to internal
migration (Table XVI). According to the 1960 census, 16.7
percent of Georgetown's population were migrants who had
arrived during the intercensal period. Of the 24,782
migrants to the capital, 13,906 (or 56 percent) were
females. 56 The higher female urban migration rate can be
explained to some degree by the increasing number of women
entering the labor force in Georgetown. In New Amsterdam
the influx of migrants was even more noticeable. The growth
of the bauxite industry at Kwakwani and the construction of
Everton, upriver from New Amsterdam, as a bauxite
transshipment center attracted 4,478 migrants, or 31.9
percent, of the town's population between 1946 and 1960.
The 1960 census also revealed that the occupational
structures of the urban areas were still dependent on
services as the most important source of employment. 57
Fuelled by internal migration, the rate of urban
growth increased by 72.7 percent from 1946 to 1960.
"Francis, o. 1966. Report on Survey of Manpower
Requirements in the Labour Force, British Guiana. Georgetown:
Government of Guyana.
56Census 1960.
nCensus 1946 and 1960.
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Georgetown increased by 57.8 percent and New Amsterdam by
46.9 percent. The capital was now more than ten-and-a-half
times the size of New Amsterdam, whereas it had been only
eight times as large in 1921. Georgetown's urban growth was
characterized by rapid suburbanization and in-filling in the
city itself. The tremendous suburban expansion resulted for
the first time in more people residing in the suburbs
{75,427} than in the central city {72,694}. In the
northeast, the upper- and middle-income suburbs of Bel Air,
Newtown, Campbellville, Kitty, and Subryanville all posted
substantial gains, and the same was true for the working-
class suburbs of La Penitence, Ruimveld~, Meadow Bank-
Houston, Agricola, and Lodge Village. Ruimveldt, with a
population of 16,040, was the largest of the suburbs and was
closely followed by Kitty, whose population amounted to
15,042. 58
A further redistribution of the population occurred
during the racial disturbances of 1962-64. Indians and
Africans fled from villages in which they were in the
minority to take up residence with members of their own
ethnic groups. Many Indians who were forced out of Linden
and the African-dominated villages of West Coast Demerara
initiated squatter settlements, such as Mon Repos, on unused
sugar estate lands along the main road and the coast.
5MCensus 1960.
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INFRASTRUCTURE AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
The following section probes the role of the central
government in influencing urban development by examining the
size and direction of its contributions to housing, roads,
sewage, water supply, health facilities, and other
infrastructural programs. It also assesses the 1945
Colonial Development Welfare Act; development plans for
1947-56, 1954-1955, 1955-1960, and 1960-1964; the Town and
Country Planning Ordinance of 1946; and the Greater
Georgetown Plan of 1951.
The slump in the sugar and rice industries, following
the cessation of hostilities in 1918, was coeval to the
decline in the country's growth and development. The
British Government had used the war as an excuse to curtail
development throughout the country. In 1917, the governor,
Sir Wilfred Collet, told the Combined Court that it was
impossible for the colony to consider hinterland
development, but after the war he promised "a revival of
industries in that neighborhood. ,,59 Likewise, a petition to
have the Corentyne road extended from Skeldon to Crabwood
Creek was denied "because of expenditure on the war.,,60
Similar situations were evident in Georgetown and New
Amsterdam. Municipal infrastructural subventions from the
59M. C. C. , Nov. 8, 1917.
6lM.C.C., 1918.
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Colonial Government were exceedingly difficult to come by
during the latter part of the war. In 1918, the Georgetown
Town Council implored the government to increase the amount
on the estimate to $6,000 for roads in the city, which were
rapidly deteriorating at this time. 61 However, the
government steadfastly refused. The governor argued that
since the Colonial Government was a sizeable rate-payer in
the city, it was up to the Town Council to manage its own
affairs.
I do not see the slightest justification for the
contribution of $6,000, seeing that the government
pays rates which amount to upwards of $30,000.~
It was not until 1921, prior to the visit of the
Prince of Wales, that the government stepped in to rectify
the problem. Brickdam, a major thoroughfare, was
macadamized, and some of the more commonly travelled streets
were repaired. Conversely, some projects which were thought
to be essential to the war effort were curtailed following
the signing of the armistice. A food factory to make flour
out of rice, maize, and ground provisions, planned for
Georgetown, was no longer thought to be necessary since the
war was over.~ Plans made in 1917 to harness the power
61Ibid.
62Ibid.
63M.C.C., Nov. 20, 1918.
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potential of the mighty Kaieteur FallsM in order to process
bauxite into aluminum were similarly dashed. 65 Instead,
Guyana's bauxite was destined for North America, where the
most lucrative value-added stage of the processing would be
accomplished.
In the interior, the number of roads and trails grew
as a result of increased mining activity, but here too, the
government did little to develop the transportation network.
On the coast, the government did step in on January 1, 1922,
to assume full control of the Demerara Railway. Two years
later, in an effort to "beautify" the city, the new owners
evicted 717 persons who had been living alongside the
railway line in North cummingsburg. M Residents of the city
suffered a further setback in 1930, when the tramway service
operated by the Demerara Electric Company Limited was
terminated.~ Laborers had depended on the trams to take
them to work on the outlying plantations on the East Bank.
On July 2, 1923, New Amsterdam suffered its most
severe fire when the entire length of pitt street, the main
retailing center, was burnt to the ground. The fire spurred
a renewal of building activity in the town, but the effort
Msituated on the Potaro River, Kaieteur is one of the
highest waterfalls in the world. with a single drop of 741
feet, it is nearly five times as high as the Niagara Falls.
MC.C., Second Special Session, 1917.
MLegislative Council Paper No. 13, 1931.
678 . 8 ., 1930.
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failed to inject any meaningful long-term development.
For some time the mortality rate in Georgetown had
been higher than those in the rest of the country. The
authorities attributed the problem primarily to a lack of
adequate sewage-disposal facilities in the city. At times,
parts of the city were saturated with raw sewage from poorly
maintained and inadequate cesspits. Therefore, it was some
relief to urbanites when the Georgetown Sewerage Scheme was
undertaken in 1924. By 1930, the entire capital was served
by a modern sewage system.
The completion of the sewage works caused some
consternation in Georgetown, for it came at a time when
unemployment in the city was rather severe. As part of the
public works program, the Georgetown Sewerage Scheme had
been a major employer of labor. Now that the project was at
an end, and the sugar, mining, and rice industries were in
the midst of a depression, there was widespread unemployment
in the city. The depression in the mining industry was
particularly visible, since it resulted in large numbers of
unemployed pork-knockers descending on the city. To relieve
Georgetown of this surfeit of labor, the legislature made a
number of proposals. These included the granting of free
passages from Georgetown to Bartica, Morawhanna, and
Mabaruma; reconditioning of roads in the neighborhood of
Georgetown; an individual colonization scheme in the North
West District; town planning and road building at Bel Air
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Park; and irrigation of the Corentyne from Bloomfield to
Philippi. 68
Most of the proposals were shelved; however, the town-
planning and road-building scheme at Bel Air Park warrants
some discussion. The purpose of the plan was foremost to
provide unemployment relief for the city, and secondly, to
curb speculation and provide orderly development. Bel Air
Park, a large race course adjacent to the municipal
boundaries of Georgetown, was an ideal site. The land was
much cheaper than those in the city, and its geographical
position suggested that annexation would be a matter of
course. According to the proposers of the plan:
... Bel Air Park should be under some form of
public ownership, more especially to avoid the
defects of private ownership as represented in the
contiguous township of Newtown ...
We consider that immediately on acquiring of the
property, east and west roads should be planned and
constructed, thus creating direct communication
with Campbellville, a growing township, and also
providing alternate and desirable approaches to the
East Coast Road which is now reached only through
the main road of Kitty ...
The example of Campbellville established that
fact that persons are now ready to erect houses
contiguous to Georgetown, since no less than 240
of these have been constructed at campbellville,
where builders have to be content with the
unsatisfactory status of lease holders.@
Unfortunately, the plan was subsequently withdrawn on
the grounds that the cost of incorporating Bel Air Park was
68Legislative council Paper No.5. 1930. Report of the
Economic Investigation Committee. Georgetown: Argosy.
69Ibid.
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prohibitive.
In 1931, the British Government did provide a grant of
$696,491 for unemployment relief in Guyana; but this grant
hardly benefitted the towns, since the money was expended in
the following manner:
Roads
Sea Defenses
Buildings
Advances Sugar Estates
Development of Country Areas
Improvements of New Amsterdam
Total
$257,142
140,703
29,275
187,197
81,174
1,000
$696,49170
The lack of expenditure on improvements in the towns
was a cause of embarrassment for the governor, Sir Edward
Denham. He apologized to town dwellers in the Legislative
council, and at the same time he tried to assure residents
of New Amsterdam that the sum of $1,000 "spent on the
bonification of the frontal lands of New Amsterdam" augured
"well for the improvement of sanitary and health conditions"
of the ~own.71
New Amsterdam, however, was allowed to annex the
Winkle and Vryheid. The town felt that the administration
!
of thes~ two adjacent communities should be administered by
70Legislative council, Jan. 12, 1932.
7lIbid.
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the municipality was in the town's best interest. 72 Since
both communities were relatively small, they did not
constitute a major extension of the town's boundaries and
population.
Denham attempted to gain the favor of Georgetown
residents by apportioning 50 percent of the cost of the
Georgetown Sewerage Scheme on taxpayers throughout the
country. Denham, himself a resident of the capital,
provided a clear case of "urban bias" when he argued:
Undoubtedly it is to the advantage of every tax
payer in British Guiana, that Georgetown, the
capital and port of the colony, should be in
possession of a Sewerage Scheme, ensuring healthy
conditions in this important centre. This is the
concern of everybody - even though it may only be
the inhabitants of Georgetown who have received
the direct benefit therefrom. Such being the case,
it may, I think be reasonably argued that the
property owners having linked up with the scheme
and placed their houses in order, the Colony may
well be responsible for the cost of the main
drainage part of the scheme. That is to say, that
in the opinion of government an ad~ustment on the
basis of 50/50 would be equitable. 3
The question of a pure water supply from artesian
wells was also reopened in 1931. Up to 1924, nearly 100
wells had been sunk along the coastal plain. The wells on
the whole had been successful in ensuring a constant supply
of potable water for domestic services. Therefore, it was
72Legislative Council paper No.7. 1931. Report of the
Committee on Local Government Administration. Georgetown:
Argosy.
73Ibid.
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not surprising that the program was extended in 1931. 74 By
1938, 69 artesian wells had been completed, providing access
to the entire urban population. Improvements in the water
supply were not confined to the towns, but were also made on
the sugar estates and the villages.
The artesian well program greatly improved the general
health of the population, who were spared the effects of a
number of gastric diseases, and to some extent problems
associated with malaria. Expenditure on health care
escalated following the end of indenture. In particular,
investment in pUblic health proceeded much more rapidly on
the sugar estates than elsewhere in the colony. The
government and planters clearly understood that, without
improvements in health care, the cost of labor would be
prohibitive; therefore, it was in their best interest to
invest in health care. In 1918, government expenditure on
hospitals and health care amounted to $54,739, by 1942 it
had risen to $946,000, and by 1946 it had reached
$1,659,000. The increase in health expenditure during the
war years was attributed partly to the influx of British
service personnel in Guyana. Having newly arrived in the
tropics, soldiers were susceptible to malaria, enteritis,
typhoid, bronchitis, and tuberculosis; in addition on
completing their tours of duty, they were liable to carry
NLegislative Council Paper No.15. 1931. Report of the
committee Appointed to Enguire into the Sinking of Wells under
the Pure Water Supply Scheme. Georgetown: Argosy.
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these diseases back to the core. 75
In 1945, over 12 percent of the country's revenue was
being allocated towards health care. Despite these
impressive sums, conditions on the estates were more
favorable than those in the villages or in Georgetown and
New Amsterdam. The hospitals on the estates were the
private property of the individual sugar companies. They
were required under the Immigration ordinance, but their
upkeep was no longer compulsory since immigration had ended
in 1917. Nevertheless, in 1945, there were 21 hospitals
with 1,409 beds on the sugar estates. This was equal to one
bed for every 51 persons. In comparison, the city of
Georgetown maintained 666 beds, or one for every 141
persons, and New Amsterdam 170 beds, or one for every 56
persons. Furthermore, it must be remembered that the two
urban areas also served their respective counties, and as a
result the ratio of beds to population was a good deal
higher. In Georgetown the ratio was 1:332, and in New
Amsterdam 1:568. Therefore, it is not surprising that the
percentage of beds occupied in estate hospitals hovered
around 40 percent, whilst government hospitals in the towns
were badly overcrowded. 76 The commissioners of a report on
the sugar industry in 1949 underscored the health-care
~Odle, M. 1976. The Evolution of Public Expenditure: The
Case of a structurally Dependent Economy. Kingston: university
of West Indies, p. 59.
76Legislative Council Paper No.11, 1948, op. cit.
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problem:
It startled us to find that, outside the estates,
no provision exists at the moment for hospital
treatment in the villages and rural districts.
Urgent cases are sent to the hospitals at
Georgetown or New Amsterdam, but these, the only
two of the five pUblic hospitals in the colony
which serve the "sugar belt," are themselves
overcrowded with town patients. TI
The Moyne Commission's report, released in 1945, urged
the British Government in that year to pass the Colonial
Development and Welfare Act, which established a Welfare
Fund to finance expenditures for education, health services,
housing, slum clearances, land settlement, and the provision
of social welfare services. 78 The 1945 Act was the basis of
an embryonic form of development planning in Guyana, since
the colony was required to formulate a ten-year development
plan before it could be receive the requisite funds. The
outcome was the 1947-56 ten-year development plan, which
basically was a document that outlined capital expenditure
over the decade. In simple terms, expenditure was targeted
at three broad areas: 1. Three major drainage and
irrigation projects - $6.5 million; 2. Social welfare,
justice, and pUblic buildings - $11.2; and 3. Economic
services, including agriculture, forestry, transportation,
surveys, and research - $lD.3. n
TIColonial Office 1949, op. cit., p. 85.
78Annual Report on British Guiana 1946, p. 6.
79British Guiana. 1947. Ten Year Development Plan 1947-
1956. Georgetown: Legislative Council
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It was expected that roughly $20 million of the
allotted expenditure would be utilized in the first five
years and that Georgetown and New Amsterdam would be the
beneficiaries of a fair amount of the plan's largesse.
However, because the plan was so poorly formulated, only two
million dollars were disbursed by 1950.
The advent of national development planning coincided
with the colony's first serious attempt at urban planning.
The increasingly active role of government in promoting
change in the colony was also transferred to the area of
town planning. Following the aftermath of the Great Fire of
1945, in which the civic and business center of Georgetown
was destroyed, the authorities formulated a plan for South
cummingsburg, Robbstown, and Lacytown. The plan came under
Ordinance No. 18 of 1945; its purpose was to control the
"height and use of premises" in the aforementioned wards of
Georgetown. The government provided a grant of $200 1 000 for
the scheme, and five commissioners were appointed by the
governor to ensure its implementation. In the following
year, the Wortmanville Housing Scheme Ordinance was passed
(Ordinance No. 18, 1946), to ease overcrowding and the
shortage of housing by providing homes for 48 working-class
families. In defining working-class, the ordinance
included: a) mechanics, artisans, laborers and other
persons working for wages; b) hawkers; c) persons not
working for wages but working at some trade or handicraft
324
and employing only members of their own families; d) persons
whose incomes did not exceed an average of $15 per week, or
such other sum as the committee could fix at its discretion
from time to time. 80
The project's modest scale made certain that many
depressed and poverty-stricken inhabitants of the capital
would remain unaffected by the development. Nevertheless,
it established the principle that it was the government's
duty to improve housing conditions and provide
accommodations at reasonable prices. The Wortmanville
scheme, like others before it, was restricted to short-range
remedial measures that were designed and implemented on a
microscale without regard to other urban problems or to
long-range developments in the city. However, it was aided
by two further ordinances in 1946: the Housing Ordinance
(Ordinance No. 24 1946) and the Town and country Planning
Ordinance (Ordinance No. 25 1946). The Housing Ordinance
expanded on the Wortmanville scheme in that it attempted to
provide a greater amount of housing for persons of the
working class; the Town and Country Planning Ordinance
provided for the "orderly and progressive development of
land, cities, towns and other areas whether urban or rural,"
the preservation and improvement of amenities, and "other
matters" connected with the planning function. The duty of
carrying out the provisions of the Town and Country Planning
WOrdinance No. 18, 1946.
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ordinance, including the execution and enforcement of
schemes, was vested in the Central Housing and Planning
Authority (CHPA). The CHPA was granted the authority to
bring under its control any land in any urban or rural area
for purposes of carrying out a planning scheme. The general
objective was to control the development of land by securing
proper sanitary conditions and conveniences, the
coordination of roads and pUblic services, protecting and
extending amenities, and conserving and developing resources
of the area to which the planning scheme applies.
Furthermore, the CHPA could prepare a plan, adopt with or
without reservations a plan prepared by owners of land
within an area, or adopt with or without reservations a
scheme forwarded to it by a local authority. Indeed, local
authorities were forbidden to permit any development for
which they did not receive prior approval from the CHPA.
One of the first tasks undertaken after the changes
was a survey of living conditions in Georgetown. Of the
7,994 houses surveyed, 2,309 were found to be unfit for
human habitation and 5,303 in need of repair, and only 382
were declared to be structurally sound. In order to
confront this dismal situation, the CHPA developed the
Greater Georgetown Plan in 1950. The plan was Guyana's
first attempt at comprehensive urban planning. A Greater
Georgetown Planning area was created, with the objective of
reconstructing and improving the city in order to render it
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capable of fulfilling the functions of a port-city which was
also a regional and national capital. Particular emphasis
was placed on redeveloping parts of the city center
destroyed by fire in 1945, providing new housing and
residential areas, creating public parks and amenities, and
improving communications throughout the metropolitan area.
The sudden upsurge in planning activity came at a time
when the country was in the throes of rapid population
growth amid increasing rural-urban migration. The
concentration of population in the capital city necessitated
additional housing, schools, water-supply facilities, sewage
works, roads, places of employment, medical and social
services, and so on. Rising standards of living also
dictated that there should be improvements in Georgetown's
infrastructure works.
The Greater Georgetown Plan was approved by the
legislature in 1951 and was amended in 1962 following a
large fire in the city center. The CHPA believed that the
destruction of significant portions of Regent street, Water
street and Leopold street warranted a revision of
development control in the downtown area. A draft-varying
scheme modifying the Town Planning Scheme for Greater
Georgetown between Robb st~eet, Princes street, and the
Demerara River was subsequently prepared. The plan
recommended the renovation of the Stabroek Market Square,
wider pedestrian walkways along the more travelled
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commercial and retail thoroughfares, increases in front
setbacks to allow the parking of cycles and loading and
unloading when there was no service road, median
reservations which could be used by pedestrians when
crossing wide thoroughfares, separation of vehicular traffic
where possible, and the creation of pedestrian malls to ease
the difficulty of shopping in the downtown area.
The attention bestowed on Georgetown did not extend to
New Amsterdam and the villages of Guyana. A number of
planning studies and field investigations were pursued. A
land-use survey of New Amsterdam and its environs was made
along with a few project-planning proposals, but nothing
became of these. The most significant changes in the town
occurred when Reynolds, the aluminum concern from the United
states, started bauxite mining at Kwakwani, 135 miles up the
Berbice River. In addition, the company located a calcining
plant at Everton, on the outskirts of New Amsterdam. The
impact of the development, while not substantial, was enough
to reinvigorate the town's growth. Migrants drawn by the
bauxite operations settled in the town, and local businesses
were able to prosper from the demands of these new settlers
as well as from the service and commercial requirements of
the industry.
Although the coastal areas were not ignored by the
CHPA, they did not benefit from the development of any
physical planning schemes. However, the areas outside
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Georgetown, and the capital itself, were implicitly affected
by the newfound adherence to development planning. In 1953
a contingent from the International Bank of Reconstruction
and Development (IBRD) was invited to Guyana to assess the
country's development program. The mission found that in
many spheres there had been substantial progress. Public
administration, education, and public health were already
developed to such a stage that they were considered to form
the basis for further development of the economy. To
support the expanding population, the mission suggested that
a continuing high level of domestic investment was
necessary. The overriding objective was to increase the
country's national income as quickly as possible in order to
enable it to support its population at an acceptable
standard of living. An investment program of 66 million
dollars over five years (1954-58) was proposed. Most
importantly for rural areas, it was recommended that 70
percent of the investment program be spent on projects
related to agriculture (land settlements, drainage and
irrigation, etc.) and transport communications, with the
remainder on industrial production, electric power,
forestry, housing, and public works. 81 However, owing to
political developments in the country, the British
Government decided that conditions had deteriorated to such
81World Bank (IBRD). 1954. The Economic Development of
British Guiana. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press.
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an extent that Guyana's development would have to be
accelerated and expanded to include more emphasis on
infrastructure and social development. The mission had
proposed an investment of 27 million dollars in two years;
the government, however, decided to increase the sum to 44
million dollars and to initiate a two-year development plan
for 1954-55.
The emphasis on infrastructure and social development
had little to do with any sincere desire to improve the
economy. Instead, increased expenditures were used to
"pump-prime" the economy in an attempt to lure support away
from the People's Progressive Party (PPP) following the
suspension of the constitution in October 1953. In the
urban areas the British Government initiated a massive low-
income housing project to neutralize African support of the
PPP. The program concentrated much of its resources on the
creation of sizeable housing schemes at Ruimveldt and La
Penitence, on the southwestern fringe of Georgetown.
Housing construction plans were also targeted for
Campbellville and Lodge in Georgetown, New Amsterdam, and
Anna Regina. The Public Works Department was given the
green light to spend, but the lack of qualified technical
personnel meant that only 26 million dollars were spent
during the two years. A great deal of money was squandered
on surveys and reports by foreign experts. Grandiose and
expensive plans were drawn up for a seven-story hospital in
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Georgetown, a plan for a superhighway from Georgetown to
Rosignol, and other lavish large-scale projects.
In its haste to construct housing for the African working
class, the British Government failed to adequately evaluate
its plans prior to implementation. At La Penitence the cost
of houses'proved to be out of reach of its targeted
population, and the houses ended up being occupied by the
middle classes. Many houses were completed without
provision for water or electricity supplies, and
consequently they had to remain vacant until the snafu was
remedied.
Within the countryside the British also sought to
induce the Indian population away from the PPP:
The sugar workers, who until then had been living
in the insanitary ranges, began to get grants to
build houses, roads were improved, drainage and
irrigation extended, more opportunities to rent or
bUy land was offered to the agricultural workers
and capital development took place .•• u
By 1955, the PPP's African-Indian coalition had been
broken. with his formation of the People's National
Congress (PNC), Forbes Burnham, to the delight of the Home
Government, had departed from the party and had taken with
him a good deal of the urban African vote. The stage was
now set whereby African and Indian tensions would
increasingly be associated with those between town and
USimms, P. 1965. Trouble in Guyana: An Account of People,
Personalities and Politics as they are in British Guiana.
London: George Allen and Unwin, p. 128,'
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country. Expenditures on urban or rural infrastructure
became dependent on the shade of the party in power.
The unexpected balance arising from the 1954-1955 plan
was incorporated into a new plan for 1955-1960, which was
framed along the recommendations of the IBRD mission, with
the inclusion of a number of new projects. The program
allocated an expenditure of 91 million dollars, with
emphasis on drainage and irrigation, transport and
telecommunications, rural electrification, land settlement,
health, housing, and education. The allocations were
revised in 1957, when the PPP came into office. The
expenditure target was increased to 102.5 million dollars,
with most of the additional expenditure (8 million dollars)
going towards drainage and irrigation in the rural areas. B3
A new five-year plan for 1960-64, drawn up by
cambridge economist Kenneth Berrill, proposed an expenditure
of 110 million dollars, 92 million dollars for economic and
18 million dollars for social development.~ with a rapid
population growth of some 3 percent per year and increasing
unemployment, the emphasis was on economic development
through expansion of the rice industry in particular. The
move towards non-plantation agriculture without agricultural
diversification was made with the belief that crops other
~Sessional Paper No.5, 1959; Legislative Council,
September, 1961.
MSessional Paper No.2, 1960.
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than rice would take too long to yield adequate returns.
The emphasis was on drainage and irrigation projects, land
development schemes, and making land thought to be suitable
for agriculture accessible. While the economic sector was
heavily biased in favor of agriculture, the PPP government
did propose financing to establish industries by private
enterprise, or in partnership with private enterprise, and
also to set up its own factories when it was deemed to be
economically sound. Social-sector expenditure was centered
on increasing educational and technical training facilities,
expanding hospital and health services, providing a pure
water supply, and improving housing. However, the urban
population, comprised mainly of Africans, were unconvinced
that the 3 percent of development funds allocated to
industrial development and the 3.6 percent allocated to
urban housing were equitable shares of the overall funds,
especially when these percentages were compared to
agriculture's allocation of 47 percent.
Infrastructural works undertaken in Georgetown during
the 1960-64 plan period included the reconstruction of the
East Bank Road between Georgetown and the international
airport at Atkinson Field, construction of wells, and
modernization of the Port of Georg9tcwn.
Guyana experienced serious civil disturbances between
1962 and 1964. In 1964, a PNC-led government came into
power, and immediately expenditure allocations were
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virtually reversed. The government spent the two years
before independence (1964 to May 1966) constructing pUblic
buildings and pursuing public-works projects in Georgetown,
New Amsterdam, Linden, and some of the other areas that were
affected by the civil strife. The urban orientation of the
new government would be made apparent in Guyana's first plan
in the post-independence era.
Land Use
This sub-section presents a description of land use
patterns over the period and discusses a number of factors
which have directly influenced land use activity, including
bauxite and diamond mining, Crown Lands policy, and land
settlement schemes.
The establishment of the bauxite industry in 1917
dramatically altered Guyana's land-use pattern, and to a
lesser extent, its spatial distribution of population.
Important spatial parameters are associated with the
economic activities of bauxite mining. Bauxite is extracted
from where it is found, and in 1917, Demba built the town of
Mackenzie, later renamed Linden, 65 miles up the Demerara
River from Georgetown.
The town was reported to be a model settlement, where
the houses were well laid out and the people were provided
with a pure water-supply system. 85 Unfortunately, the well-
S5C. C. March 2, 1921.
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arranged section of the town was the exclusive preserve of
white expatriates who ran the mines. Indigenous laborers,
overwhelmingly Africans, were accommodated in more austere
surroundings, and in the adjacent villages of Christianburg
and Wismar. The two villages had previously been settled by
persons providing services to pork-knockers and others in
the gold industry. Now their growth was to be predicated
upon locational decisions made overseas. Decisions were
rationalized by the desire for quick profits from the sale
of bauxite to external markets.
The growth of the diamond industry in the 1920s
brought renewed life to Bartica, but akin to the gold
industry, diamond mining was to suffer through cyclical
periods of booms and busts, and this instability certainly
restricted the development of the town. In any case, it
appeared that most of the miners or pork-knockers were
intent on returning to the coast after laboring for a few
months in the bush. Remittances from miners were oftentimes
almost wholly responsible for the economic well-being of
many African coastal villages.
Elsewhere in the interior, settlement activity
remained negligible. Government policy was committed to the
coast to such an extent that in 1922, Major Wood (later
Viscount Halifax) formulated a proposal of separating the
interior from the coastal strip and assigning it an
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independent administration. 86 The distribution of land use
in Guyana was set, and the pattern has continued to the
present day. sugar and rice dominated the coastal fringe,
with ground provisions and coconuts on the sand reefs. On
the swampy areas behind the coastal fringe, cattle were
found. Large herds of cattle were once found on the coast,
but these steadily retreated as the acreage under rice began
to be expanded in the modern era. On the riverain lands
there were root crops, fruit, coconut, and rice. In the
Rupununi and intermediate savannas, cattle were reared; and
in the interior forests, the timber industry had a hold in
several areas.
Regarding the issue of Crown Lands, in 1938, it was
decided that conditional freehold grants of Crown Lands
would not be made and that Crown Lands would be rented under
leases or licenses of occupancy for terms no longer than 99
years. A little later the terms were reduced to 21 years.
Leases, licenses, and permissions to occupy Crown Lands for
agriculture, cattle grazing, logging, balata extracting,
quarrying, and so on were strictly enforced. In 1956, a
systematic inspection of Crown Lands held under title was
commenced, with a view to terminating titles when the
conditions attached to these titles were not being complied
with. The onerous conditions attached to Crown Land titles
K6British Guiana. 1951. Report of the British Guiana
Constitutional Commission. p. 9.
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ensured meager participation rates. During 1960, for
instance, only 711 applications for titles affecting 40,000
acres were granted, and these included 122 applications for
renewals of expired titles. In addition, 15 renewals of
permissions for grazing cattle over 872 square miles of
interior savannah lands were granted, and an additional
6,000 square miles of Crown Lands were considered to be
Amerindian reservations. Amerindians had been allotted
Crown Lands through the Amerindian Ordinance of 1953. Under
the ordinance, residents on the declared Amerindian
reservations were permitted to occupy and use the land free
from rates and taxes. However, within the reservations they
were forbidden to hold titles for lands.
Since the end of the First World War, sporadic
attempts have been made to establish land-settlement schemes
and to develop existing ones. In 1923, Plantation Anna
Regina was bought by the government. However, the scheme
encountered many problems, and little attention was paid to
land settlements until the Second World War. In 1944, a
plot of land comprising 170 acres and situated on the right
bank of the Pomeroon River was bought by the government.
Known as the Charity-Amazon Scheme, the settlement was
divided into 35 agricultural and 140 house lots. The
settlement was originally intended to be primarily
agricultural, but in 1960 the CHPA was given the authority
to develop the scheme into a township to serve the Pomeroon
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and the northern region of the Essequibo coast. Two years
later, four estates - namely Vergenoegen, Philadelphia,
Greenwich Park, and Barnwell - comprising a total acreage of
3,595 acres were combined to form the Vergenoegen
development scheme. situated on the East Bank of the
Essequibo, 18 miles from Georgetown, the settlement housed
200 families who cultivated rice and vegetables and provided
milk for the Georgetown market.
In 1948, the Cane Grove-La Bonne Mere Land Development
Scheme, comprising a total area of 7,233 acres in East Coast
Demerara, was established. Four hundred and eighty-five
families were chosen, mainly from the nearby sugar estates,
on account of their experience as farmers. However, the
scheme's land use did not include sugar; instead, planting
centered on rice and coconut cUltivation, mixed farming, and
pasturage.
No further settlement schemes were pursued until 1955,
a Lime when the British Government was attempting to weaken
the support of the PPP. Plantation Onverwagt in West Coast
Berbice, comprising 6,000 acres, was allotted for rice
cultivation. In the following year, two schemes were added:
the Mara Land Development Scheme on the East Bank of the
Berbice River, comprising 3,870 acres, was established to
ease unemployment in the Indian-dominated canje and
Corentyne areas; and the ironically named Garden of Eden
Land Development Scheme, comprising 1,200 acres on East Bank
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Demerara, was established just outside Georgetown. Seventy-
eight families were selected for the scheme, but most of
these continued to live in Georgetown, preferring to be
absentee farmers.
In 1960, the PPP government launched the Black Bush
Polder Scheme in the Corentyne. covering some 31,000 acres,
the scheme was intended to house some 1,500 families. Each
family was allotted a 2-1/2-acre homestead plot for the
production of food crops other than rice and a 15-acre plot
for rice cultivation.
In broad terms, the objectives of land-settlement
schemes during the period were to take in the surplus
population, reduce unemployment, foster agricultural
development through the production of rice, encourage small-
scale agriculture, and to a lesser extent promote
agricultural diversification. All of the schemes were
concentrated on the coastal strip. Many of the schemes were
chosen because the land was cheap, with little thought being
given to their spatial location. It was only during the
early 1960s that attention was given to settlement in the
interior and a few experimental schemes were initiated.
Political and Social Structure
This sub-section briefly examines the political and
social changes occurring in the society during the period
under review. Attention is focussed on franchise
requirements and the ability of ethnic groups, as well as
339
urban and rural constituents, to articulate their demands
through the political process.
In 1918 the total number of registered voters had
increased to 4,340 - a rather anemic figure when one
considers that the entire population in that year was
estimated at 310,972. 87 Africans comprised nearly three-
quarters of the electorate and Indians barely one-twentieth,
whilst Europeans (mostly British), Portuguese, and Chinese
were largely overrepresented. English literacy requirements
had slowed the entry of Indians into the political arena,
and it was not until 1916 that the first Indian, Mr. Joseph
Luckhoo of New Amsterdam, was elected into the Combined
Court. Despite the meager electorate, the non-white group,
especially the colored and African commercial professional
middle class, had been intensifying their hold on seats in
the legislature. It was evident that the planters would be
hard-pressed to win a seat in any future elections. To
ensure planter representation, the constitution would have
to be amended. A constitutional change was in the offing.
The general election of 1926 returned a majority of
non-whites to the legislature. Alarmed by this development
and the financial condition of the colony, the British
Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1926 appointed a
Royal Commission to report on the economic conditions in the
country and to ascertain the causes that had retarded
87B. B., 1918.
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development. 88 The commission, in its report, which was
published in 1927, concluded that the major obstacle to
development was the constitution, which hindered the
government from effectively governing the country. The
Colonial Government was said to be incapable of controlling
the finances of the country, since it was dependent on the
cooperation of elected members who were at best financially
irresponsible. 89 The commissioners recommended a change in
the constitution and suggested that the details be handled
by another commission. The new commission set to work in
1927; its report proposed the abolition of both the Court of
Policy and the Combined Court and their replacement by a
single Legislative Council. This new Crown Colony system of
government was introduced in JUly, 1928, by an act of the
British Parliament. At the final meeting of the Court of
Policy, Mr. Crane, the member for West Demerara, meekly
closed the sitting:
The Court of Policy, as far as British Guiana is
concerned, has been established••. since 1732 .•. it
has passed through a good many shades of Government
in this colony. It has seen the days of the hard
toiling Dutch settler who established himself on
the three rivers of the wild coast of Guiana to
found the social order out of primeval chaos; it
has seen the balmy days of the Planter, the magnate
and dandy of his day, it has seen the day when,
after the reform of 1891, the proletariat obtained
the lead in the Financial Chamber; and it is now
decreed that under existing conditions the best
thing to do for the progress of the Colony is that
88British Guiana. Report on the British Guiana commission.
"Ibid., p. 51.
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the Court should give way and permit another form
of Government to take its place.~
Under the new constitutional arrangement, the
Legislative Council consisted of the governor as president,
ten official members, five government-nominated unofficial
members, and 14 elected members. with a total membership of
29, unofficial members (19) were in the majority in the
Legislative Council, though not an elected one. The
Executive council was constituted wholly of government
officials and nominees of the governor, of whom two were
elected members of the Legislative Council.
Crown Colony Government strengthened the power of the
governor, since official and nominated members outnumbered
those who were elected. However, the British Government was
not about to take any chances. Just in case the unofficial
members did not toe the government line, the governor was
bestowed the power to adopt or reject any measure without
majority approval if it was:
.•. in his opinion necessary in the interests of
public order, public faith, or other first
essentials of good government including the
responsibilities of the colony as a component part
of the British Empire ... 91
The revamping of the constitution extended the
franchise to women, although they were still excluded from
the legislature. The previous differences in qualifications
~.C.P., July 17, 1928.
91Clementi 1937, op. cit., p. 397.
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between town and country voters were abrogated, and uniform
property qualifications for voters were decreased to include
the following:
1) ownership during the six months previous to
registration of not less than six acres of land; or
2) occupation or tenancy, during the six months
previous to registration of not less than six acres
of land secured by lease or some document in
writing for three years or upwards, such lease or
document to be recorded or deposited in the Deeds
Registry; or
3) ownership during the six months previous to
registration, of a house or land, or land with a
house or other erections thereon, of the value of
not less than $500; or
4) occupation or tenancy, during the six months
previous to registration, of a house or land with a
house or other erections thereon, of the annual
rental of not less than $100 secured by lease or
any document in writing for one year or upwards,
deposited or recorded as aforesaid; or
5) possession or enjoyment of an annual income
or salary which (together with any sum paid or
allowed to him or on his behalf for board or
lodging or board and lodging) amounts to not less
than $300 coupled with residence in the district,
such possession or enjoyment and residence having
subsisted during the six months previous to
registration; or
6) payment during the twelve months previous to
registration, of direct taxes to the Colonial
Revenue of $20 or upwards, coupled with residence
in the district during the six months previous to
registration: provided that no licence duty of any
kind shall be deemed to be within the meaning of
the term "direct taxes. 1192
A glance at the qualification requirements would
suggest that residents of the rural areas were the primary
beneficiaries of the new rules. Land was no longer required
to be beneficially occupied. However, the acreage was
increased from three to six, and this increase resulted in
92B.B., 1928.
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the disenfranchisement of a number of rural dwellers. In
1930, the first year of elections in the wake of the new
constitution, there were only 9,252 voters in the country's
14 electoral divisions. 93 Georgetown and New Amsterdam
alone accounted for 39 percent of this narrow electorate.
Qualifications for the Legislative Council were of
course more stringent than those for the franchise. To be
eligible for membership, one needed to be in receipt of a
clear income of not less than $2,400; or in possession of
immovable property of not less than $5,000 over and above
the amount of any mortgage; or in ownership, under a lease
for 21 years or upwards, of any house or house and land, the
annual rental of which was not less than $1,200.~ Those
who were disq~alified from membership included anyone who
was not entitled to vote, ministers of religion, and holders
of emoluments under the crown or under the government of the
colony.95 Thus, the Colonial Government had managed to
continue the wide distinction between the qualifications for
membership in the legislature and those for a voter. within
the Legislative Council, the governor utilized his power to
nominate unofficial members by including representatives of
the planting class or those who were sympathetic to this
group:
93B. B., 1930.
~British Guiana 1927, op. cit., p. 8.
95 I bid.
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The nominated unofficial members are all men well
known and respected in Water street, and in
connection with the staple industries of the colony.
Mr. smith, for example, is the manager of Rose Hall
Estate in Berbice while Mr. Seymour, proprietor of
an estate in Essequibo, of which district he is
regarded as the most progressive resident, is
representative of the secondary agricultural
interests, including rice cultivation... %
The governor also utilized his prerogative of
nominating elected members to the Executive Council by
appointing men who were in agreement with the official
section of the council. Of the first two appointments,
neither was African or Indian, despite the fact that the two
groups combined represented over 80 percent of the
population and 90 percent of the voters. According to the
governor, the remaining elected members were excluded from
the Executive Council because:
..• there is not one of whom I could say both that
he is of the requisite standing in the community
and that he may confidently be expected to
cooperate with the government in its general pOlicy
and not to oppose it on any important question
without strong and substantial reasons.~
The decade following the introduction of Crown Colony
Government was one of widespread unrest in Guyana and
elsewhere in the Caribbean. In 1935 the franchise was
extended to include tenants of Crown Lands, and the income
and property qualifications were slightly lowered. This
%West India Circular, sept. 6, 1928. Quoted in Lutchman
1974, Ope cit., p. 197.
97Secret Despatch, Rodwell to Amery, May 7, 1928. Quoted
in Lutchman 1974, Ope cit., p. 199.
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change, however, failed to widen the electoral base
significantly, and only 9,461 persons were registered as
voters in the September general elections. 98 Limited
political participation and social and economic difficulties
combined to foster continued working-class protest against
an autocratic government and its close ally, the sugar
industry. Sugar workers and the urban proletariat,
particularly dockworkers, were distrustful of the British
and did not believe that the Colonial Government represented
their interests.
Failure to quell the strife induced the British
Government to appoint a commission, under the chairmanship
of Lord Moyne, to investigate social and economic conditions
in Guyana and throughout the British West Indian islands,
and to make recommendations. The Moyne Commission, as it
came to be known, visited the Caribbean in 1938, and its
members undertook a year-long comprehensive study of
conditions in the colonies. Its conclusion was a damning
indictment of the inequities associated with colonialism.~
Such were the findings that the British Government, for
security reasons, felt obliged to withhold its pUblication
until after the Second World War. The commission's
recommendations, however, were allowed to be disseminated,
nB.B., 1935.
~Report of the West India Royal Commission 1938-39, 1945,
Ope cit.
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and these called for major economic and social reforms as
well as increased liberalization of the political process.
stemming from the Moyne commission's recommendations,
a number of constitutional changes were enacted in 1943. In
the Legislative Council, elected members were placed in the
majority; and in the Executive Council, unofficial members
predominated, although the governor retained his right to
pass or block legislation. Income qualifications for the
franchise were reduced from $25 to $10 per month, and
property qualifications for membership to the Legislative
Council were lowered. In 1945, another extension of the
franchise followed to include all literate adults. Income
and property qualifications for the franchise and for the
Legislative Council were reduced, and membership in the
legislature was accorded to women.
New elections under the reformed constitution were
held in 1947. The effect of the 1945 reduction in the
franchise qualifications was most discernable. The number
of voters shot up from 10,772 in 1943 to 59,384 in 1947.
Over 12,000 of the new electorate were women, whilst Indian
voters increased their share of the franchise to 30 percent.
The elections brought a greater representation of Indians
and Africans to the Legislative Council. Effectively barred
from governmental jobs and upper-management positions in the
dominant sugar and bauxite industries, members of the two
major ethnic groups had been steadily entering the
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independent professions. This allowed them the economic
independence to challenge the rUling white elite in the
national political arena. Nevertheless, despite the
Indians' and Africans' inroads into the new House, the
Legislative Council was still dominated by white planters
and their commercial allies. The governor and the colonial
office helped to solidify this domination; for example, in
the 1947 elections, the governor nominated F.J. Seaford, a
sugar planter, to the Legislative Council, although he had
been defeated at the polls.
Dr. Cheddi Jagan formed the People's Progressive Party
in January 1950. The party with Jagan (an Indian) as its
leader, and Forbes Burnham (an African) as its chairman,
began to agitate for changes in the colony's constitution.
Later in the year, the British Government appointed a Royal
commission under the chairmanship of Sir E.J. Waddington to
examine the franchise, the makeup of the legislature, and
matters I concerning economic and political developments, and
I
to forward recommendations. Amongst its many findings, the
i
. i.commlss~on reported:
.l.we found in the villages and country districts
a pblitical climate very different from that of
Georgetown, and we have been impressed also with
the persistence in Essequibo, Demerara and Berbice
of a sense of their distinctive identity as
separate colonies, each with a long history of its
own. This is largely the product of geography for
even coastwise communication is rendered difficult
"by the very deep and mighty rivers" ... it is a
feature, too, which had important political
repercussions. Difficulties in communications have
produced in the country at large a sense almost of
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isolation from Georgetown and the rural areas
contiguous to it. A capital town naturally tends
to play a predominant part in the life of any
country, and it is to be expected that many men of
talent and ability should gravitate towards it.
Danger arises when the capital achieves a virtual
political monopoly, and when an undue number of
legislators are residents in the capital,
possessing no roots in the constituency which
returns them and professing, when elected, little
active care of the interests of their constituents.
In many villages we met with the complaint of
neglect, and this sense of isolation may well
foster the dangerous conviction that the affairs
of central government do not concern them. 1oo
The commission further pointed out that:
Sheer weight of numbers made it certain that,
following emancipation, the non-European
communities would eventually predominate, but
owing largely to the oligarchical nature of the
old constitution, the European community was for
a considerable time able to retain a substantial
majority in the legislature. 101
In order to defuse the potential for violent political
action, especially among the urban and rural proletariat,
the Waddington commission provided for universal adult
suffrage at age 21 (property and income qualifications were
quashed), a ministerial system of government, and a
bicameral legislature consisting of a House of Assembly and
a State Council. The House of Assembly, or the lower house,
consisted of 24 elected members and three ex-officio members
- namely, the chief secretary, the attorney general, and the
financial secretary. The State Council, or the upper house,
IOOGreat Britain. 1951. Report of Constitutional
commission, 1950-51. London: H.M.s.a., p. 15.
IOIIbid., p. 16.
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consisted of nine members - six nominated by the governor,
two by the majority group in office, and one by the
opposition. Government of the country was to be in the
hands of an Executive Council, consisting of the following:
the governor, armed with the veto power as president; the
three ex-officio members of the House of Assembly; six
ministers from among the elected members of the House of
Assembly; and one minister without portfolio nominated, by
the state Council.
The first general election under the Waddington
constitution was held in April, 1953, and resulted in the
PPP winning 18 of the 24 seats and securing well over 50
percent of the vote. lm Once in office, the PPP, buoyed by
its sweeping victory at the polls, began a series of
progressive reforms. The Undesirable Publications
ordinance, which prevented Communist publications from
entering the country, was revoked; a ban to restrict the
entry of radical West Indians into Guyana was lifted; the
Rice Farmers' Security of Tenure Ordinance of 1945 was
amended to pressure landowners to provide better drainage
and irrigation facilities for tenants; and moves were on the
way to pass a labor-relations bill that would have made it
compulsory for employers to recognize worker-supported trade
unions when the British Government suspended the
constitution in October 1953.
ImGreat Britain 1966, op. cit., p. 8.
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To justify their actions, the colonial authorities
declared that the suspension was necessary in order "to
prevent Communist subversion of the government and a
dangerous crisis both in pUblic order and economic
affairs. ,,103 The plantocracy and commercial interests in
Guyana had also concluded that the reforms were Communist-
inspired, but according to Jagan:
The changes we began to introduce now seem quite
modest: to bring all schools under the supervision
of government and local education committees; to
reform local government so that on this level, too,
there would be universal adult sUffrage without
property limitations; to appoint working people to
government boards and committees; to revise the
fees of government medial officers in order to
make medical care possible for the poor; to curtail
unnecessary expenditure of pUblic funds; to provide
more scholarships; to bring about social security
and workmen's compensation; to improve drainage and
irrigation; to make available and usable, large
tracts of land then uncultivated; and to review and
act on the recommendations of the Central Housing
and Planning Authority. J(M
An interim government was appointed on January 1,
1954. Many of the appointees had been defeated at the polls
in 1953 and were bitter enemies of the PPP, but these and
other conservative elements were considered essential in
restoring the confidence of the people and in attracting
investment capital from abroad.l~
lillBritish Guiana. 1953. The Constitution Suspension
Ordered on Oct. 8, 1953. Bureau of Public Information, p. 3.
1WJagan, C. 1966. The West on Trial: My Fiqht for
Guyana's Freedom. New York: International Publishers.
l~Great Britain. 1954. Building confidence. The Story of
British Guiana in 1954. Government Information services, p. 3.
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with the suspension of the constitution in place, a
campaign designed to vilify, repress, and harass the
leadership of the PPP was launched. Leaders, with the
exception of Burnham, were imprisoned and placed under house
arrest (Burnham was served with a restraining order, but he
was allowed to violate the regulation). A concerted effort
was made to break the nationalist movement and to exploit
internal differences within the party. Jagan was branded a
doctrinaire Communist, whilst Burnham was presented as a
level-headed social democrat who was unlikely to be a threat
to capital. Sensing a window of opportunity and emboldened
by implicit British support, Burnham mounted a challenge for
the leadership of the PPP. The move failed to dislodge
Jagan, but the party was split into two competing factions.
The right wing of the party went with Burnham, but Jagan was
able to retain the radicals and the support of Indian and
African party members. However, the broad-based national
support of the PPP (Jagan) was short-lived and by 1957 a
good deal of Jagan's African support had left the party.
In 1956, further constitutional changes were
announced, with elections slated for August 12, 1957.
Additional nominated and official members were introduced
into the legislative and executive councils, to reduce the
power of the elected members. A concerted effort was made
to ensure the demise of the Jagan faction of the PPP.
Electoral districts were redrawn to place the party at
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disadvantage. On the Corentyne, a Jagan stronghold, one
district contained 32,000 voters, while in Burnhamite
Greater Georgetown three districts contained a total of
45,000 voters. An accelerated development program had also
been launched by the interim government to demonstrate the
possibilities of life without Jagan. Furthermore, the
British Government reasoned that the split in the PPP, along
with the restrictions imposed on the party during its four
years out of office, was sufficient to ensure its defeat at
the polls. It was generally felt that Jagan's PPP could
win only two of the 14 seats; however, the party confounded
all observers by taking nine of the contested seats, whilst
Burnham's faction won three. 1oo
The elections of 1957 were significant, for they
underscored the fundamental structural fragility of Guyanese
society. All of the seats won by the Jaganite PPP were in
the rural Indian districts while those won by the Burnhamite
PPP were in th~ urban African districts. The distinction
between town and country corresponded to the occupational,
class, and racial polarization of the society.
After the elections, Burnham's faction of the PPP
merged with the united Democratic Party, a conservative
African-based party which had won New Amsterdam, to form the
People's National Congress (PNC).IOO The urban African
lOOGreat Britain 1966, op. cit., p. 8.
tOOIbid.
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alliance ensured that race would be pivotal in Guyana's
political future.
In November 1958, a constitutional committee was set
up to make recommendations on further constitutional changes
in Guyana. In its recommendations, the committee suggested
that Guyana become an independent state within the
Commonwealth, with a cabinet and a westminster style of
government. Further talks on the constitution were held in
1960. In an effort to curtail the PPP's electoral strength,
the electoral districts were revised for the forthcoming
elections in August 1961; neverUheless, out of 35 seats, the
PPP won 20, the PNC 11, and the United Force (U.F.), a
conservative party which had been formed in 1960, the
remaining four.
The PPP's return to power in 1961 signalled to the
opposition that, as long as race was a determining factor in
voter behavior, it would be virtually impossible to unseat
the PPP from office. The faster growth of the Indian
population meant that they would dominate the political
arena well into the future, unless the electoral system was
changed. Thus, the PNC and the UF began to lobby for the
introduction of a system of proportional representation.
Jagan visited the united states in Octaber 1961, in
search of aid to fund his development program, but was
rebuffed by President Kennedy. Failing to obtain financing
from other donors, Jagan invited Nicholas Kaldor, a
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Cambridge University economist and tax expert, to help draw
up the bUdget and to formulate tax proposals that would
generate additional revenue. The proposed budget included a
capital gains tax, a compulsory savings scheme for those in
the upper-income brackets, an increase in property taxes,
and certain measures to prevent tax evasion. Although it
was generally believed that the measures were economically
sound, the UF, later supported by Burnham and the PNC, took
to the streets of Georgetown. The protest quickly
degenerated into rioting, arson, violence, and looting. A
large swathe of the commercial center of Georgetown was
destroyed on February 16, 1962. The governor declared a
state of emergency, and British troops were requisitioned to
quell the disturbances. In all, five people lost their
lives and 80 were injured, and damage sustained to property
was estimated at 11 million dollars.
The failure to topple Jagan sent Burnham to Washington
in May 1962. His reception at the White House was much
different from Jagan's. Arthur Schlesinger, a member of
Kennedy's advisory staff, noted:
Burnham's visit left the feeling, as I reported
to the president, that "an independent British
Guiana under Burnham (if Burnham will commit
himself to a multi-racial policy) would cause us
many fewer problems than an independent British
Guiana under Jagan." And the way was open to
bring this about, because Jagan's parliamentary
strength was larger than his popular strength:
he had won 57 percent of the seats on the basis
of 42.7 percent of the vote. An obvious
solution would be to establish a system of
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proportional representation. 1m
On Burnham's return to Guyana, the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and British Intelligence
instigated a campaign to oust Jagan. The issue of the
country's independence had been on the books for some time
and was thought to be inevitable. However, the metropolitan
powers were not prepared to risk having Jagan at the helm of
an independent Guyana. The tabling of a labor-relations
bill in 1963 provided the impetus needed to initiate the
campaign of destabilization. The proposed bill, ironically
modeled on the u.s. Wagner Act, would have given the
government rather than employers the power to decide on the
recognition of unions for worker representation.
Demonstrations soon followed, and a general strike lasting
80 days ensued. The strike was marked by racial violence,
which unlike previous disturbances spilled into the
countryside. In the towns, the urbanization of Indians had
increased the competition for jobs, which were once the
exclusive domain of Africans. This was especially so in the
civil service, where Indians were being increasingly
employed. with the PPP in power, many Africans were fearful
that they would be deprived of government jobs in favor of
Indians. Since the PPP drew its support from the rural
areas, it was at a great disadvantage in its confrontation
ImSchlesinger, A. 1965. A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy
in the White House. Boston: Houghton Miflin, p. 778.
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with the urban-based opposition. In a dependent economy,
control of the capital city is essential if one cherishes
any hope of changing economic, political, and social
structures. with the party's administration centered in
Georgetown, it had to run the gauntlet every time it
forwarded a proposal. The strike succeeded, and the
proposed bill was allowed to lapse. The strike's longevity
and success must be attributed to the CIA, which used the
London-based international trades-union secretariat, the
Public Services International (PSI), to channel funds to
support the strike. 109
In the aftermath of the strike, the British Government
agreed to the introduction of proportional representation.
The decision infuriated the PPP and its supporters. Shortly
thereafter, the majority of sugar workers went on strike in
support of their claim that the Guyana Agricultural Workers
Union (GAWU), a PPP-backed union, should be their official
representative. The strike was opposed by the PNC and the
UF, which came to the rescue of international capital. The
sugar estates, in an effort to break the strike, brought in
mainly African laborers. There was a tremendous racial
confrontation, which resulted in the loss of 176 lives,
widespread destruction of property, and the displacement of
15,000 persons who were forced to flee their residences and
seek shelter in communities of their own ethnic groups.
I09Sunday Times (England), April 16, 1967.
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Some of the worst racial violence took place in the bauxite-
mining town of Linden. Armed gangs were given free rein in
terrorizing the 1,600 Indians out of the town and back to
the coast.
Elections were held in December 1964, under the new
proportional representation system. There was a 96-percent
turnout of the electorate. The PPP received 45.8 percent of
the votes, the PNC 40.5 percent, and the UF 12.4 percent.
Accordingly, under the PR system the PPP was awarded 24
seats in the house, the PNC 22 and the UF seven. lID The PPP
was the only party to have increased its share of the vote
over the previous election, and under the 1961 "first-past-
the-post" system it would have had 20 out of the 35 seats,
the PNC would have had 13, and the UF two. In any event,
although Jagan's party had captured the most seats, the
governor called upon Burnham to form the government, which
he accomplished through the support of the anti-socialist
UF. Thus, the PPP was finally removed from office. The
Sunday Times (England) reported:
As coups go, it was not expensive: over five
years the CIA paid out something over £250,000.
For the colony, British Guiana, the result was
about 170 dead, untold hundreds wounded, roughly
£10m-worth of damage to the economy and a legacy
of racial bitterness. III
On May 26, 1966, Guyana became a sovereign independent
1IOGreat Britain 1966, Ope cit., p. 15.
IIISunday Times (England), April 16, 1967.
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state under the premiership of Forbes Burnham. However, the
ties that bound Guyana to the core remained.
SUMMARY
The externally directed termination of indentured
immigration in 1917 failed to disrupt the legacy of the
plantation economy. Guyana remained inexorably tied to the
caprices of the core. Linkage to metropolitan markets was
reinforced by the establishment of the bauxite industry,
which continued the sugar industry's pattern of selective
external exploitation.
The two World Wars for a time fostered some degree of
self-reliance and a weakening of dependency through the
development of regional trade, but once the conflicts ended
the country reverted to its dependent relationship with the
core.
Following the Second World War, universal adult
suffrage became a reality, and by the early 1950s the
country was well prepared for self-rule. Urbanization
increased markedly after this period. In 1960, nearly one-
third of the population were residing in what were defined
as urban areas, whereas in 1921 only one-fifth were so
classified. The most growth took place in Georgetown, which
in 1960 was ten-and-a-half times the size of New Amsterdam,
the country's only other urban area.
As the sugar industry became mechanized, the promise
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of jobs in bauxite and on the American bases in Georgetown
stimulated an exodus of people leaving the countryside to
look for work in the towns. These events occurred at a time
when significant demographic changes were taking place in
the society. Falling death rates and rising birth rates,
coexisting with surplus labor in the countryside, led to
rural-urban migration. Migration to Georgetown, and to a
lesser extent New Amsterdam, became the geographical
expression on the part of the rural population to avoid
unemployment in the countryside. There was a marked effect
on population settlement and mobility. The development
pattern was one of accretion to the existing urban areas
rather than the creation of new settlements. In-migration
during this period was consequently a chief contributor to
urban growth in general and to suburban expansion in
particular.
Once indentured immigration had ended, the colonial
authorities and sugar planters were particularly attentive
to conditions on the estates. Health care, housing,
sanitation, and flood control were all improved. However,
it was the eradication of malaria which was perhaps the
single most important factor that was responsible for the
upswing of population growth in the countryside. The
government responded to the population increases by
undertaking land-settlement schemes to ease rural population
pressures and to prevent migration to the towns. The
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schemes were insufficient and piecemeal. They did little to
deter migration, and as a result the spatial isolation of
the two major ethnic groups continued, although they began
to slowly dissolve in the urban milieu.
Closer contact between Indians and Africans brought
with it increased friction. For a short while the
nationalist PPP had managed to galvanize the African urban
proletariat and the Indian rural proletariat into a united
force against colonialism and the established power
structure, but class affinities failed to bridge the ethnic
differences and geographical separation in the plural
society. The late 1950s and early 1960s were an
exceptionally troubling period in Guyana's history, and the
importance of external factors in fomenting internal
conflict cannot be denied. The metropolitan powers were
exceedingly alarmed that Guyana's economic and political
ties to the West might be jettisoned through the
establishment of a pro-soviet state. The externally
controlled bauxite and sugar industries were fearful of
nationalization, and as a result, by means of a
destabilization policy, the united states and Great Britain
endeavored to change the course of the country's history on
behalf of international capital.
Through urban and national development planning, the
state began to play an ever-increasing role in the
organization of the space economy. Urban planning was
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confined to Georgetown and to short-range remedial measures
that were designed on a microscale without regard to other
urban problems or to long-range developments in the city.
The British attempted to stymie urban African support of the
PPP by providing housing projects in the capital. The
transfer of government in 1957 lessened the urban emphasis,
for although the PPP stressed the need for planned
development in keeping with its socialist philosophy, its
orientation was decidedly rural. The rural bias of the
party cannot be ascribed solely to the PPP's proclivity to
reward its Indian population; rather, there was a general
belief that the country's comparative advantage was in
agriculture. Furthermore, the PPP reasoned that a viable
peasant sector would provide a sound alternative to the
tyranny of the plantation sector. Industrial and urban
infrastructural development would have to be sacrificed,
since their optimal development would be dependent on the
viability of the agricultural sector.
The ouster of the PPP from power in 1964 signalled a
reversal in planning policy. state action in the two years
prior to independence had a decidedly urban flavor. The
PNC,s urban bias was a harbinger of events to come - the
politics of race ensured. that this would be the case.
CHAPTER V
POST-INDEPENDENCE 1966-PRESENT
GLOBAL LINKAGES
This section outlines a number of economic policies
which have been attempted in the post-independence era, and
surveys their resultant effects on the country's linkage to
the core. In particular, the section assesses the 1966
"industrialization by invitation" program, the 1970
Cooperative Republic pOlicy of national self-reliance, and
the attempts at demand management in the late 1980s and
early 1990s , at the behest of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF).
In 1966, the government moved to diversify the economy
by adopting a policy of "industrialization. by invitation."
The "industrialization by invitation" program was designed,
much like Puerto Rico's Operation Bootstrap, to solve
Guyana's economic problems of unemployment,
underdevelopment, and slow economic growth, through large
inputs of foreign capital investments. The policy was
abandoned in the latter part of 1969, when the reality was
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all too apparent that it had failed to open up the economy.
In 1966, exports of sugar, rice, and bauxite accounted for
84 percent of total export earnings. By 1970, the three
commodities together comprised over 88 percent of the
country's export earnings (Table XX).
TABLE XX
EXPORT EARNINGS OF SUGAR, RICE, BAUXITE 1966-1989
(PERCENTAGES)
Year sugar! Rice Bauxite2 Total
1966 29.3 13.3 41.6 84.2
1967 32.9 12.8 39.0 84.7
1968 31.3 12.0 42.1 85.4
1969 37.0 8.1 42.0 87.1
1970 29.6 6.8 51. 7 88.1
1971 34.5 7.2 45.7 87.4
1972 36.3 8.3 42.8 87.4
1973 29.5 8.3 46.0 83.8
1974 51.3 8.1 33.4 92.8
1975 51.3 10.0 31. 0 92.3
1976 38.9 11. 3 44.7 94.9
1977 28.9 10.1 43.6 82.6
1978 32.4 12.8 44.2 89.4
1979 32.8 10.9 44.0 87.7
1980 24.7 8.9 48.3 81.9
1981 37.4 11. 3 44.1 92.8
1982 37.0 7.3 36.4. 80.7
1983 37.6 11.5 37.8 86.9
1984 32.4 10.4 43.9 86.7
1985 29.1 6.5 47.7 83.3
1986 38.9 6.2 33.1 78.2
1987 43.3 6.5 34.9 84.7
1988 37.0 6.5 36.8 80.3
1989 32.7 5.7 31.3 69.7
Source: statistical Bureau; Bank of Guyana
Annual Reports.
1. Includes molasses and rum.
2. Includes alumina, dried and calcined bauxite.
The sharp increase in the value of export earnings
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during 1966-1970 was obtained primarily through bauxite,
which experienced a surge in export prices. Bauxite export
earnings increased from 78 million dollars in 1966 to 139
million dollars in 1970. On the other hand, sugar earnings
increased more modestly from 55 million dollars in 1966 to
79 million dollars in 1970, whilst the export earnings of
rice declined from 25 million dollars to 18 million (Table
XXI).
The dependence on sugar, rice, and bauxite for export
earnings was reinforced by the fact that there was a
concentration of trading partners (Table XXII). Guyana's
export market was heavily dependent on the united Kingdom,
Canada, the United states, and the Caricom (caribbean Common
Market) countries. Market concentration was highlighted by
the facts that the United Kingdom was the chief recipient of
Guyana's sugar, the United states and Canada were the chief
recipients of Guyana's bauxite, and the Caricom was the
chief recipient of Guyana's rice. Between 1964 and 1970,
Guyana's four major trading partners dominated its export
market. However, the relative export shares amongst the
group underwent some interesting changes during this period.
The United states became Guyana's largest export market (28
percent) by displacing Canada (19 percent) and the United
Kingdom (20 percent). Much of the increase in exports to
the United states came at the expense of the Canadian
market, which was quickly becoming a less important
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TABLE XXI
EXPORT EARNINGS OF SUGAR, RICE, BAUXITE 1966-1989
(G$ MILLIONS)
Year Tot. Exports sugarl Bauxite2
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
186.4
197.5
216.3
242.0
268.0
298.4
305.0
293.0
602.5
848.2
648.9
661.8
750.2
742.7
992.6
974.3
775.5
566.0
790.0
869.3
920.8
2,406.0
2,123.1
6,452.0
54.7
64.9
67.7
89.6
79.4
102.8
110.7
86.6
309.2
435.4
252.4
191.5
243.5
243.7
244.8
364.9
287.3
212.8
255.8
253.0
358.5
1,042.2
785.8
2,109.6
24.9
25.2
26.1
19.7
18.3
21.3
25.3
25.0
49.0
84.8
73.6
66.8
96.0
80.8
87.6
110.0
56.7
64.9
82.1
56.6
57.0
157.1
138.5
367.4
77.6
77.1
91.2
101. 6
138.6
136.4
130.4
134.9
201.0
262.9
290.1
331. 0
332.0
326.8
479.3
429.5
282.4
214.1
347.0
414.4
304.6
840.2
782.2
2,022.0
Source: statistical Bureau; Bank of Guyana
Annual Reports.
1. Includes molasses and rum.
2. Includes alumina, dried and calcined bauxite.
destination for Guyana's bauxite.
Guyanese imports between 1964 and 1970 mirror its
export market concentration with dependence on the United
Kingdom, Canada, the United States, and Caricom (Table
XXII). However, imports from among the four major trading
partners were more stable throughout the period. The United
Kingdom was the largest import market, followed by the
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united states, the Caricom countries, and Canada.
TABLE XXII
EXPORTS AND IMPORTS WITH SELECTED MAJOR TRADING PARTNERS
1964-1976
(PERCENTAGES)
Exports
19.8 20.9 20.9 22.5 26.0 28.3 34.7 31.6 34.9
UK
Canada
USA
Caricom
Rest of
the World
Imports
20.0 24.2
30.6 18.0
15.7 25.1
13.9 11. 8
19.7 24.6
18.6 10.7
27.6 26.0
13.2 16.2
29.0
6.4
25.2
13.4
29.3
5.0
21.4
16.0
20.8
5.4
27.6
11. 5
28.5
3.7
23.7
12.5
26.7
2.7
19.6
16.1
23.5 25.2 22.4 24.2 23.1 22.9 22.4 22.5 21.8
UK
Canada
USA
Caricom
Rest of
the World
33.3
9.0
22.6
11. 6
31.4
8.3
21.4
13.7
31. 0
9.0
23.5
14.1
30.9
5.5
24.3
15.1
30.3
5.1
24.3
17.2
25.4
5.3
24.2
22.2
20.5
4.9
25.7
26.5
21.4
4.3
29.3
22.5
23.0
4.2
28.5
22.5
Source: Government of Guyana 1974; statistical Bureau.
In 1970, the government signalled a change in policy
by declaring the country a Cooperative Republic. within the
framework of its newly professed socialist objectives, the
government announced a policy of national self-reliance,
whereby:
..• Guyana must itself produce the basic
requirements of its people, must itself decide
on its trade and other external policies.!
In pursuit of its self-reliant strategy, the
IKing, K.F.S. 1973. A Great Future Together. Georgetown:
Ministry of Information, p. 3. Quoted in Jeffrey and Baber
1986, Ope cit.
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government embarked on a program which was aimed at
controlling the commanding heights of the economy. A
program of nationalizing foreign-owned industries ensued.
Between 1970 and 1976, an aggressive acquisition program
resulted in the nationalization of sugar and bauxite,
Guyana's two largest industries. In 1971, Demba, a
sUbsidiary of Alcan, was nationalized; and this action was
.followed in 1975 by the nationalization of American-owned
Reynolds, the other bauxite TNC operating in Guyana. The
two British TNCs which controlled the sugar industry,
Jessels securities and Bookers, were nationalized in 1975
and 1976, respectively. By 1980 the government boasted
proudly that it was in control of 80 percent of the economy.
The transfer of the economy into the hands of the
state did little to alter Guyana's linkages to the core.
~he commitments to sugar and bauxite exports were retained,
despite calls to diversify the economy and the establishment
of closer links with China, the soviet Union, and countries
of the Eastern Bloc. Data on trading partners after 1976 is
not readily available; nevertheless, in this year (six years
after the proclamation of the Cooperative Republic), the
United Kingdom, Canada, and the United states absorbed 49
percent of Guyana's exports and were responsible for 56
percent of the country's imports (Table XXII). Trade with
the Sino-soviet Bloc increased in the post-1970 period, but
in 1973 this geopolitical grouping accounted for only 3.4
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percent of the country's total trade. 2
In the early 1970s, Guyana's three major export
earners - sugar, bauxite, and rice - were aided by
exceptionally high world commodity prices, which were
prevailing at the time. Between 1970 and 1975, the export
price of sugar witnessed a fivefold increase, while the
price of rice more than tripled. Although increases in the
export prices for dried bauxite and alumina were not as
significant, those for calcined bauxite tripled (Table
XXIII).
TABLE XXIII
UNIT VALUES OF MAJOR EXPORTS 1970-1981
(G$ PER LONG TON)
Dried Calcined
Year Sugar Rice Bauxite Bauxite Alumina
1970 261. 2 309.9 19.0 68.8 143.2
1971 273.6 313.8 19.5 81.1 134.2
1972 339.3 360.7 19.3 100.1 112.2
1973 337.0 520.8 19.4 114.6 125.6
1974 941. 7 960.7 20.6 164.0 157.3
1975 1,449.4 1,034.1 30.4 211. 3 211. 6
1976 871.0 1,036.6 40.8 260.7 243.0
1977 894.0 1,013.6 46.7 305.2 298.5
1978 835.4 916.0 48.5 349.1 327.4
1979 875.0 965.3 54.2 402.5 370.3
1980 1,239.8 1,100.6 62.7 515.1 492.5
1981 1,130.4 1,410.3 78.5 527.3 614.3
Source: Thomas 1982, p. 24.
The export-led boom immediately fuelled a demand for
imports. In 1971 the government, in an effort to reduce
2Government of Guyana. 1974. A Decade of Progress.
Georgetown, pp. 50-51.
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dependency and stimulate domestic production, banned a wide
array of consumer goods including 100 items of food. The
foreign exchange windfall, nevertheless, encouraged the
expansion of central government expenditures.
Unfortunately, the expansion in expenditures came at a time
when the record-high world sugar prices of 1975 had begun to
wane. The government, however, believed that the fall in
world prices was an aberration; it therefore continued to
press ahead with its nationalization program, the
establishment of new state ventures, and the expansion of
existing ones. within a short time the lack of caution
exercised by the government, combined with the high price of
imported oil and manufactured goods, resulted in a balance-
of-payments crisis that has continued to the present time
(Table XXIV).
In the wake of its worsening balance-of-payments
situation, the government sought external financial
assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in
July 1978. A one-year standby loan for 6.25 million SDRs
(Special Drawing Rights, the currency unit of the IMF - in
1983, 1 SDR was equivalent to US $1.10) was agreed upon. In
return, Guyana agreed to pursue a policy of demand
management, whereby the government would reduce spending in
order to decrease the demand for imports. To implement the
policy, the government eliminated subsidies on many basic
commodities including milk, rice, flour, and cooking oil; it
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TABLE XXIV
BALANCE OF VISIBLE TRADE 1970-1989
(G$ MILLIONS)
Year Exports Imports Balance
1970 268.0 268.2 -0.2
1971 298.4 267.6 +30.8
1972 305.0 297.9 +7.1
1973 293.0 372.5 -79.5
1974 602.5 567.0 +35.5
1975 848.2 810.6 +37.6
1976 648.9 927.4 -278.5
1977 661.8 804.3 -142.5
1978 750.2 711.1 +39.1
1979 742.7 810.1 -67.4
1980 992.6 1,010.0 -17.4
1981 974.3 1,236.5 -262.2
1982 775.5 840.4 -64.9
1983 566.0 738.3 -172.3
1984 790.0 811. 3 -21.3
1985 869.3 959.8 -90.5
1986 920.8 1,030.0 -109.2
1987 2,406.0 2,619.0 -213.0
1988 2,123.1 2,125.3 -2.2
1989 6,452.0 7,012.0 -560.0
Source: statistical Bureau; Bank of Guyana Reports.
introduced new revenue measures by increasing airport exit
taxes, transportation fares, and telephone and other public
utility charges; and it moved to curb government spending
through the imposition of a policy of wage restraint and
retrenchment. 3 In August 1979, a three-year Extended Fund
Facility for 62.75 million SDRs was reached, which included
more of the IMF's typical array of restrictive measures
aimed at reducing demand and limiting the growth of the
3Car ibbean Contact, October 1978.
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public sector. However, by the end of 1979, it was clear
that the IMF remedy was not working. A new IMF Extended
Fund Facility for 100 million SDRs was negotiated along with
a structural adjustment loan of 22 million u.s. dollars from
the World Bank, the object of which was to stimulate the
supply side of Guyana's economy. While the IMF loan carried
its now-familiar policies, the World Bank's loan was to be
used to establish an export development fund and to buy
machinery and spare parts for the electricity, forestry,
fishing, and bauxite industries,4 in an effort to increase
export production.
Guyana failed to meet the targets set by the IMF-World
Bank Group and was compelled to withdraw from the agreement
in 1982. More overtures were made to the IMF in 1983, but
these offers subsequently fell through. In 1984, the Guyana
dollar was devalued by over 33 percent to satisfy IMF
conditions. The agency had become Guyana's largest
creditor, and in 1985 31.7 million dollars, or nearly 41
percent of Guyana's export earnings for that year, were
destined for the IMF to service the country's debt. The
payments were much too onerous; Guyana subsequently
defaulted and was declared not credit-worthy for additional
financing by the IMF. At the end of· 1988, the total debt
had reached 1,764 million u.s. dollars, or seven times the
4Thomas, C. 1982. "Guyana: the IMF-World Bank Group and
the General Crisis." Social and Economic Studies 31 (4), p.52.
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level of exports. Debt service payments accounted for 75
percent of exports, and interest service payments 30 percent
of exports. with a 'foreign debt approaching 2,500 U.S.
dollars for every man, woman, and child, Guyana had become
one of the most heavily indebted countries in the world in
terms of per-capita debt and debt ratios to GOP and exports.
In March 1989, another structural adjustment program
was agreed upon between the Guyana Government and the IMF-
World Bank Group. An Economic Recovery Program (ERP) was
established, to be implemented in three stages:
1. Stabilization (March 1989-November 1989),
2. Rehabilitation (1990-1991), and 3. Recovery and growth
(1992-). During the first two years, the objectives of the
ERP were quite ambitious; they included an increase of the
GOP growth rate to 4 percent per annum, a reduction in the
inflation rate from 50 to 10 percent, a reduction in the
public sector deficit to 20 percent of the GOP, the
elimination of payments arrears, and the restoration of net
international reserves.
Implementation of the ERP began in earnest with the
1989 bUdget when the Finance Minister announced a 70 percent
devaluation from 10 dollars to 33 dollars to 1 U.S. dollar,
with the full transfer of the increases on retail prices. A
number of measures were also taken to reduce price
distortions, in order to increase export production and to
reduce the fiscal and balance-of-payments deficits.
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Two years into the ERP program, the government once
again failed to meet most of the targets set by the IMF. In
February 1991, the Finance Minister, Carl Greenidge,
acknowledged that the IMF had given the government a
reprieve despite its default on the targets. s His bUdget of
1991 was not very different from those of the past several
years. Once again the largest slice of the bUdget, some 43
percent, was allocated towards debt servicing. The Guyana
dollar was devalued from 45 dollars to 101.75 dollars for 1
U.S. dollar, and a number of financial and fiscal measures
were introduced, aimed at creating a more efficient market
economy.
Whilst it is true that many of Guyana's balance-of-
payments difficulties have been externally generated by
unfavorable patterns of the terms of trade, and by
questionable policy dictates of the multilateral financing
institutions, it should be pointed out that the crisis was
also one of production. This aspect of the present crisis
will be more fUlly discussed in the following section
(Industrial structure), but a brief look at the export of
sugar, rice and bauxite/alumina between 1980 and 1989
reveals the extent of the failure. Even though the country
was guaranteed markets for sugar and ready outlets for rice
and bauxite, its three major exports have all witnessed
significant declines. Between 1980 and 1989, sugar exports
SStabroek News, February 21, 1991.
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fell from 248,000 tons to 166,000 tons, rice fell from
80,000 tons to 39,000 tons, dried bauxite from 994,000 tons
to 950,000 tons, calcined bauxite from 594,000 tons to
341,000 tons, and alumina exports (which were 226,000 tons
in 1980) actually ceased production in 1983 (Table XXV).
TABLE XXV
EXPORT OF SUGAR, RICE, BAUXITE, 1980-1989
(THOUSANDS OF LONG TONS)
Year Sugar Rice
1980 248 80
1981 263 77
1982 252 34
1983 219 39
1984 211 72
1985 215 29
1986 212 37
1987 184 68
1988 135 55
1989 166 39
Dried
Bauxite
994
995
692
786
1,097
1,051
931
898
866
950
Calcined
Bauxite Alumina
594 226
488 150
367 93
342
535
. 535
448
453
410
341 na
Total
Bauxite
1,814
1,633
1,152
1,128
1,632
1,586
1,379
1,351
1,276
1,291
Source: statistical Bureau.
na - not available.
INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE
This section looks at the sectoral origins of the GDP
since 1966. It highlights the remarkable consistency of the
industrial structure, save for the decline of the mining
sector in the latter half of the 1980s.
Export specialization and concentration in primary
products have continued to dominate Guyana's industrial
structure in the post-independence period. The preservation
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of colonial patterns of global economic linkages was
mirrored by the lack of transformation in the domestic
structure of the economy. In terms of the sectoral origins
of the GDP, the period since 1966 highlights the remarkable
consistence of the industrial structure, save for the
decline of the mining sector in the latter half of the 1980s
(Table XXVI).
TABLE XXVI
SELECTED SECTORAL CONTRIBUTION TO GDP 1966-1989
(PERCENTAGES)
Sector 1966 1970 1975 1980 1985 1989
Agriculture 26.5 23.4 40.0 27.8 31.0 4J.5
sugar (12.5) (12.4) (30.6) (14.8) (13.2) (26.0)
Rice ( 5.7) ( 3.7) ( 3.8) ( 3.8) ( 3.4) ( 4.0)
Mining 17.2 20.4 13.0 16.5 3.1 2.1
Bauxite (19.5) 12.1 ( 1. 3) ( 0.5)
Manufacturing 7.7 8.2 6.3 8.1 9.8 8.9
Services 48.6 48.0 40.7 47.6 56.1 45.5
Government (12.4) (13.2) (14.6) (18.7) (21.2) (14.9)
Source: statistical Bureau.
Agriculture, which was the second-largest sector in
1966, accounted for 26.5 percent of the GDP and continued to
be the mainstay of the economy; and in recent years its role
has grown, while that of the mining sector has declined.
After agriculture suffered a slight decline in 1970, value
added by this sector soared to 40 percent of GDP in 1975
when world prices for sugar, the dominant component of the
sector, reached record levels. There followed another
decline, and by 1980 agriculture's share of the GDP was 27.8
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percent. In 1985, agriculture represented 31 percent of the
overall GOP, and by 1989 its dominance of domestic
production was evidenced by its 43.5 percent share; at the
same time, sugar's contribution to the GOP rose from 13.2
percent to 26 percent. Throughout the 1966-1989 period,
rice, the other major component in the agriculture sector,
basically held steady at around 4 percent of the GOP.
The mining sector, by contrast, declined from a level
of 17.2 percent of GOP in 1966 to 2.1 percent in 1989. In
1970 mining was 20.4 percent of GOP and was challenging
agriculture (23.4 percent of GOP) for the second-largest
sector of the economy. However, following the
nationalization of the bauxite industry (1971-1975), the
chief contributor to the mining sector, its proportion of
GOP declined to 13 percent in 1975, and to 2.1 percent in
1989.
Bauxite's decline was spectacular. In 1970, bauxite
represe~ted over 95 percent of mining's sectoral output; but
!
in 1989,1 when mining's contribution to GOP was already quite
I
i
poor, i1s share of the mining sector was less than 25
percent.! Gold and diamonds, by default, have become
,
mining's dominant industries as measured by direct
con~ribution to the GOP. This reversal has occurred even
though recorded levels of gold and diamond production have
also declined (Table XXVII).
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TABLE XXVII
PRODUCTION OF GOLD AND DIAMONDS 1981-1989
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
Gold (Grams)
599
268
143
328
323
436
666
585
538
Diamonds
(Metric Carat)
10
11
12
8
12
9
7
4
8
Source: statistical Bureau.
The manufacturing sector has been remarkably steady in
the post-independence era. Its contribution to GDP has
increased only marginally, from 7.7 percent in 1966 to 8.9
percent in 1989. The manufacturing base, much like those in
the rest of the economy, is extremely narrow. Most of the
manufacturing sector is dependent on light industries such
as food, pharmaceuticals, clothing, and furniture. This
sector has shown no sign of dynamic growth or takeoff,
despite the government's efforts in the early post-
independence period to provide such stimuli as tax holidays,
accelerated depreciation of investment, and duty-free
imports of raw materials, building materials, and machinery.
In later years, attempts were also made to promote
manufacturing through import restrictions via tariffs,
quotas, and outright banning of items.
The main constraints to the development of the
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manufacturing sector have been the small size of the home
market; low per-capita levels of income; shortages and
unreliable supplies of inputs; the government's previous
emphasis on cooperatives and its insistence on equal
participation in some enterprises; the limited availability
of investment finance; shortages of administrative, skilled
and semi-skilled persons, particularly managerial staff; and
the concentration of manufacturing activities in the capital
city, which provides rather weak linkages with other
economic sectors and geographical areas. Apart from these
factors, the lack of dynamism in the manufacturing sector
can also ne explained in part by the uncertain political
climate and racial problems which continue to plague the
country.
Throughout the post-independence era, services have
been the dominant sector of the economy. Although the
sector's relative share of the GOP fell from 48.6 percent in
1966 to 45.5 percent in 1989, it did contribute 56.1 percent
to the GOP in 1985. The service sector is a catch-all
category that includes distribution, transportation and
communication, rent, financial services, government, and so
on. Within the service sector, the government component has
been very strong. In 1985, government represented 21.2
percent of the total GOP and 62 percent of the service
sector's GOP. since 1985 it has declined, and in 1989 it
was only 15 percent of the total GOP. This figure, however,
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masks the true importance of the government sector in
Guyana's economy, for it excludes the government's
involvement in agriculture (primarily sugar), mining, and
manufacturing. In fact, the government is involved in just
about every facet of the economy.
The poor performance of the economy since independence
is, amongst other things, conditioned by the agricultural
and mining sectors, and, in particular, by their major
components - sugar, rice, and bauxite.
Sugar production in 1970 was 311,000 tons; the
following year the industry achieved a peak output of
369,000 tons. Output has since declined precipitously, and
in 1989 production was a mere 164,000 tons (Table XXVIII).
Between 1970 and 1980, sugar production fluctuated,
and it averaged around 306,000 tons per annum for the
period. Production has since fallen considerably; and
between 1981 to 1989, average annual output was only 235,000
tons. What accounts for sugar's declining production?
Among reasons cited are industrial unrest, which has led to
numerous and in some cases quite protracted strikes; lack of
foreign exchange and balance-of-payments difficulties, which
have hindered the industry from purchasing spare parts and
other necessary inputs; cane diseases; and the vagaries of
the weather. 6
The poor production figures have meant that Guyana has
6Shahabuddeen 1983, op. cit., p.46.
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been unable to meet its Lome convention quotas, which
TABLE XXVIII
PRODUCTION OF SUGAR, RICE, BAUXITE 1970-1989
(THOUSANDS OF LONG TONS)
Dried Calcined Total
Year Sugar Rice Bauxite Bauxite Alumina Bauxite
1970 311 143 2,289 717 312 3,318
1971 369 120 2,101 710 305 3,116
1972 315 94 1,652 690 257 2,599
1973 266 110 1,665 637 234 2,536
1974 341 153 1,383 726 311 2,420
1975 300 160 1,350 778 294 2,422
1976 333 110 969 729 265 1,963
1977 242 210 1,001 709 273 1,983
1978 325 182 1,024 590 236 1,850
1979 298 143 1,117 589 160 1,866
1980 270 166 1,103 598 212 1,915
1981 301 163 982 505 167 1,654
1982 287 179 958 386 93 1,437
1983 252 147 761 310 1,071
1984 242 184 823 520 1,343
1985 241 155 1,096 464 1,560
1986 245 169 1,036 434 1,470
1987 221 145 921 419 1,340
1988 167 128 953 394 1,347
1989 164 140 1,040 294 na 1,334
Source: statistical Bureau.
na - not available.
guarantee the country a special price and the EEC market.
The failure of the industry has also resulted in the further
closure of sugar estates. In 1986, the closure of the sugar
estate at Leonora was another signal that all was not well
with the industry. Leonora's demise was followed in 1987 by
the closure of Diamond Sugar Estate. As of May 1992, only
eight sugar estates were in operation in the entire country.
Rice, the second most important agricultural product,
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has also performed poorly. output in 1970 was 142,000 tons.
A peak production of 210,000 tons was reached in 1977, but
by 1989 output was down to 140,000 tons, or 2,000 tons below
the 1970 level. The decline in production, as well as
acreage, may be attributed to many of the same problems
associated with the sugar industry. In addition, rice
farmers complain that the Guyana Rice Board, which controls
the industry, has been not only inept, but dishonest in its
grading, pricing, and weighing of their produce. 7
Bauxite has been the most important mineral exploited
in Guyana, and for a time in the 1970s it was the most
dynamic component in the economy. In 1970, peak outputs of
dried bauxite (2.3 million tons) and alumina (312,000 tons)
were achieved, while calcined bauxite (778,000 tons)
achieved its peak production in 1975. The level of
production for dried bauxite in 1989 was one million tons,
or 43 percent less than the peak output of 1970, whilst
calcined bauxite's production was 294,000 tons, or 38
percent less than the peak output of 1975. Production of
alumina was suspended in 1982.
since nationalization, the bauxite industry has had to
contend with managerial, financing, marketing, and labor
problems that have adversely affecr.ed production. Key
7De Caires, D. 1988. "Guyana After Burnham: A new era? Or
is President Hoyte Trapped in the Skin of the old PNC?
Caribbean Affairs 1 (1), p. 193; Singh, C. 1988. Guyana:
Politics in a Plantation Society. New YorK: Praeger, p. 112.
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inputs such as fuel, oil, and caustic soda have increased,
and the industry has had to pay high freight rates for
inputs. The depressed state of the world market for
aluminum also softened prices for bauxite, and this
depreciation has been especially troubling since Guyana is a
high-cost producer owing to the nature of bauxite deposits.
The ore has to be mined from about 200 feet under an
overburden of sand and clay, thus increasing the cost of
extraction. The relative difficulty of reaching the
deposits, is however, compensated for by the size of the ore
bodies, which are unusually large, and the high-aluminajlow-
iron content which is best suited to the production of
calcined bauxite, for which Guyana holds a virtual monopoly.
Calcined bauxite, after application of intense heat,
is used to manufacture abrasives and refractory brick for
high-temperature kilns. The product was widely viewed as
the future of the industry in Guyana, but unreliability of
supplies to customers has made the country a supplier of
last resort. The country had 85 percent of the world market
in 1975, but then its market share fell to 57 percent in
1984, as purchasers began to experiment with sUbstitutes,
adopt new technologies, and accept lower-quality ores from
other countries. 8 As a result, Guyana has been forced to
produce dried bauxite - the least valuable product of the
industry.
8Jeffrey and Baber 1986, op. cit., p. 146.
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Labor Supply
The absence of change in the industrial structure is
evident in the data on the country's labor supply.
Nevertheless, the sec~oral composition of the labor force
has not been entirely static. This section discusses some
of these changes. Specifically, it addresses the expansion
of public sector employment, and the growth of the informal
labor force which took place following the economic
difficulties of the late 1970s.
The Manpower Survey in 1965 estimated that there were
some 193,048 persons in the labor force in that year, or
about 31 percent of the population, excluding Amerindians;9
of this number 165,912 were employed, implying that slightly
over 14 percent of the labor force was unemployed (Table
XXIX). However, the manpower survey placed the unemployment
rate at 16 percent and attributed the much higher
unemployment ratio to seasonal factors. 1O Of the
unemployed, the highest incidence was found in Georgetown
and New Amsterdam, among females and younger groups with
limited training and experience.
By 1970, the labor force had grown to 210,000 persons,
while the number of those employed had declined to 162,000.
Consequently, the unemployment rate had increased to 23
9Francis 1966, op. cit.
IllIbid., Tables 1.1 and 1.2.
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percent of the labor force. Although the actual labor force
in 1970 was 210,000, or 30 percent of the total population,
the figure excluded half of the working population, or
223,000 persons; of these, 178,000 were females. The labor
participation rate of females in 1970 was only 18 percent,
while that of males was 47 percent.
TABLE XXIX
SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF LABOR FORCE 1965-1980
1965 1970
Labor force 193,048 210,000
Employed 165,912 162,000
Industries ~ ~0 0
Agriculture 34.9 29.0
Mining 3.1 4.9
Manufacturing 16.2 15.0
Services 45.8 49.0
Unemployment 14.1 23.0
(% of labor force)
Sources: Jameson 1980; Manpower Survey 1965.
A look at the data on the sectoral shares of
employment indicates the minimal structural change in the
economy (Table XXIX). Two major sectors - agriculture and
services - remained the major labor-absorbing industries.
However, agricultural employment fell from a 35 percent
share in 1965 to 29 percent in 1970, while service
employment rose from 46 percent to 49 percent.
In 1970, sugar accounted for about one-third of the
agricultural labor force - employing slightly over 17,000
workers. Since independence, employment in sugar has held
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relatively steady. Some decline was observed among factory
workers, but this was compensated for by a slight increase
in field employment (Table XXX).
TABLE XXX
SUGAR ESTATE EMPLOYMENT 1966-1970
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
Field Workers
13,262
13,597
13,992
14,553
14,100
Factory Workers
3,663
3,545
3,619
3,287
3,140
Total
16,925
17,142
17,611
17,840
17,240
Source: Sukdeo 1975, pp. 238-240.
Rice was the second most important agricultural
product, but employment estimates of this component are
difficult to ascertain. In 1970, it was estimated that
45,000 families were concerned with rice production, and
most of this group were dependent on the staple as a major
source of income and livelihood. 1I
Although the bauxite industry was a dynamic sector of
the economy in 1970, it failed to create significant
employment opportunities. Between 1965 and 1970, mining's
share of sectoral employment increased marginally from 3
percent to 5 percent (Table XXIX). Very few linkages had
been created with other sectors of the economy. ,The
smelting of aluminum had been investigated, and it was hoped
lIJameson, K. and F. Bonello. 1978. A Macroeconomic
Assessment of the Economy of Guyana. pp. 33-34.
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that significant employment opportunities would be created
in fabricating industries which would utilize the smelter's
output to produce wares, tubes, rods, wire, sheets, and
foil. However, whilst the feasibility of the project was
established, the government failed to garner the requisite
funds to secure the project.
The failure to establish an aluminum smelter
highlights the country's low level of industrialization.
The sectoral employment share in manufacturing was 16
percent in 1965; and by 1970, it had fallen to 15 percent.
The sectoral distribution of the labor force between
1970 and 1980 reflects the overall increase in the
proportion employed in services, from 49 percent to 52
percent (Table XXIX). This is in keeping with the expansion
of the pUblic sector which took place in the 1970s when the
government embarked upon a cooperative developmental policy.
Relatively high proportions of females are employed in the
service industries, including the civil service and
community services such as education and health.
comparing the occupational status of the economically
active population, one is struck by the difference in
proportions that worked for government as opposed to private
enterprise between the 1970 and 1980 censuses (Table XXXI).
In 1970 only 19 percent worked for government and 45 percent
in the private sector, whereas in 1980 the figures were
almost reversed: 43 percent worked for government and 20
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percent in private enterprise. Occupational status
distribution by gender over the 1970 and 1980 censuses
indicates that the proportions of both groups that worked
for others were relatively close, but a higher proportion of
males were self-employed, whereas a higher proportion of
females were unemployed.
TABLE XXXI
OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OF THE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION
Occupational
Status
1970
Males Females Total
1980
Males Females Total
Worked for
others 66.2 65.6 65.9 66.2 63.9 65.0
govt 17.4 21. 6 19.5 44.4 41.4 42.9
private sec. 47.1 42.2 44.7 20.0 20.5 20.2
unpaid worker 1 ., 1.7 1.7 1.8 2.0 1.9.,
Has own business
or farm 17.5 12.0 14.8 15.9 9.6 12.8
Did no work 15.8 21.9 18.9 15.8 23.4 19.6
Not stated 0.4 0.4 0.4 2.1 3.1 2.6
Sources: 1970 census; 1980 census.
The agriculture industry continued to employ the
second-largest share of the economically active population
in 1980 - 50,316 persons, or 27 percent of the labor force.
since independence, the proportion employed in agriculture
has continued to fall. However, the sugar industry, the
sector's largest component, witnessed an increase in its
labor force during the 1970s. Employment in sugar increased
from 17,240 persons in 1970, to 31,128 in 1980, with much of
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the increase coming after nationalization in 1976 (Table
XXXII). The importance of the industry was such that
according to one estimate, in 1980, roughly 150,000 people
were in some way dependent on sugar for their livelihood. 12
TABLE XXXII
SUGAR ESTATE EMPLOYMENT 1970-1982
Field and
Factory Workers
1970
1971
1972
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
17,240
17,521
17,394
28,406
33,545
31,651
33,067
31,128
31,374
28,077
Sources: Sukdeo 1975, pp.238-240;
Collymore 1984, p.29.
Since 1976, employment in the sugar industry has been
rather unsteady, although an initial glance at the data
reflects an upward trend, at least until 1982. In 1977, the
industry was hit by a 135-day strike that was called in
response to the refusal of the government to pay 238.9
million dollars in a profit-sharing scheme with the workers.
In response, the government hired 6,132 strike-breakers and
granted them permanent positions.13 Therefore, at the end
12Shahabuddeen 1983, Ope cit., p. 49.
13Collymore, C. 1984. Bitter sugar and the Working People.
p. 28.
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of 1977, the work force should have been around 34,500;
however, the industry reported a total of only 33,545
workers. The government had thus used the strike to dismiss
almost 1,000 workers.
During 1981-1982 the sugar industry lessened its work
force by nearly 12 percent when it laid off 3,297 workers as
part of a retrenchment program to satisfy the IMF. The
retrenchment program too~ place in the midst of high
unemployment rates that were prevailing in the country.
Retrenchment of workers was not confined to sugar; it also
included the gamut of organizations, corporations, and
companies run by the state. The state, rather than
transnationals or a hegemonic power, was now manipulating
the country's labor supply to preserve or increase the rate
of exploitation. The unemployed constituted an industrial
reserve army to be used by any sudden expansion of
capitalist production.
Whilst all workers have borne the injustices of state
capitalism, those in sugar have been hit particularly hard.
Wages of sugar workers have historically been low when
compared with those of other industries. It was hoped that
with nationalization, relations of production would change
and workers would be rewarded for the fruits of their labor.
However, this was not to be the case, and wage rates have
lagged the inflation rate for much of the period. But given
the difficulties in securing employment in Guyana, the
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industry has been able to dictate wage rates without fear of
interrupting its supply of labor.
with the increase in economic dislocation in the late
1970s and the government's attempts at corrective measures,
an ever-increasing number of the population have been forced
into activities outside the formal labor force. Many
workers are now engaged in small-scale trading, smuggling,
and other petty-commodity production activities (the so-
called informal economy beyond government control).
According to some estimates, the informal economy accounted
for 70-80 percent of the GOP in 1987 and was nearly as large
as the formal economy.M
A high proportion of those involved in the informal
economy are women. IS Women are dominant in what is known as
the "suitcase economy" or "international trading," an
activity which became noticeable around 1978. 16 Traders in
this segment of the informal economy are identified by their
commodious striped polytene bags and cavernous suitcases,
and are found in just about every airport of the region.
They smuggle out gold, jewellery, foreign currency, and
local goods and crafts, and bring in items that are deemed
140anns, G. n.d. "The Underground Economy and the state in
Guyana A synopsis." Unpublished paper (University of
Guyana), p. 13.
ISEconomist Intelligence unit. 1988. country Profile.
Guyana, Barbados, Windward & Leeward Islands. London: EIU, p.
14.
160anns n. d, op . cit., p. 17.
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to be in short supply, which in the 1980s was just about
every conceivable item. 17
DEMOGRAPHY
This portion of the chapter traces the components and
trends of population growth and distribution since
independence. In addition to births, deaths, and rural-
urban migration, it closely examines the impact of
emigration on urbanization. For instance, how has
emigration affected the racial composition of the
population? What became of whites and Chinese? The focal
point of the study's demographic structure remains
Georgetown and its junior urban partner, New Amsterdam; but
newer designated urban areas to the settlement hierarchy -
such as Rose Hall, Corriverton, and Linden - are surveyed.
The creation of a regional system of administration and the
resultant generation of a rich body of regional data also
allows one to pursue a regional comparative analysis of the
demographic structure. This ought to be particularly
helpful in the sUbsequent section when the study attempts to
assess infrastructure provision and expenditure patterns.
During the intercensal period 1960-1970, the
population of the country increased by 139,518, or 25.2
percent, reflecting a growth rate of 2.25 percent per annum
(Table XXXIII). These rates are much lower than the 3.3
17Ibid., pp. 17-19.
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percent per annum growth observed during 1950-1960. The
slower growth rate in the 1960s is attributed to a number of
factors, not the least of which was the continuing
emigration to metropolitan countries.
TABLE XXXIII
POPULATION DISTRIBUTION 1960-1980
Year Guyana Georgetown ! N/Amsterdam ,:[ Urban l1<...2.
1960 560,330 148,391 26.5 14,053 2.5 162,444 29.0
1970 701,718 164,039 23.4 17,782 2.5 223,2121 31.8
1980 759,567 167,839 22.1 19,287 2.5 235,126 31. 0
Sources: Census 1970; Census of the Commonwealth
Caribbean 1980-1981.
1. corriverton, Rose Hall, and Linden were designated
urban areas, under the Municipal and District Councils
Act of 1969.
A conservative estimate of population movements
between 1965 and 1969 suggested that net emigration averaged
2,200 persons per annum. 18 Furthermore, it was noted that a
majority of the emigrants were experienced and skilled, with
above-average training. 19 This migration aggravated the
acute shortage of skilled labor in the country, and because
mostly males emigrated, there was also a steady decline in
the gender ratio (Table XXXIV).
In addition to emigration, births and deaths
18IBRD. 1970. Current Economic Position and Prospects of
Guyana. Vol. I. Main Report. Central America and Caribbean
Department, p. 29.
19Ibid., p. 31.
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constitute the prime determinants of population growth in
Guyana. Between 1960 and 1970, the average natural increase
of the population (that is, the difference between the
average birth rate and the average death rate) declined from
TABLE XXXIV
GENDER RATIO 1960-1989
1960
1970
1980
1989
Male Female Total Gender Ratio
279,128 281,202 560,330 0.99
349,143 352,575 701,718 0.99
376,381 383,186 759,567 0.98
373,900 381,300 755,200 0.98
Sources: Censuses 1960-1970; Census of the
Commonwealth Caribbean 1980; Statistical
Digest 1989.
32.3 per thousand to 26.9 per thousand. Over this period
the birth rate per annum declined from 43.3 per thousand to
33.8 per thousand, whilst the death rate declined from 10.4
per thousand to 6.9 per thousand. Thus, the pronounced
decline in the birth rate combined with the emigration
figures and the modest decline in the death rate to produce
the slow overall growth of the population.
The distribution of the population in 1970 indicates
that there were 223,212 persons out of a total of 701,718
living in urban areas (Table XXXIII). Although this figure
represented some growth in the urban population over the
1960 census, the 2.8 percent increase is slight when one
considers that Corriverton (population 12,417), Rose Hall
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(population 5,018), and Linden (population 23,956) were
accorded urban status in 1970. If the populations of these
three newly designated urban areas are excluded from the
urban total for 1970, the proportion of the population
living in urban areas would register a decline of 3.1
percent during the intercensal period.
In 1970, Georgetown, the capital city, had an
estimated population of 164,034, which represented a growth
rate of a little over 1 percent for the decennium (Table
XXXIII). The low rate of increase in Georgetown was
attributable to primarily three factors. Firstly, the
capital had a low rate of natural increase - according to
the 1970 census, 38 percent of all women in the childbearing
age group (15-44 years) had no children. Secondly, the 1965
Manpower Survey surmised that among those who emigrated,
many more left from urban than from the rural areas. 20 And,
thirdly, the disturbances of the early 1960s hindered
movement into the capital and at the same time encouraged
movement outward. 21
Within the city proper, the population between 1960
and 1970 decreased by 9,780 (13.4 percent) from 72,964 to
63,184, while the population in the suburbs of Georgetown
increased by 25,428 (33.7 percent) from 75,427 to 100,855.
This internal redistribution of population was undoubtedly
2°Francis 1966, Ope cit., p. 25.
2lIbid.
395
related to out-migration from the central city as well as
the rural areas. Migration to the suburbs was also
influenced by the establishment of the University of Guyana,
at Turkeyen. 22
Despite the slowdown in the growth of Georgetown over
the decade, the city nevertheless dominated the settlement
hierarchy. This domination is emphasized by the fact that,
in 1970, 370,000 people (over 50 percent of the total
population) were contained within a 25-mile radius of the
city.~ The city was 6.8 times the size of Linden and 9.2
times the size of New Amsterdam. Linden, formed by the
amalgamation of Mackenzie, Christianburg, and Wismar, had
overtaken New Amsterdam as the nation's second-largest urban
center.
New Amsterdam registered an increase in population of
3,729 or 26.5 percent, over the period. The increase was
slightly above the overall rate for the country (25.2
percent). However, East Berbice, the portion of the county
in which New Amsterdam is located, realized a percentage
increase of more than 30 percent. This high rate of
increase in East Berbice seemed to be related to migration
22The University of Guyana was founded in 1963 in
Georgetown. It began life as an evening college and was
disparagingly referred to by some as "Jagan's Night School."
In 1973, following the move to Turkeyen, it began to admit
full time students.
DCentral Transport Planning Unit. 1975. Transport Plan
for Guyana, p. 16.
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that was influenced by the establishment of land settlement
schemes such as Black Bush Polder (1960), BrandwagtjSari
(1963), and Mara (1957). The higher fertility rates of the
Indian population which predominated the area was another
likely factor which accounted for the differences in
population growth between New Amsterdam and East Berbice.
In 1970, Indians were largely in the rural areas, as they
have been since indentureship, while African-descended
segments of the population were clustered in the urban
centers (Table XXXV).
TABLE XXXV
RACIAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION 1970
% of % of Pop. of
Urban Race Urban area Rural
% of % of Pop.of
Race Rural area
Indian 48,861 13.5 23.2 311,875 86.5 64.2
African 113,497 52.0 53.8 104,904 48.0 21.4
Chinese 2,597 76.3 1.2 805 23.7 0.2
AmerIndn. 1,856 5.4 0.9 32,446 94.6 6.6
White 1,656 75.8 0.8 530 24.2 0.1
Mixed 37,675 52.1 17.9 34,642 47.9 7.1
Others I 4,337 72.3 2.1 1,661 27.7 0.3
Not stated 288 59.4 0.1 214 42.6 0.04
Total 210,767 30.1 100.0 489,077 69.9 99.942
Sources: Census 1970; Jones 1981 (Table 1.2) p. 9.
1. Includes Portuguese.
2. Rounding accounts for deviations from 100.
The racial composition of the popUlation in 1970 shows
that Indians were in the majority with 51.8 percent of the
popUlation (Table XXXVI). Since 1960, Indians had increased
their share of the popUlation by nearly 4 percent, whilst
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Africans, the second-largest group, had registered a decline
in their share by almost 2 percent.
TABLE XXXVI
RACIAL COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION 1960-1986
Race 1960
.! 1970 .! 1980 .! 19863 .!
Indian 267,797 47.8 362,736 51.8 389,760 51.4 375,507 49.7
African 183,950 32.8 218,401 31.2 231,330 30.5 229,844 30.4
Chinese 4,074 0.7 3,402 0.5 1,842 0.2
AmerIndn.25,453 4.5 34,302 4.9 39,867 5.3 40,619 5.4
White 3,217 0.6 2,186 0.3 770 0.1
Mixed 67,191 12.0 72,317 10.3 83,763 11.0 106,467 14.1
Others· 8,415 1.5 5,998 0.9 3,266 0.4 3,635 0.4
Not stated 233 .0 502 0.1 8,021 1.1
Total 560,330 100 699,8442 100 758,6192 100 756,072 100
Sources: Census 1970; Census of the Commonwealth Caribbean
1980-1981; Statistical Bureau.
1. Includes Portuguese.
2. Count of non-institutional population.
3. Chinese and Whites are grouped with "Others."
Indians, Africans, Amerindians, and the Mixed group
steadily increased in numbers up to the 1980 census. The
fastest growth rates were experienced by the Amerindians,
who increased by 16.2 percent between 1970 and 1980. They
were closely followed by the Mixed group, whose intercensal
growth was 15.8 percent, whereas the increase for Indians
was 7.4 percent, and for Africans 5.9 percent. The rapid
growth of the Amerindians was due in part to declining
mortality accompanied by sustained high fertility among the
race, but it may also have been due in part to better data
collection by census takers in the interior where the
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Amerindians live.
Perhaps the most noticeable feature of the country's
racial composition since independence has been the severe
reduction in the numbers of Chinese and whites. Between
1960 and 1980, the Chinese population was reduced by 55
percent and whites by 76 percent. Most of the decline of
the two groups took place during the 1970-1980 period, and
the timing leads one to suspect that emigration was the
major contributor to the loss of population. Certainly,
intermarriage may be responsible for some of the losses of
both minority groups, but the reductions are so large that
this is highly unlikely to be the only factor. In more
recent times, the numbers of Chinese and whites have been so
insignificant that they are no longer classified separately.
Emigration cuts across all racial groups. Whereas
during the 1960-1970 census interval the population
increased by 141,388, the increase from 1970 to 1980 was
only 57,849. The level of emigration is apparent when one
considers that for the 1970-1980 period the number of births
totalled 238,450 and the number of deaths 57,690, indicating
a natural increase of 180,760. This increase implies that
121,911 persons departed the country during the decennium -
an astonishing number for a country whose total population
in 1980 was 759,567. Although more males than females left
during this period, the emigration ratios for the groups
were much closer than in the past when males had dominated
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(Table XXXVII).
TABLE XXXVII
COMPONENTS OF POPULATION CHANGE 1970-1980
Males Females Total
population in 1970 349,143 352,575 701,718
Population in 1980 376,381 383,186 759,567
Intercensal change 27,238 30,611 57,849
Births 1970-1980 120,850 117,600 238,450
Deaths 1970-1980 31,900 25,790 57,690
Natural increase 88,950 91,810 180,760
Implied emigration -61,712 -61,199 -122,911
Source: Census of the Commonwealth Caribbean 1980-1981.
The country's population distribution remained
relatively unchanged throughout the decade of the 1970s.
Georgetown, with a population of 167,839 in 1980, increased
its population by 3,800, or 2.3 percent, whilst New
Amsterdam's population rose by 1,505, or 8.5 percent.
Overall, Georgetown's share of the country's total
population declined from 23.4 percent to 22.1 percent. The
city was still overwhelmingly the largest settlement and was
still attracting internal migrants. In 1980, over 42
percent of Georgetown's population were born in other parts
of the country (Table XXXVIII). New Amsterdam, the Eccles-
Soesdyke district (on East Bank Demerara between Georgetown
and Timheri International Airport), Upper Demerara (Linden),
and Mazaruni-Potaro (a mining district) also have high
proportions of their populations who were born elsewhere in
the country.
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TABLE XXXVIII
AREAS OF RESIDENCE AND BIRTHPLACES OF POPULATION 1980
Area of Birth
Area of Elsewhere outside Total Nos.
Place Residence in Country Country (= 100%)
Georgetown 56.2 42.2 1.6 167,839
New Amsterdam 61.2 37.9 1.0 19,287
Eccles-Soesdyke 62.6 36.4 0.9 42,329
Indst.-La Recns. 84.3 15.4 0.4 121,335
West Berbice 89.1 10.9 .0 36,342
East Berbice 91.2 8.2 0.5 138,528
Upper Dem. River 54.9 43.4 1.7 36,678
West Demerara 83.6 16.1 0.3 86,886
Pmrn-Smrs-Brk 91.0 9.0 .0 58,586
N.W. District 88.0 11. 6 0.5 18,297
Mazaruni-Potaro 57.8 36.2 6.0 16,335
Rupununi 91.5 7.4 1.1 16,177
Guyana 99.2 0.0 0.8 758,619
Source: Census of the Commonwealth Caribbean 1980-1981.
Assessing internal migration in Guyana is a hazardous
business. It does not appear to be a one-step process, and
migration cannot be seen in unidirectional terms by which
people move only from rural to urban areas. This is
highlighted in Table XXXIX, which shows that areas such as
Georgetown and New Amsterdam, which have large proportions
of their popUlations born elsewhere in the country, are also
areas which have lost a good deal of their native-born
popUlations to other areas in the country. For example,
over one-third of the people who were born in Georgetown (34
percent) and New Amsterdam (38 percent) resided in another
part of the country in 1980.
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TABLE XXXIX
PLACE OF BIRTH AND AREA OF RESIDENCE OF POPULATION 1980
Area of Residence (%)
Place of Elsewhere Total
Place Birth in Country Numbers
Georgetown 66.0 34.0 140,168
New Amsterdam 62.0 38.0 19,025
Eccles-Soesdyke 79.2 20.8 33,454
Indust.-La Recns. 80.9 19.1 126,336
West Berbice 72.3 27.7 44,808
East Berbice 87.9 12.1 143,781
Upper Dem. River 77.1 22.9 26,130
West Demerara 82.1 17.9 88,464
Pmrn-Smrs-Brk. 71.1 28.9 75,019
N.W. District 77.5 22.5 .20,768
Mazaruni-Potaro 79.3 20.7 11,904
Rupununi 94.9 5.1 15,601
Not stated 6,759
Guyana 100.0 0.0 752,217
Source: Census of the Commonwealth Caribbean 1980-1981.
The results of the 1990 census have not, at the time
of this writing, been made available to the pUblic.
However, in 1986, the Statistical Bureau estimated the
population to be 756,072, or a decline of 3,495 persons (.5
percent) over the 1980 census. This was the first recorded
decline of the total population since census collection
began in 1841. Low fertility and massive emigration were
the likely causes of the reduction. Fertility in Guyana has
been steadily declining. According to Statistical Bureau
figures, the fertility rate for women in the reproductive
age group (14-49) was 2.6 children per woman, whilst the
overall average number of children born to all women was
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slightly higher, at 2.8 per woman. Among women under 23
years of age, the average number of children was below one -
a clear indication of the continuing decline in fertility
observed in the post-independence era.
Fertility differentials among the races also display
recent changes. Indian women, who in the past have
traditionally exhibited higher fertility rates than the
African and Mixed groups, are now showing fertility levels
that are similar to those of these two major groups.
Fertility rates, however, remain relatively high among
Amerindian women (Table XL).
TABLE XL
FERTILITY RATES BY RACE FOR FEMALE POPULATION 14-49 YEARS
1986
Age Group Indian African Mixed Amerindian
-14 .02 .00 .00 .03
15-19 .12 .17 .22 .40
20-24 .80 .93 1.00 1. 70
25-29 1.95 1.88 2.03 3.14
30-34 3.41 3.17 3.35 4.42
35-39 4.06 4.07 4.80 6.26
40-44 5.32 4.90 5.07 7.51
45-49 7.01 6.10 6.03 8.00
Total 2.22 2.11 1.96 3.31
Source: statistical Bureau 1987.
Emigration, another major reason for the decline in
popUlation, was very high during the statistical Bureau's
survey period (1981-1986) (Table XLI). Between 1981 and
1986, approximately 31,808 persons departed Guyana for
permanent residence abroad. Looking at those who emigrated,
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it is noticeable that in every year, females (53.8 percent)
outnumbered males (46.2 percent). Furthermore, emigration
was age-selective, with just over 65 percent of emigrants
being in the highly reproductive age group of 15-34 years of
age. The highest number of emigrants were reported as
having departed the country in 1986 (7,682 persons), but
this figure may well have been a function of respondent
recall and reporting, rather than any differential in
outflow. The statistical Bureau's figures are also probably
on the conservative side, since family emigration has become
commonplace and some emigrants may have no family members
left in Guyana to report on their behalf. This aspect of
emigration is especially noticeable in the villages of
Corentyne, Berbice, where row upon row of houses have been
boarded up by owners who have left for foreign climes.
Underestimation of the number of emigrants may also be
attributed to illegal emigration and withholding of
information by respondents.
Population distribution data in 1986 are not directly
comparable with those in previous surveys, since the newly
provided figures are based on regions and are not broken
down by individual settlements (Figure 4). As Table XLII
shows, over one-quarter (28.3 percent, or 214,027 persons)
of the country's population were living in urban areas;
however, there is no information on the population levels of
each of Guyana's five urban centers - Georgetown, Linden,
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New Amsterdam, Rose Hall, and corriverton.
TABLE XLI
EMIGRATION BY AGE GROUP, GENDER AND YEAR OF DEPARTURE
1981-1986
Year of Departure
0- 4
5- 9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75-79
80-84
85+
438 0
1135 0
2176 102
5501 121
7340 72
5408 208
2599 75
1622 '121
1413 59
923 21
958 21
925 14
659 20
442 0
184 0
88 0
76 0
20 0
o 35
21 129
141 202
371 450
331 482
232 394
78 218
39 93
40 100
21 61
15 41
34 73
33 14
o 41
o 20
o 0
o 0
o 0
60
55
110
398
722
525
180
53
39
97
59
95
42
41
o
o
o
o
34
93
189
413
990
477
395
142
160
103
56
20
o
38
o
o
21
o
47 20
108 60
122 160
585 467
791 485
693 357
236 225
239 94
166 210
118 55
21 79
60 19
95 0
o 40
40 20
53 0
14 0
o 0
40
191
213
519
584
379
172
172
122
53
137
89
20
40
42
o
o
o
20 20
95 54
119 285
480 517
566 685
415 484
247 233
136 130
47 21
93 110
85 92
58 154
154 121
o 42
o 41
o 0
o 0
o 20
101
132
194
533
621
656
304
209
209
72
112
147
100
119
21
21
20
o
61
197
339
647
1011
588
236
194
141
119
240
162
60
81
o
14
21
o
Tot. 31808
Male 834
Female 1356
2353
2476
3131
3388
2291
2773
1985
2515
3009
3571
4111
Source: statistical Bureau 1987.
Guyana's five urban centers - Georgetown, Linden, New
Amsterdam, Rose Hall, and Corriverton - are located in three
of the country's ten regions. Georgetown is the only urban
center in Region 4 (DemerarajMahaica), and Linden the only
POTARO - SIPARUNI
EAST BERBICE - CORENTYNE
CUYUlII - NAZARUNI
1. BARIHA - \VAINI
2. POHEROON - SUPENAMI
I
3. ESSj~QUIBO IDS. - \VEST DEHERARA
I
4. DEHbARA - ~IAHAICA
5. HAIIAICA - BERBICE
6.
7.
8.
9. UPPER TAKUTU - UPPER
ESSEQUIBO
10. UPPER DEHERARA - BERBICE
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Figure 4. Administrative Regions of Guyana.
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TABLE XLII
URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION DISTRIBUTION BY REGION 1986
Region Population Urban ~ Rural 1~
Reg. 1 Barima/Waini 18,516 18,516 100.0
Reg. 2 pomeroon/Supenaam 41,966 41,966 100.0
Reg. 3 Essequibo/W.Dem. 102,760 102,760 100.0
Reg. 4 Demerara/Mahaica 310,758 150,368 48.4 160,390 51.6
Reg. 5 Mahaica/Berbice 55,556 55,556 100.0
Reg. 6 E.Berbice/c'tyne 148,967 34,623 23.2 114,344 76.8
Reg. 7 cuyuni/Mazaruni 17,941 17,941 100.0
Reg. 8 Potaro/Siparuni 5,672 5,672 100.0
Reg. 9 Upp. Takutu/
Upp. Essequibo 15,338 15,338 100.0
Reg.l0 Upp. Dem/Berbice 38,598 29,036 75.2 9,562 24.8
Total 756,072 214,027 28.3 542,045 71.7
Source: Statistical Bureau 1987.
center in Region 10 (Upper Demerara/Berbice), whilst New
Amsterdam, Rose Hall, and corriverton are all urban centers
in Region 6 (East Berbice/Corentyne). Therefore, from the
data in Table XLII, one is able to deduce the populations of
Georgetown and Linden, and the combined population of New
Amsterdam, Rose Hall, and corriverton. Georgetown, with a
population of 150,368 in 1986, witnessed a decline of
17,471, or 10.4 percent of its population since the 1980
census, and a decline of 13,671, or 8.3 percent, over the
1970 census. A slight decline in population was also
noticed in the towns of East Berbice. During 1970 and 1986,
New Amsterdam, Rose Hall, and Corriverton registered a loss
of 592, or 1.7 percent of their combined population.
Conversely, Linden, whose population was fixed at 23,956 in
1970, saw its population increase by 5,080, or 21.2 percent,
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between 1970 and 1986. Georgetown, nevertheless, accounted
for just over 70 percent of the country's urban population
and 20 percent of the country's total population, and was
five times larger than Linden, the second most populated
urban center in the settlement hierarchy.
Whilst population figures for New Amsterdam are not
available, it is observable that the town is being
challenged by the two urban centers in Corentyne, Rose Hall,
and Corriverton. In particular, Corriverton has been buoyed
by trading activities with neighboring Surinam. The banning
of a range of consumer items in the 1970s provoked a
vigorous illicit trade with the former Dutch colony, and
this trade has continued up to the present time as the local
population has continued to respond to the endemic shortages
of goods in the country in the 1980s and 1990s. Rose Hall
too has benefitted from its proximity to surinam and has
managed to share some of the spoils of the trade. However,
the government's decision to revoke its list of banned
consumer items has relaxed the Surinam-Corriverton/Rose Hall
trading nexus, since goods can now freely enter through
Georgetown.
Of the regions in 1986, slightly more than 60 percent
of the population were resident in Region 4
(Demerara/Mahaica) and Region 6 (East Berbice/Corentyne).
By contrast Regions 1 (Pomeroon/supenaam), 7
(cuyuni/Mazaruni), 8 (Potaro/Siparuni), and 9 (Upper
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Takutu/Upper Essequibo) together accounted for less than 8
percent of the total population. The regions with defined
coastal boundaries - Regions 2 (Pomeroon/supenaam), 3
(Mahaica/Berbice), and 6 (E. Berbice/Corentyne) - were home
to almost 90 percent of the country's population. There was
very little intra-regional migration; just over 84 percent
of the population still resided in their regions of birth
(Table XLIII). The regions in the interior, 8 and 9, had
the highest percentages of non-movers (95 percent), whilst
the lowest percentages were found in Region 2 (73 percent)
and Region 5 (75 percent).
TABLE XLIII
POPULATION BORN IN GUYANA BY REGION OF BIRTH: NON-MOVERS
1986
Region Born in still Living in J!,.
..2.
Reg. 1 Barima/Waini 21,022 16,434 78.2
Reg. 2 Pomeroon/Supenaam 53,354 38,898 72.9
Reg. 3 Essequibo/W.Dem. 112,938 87,672 77.6
Reg. 4 Demerara/Mahaica 282,068 252,843 89.6
Reg. 5 Mahaica/Berbice 60,447 45,601 75.4
Reg. 6 E.Berbice/C'tyne 159,099 138,364 87.0
Reg. 7 cuyuni/Mazaruni 10,973 9,482 86.4
Reg. 8 Potaro/siparuni 5,061 4,794 94.7
Reg. 9 Upp. Takutu/
Upp. Essequibo 14,691 14,032 95.5
Reg.10 Upp. Dem/Berbice 30,215 23,226 76.9
Total 749,868 631,346 84.2
Source: statistical Bureau 1986.
Though half the regions (4, 7, 8, 9, and 10) were net
recipients of populations, Region 4 was by far the most
attractive, with 46 percent of the country's intra-regional
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migrants resident there (Table XLIV). Much of this
attractiveness was undoubtedly due to the presence of
Georgetown in the region. Although only about 7 percent of
all lifetime migrants resided in Region 7, the migratory
process was nonetheless very significant in this region and
in Region 10. Lifetime migrants made up 46 percent of the
total population of Region 7 and 39 percent of Region 10.
In more recent times, Regions 7 and 8 might have been
attracting additional populations because of desperate times
in Georgetown. A number of the African male population were
migrating to the hinterland in search of productive
employment in the mineral belt of the country - the Bartica-
Potaro area. By contrast, in Regions 2, 6, and 9, less than
8 percent of the population were born elsewhere.
TABLE XLIV
POPULATION BORN IN GUYANA BY REGION OF RESIDENCE:
IN-MIGRANTS
1986
Region Population Born Elsewhere !
Reg. 1 Barima/Waini 18,392 1,958 10.6
Reg. 2 Pomeroon/Supenaam 41,922 3,024 7.2
Reg. 3 Essequibo/W.Dem. 102,306 14,634 14.2
Reg. 4 Demerara/Mahaica 307,028 54,185 17.4
Reg. 5 Mahaica/Berbice 55,482 9,881 17.8
Reg. 6 E.Berbice/C'tyne 148,210 9,846 6.6
Reg. 7 cuyuni/Mazaruni 17,695 8,213 45.8
Reg. 8 Potaro/Siparuni 5,452 658 11. 6
Reg. 9 Upp. Takutu/
Upp. Essequibo 15,147 1,115 7.3
Reg.10 Upp. Dem/Berbice 38,234 15,008 38.9
Total 749,868 118,522 15.8
Source: statistical Bureau 1987.
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since 1980, the Indian population has continued to
decline. Between 1980 and 1986, the Indian population fell
by 14,253, or 3.7 percent, the largest absolute and
percentage decline of any racial group in Guyana. Much of
the decline can be attributed to the high rate of Indian
emigration. Since 1970, when the PNC consolidated its hold
on power in Guyana, Indians have comprised the bulk of the
emigration stream, whereas in the past Africans were the
overwhelming majority of emigrants.
Indians, however, were still the largest racial group
in the country in 1986, accounting for slightly under half
of the population. Africans, the second-largest group,
comprised 30 percent of the population. Between 1980 and
1986, their numbers had fallen slightly by 1,486, or .6
percent. By contrast, Amerindians had increased by 752, or
1.9 percent, and the Mixed group by 22,704, or by 21.3
percent. The increase in the Mixed population since the
1980 census appears to be inordinately high, and this figure
may well be the result of more people reporting themselves
or being reported as mixed.
A look at the racial distribution of the population by
region in 1986 revealed that the majority of the Indian
population, some 98 percent, resided in Regions 2, 3, 4, 5,
and 6, with 33 percent in Region 4 and close to 30 percent
in Region 6 (Table XLV). The African population revealed an
even less-balanced spatial distribution than the Indian
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group; almost 60 percent resided in Region 4, which together
with Regions 3, 5, 6, and 10 accounted for nearly 95 percent
of the group. The Amerindian population was heavily
concentrated in the interior and riverain areas,
particularly in Regions 1, 2, 6, 8, and 9. Because of their
high concentrations in remote areas of the country,
Amerindians constituted majorities in Region 9 (83 percent),
Region 8 (71 percent), and Region 1 (53 percent).
TABLE XLV
RACIAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION BY REGION 1986
Region Indian African Mixed Am.Indn Other Total
Reg. 1 Barima/
Waini 473 1,238 7,024 9,768 13 18,516
Reg. 2 Pomeroon/
Supenaam 21,153 6,546 8,932 5,200 135 41,966
Reg. 3 Essequibo/
W.Dem. 77,963 15,544 8,720 195 338 102,760
Reg. 4 Demerara/
Mahaica 123,803 133,058 49,868 1,308 2,721 310,758
Reg. 5 Mahaica/
Berbice 39,349 13,666 2,413 72 56 55,556
Reg. 6 E.Berbice/
c'tyne 106,105 28,949 10,755 2,966 192 148,967
Reg. 7 cuyuni/
Mazaruni 4,770 4,188 6,253 2,704 26 17,941
Reg. 8 Potaro/
Siparuni 78 619 946 4,029 5,672
Reg. 9 Upp. Takutu/
Upp. Ess. 189 598 1,756 12,739 56 15,338
Reg.10 Upp. Dem/
Berbice 1,624 25,438 9,800 1,638 98 38,598
Total 375,507 229,844 106,467 40,619 3,635 756,072
Source: statistical Bureau 1987.
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INFRASTRUCTURE AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
Three national development plans (1966-1972, 1972-
1976, and 1978-1981) have been formulated during the period
under review. This section examines each of the three plans
and elaborates on their goals, objectives, and
accomplishments as they relate to the provision of
infrastructure in urban and rural areas. Since there were
no national development plans after 1981, infrastructural
provision beyond this point is assessed through bUdgetary
sectoral allocations and regional allocations of
expenditure. To provide a greater understanding of urban-
rural differentials, this section also attempts to compare
access to services between the urban and rural sectors.
Economic difficulties have constrained urban development.
Thus, the 1982 Georgetown Planning Area Development Plan
stands out in the context of little if any urban planning
efforts. An assessment of the plan is made, and the
problems confronting the capital city are outlined.
Guyana's first development plan after independence was
prepared by a team of foreign experts from Britain, Canada,
and the United States. Headed by Sir Arthur Lewis, the team
prepared a seven-year development program for the 1966-1972
period, which proposed 25 major goals/objectives (Appendix
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The development program envisaged a total expenditure
of $294.25 million over the seven-year period (Table XLVI).
The proposed capital expenditure of the plan was
considerably more than those of the previous development
plans. As Table XLVI reveals, heavy emphasis was placed on
the development of the country's physical and social
infrastructure. A large proportion of the plan's
expenditure outlay was concentrated on transportation
(especially roads), sea defenses, drainage and irrigation,
electric power, telecommunications, housing, health,
sanitation, and water supply. It was believed that
attention on developing Guyana's infrastructure would entice
substantial inflows of foreign investment, on which
successful implementation of the plan depended. This
investment would in turn stimulate GOP, reduce unemployment,
and raise the real income and welfare of the population.
The pattern of expenditure of the 1966-1972
development plan was much different from those prepared in
the Jagan era. In the 1966-1972 plan, only 24.9 percent of
the development expenditure was allocated to agriculture
(including sea defenses, drainage and irrigation, and
fishing), compared with 46.7 percent in the 1960-1964
24Government of Guyana. 1966. Development Programme 1966-
1972. Georgetown: Government Printery; Barker, A. 1968.
Development Planning and Plan Implementation in Guyana.
Georgetown, pp. 12-14.
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TABLE XLVI
ALLOCATION OF DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE
1966-1972 DEVELOPMENT PLAN
(G$ MILLIONS)
Expenditure ~
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
Agriculture
Drainage and irrigation
Sea defenses
Fishing
Land development
Forestry
Industry and Trade
Electric power
Transportation
Roads
Railways
Airports
Berbice Channel
Telecommunications
Resettlement schemes
Education and training
Housing, urban, and rural
community development
Health, sanitation, water supply
Public safety and national def.
Public buildings, printery,
vehicles
Resource surveys
Miscellaneous
Total
73.11
(40.11)
(14.00)
( 0.60)
( 3.18)
6.28
16.90
15.00
65.08
(37.80)
( 1. 95)
( 5.10)
( 8.20)
9.22
4.00
12.24
5.34
19.48
17.76
13.24
4.30
12.30
294.25
24.9
2.1
5.7
5.1
22.1
3.1
1.4
4.2
8.6
6.6
6.0
4.5
1.5
4.2
100.0
Source: Development Programme 1966-1972.
development plan; industry and trade increased from 3
percent to 5.7 percent; housing from 3.6 percent to 8
percent; and transportation and communications from 11.2
percent to 25.2 percent. Whilst the plan did not give a
clear breakdown of expenditures between the urban and rural
sectors, the movement away from agriculture represented a
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fundamental shift from the rural Indian farmer to the urban
African wage earner.~
Although the 1966-1972 plan encouraged the notion of
self-reliance, the dependence on international funding
rendered this objective a virtual impossibility. Foreign
investment, however, proved to be elusive, and considerable
difficulty was encountered in achieving anything close to
the required levels of financing. Besides the lack of
funding, the plan faced a number of additional difficulties.
The objectives were not clearly stated. There was no
overall integration of the various sectors and projects.
Each project was a separate entity, having little or no
relationship to other projects that were being implemented.
Problems were encountered in recruiting personnel with the
requisite skills and in retaining them. And, above all, the
targets that were set by the planners were far too ambitious
and could not conceivably be met within the allotted time
frames. Consequently, in 1970, the government abandoned its
first plan of the post-independence era.
When the achievements of the government in
infrastructural development during the 1966-1970 plan period
are reviewed, very few successes are readily apparent.
25s tanding, G. 1979. Socialism and Basic Needs in Guyana.
In G. standing and R. Szal, Poverty and Basic Needs: Evidence
from Guyana and the Philippines. Geneva: ILO, World
Development Programme, p. 26; Greene, J. 1976. "The Politics
of Economic Planning in Guyana." social and Economic studies
23 (2), p. 198.
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However, it was evident that improvements were being
directed to districts from where the government drew its
largest support. During the plan period, 196 miles of road
were either constructed or completely rehabilitated and
another 63 miles improved. However, the only completely new
road constructed during the period was the highway
connecting Georgetown to the bauxite-mining town of Linden.
A comprehensive potable water supply program was developed
and designed to mobilize capital investments through a
phased program with priority areas defined. Similarly, the
first phase of the project covered the population from
Buxton to Soesdyke, another area of party support. 26
Political patronage was particularly evident in the
government's housing program. virtually all of the housing
schemes which were initiated were located in Linden,
Georgetown, and New Amsterdam.
In 1970, 92 percent of Georgetown's and New Amsterdam's
populations were served by a house-connected water supply,
compared with 32 percent of the rural population. 27 In the
following year, a National Food and Nutrition Survey found
that one in eight rural households did not even have piped
26Hoyte, D. 1973. The Great Advance in Infrastructure
Development Under the P.N.C. Government. Address by Desmond
Hoyte Minister of Works and Communications at the 16th Annual
Delegates Congress of the PNC, May 2-10, 1973. Georgetown, p.
12.
27UNDP. 1972. Background Paper. country Programming 1972-
1976. Geor.getown: Cooperative Republic of Guyana, p. 77.
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water within 100 yards of their dwellings. 28 All households
in the urban centers were supplied by piped water within the
100-yard boundary. The availability of running water
enabled 90 percent of urban households to have access to a
flush toilet (shared with another household in 30 percent of
the cases). The lack of running water in the rural areas
meant that almost 90 percent of rural households resorted to
pit latrines (shared by 22 percent of all householders).29
Similarly, over 95 percent of urban households had a
bathroom/shower, while only 85 percent of rural households
possessed this basic facility.
In 1971, the population per physician was 4,695; per
dentist, 25,000; per nurse and midwife, 917; and per nursing
auxiliary, 18,868.~ In addition, the low
personnel/population ratio was inequitably distributed, with
concentration in the urban areas. 31
Urban populations were also better educated than their
rural counterparts. According to the 1970 census, the rural
population was found to be lagging on all educational
scales. In Georgetown, 23 percent of males leaving school
were in possession of high school diplomas of some kind. In
DpAHO. 1976. The National Food and Nutrition survey of
Guyana. Washington, D.C., p. 73.
29rbid.
30UNDP 1972, Ope cit., p. 79.
31rbid.
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New Amsterdam the rate was 18 percent, while in the rural
areas it was 5 percent. In the realm of higher education,
the University of Guyana was firmly established in 1969 on a
140-acre campus at Turkeyen, on the outskirts of Georgetown.
Included in the 1966-1972 national development plan
were several town planning schemes, which further
highlighted the government's proclivity to reward certain
sections of the population. The politics of planning
resulted in a Regional Planning Scheme for the development
of Linden; an Improvement Scheme for the Georgetown suburb
of Lodge, for the provision of better drainage and roads;
and an Improvement Scheme for La Penitence, for the orderly
development of the area and rehabilitation of its buildings.
The 1966-1972 development plan was abandoned on
February 23, 1970, when Guyana became the first Cooperative
Republic in the world. In this new philosophic arrangement,
it was envisioned that cooperatives would become the third
sector of the economy (in addition to pUblic and private
enterprise), and the main vehicle for achieving an
egalitarian society based on social and economic justice.
The cooperative would allow the "small man" meaningful
identification with all aspects of control and decision
making in Guyana. It would be the vehicle for social and
economic change which would redress the country's
underdevelopment, curb rural-urban migration, diversify the
economy, and promote a more equitable distribution of the
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country's population.
In line with the above stated goals, the government
began to formulate a new, more comprehensive national
development plan. Initially the government attempted to
prepare a 10-year plan for the 1971-1980 period, which would
be undertaken primarily by Guyanese planners. However, the
project was scaled down, and a draft of a five-year plan for
1972-1976 was released in 1973.
The 1972-1976 Development Plan's expressed development
objectives were the creation of employment opportunities for
all Guyanese, the attainment of an equitable distribution of
income, the achievement of an equitable geographical
distribution of economic activities, and the establishment
of a foundation for the attainment of self-sustained
economic growth. 32 However, the short-term strategy of the
plan was to "feed, clothe, and house the Nation by 1976.,,33
In attempting to achieve the above-stated objectives,
the 1972-1976 plan acknowledged agriculture's pivotal role
in the development strategy. The attention to agriculture
initially appeared to be in stark contrast to the urban bias
of the previous plan. However, the allocation of
development expenditure tells another story. In the 1966-
1972 plan, 24.9 percent of the total planned expsnditure was
nGovernment of Guyana. 1973. Draft Second Development
Plan 1972-1976. Georgetown: Ministry of Economic Development,
p. 81.
33Ibid., p. 72.
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devoted to agriculture; but in the 1972-1976 plan,
agriculture's share fell to 16.7 percent (Table XLVII).
TABLE XLVII
ALLOCATION OF DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE
1972-1976 DEVELOPMENT PLAN
(G$ MILLIONS)
Sector Expenditure l
1. Agriculture 192.0 16.7
FiShing (27.0)
2. Forestry 64.5 5.6
3. Mining and quarrying 62.0 5.4
4. Manufacturing 187.0 16.2
Power (82.0)
5. Engineering and constrn. 10.0 0.9
6. Distribution 37.0 3.2
7. Transport and communication 207.9 18.1
8. Housing 250.0 21.7
9. Buildings and equipment 136.0 11.8
10. Other investment 5.0 0.4
Total 1,151. 4 100.0
Source: Draft Development Plan 1972-1976.
The program to feed the nation would be accomplished
by replacing imports through the expansion of local
production. By expanding domestic production, the
government hoped that the immediate direct benefits would
include incorporation of idle arable and pasture lands,
reduction of the dependence of the agricultural sector on
rice and sugar, establishment of agro-based industries, and
creation of additional employment opportunities. The
planners, however, realized that they would have to remove a
number of constraints in order to successfully implement the
program. Accordingly, the plan suggested that the
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inadequate drainage and irrigation facilities be improved
through installation of additional pumps, digging of canals,
and construction of kokers,~ sluices, and darns. And it
suggested that the poor transportation network be augmented
by the construction of roads and by improvement of air and
water transport to facilitate the movement of inputs and
outputs.
To clothe the nation, the government proposed the
establishment of a textile mill in Georgetown to produce
cloth. Initially it was expected that yarns would have to
be imported, but in time this importation would increasingly
be replaced by local cotton production. In addition, the
plan called for the creation of a leather factory to convert
hides into the subsequent manufacture of shoes, hats,
handbags, and other types of leather goods.
To house the nation, the guvernment earmarked 21.7
percent, or the lion's share, of total development
expenditure of the 1972-1976. plan period (Table XLVII). It
was estimated that there was a shortfall of 30,000 housing
units in the country in 1970. 35 To rectify the shortage,
and to be able to adequately house the growing population,
the plan called for the construction of 65,000 housing units
by 1976, of which 31,000 units would be built by the pUblic
and cooperative sectors and 34,000 units by the private
34Flood-gates.
nUNDP 1972, Ope cit., p. 88.
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sector. 36 To assist the housing program, the plan urged the
production of building materials which would utilize
domestic raw materials whenever possible. These building
materials included the production of steel rods, cement,
stone, clay blocks, lumber, nails, pipes, tiles, bolts,
screws, windows, sinks, cables, paints, and so on.
centering its attention on Georgetown and New
Amsterdam, the plan outlined the investment activities which
would be undertaken during the 1972-1976 period. These
included:
In Georgetown -
1. establishment of factories in and around
Georgetown, for example, automobile components,
building materials manufacture, and extension of
present manufacturing activities;
2. reconstruction of the road approaches to
Georgetown and the main arterial roads within
greater Georgetown;
3. improvement of the drainage system to cope with
the expansion of the city;
4. improvement and expansion of water supply, sewage,
and other waste-disposal systems;
5. completion of the construction of new sea defence
works;
6. continued redevelopment of the business and
commercial center of the city;
7. redevelopment of the Georgetown hospital;
8. completion of the cultural center;
9. upgrading of Ogle Airport;
10. continuation of the program of house construction;
11. continued development of the University of Guyana
complex.
In New Amsterdam -
1. rehabilitation and improvement of the fish storage
facilities;
2. establishment of light manufacturing factories for
36Draft Second Development Plan 1972-1976, p. 314.
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the assembl~ of refrigerators and electrical
appliances. 7 _
By 1976, it was evident that the government's
expectation to feed, clothe, and house the nation had not
been met. The failure to achieve the stated objectives of
the plan "in any satisfactory way" was noted by Prime
Minister Burnham in his message to the P.N.C. on December
14, 1976. 38 The program to build 65,000 units by 1976 was
an abject failure. Even those who were sympathetic to the
government could only claim that during the period, houses
were being built at an annual rate of 3,000 by all sectors
of the economy - a figure that was well below the target of
13,000 per annum. 39 Some trade unionists have even
suggested that only 6,000 housing units were built during
the entire period.~ Failure to achieve the target was
attributed by the government to bottlenecks such as lack of
building materials and skilled manpower. 41 What little
housing was provided accrued to areas of party support.
Built houses meant that many of the lower-income groups in
the urban centers and villages along the coast continued to
live in shelters with the minimum requirements, while the
TIlbid., pp. 137-138.
38Burnham, F. 1976. Address to the PNC. Georgetown, p. 26.
39Dick, C. 1984. Housing the Nation Over two Decades.
Unpublished, p.27.
~Jeffrey and Baber 1986, Ope cit., p. 139.
41Standing 1979, Ope cit., p. 52.
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government completely ignored the problems of housing in the
hinterland and interior regions.
Despite the failure of the housing program, a number
of infrastructural works were undertaken, which gave the
countryside some of the services and amenities which were
already available in the urban areas and Georgetown in
particular. In the area of education, the historical
dependence for high school education on Georgetown was
lessened by the building of six multilateral schools (these
schools were expected to provide a five-year diversified
course covering academic, technical, agricultural, and
commercial education) at Mahaica, Bladen Hall, Anna Regina,
Ruimveldt, Linden, and New Amsterdam. Two higher-education
institutions, Kuru-Kuru Cooperative College and the Guyana
School of Agriculture, were also opened outside of
Georgetown.
Ironically, the planned provision of more schools in
the rural areas was used as an excuse by the government to
phase out its railway operations. In 1970, the government
closed 49 miles of track from Mahaica to Rosignol, and in
1972 the last 12 miles of the East Coast Railway between
Georgetown and Mahaica were scrapped. The smaller West
Coast Railway from Vreed-en-hoop·to Parika ceased operation
in 1974. 42 The East Coast Railway had been used by large
GGovernment of Guyana. 1980. 50 Years of Service.
Transport and Harbours Department, p. 23.
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numbers of school children from the rural areas to attend
school in the capital, and it was felt that abandonment of
this railway would have increased congestion on the main
coastal road. The surfacing of the main road on the
Atlantic coast, from Charity on the Pomeroon River to
Crabwood Creek on the Corentyne River, also provided the
railway with stiff competition and precipitated its demise.
The completion of the Coastal Highway was met with lukewarm
support by those in Corentyne. Corentyne residents were
upset to find a series of tollgates dotted along their
section of the highway. For many, these were perceived as
just another in a long series of government measures which
were unfairly aimed at the Indian farmer; this segment of
the population was adversely and disproportionately
affected, since other more-travelled sections of the highway
in predominantly African-populated areas, including the
soesdyke/Linden Highway, were devoid of tollgates.
The situation with regard to electrical power was
somewhat mixed. A rural electrification program began with
the extension of services on East Coast and East Bank
Demerara from Mahaica Creek to Timheri and on West Coast and
West Bank Demerara from De Kinderen to Plantation Vriesland.
At the end of 1976, the Guyana Electricity Corporation (GEC)
was engaged in improving and extending services on the
Essequibo Coast and Islands, West Coast Berbice and the
Corentyne coast, and Bartica. Many isolated areas and some
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intermediate settlements, however, remained outside the
program and without supply.
The Guyana Water Authority (GUYWA) was established on
October 1, 1972, to control and regulate the collection,
production, storage, transmission, distribution, and use of
water. 43 In addition, GUYWA was expected to ensure that
standards in the rural areas would be comparable to those in
the urban centers. According to the 1972-1976 plan,
services were expected to cover Georgetown, New Amsterdam,
Linden, East Bank and East Coast Demerara, West Coast and
East Bank Berbice, the corentyne Coast, and selected areas
in the lnterior. M The new authority was extremely slow in
acting on its mandate, and by 1976, other than the urban
centers of Georgetown, New Amsterdam, and Linden, only East
Bank and East Coast Demerara were approaching completion of
a potable water supply system.
Having failed to achieve many of the objectives of the
1972-1976 plan, the government decided that the plan should
be "rolled over" into 1977. In the 1978 bUdget, the
government set forth its final plan of the post-independence
era. The plan outlined a four-year development program for
1978-1981, with a continued emphasis on project development.
Implementation of the plan would be carried out by a newly
~Act No.3 of 1972.
MDraft Second Development Plan 1972-1976, op. cit., p.
365.
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formed state Planning commission. A look at the program's
planned allocation of development expenditure indicated that
the government had markedly increased its investment in
agriculture whilst at times lowering those of education,
health, housing, and roads (Table XLVIII). The plan was
primarily concerned with the tripartite productive sectors
of sugar, bauxite, and rice, whose continued development it
was argued, would achieve the goals and objectives of the
previous plan and bring about a socialist society.
TABLE XLVIII
ALLOCATION OF DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE
1978-1981 DEVELOPMENT PLAN
sector
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Agriculture
Forestry and fishing
Mining and quarrying
Manufacturing
Power
Education and social development
Health and housing, roads
Sea defense
General administrative & other services
Total
33.5
7.8
12.9
3.9
6.5
3.9
6.8
1.9
19.9
97.1
Total Investment $G 1,282,000
Source: Adapted from Potter 1987, p. 237.
Between 1978 and 1981, capital expenditures increased
rapidly, from 117.3 million dollars to 423 million dollars.
In keeping with the 1978-1981 Development Plan, the largest
component of government capital expenditure was on
agriculture, although the sector's share was a little lower
428
than had been planned (Table XLIX). The focus on
agriculture suggested that there was a spatial shift in
government policy from urban to rural areas. This belief
was further strengthened by the fact that outlay on roads
and infrastructure, contrary to the recommendations of the
1978-1981 Development Plan, was the second-largest component
of government capital expenditure, with much of the
allocation monies being centered on previously neglected
areas such as East Coast Berbice and Upper Essequibo.
Whilst sectoral spending appears to have favored rural
areas, the 1979 bUdget presented quite a different story.
This was the first bUdget in which capital expenditure was
allocated on a regional basis (Figure 5), and it provided
clear evidence that Georgetown, Linden, and the urban areas
in general were the prime beneficiaries of the pUblic purse
(Table L). Almost 58 percent of capital spending was
devoted to Region 3 (Central Demerara and West Berbice) and
its two urban centers of Georgetown and Linden. The skewed
distribution of capital expenditure was particularly
disastrous for Regions 1, 5, and 6. The concentration of
expenditure on the coast meant that these three regions,
which represented the interior areas of the country,
received only 6~1 percent of the total capital expenditure.
According to Potter, capital spending on a per-capita
basis in 1979 was even more instructive, for it revealed
that the hinterland regions were quite well positioned, and
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TABLE XLIX
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CAPITAL EXPENDITURE BY SECTORS 1978-1981
(G$ MILLIONS)
Sector 1978 1979 1980 1981 1978-81 1978-81
%
88.3 120.3
11.0 24.5
0.1 2.7
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
Agriculture
Forestry
Fishing
Mining and
quarrying
Power
ManUfacturing
Roads and other
infrastructure
Transportation
and commns.
Housing
Water and
sewerage
Education and
culture
Health
Defense and
security
Administration
Tourist devt.
Financial
transfers
31.6
o.
0.0
0.1
2.1
16.0
22.8
7.6
1.9
0.0
11.4
1.5
12.1
7.3
0.0
2.8
45.0
16.2
5.5
0.7
5.7
22.8
27.1
13.2
3.2
1.3
18.9
1.3
18.8
7.3
0.0
26.5
2.5
10.2
48.7
37.0
7.9
3.2
4.0
28.6
6.8
31.4
12.3
1.0
4.8
0.4
23.4
23.1
44.8
36.5
7.1
6.9
27.5
10.9
33.0
16.3
1.5
44.1
285.2
41.8
8.3
3.7
41.4
110.6
131. 7
65.2
15.4
12.2
86.4
20.5
95.3
43.2
2.5
78.2
27.4
4.0
0.8
0.4
4.0
10.6
12.6
6.3
1.5
1.2
8.3
2.0
9.1
4.1
0.2
7.5
Total 117.3 203.5 297.8 423.0 1041.6 100.0
Source: Estimates 1981.
"it was in fact the 'peripheral' coastal areas (Regions 2
and 4), the heartland of the Indo-Guyanese population, which
were not receiving their fair share. ,,45
Between 1982 and 1990, Guyana's economic diffic~lties
~Potter, L. 1987. Guyana: Cooperative Socialism, Planning
and Reality. In D. Forbes and N. Thrift (eds.). The Socialist
Third World. Urban Development and Territorial Planning. New
YorK: Basil Blackwell, p. 238.
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TABLE L
REGIONAL ALLOCATION OF CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 1979
(PERCENTAGE)
Reg. 1
Reg. 2
Reg. 3
Reg. 4
Reg. 5
Reg. 6
Region
North-West
Essequibo & West Oem.
East Oem. & West Berbice
East Berbice
Mazaruni/Potaro
Rupununi
% of Allocation
2.1
13.0
24.3
9.6
3.0
1.0
Georgetown
Linden
New Amsterdam
Total
28.0
4.8
13.5
100.0
Source: Adapted from Potter, 1987, p. 238.
resulted in nearly 40 percent of central government capital
expenditure being tied up in financial transfers (Table LI).
The growth in financial transfer allocations meant that most
sectors of the economy witnessed some reductions in their
budget allocations. Agriculture was the second-largest
recipient of government spending, but its share was now only
19.5 percent. Roads and other infrastructure was the third
most important sector, with 12.2 percent of capital
expenditure, but it was the only other sector which received
more than 10 percent of central government spending. With
so much of the capital expenditure budget tied to financial
transfers, the urban and rural areas in some ways were
equally neglected. The international constraints on the
domestic economy seriously impeded the government's ability
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to finance development planning in the country, and its
attempts to reduce spatial inequalities.
TABLE LI
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CAPITAL EXPENDITURE BY SECTORS 1982-1990
Sector
1. Agriculture
2. Forestry
3. Fishing
4. Mining and quarrying
5. Power
6. Manufacturing
7. Roads and other infra.
8. Trans. and commns.
9. Housing
10. Water and sewage
11. Education and culture
12. Health
13. Defense and security
14. Administration
15. Tourist development
16. Financial transfers
Total
1982-1990
(G$ Mn)
1,698.1
41.4
155.6
262.5
55.8
40.1
1,063.6
383.2
31.9
148.1
507.9
154.0
306.1
402.3
1.7
3,435.4
8,687.7
1982-1990
(%)
19.5
0.5
1.8
3.0
0.6
0.5
12.2
4.4
0.4
1.7
5.8
1.8
3.5
4.6
0.0
39.5
99.8 1
Source: Estimates 1982-1990.
1. Rounding accounts for deviations from 100 percent.
In 1980 a new regional administrative system was
enacted. The country was divided into ten administrative
regions, and the five urban areas of Georgetown, Linden, New
Amsterdam, and Rose Hall were granted separate powers to
manage their own affairs. Municipal subventions were
provided by the central government, but the figures for
these have not been made available to the pUblic. For the
1982-1990, period however, regional allocations of capital
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expenditure continued to favor the coastal regions, and in
particular Regions 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 (Table LII). Regions 2
and 3, predominantly populated by Indians, were the two most
important recipients of government capital expenditure.
This apparent reversal of, policy must, however, be placed in
perspective, since the Tapakuma Irrigation Project in Region
2, and the Demerara Forestry Development Project in Region
3, accounted for the bulk of the expenditures in these two
regions. By contrast, the heartland of the Indian
population, Region 6, was among the lowest recipients of
government spending on a per-capita basis.
TABLE LII
REGIONAL ALLOCATION OF CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 1982-1990
Region 1982-1990 1982-1990
(G$ Mn) (%)
Reg. 1 Barima/Waini 14.44 3.3
Reg. 2 Pomeroon/Supernaam 65.41 15.1
Reg. 3 Essequibo/W. Dem. 165.52 38.2
Reg. 4 Demerara/Mahaica 44.03 10.1
Reg. 5 Mahaica/Berbice 45.81 10.6
Reg. 6 E. Berbice/C'tyne 42.66 9.8
Reg. 7 Cuyuni/Mazaruni 17.21 4.0
Reg. 8 Potaro/Siparuni 7.09 1.6
Reg. 9 Upp. Takutu/Upp. E'bo. 10.45 2.4
Reg. 10 Upp. Dem./Berbice 21.23 4.9
Total 433.85 100.0
Source: Estimates 1982-1990.
For most of the 1966-1981 period, the Central Housing
and Planning Authority (CHPA), the authority in charge of
urban planning, was relatively inactive as a result of the
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government's concentration on national/regional planning as
a means of improving the living conditions of the population
through economic growth. During this time the CHPA was
primarily functioning as a support organization in national
economic development programs - for example, by providing
expertise in land settlement schemes, housing, and
industrial location. In late 1980, however, the CHPA was
asked to prepare a new physical plan for the Georgetown
area. Up to this time, guidelines for the development of
Georgetown -- with regard to its commercial, industrial, and
residential areas -- were under the auspices of the 1950
Greater Georgetown Plan. And whils~the 1950 plan was a
commendable one, by 1980 it no longer reflected the
realities of conditions in the capital. In 1970, the
demands for additional housing in areas such as North
Ruimveldt, South Ruimveldt Park, and Festival City (planned
and built for Carifesta in 1972), and also for such
i
unanticipated uses as the University of Guyana, had to be
met by encroachment on the greenbelt zone of that plan.
I
Increas~ngly the greenbelt became the home of a number of
I
governmdnt buildings, which were erected without the benefit
of an integrated comprehensive plan. The 1950 plan's
allocation for housing, commercial, and industrial uses had
become virtually obsolete, and all three sectors were facing
shortages of developable land in Georgetown. The horizontal
unplanned spread of the capital city was beginning to pose
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serious environmental concerns. Development had reached a
stage where productive agricultural land was being
threatened. Furthermore, the increase in population
combined with haphazard development resulted in enormous
pressures on the city's infrastructural facilities such as
electricity and water supply, transportation, sewage,
health, education, and so on.
Cognizant of the above deficiencies, the CHPA in 1980
began to formulate a new Georgetown Plan with the following
objectives in mind:
1. To identify problems, constraints, and prospects
for future physical development and for proper
land-use planning of the area.
2. To formulate a long-term physical development
strategy and an integrated broad development plan
to the year 2000, thereby providing a basis for
promoting, guiding, and controlling physical
development within the Georgetown Planning Area in
the immediate and short term.
3. To indicate a specific action programme for the
next five years to remedy the critical Rroblems
facing the Planning Area at the moment. 6
In 1982, a new plan for Georgetown was introduced.
However, little confidence was placed in the document.
Those who were responsible for the plan at the outset
alluded to the difficulties encountered in its formulation.
Firstly, there was a lack of cooperation from other
governmental agencies. Over 30 governmental agencies were
consulted by the CHPA, and many failed to provide data and
46CHPA. 1982. Georgetown Planning Area Development Plan -
Vol. 1, Summary Report, p. 2.
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other material inputs. Secondly, there was a general lack
of data. Data on population, labor force, employment, and
so on had to be estimated, since the government refused to
divulge information from the 1980 census. In addition, no
detailed information was available on land and property
values, public utilities, and services. Thirdly, the
planning authorities suffered from a shortage of personnel,
even though the CHPA was assisted by staff from the United
Nations. Fourthly, more time was needed to render a more
satisfactory document. u
The plan outlined a list of 14 goals and objectives
which were to be achieved in the Georgetown Planning Area
(GPA) by the year 2000 or earlier (Appendix B). As of this
date, none of the plan's goals and objectives have been met.
This is partly a result of the plan's shaky informational
and statistical foundations, but the major reason has
undoubtedly been the poor performance of the economy. with
the economy in tatters, urban planning and physical planning
in general have become an afterthought. Verbally committed
to socialism, the government nevertheless, has pursued
planning pOlicies and practices within an essentially
capitalist social formation and under the dominance of the
capitalist mode of production. Therefore, it is not
surprising that efforts to ameliorate local and regional
differentials is sUbjugated to, and controlled by, the
UIbid., p. 13.
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forces of capitalist accumulation.
Georgetown does not contain enough directly productive
activities to maintain its physical and social
infrastructure, it must rely on appropriations from the
state, which in turn is dependent on the functioning of the
national economy. The poor performance of sugar, bauxite,
and rice in recent years, however, has led to a reduction of
surplus concentration in the urban areas.
In December 1990, Georgetown's Mayor, Compton Young,
acknowledged that there had been a breakdown in services
between 1970 and 1990, and that the Georgetown city Council
had been unable to attract enough staff and money to better
maintain the city.48 Lack of maintenance is evidenced in
the rapid deterioration of the city roads. Massive potholes
are a common occurrence on most of the major thoroughfares
including Norton, Lamaha, and Middleton streets. According
to the independent Stabroek News:
The pot holes in some areas have graduated into
craters. Certain roads are more pock-marked than
the surface of the moon. A city ride is all
swerve, shudder, and jar.o
The supply of potable water in the past was only an
occasional problem in Georgetown. Now, in many areas of the
city -Wortmanville, Newtown, Campbellville, South Ruimveldt,
Lodge, Werk-en-Rust, Charlestown, Kitty, Bel Air, Prashad
48Stabroek News, December 4, 1990.
°Stabroek News, December 6, 1990.
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Nagar, Lamaha Gardens, and Lillendaal - water pressure is so
low that householders are deprived of water for extended
periods of time. Yard taps produce no water at all during
the day, and residents have to wait until odd hours to
collect a few buckets for next day's use. Water piped into
the house is no longer available for most residents. The
city's chief engineer estimated that the city was losing
about 50 percent of its water supply through leaks in the
distribution system. 50 Oftentimes when the water does flow,
it is so discolored that using it for drinking or cooking
purposes is unthinkable.
ln comparison to a number of cities in the developing
world, housing, or the IQCk thereof, is not a major problem
in Georgetown. However, in recent years the quality of the
housing stock has begun to decline, and very little new
housing has been constructed since the completion of Roxanne
Burnham Gardens. The government has abdicated its role of
providing housing. The last two housing schemes to be
constructed in Georgetown were the Shirley Field-Ridley
Scheme on the Kitty Avenue and the ill-fated North East La
Penitence Scheme in 1983. The North East La Penitence
Scheme was expected to provide more than 120 houses for
employees of the Health Ministry, the city Council, the
Guyana National Newspapers Ltd., and a co-op group known as
Excelsior; but by 1987, fewer than one-third of the houses
~Stabroek News, October 28, 1990.
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had been completed, and tenants were without electricity,
water, and sewage. 51 The financially strapped government
simply did not have the resources to provide materials for
infrastructural development.
with the government no longer sponsoring housing
schemes in Georgetown, it has increasingly looked to the
private sector to take up the slack. contractors and
businessmen, however, are wary of entering the housing
market. Many recall the rental freezes in the early 1970s
and early 1980s. They are also apprehensive about supply
bottlenecks, and as a result the only private development in
the works is a housing scheme on the East Coast Demerara
Road, some 10 miles outside Georgetown.
The lack of new housing has led to the growth of
informal housing in the city; and while the problem is
relatively small, it is another indication of the city's
ailing health. In 1982, the Georgetown Planning Area study
noted four main "squatting areas" in the capital, housing
some 100 squatters.~ The largest of them, Yarrow Dam,
north of Alexander village, was mainly comprised of small
huts built of zinc and salvaged materials. The huts were
dilapidated, but the authorities made some effort to
regularize the development by providing it with services
such as water and electricity. Another squatting area was
51stabroek News, May 15, 1987.
52Georgetown Planning Area study - Vol. 1, p. 89.
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located along the Cummings Canal in cummingsburg and
Albertown. The houses here were originally sheds
constructed for gardeners and have been converted into
regular dwellings. Smaller squatter settlements were also
identified in the eastern part of Botanic Gardens along the
Lamaha Canal, and in East and West Ruimveldt Front Road
Reserve.
More recently a new squatter settlement has mushroomed
at Sophia, in the northeast section of the city. situated
adjacent to Prashad Nagar, an upper-class residential area,
the development has encountered opposition from the
government, which in the past has displayed a degree of
tolerance of informal housing. By December 1990, roughly
150 families had taken up residence in the area and had
built a similar number of dwellings. 53 With more building
developments in the offing, the CHPA energetically
sanctioned the removal of squatters in Sophia. The scrutiny
levelled at the Sophia squatters spilled over to older
squatter settlements. The CHPA announced that squatters
along the Lamaha Canal posed a severe danger of polluting
the canal, the major source of the city's water supply, and
that "expeditious and effective action" was necessary to
remove them.~ And in February 1991, the city demolished a
number of squatter shacks along the Lillendaal Railway
nStabroek News, December 6, 1990.
~Stabroek News, January 24, 1991.
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Embankment. As of March 1991, building activity at Sophia
remained unchecked, and no additional squatter settlements
had been destroyed, despite President Desmond Hoyte's
assertion that squatters in suburban Georgetown had to
move."
In addition to the problem of informal housing,
roughly 18 percent of all houses in the Georgetown area were
deemed to be substandard in 1982. 56 In some of the poorer
areas such as Albouystown, Bourda, Lacytown , Tiger Bay and
Lodge, roughly 50 percent of the residential buildings were
officially categorized as dilapidated slums. 57 High
concent~ation~ of buildings in poor structural condition
were also noted in Lacytown, Lodge, West La Penitence, and
Alexander Village. D
The areas of poor housing in Georgetown's urban
landscape stand in stark contrast to the high-income
residential areas in the central northern wards and the
eastern wards of the suburbs. Class contradictions
reflected by intra-urban inequality have been evident since
the colonial era, but the polarization evidenced today
appears to be far more striking. The upper classes protect
"stabroek News, February 3, 1991.
56Georgetown Planning Area study - Vol. 1, p. 184.
nlbid., pp. 86-87.
58CHPA. 1982. Georgetown Planning Area Development Plan -
Vol. 2, p. 304.
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themselves from the masses, and are isolated from them,
through the creation of semi-fortified buildings replete
with bars, grills, security fences, surveillance equipment,
watchdogs, and security personnel. with a premium on large
open spaces, this type of residential living has recently
begun to appear in the south of Georgetown, in areas such as
Peter's Hall and Providence. Meanwhile, the less fortunate
must make do with the squalor and congestion of the slums
and squatter settlements.
An offshoot of the stagnant economy and the attendant
implementation of the government's corrective measures have
resulted in the rise of petty-commodity production in the
capital city. Inequality between the upper class and the
masses in Georgetown is as acute in terms of employment
opportunities and income as it is in terms of housing. In
1982, approximately 16 percent of the total number of
households in Georgetown were engaged in petty-commodity
production, of which 53 percent had stable, and 47 percent
had unstable, employment in the sector. 59 The majority of
petty-commodity producers are vendors, who account for 30
percent of total households in the informal sector. Other
notable informal occupations are tailors/seamstresses (14
percent), carpenters (7 percent), mechanics (5 percent), and
salespersons (4 percent). Together, these occupations
account for 60 percent of all households engaged in informal
DGeorgetown Planning Area study - Vol. 1, p.36.
443
activities. Although no up-to-date figures are available on
the current size of the informal sector in Georgetown, it
appears safe to conclude that its employment share has grown
since 1982, as persons in various skill categories continue
to move into petty-commodity production as a means of self-
employment.
The problems so prevalent in Georgetown are also
evident in the urban centers of New Amsterdam, Linden, Rose
Hall, and corriverton. For example, no planning scheme is
in effect in New Amsterdam, and none is expected in the near
future. Infrastructural facilities have deteriorated to the
point where only the three major thoroughfares - the Strand,
Main Street, and Republic Road - are paved and in tolerable
condition. The road leading up to the New Amsterdam
Stelling was recently paved, but within days a pothole had
re-emerged. The Town council has been using waste from the
.upriver bauxite mining operations to repair the side
streets. When there is no rainfall, dust from the side
streets is strewn everywhere, and certain parts of the town
with its red dusting takes on the appearance of the mining
town of Linden. When the rains fall, the in-fill quickly
washes away, exposing the town's all-too-familiar potholes.
The in-fill also affects the free flow of the interlot
drains, which are already fairly clogged by refuse due to
the town's irregular collection of garbage. Electricity and
water supplies are unstable. Power surges and fluctuations
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in the supply of current reduce the longevity of most
electrical equipment. Residents are forced to bUy surge
protectors and other devices to protect their investments,
but even these measures are often in vain. When water is
available, the pressure is usually so low that only outlets
at ground level are supplied. Some townspeople venture as
far afield as the GUysuco sugar estate at Canje to fill up
their plastic barrels - sent to them by relatives abroad -
with water. The once-majestic and ornate General Hospital
has fallen into disrepair. Gaping holes are found in the
hospital's roof, where zinc sheets have blown away and have
not been replaced; and much of the structure, like the town,
appears to be in imminent danger of collapse.
Land Use
Since independence, the central government has been
playing an increasingly prominent role in attempting to
transform the pattern of land use in Guyana. The following
subsection of this chapter elaborates on the most recent
attempts at creating land settlement schemes, and the role
of regional planning in effecting new settlement patterns.
Following independence in 1966, the government
continued to maintain a number of land settlements on the
coast, including, Cane Grove, Verdenoegen, Government
Estates, Onverwagt, Anna Regina/Tapakuma, Charity, Amazon,
and Black Bush Polder. However, in 1968, the government
almost accidentally began to direct its attention to
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interior development and settlement, following the
withdrawal of the African Manganese Company (an American
concern) from the small interior mining town of Matthews
Ridge. The town's 6,000 residents were wholly dependent on
the company for their livelihood; and with closure of the
mine, the government stepped in to assume the task of saving
the town. Matthews Ridge was to be transformed into an
agricultural settlement. Former mine workers were employed
to clear land for themselves as well as new settlers, but
progress was slow, and by 1971 little farming had taken
place.
The expansion of land settlement in the interior
nevertheless gained momentum with the initiation of the
Soesdyke/Linden Land Settlement Scheme alongside the
recently completed 44-mile Soesdyke/Linden highway. Seven
sites were identified as settlement centers in 1971 - Kuru-
Kururu, Yarowkabra, Low Wood, Long Creek, Dora, Clemwood,
and Moblissa. w Settlers were to be provided with 2,935
ten-acre agricultural lots and 3,517 one-acre residential
lotS. 61 Initial reaction to the scheme was positive; and by
March 1971, the authorities had received approximately 6,500
applications for leases from prospective migrants from
Guyana and overseas. Since a large number of the overseas
WDowner, A. 1982. settlement on the White Sands. In M.
Thomas (ed). The Caribbean Peoples and their Environment.
London: CHEC, p. 194.
61Ibid.
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group were of African origin from the West Indies, the
granting of leases of highway lands was met with a certain
degree of trepidation by other ethnic groups in the country.
These groups felt that the central government was attempting
to restore an African majority in order to consolidate its
hold on power. In its defense, the government countered
that it was merely attempting to develop and populate the
interior for security considerations so as to stave off the
territorial claims of neighboring countries.
As far back as 1969, Prime Minister Burnham had
stated:
Increasingly we are turning our attention to the
development of our interior. Our existence upon
the coastland is the result of a pattern imposed
upon us by colonialism. Our entry into the
interior is an expression of our freedom. Already
at Matthews Ridge and Kaituma we have laid the
foundation for a development which in time will
spread to include the whole of the North West.
Our motto now and in years to come must be:
Forward! Go West, Go South, Go to the Land!
We cannot allow our rich hinterland to remain
almost uninhabited and uncultivated. The sight of
these rich lands lying unexploited tends to excite
the avarice of some covetous souls and to encourage
vaulting ambitions of others. We must possess
these lands. To this end government is formulating
plans for the orderly development of the interior. 2
Guyana's Development Plan for 1972-1976 identified for
the first time that regional planning would be employed as a
strategy to achieve a more even geographical distribution of
development, in order to reduce the pressure on social
62Burnham, F. 1970. A Destiny to Mould. London: Longman,
pp. 150-151.
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facilities in the urban areas. 63 The plan contended that
the concentration of social amenities on the coast had made
it difficult to fulfill the desired mobility of labor from
the urbanized shelter of the coastlands to the potentially
more rewarding hinterland. M Furthermore, until that time,
government efforts to develop and populate the areas away
from the coast had been haphazard. Development was
concentrated in a few selected areas. As of 1973, of the
four large-scale land settlement schemes undertaken in the
post-independence period, two (SoesdykejLinden and Look Out)
were contiguous to the coastal belt (Table LIII).
The 1972-1976 plan proposed that greater occupancy of
the country's land would be accomplished by two distinct
methods. The first method envisioned a gradual movement
from the thickly populated coastlands to contiguous areas
much like the intermediate savannahs along the
SoesdykejLinden Highway, as well as along the roads to
Orealla, Rockstone, and Makouria. New settlements in these
areas were expected to be within reach of existing ones to
permit use of their infrastructural facilities such as
water, sewerage, electricity, schools, health concerns, and
so on. The second method involved a more direct movement to
the interior, and required a production and transportation
policy by which the needs of settlers would be met. In
63Draft Second Development Plan 1972-1976, p. 127.
MIbid., p. 4.
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TABLE LIII
LAND SETTLEMENT SCHEMES - 1973
Location
Wauna
Soesdyke/Linden
Matthews Ridge/
Kaituma
Look Out
Acreage
32,000
64,000
10,000
300
Agro-activity
Peanuts
citrus
oil palm
Dairy farming
citrus
Pineapple
Poultry
Cattle ranching
Stock rearing
citrus
Ground provision
Corn
Fruit
Vegetables
Livestock
Source: Guyana A Decade of Progress 1974, p. 47.
cases where interior settlements would be pursued away from
mining and forestry complexes, development was expected to
concentrate on activities which would lower transportation
and other infrastructural costs. The emphasis in these
areas was on self-sufficiency and the production of high-
value crops which would better bear the high cost of
transport.
For implementation of the settlement program, the
country was divided into 20 regions, with regional
boundaries demarcated by soil capability. The
classification of regions by soil emphasized the priority
accorded to agriculture as one of the most important
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production bases of the economy. However, before the new
regional system could be implemented, the government
concluded that administration of 20 regions would be too
unwieldy and that a more streamlined system was necessary to
meet current circumstances. As a result, a new regional
system was unveiled in 1973.
The regional system of administration that was
introduced in 1973 divided the country into six regions,
namely, North West, Essequibo and West Demerara, East
Demerara and West Coast Berbice, East Berbice,
Mazaruni/Potaro, and Rupununi, with six regional ministers
as functional heads for their respective regions (see Figure
5). Besides providing an administrative function, the
regional system was expected to be an important institution
for social reconstruction and national development. Its
primary objective was:
To facilitate and accelerate the process of
development, and create self-reliant, confident and
productive communities who understand the nature of
national development and accept individual and
collective responsibility for this task.~
A few years after its implementation, it was evident
that the new regional administrative framework was unable to
attain any of its lofty objectives. The incursion of the
regional system on existing local governments and
organizational framework for physical and economic planning
created confusion and friction among the different layers of
MGuyana Handbook 1976, p.45.
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government. It was ne~er very clear whether civil servants
were in charge or were beholden to political appointees.
Lines of communication were further muddled by the
government's effort to unite political and governmental
authority in the regions; each regional minister also
functioned as chairman of the rUling party's (PNC) regional
organization. At the same time, power to finance and
implement projects remained firmly in Georgetown. Regional
development boards were merely advisory. Even the simplest
project had to receive the assent of the Regional
Development Ministry in the capital. This led to horrendous
delays and subverted any attempts at decentralization.
Interior regions were especially neglected, for they failed
to garner an equitable allocation of government funds,
although on a per-capita basis the disbursements were not
quite so inequitable (see Table L).
In introducing the new 1980 regional administrative
system, the government uncharacteristically acknowledged
that the 1973 regional framework was a failure. The 1973
regional framework, according to the government, had failed
to alter the country's pattern of land use, to speed up its
development, and to raise the standard of living of the
population. In addition, the revised regional system was
formulated in 1980 to accompany the promulgation of a new
constitution, whose main purpose was to democratize the
country's institutions in order to enable greater citizen
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participation in the management and development of their
communities. 66
Article 72 of the 1980 constitution divided the
country into 10 regions (see Figure 4). Each region was
further subdivided into subregions, districts, communities,
neighborhoods, and people's cooperative units. Regional
boundaries were demarcated according to population, physical
size, geographical characteristics, economic resources, and
planned infrastructure for the area.~ The resulting
boundaries of the 10 regions were found to be natural
boundaries, following rivers or watersheds, with each region
having an adequate resource base to be economically
viable. 68
Although omitted from the 1980 regional system, the
five urban areas of Georgetown, New Amsterdam, Linden, Rose
Hall, and Corriverton were expected to cooperate within the
regional framework whenever developments occurred which
extended across their respective boundaries. Each local
authority was accorded the power to do "anything" considered
essential to the development of its area and the welfare of
66Hoyte, rJ.1980. Speech by Comrade Desmond Hoyte Minister
of Economic Development and cooperatives During Debate on the
"Local Democratic Organs Bill" in the National Assembly on
August 18, 1980. Georgetown: Ministry of Information, p. 3.
67Ibid., p. 8.
68Ibid.
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its people. 69 The real emphasis was on devolution and
decentralization of activities by the central government.
By granting greater power to local areas and their people,
the government hoped to reduce the deep economic malaise
that had gripped the country. The alienation of the work
force which appeared to be so prevalent would be lessened if
workers in the regions were allowed to produce for their
immediate benefit rather than for some far-flung entity. In
turn, prosperity in the regions not only would sustain local
populations, but would also lure workers away from the
capital city.
Commitment to interior development was also boosted by
the creation of the Guyana National Service in December
1973. ostensibly a paramilitary organization, the Guyana
National Service was charged with a number of objectives,
including one to settle the country's youth (i.e., persons
up to 25 years of age) in the hinterland so that the natural
resources of the country could be fully exploited for its
development. 7o Initially three hinterland centers were
established at Kimbia, Berbice River; Papaya, North West
Region; and Tumatumari, Potaro River. Large-scale
cultivation of cotton and pineapples was attempted at
Kimbia, and blackeye peas and pineapples at Tumatumari, but
the results were far from encouraging. All three centers
~ b'dI 1 ., p. 10.
wGuyana National Service State Paper, 1973.
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were expected to alter unfavorable perceptions of the
interior and to imbue Guyanese youths with the wherewithal
and skills to break out of the "cramped" coastland.
However, whilst exposure to the interior might have fostered
a greater awareness of the hinterland, very few Guyanese
were ready to make permanent moves away from the coast.
Despite its stated intention to settle the hinterland,
the government continued to target a large proportion of its
resources to the coastal areas, and in particular, to areas
of party loyalty. In 1975, the government converted a 200-
acre sugar estate, Elizabeth Hall, into the country's first
cooperative village. Named Melanie Damishana, and located
15 miles east of Georgetown, the village was to be a self-
reliant community, housing government supporters from the
army, police force, and civil service. By 1980, the
government had poured 10 million dollars into the settlement
to provide residents with a three-story shopping complex, a
school, a day care center, a chicken farm, a garment
factory, piped water into all homes, a community hall and
pavilion, and other recreational and social facilities.
Members of the community were given time off from work by
the government, with pay, to enable completion of their
homes. 71 In addition, the estimated 500 householders were
allowed to repay their mortgages to the cooperative housing
71Payne, G. 1982. Analysis of a Settlement - The Guyanese
situation - Melanie Damishana. In M. Thomas (ed), Ope cit., p.
217.
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society according to their incomes rather than the values of
their properties. 72 For many, this seemed to characterize
Guyana's version of "Cooperative Socialism."
Political and social structure
The state has become increasingly powerful since
independence, and the political and bureaucratic elites have
become the most important classes in the society. This
subsection charts the PNC's control of the political
structure through rigged elections in 1968, 1973, 1980, and
1985; the politicization of the military and paramilitary
forces; the use of violent cults; the doctrine of the
paramountcy of the party; and the resort to violence in
order to stifle the opposition and dislodge opponents. The
subsection also highlights the dominance of race over class,
and it seeks to demonstrate how certain sections of the
society have benefitted from the ensuing political and
social changes, whilst others have not.
In 1966, Guyana became independent from Great Britain,
with the Burnham-led PNC-UF coalition still constituting the
government. The coalition, however, was a shaky one; and
soon ideological disagreements surfaced between Burnham and
the leader of the UF, Peter D'Aguiar. D'Aguiar, who held
the Minister of Finance portfolio in the coalition
government, became disillusioned by the government's misuse
72 b'dI 1 ., p. 214.
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of funds to placate PNC supporters in Georgetown. 73 After
discovering that over 20 million dollars of government funds
could not be accounted for, D'Aguiar broke away from the
coalition, prior to the 1968 elections.
with D'Aguiar out of the way Burnham could
independently chart Guyana's future. The departure of the
UF from the coalition resulted in a rise in pUblic
expenditure, and with it an expansion of the government
sector. The PNC was bent on consolidating its power, and
this meant that its policies were designed to accrue mainly
to middle-and lower-income Africans in the urban areas.
Africans, with help from the PNC, were being increasingly
employed in the civil service, the police force, and the
military. The PNC's strategy of peopling the machinery of·
the state with supporters of the party was a deliberate one,
to ensure victory at the polls and to hold on to the reins
of power.
The 1968 elections were a triumph for Burnham and the
PNC. After four years in power, the PNC was able to
establish political dominance by transforming the minority
of the pre-independence elections into a majority in the
1968 elections. According to the official results, the PNC
captured 30 of the 53 contested parliamentary seats, the PPP
won 19, and the UF 4. The sanctity of the elections was
73Spinner. T. 1984. A Political and Social History of
Guyana, 1945-1983. Boulder, Colorado: Westview, p. 121.
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widely disputed. The opposition and many independent
observers have documented widespread rigging of the
electoral lists. Along with padding the voters' list,
widening the provisions for proxy voting, and tampering with
the ballot boxes, a special feature of the rigging was the
use of overseas voting. Guyanese residents overseas were
allowed to participate in the elections, irrespective of the
time they had lived abroad. Altogether, over 70,000
overseas voters were added to the voter register by this
electoral device. The Opinion Research Centre, a reputable
English firm, estimated that, of the 44,295 overseas voters
registered in Great Britain, only 15 percent of the en~ries
on the register were valid.~ The director of the firm,
Humphrey Taylor, summing up his company's findings in an
interview, concluded:
Obviously I don't know what happened in Guyana,
but as far as Britain is concerned, the compilation
of the register was a totally dishonest, and corrupt
operation. And, as we have clearly established,
the great majority of the people listed, do not
exist. This I would think is unprecedented for a
Commonwealth country, as far as I know; and it's
you know, a pretty awful and disgraceful episode. 75
The scale of the fraud was substantiated in two
documentaries by Britain's Granada Television Company, which
also found similar abuses in the United states. within
~Latin American Bureau. 1984. Guyana: Fraudulent
Revolution. London: Latin American Bureau, p. 49.
75Tennassee, P. 1982. Guyana: A Nation in Ruins. The
Puerto Rican Model Failed. Toronto: Guyanese Research &
Representation Services, pp. 26-27.
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Guyana, names of infants, the deceased, and those who never
existed were to be found on the electoral rolls. On the
other hand, names of thousands of Indian voters were omitted
from the rolls. This stratagem produced some interesting
results in Guyana. Between the 1964 and 1968 elections, the
number of registered voters increased by a whopping 21
percent, whereas in the previous election period (1953-1964)
the increase was only 18 percent, despite a much longer lead
time. The distribution of the increases is particularly
revealing. In six Indian-dominated areas on the Corentyne,
the average increase was 10 percent, while in the PNC
strongholds of Linden, Mazaruni-Potaro, and Abary the
increases were 105 percent, 55 percent, and 49 percent,
respectively.~
The policy to people the machinery of the state with
supporters of the party had paid off handsomely. It was
quite an endeavor to perpetuate such a large-scale fraud,
and this obviously required the cooperation of the
bureaucracy. with power firmly in its grasp, the PNC
embarked on a program to lure top-level politicians from the
PPP and the UF into its fold, and to gain the support of
certain sections of the business and religious communities.
In these efforts, the party was quite successful. A number
of politicians were recruited from the opposition and were
given prominent positions in the government. certain
~Ibid., p. 25.
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members of the business community openly began to express
their allegiance to the PNC, and were rewarded with
government contracts and access to licenses and other
government privileges. Business leaders who refused
advances by the government were effectively squeezed. TI
Many found life unbearable and left the country.78 Powerful
figures in Indian cultural and religious organizations such
as the Maha Sabha, the United Sad'r Islamic Anjuman, and the
Gandhi Youth organization were co-opted, and as a result
transferred their organizations' support from the PPP to the
PNC.~ Hintzen adds:
Thus, clientelism served the interests of the
PNC regime by acting effectively to demobilize the
political opposition and to co-opt the leaders of
strategic mass-based organizations. with the
co-optation of these leaders, their organizations
were no longer available to be used for mounting
challenges to regime power. 80
On February 23, 1970, Guyana was declared a
TIDanns, G. n.d. liThe New Elites in a silent Revolution. II
Unpublished paper (University of Guyana), p.21. According to
Danns: To survive private sector elites are constrained to
bribe the state and pUblic sector elites and to payoff
political elites or else give big donations to the ruling
party. Unwillingness to give bribes, gifts and donations will
more than likely result in the loss of business in one way or
another.
78Ibid.
79Hintzen, P. 1989. The Costs of Regime survival: Racial
Mobilization, Elite Domination and Control of the state in
Guyana and Trinidad. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp.
70-71. Hintzen claims are supported by Danns (n.d. The New
Elites etc., p. 24).
80Ibid., p. 71.
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cooperative Republic. Cooperatives were perceived by the
government "as an alternative to Jagan's communism and
0' Aguiar's capitalism. ,,8\ And, since they existed not only
in the East but in the capitalist West, the government
surmised that its new direction was unlikely to provoke
international capital and members of the comprador bourgeois
class in the country. The government could also argue that
the cooperative ethic had a long historic tradition in
Guyana. Elements of cooperativism are an integral part of
Amerindian society. In the post-emancipation era, freed
slaves had established cooperative villages, and Indian
indentured laborers had made the transition to rice farming
through cooperative endeavors. 82 Burnham elucidated his
conception of cooperativism in the following way:
The cooperative is the means through which the
small man can become a real man, the means
through which the small man can participate
fully in the economic life of the nation, and
the means through which the small man can play
a predominant part in the workings of the
economy. 83
Burnham's concern for the "small man" \lIaS ostensibly
an effort to appease the left wing of the party by reaching
out to lumpen and lower-class Africans in the urban areas
who had not benefitted from the existing economic strategy.
81spinner 1984, Ope cit., p. 136.
nLutchman 1974, Ope cit., p. 244.
~In Hope, K. 1985. Guyana: Politics and Development in an
Emergent Socialist state. Oakville, ontario: Mosaic, pp. 83-
84.
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Thus, cooperatives were expected to provide this class of
workers with the impetus to tap the agricultural wealth of
the country.
Cooperative socialism reinforced the PNC's hold on the
state. Having long destroyed the old white rUling group,
the PNC sought to utilize the state in order to maintain
African control of Guyana. cooperative socialism in Guyana
was a triumph of politics, for it widened the country's
political elite grouping by increasing the role of the state
in the society. As the political and bureaucratic elites
thrived, ethnic cleavages were reinforced. The PNC used its
control to fill positions in the nationalized industries and
in the government mainly with its African supporters. One
observer in the 1980s noted:
.•. it would seem that Afro-Guyanese comprise more
than sixty percent of the total number of civil
servants and occupy more than eighty percent of
the senior positions. M
Racial divisions and the small number of people in the
country have prevented political mobilization on the basis
of unified class interests. For example, despite similar
socioeconomic interests, the African urban lower class and
the Indian rural lower class have never constituted a
political alliance in the post-independence era.
As mandated by the constitution, elections were held
in 1973. Once again the PNC was victorious, but this time
M 'tHope 1985, op. Cl ., p. 35.
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the party claimed ~7 of the 53 seats in parliament, or a
whopping 70 percent of, the votes cast. The independence
constitution of Guyana closely resembled the typical
Westminster-style Gommonwealth constitution. Constitutional
changes and provis:ions, in many cases could be altered only
by a two-thirds majority in parliament. The PNC spent the
months preceding tt~e elections informing the public that it
was assured of a two-thirds majority. Prior to polling day,
the government annqunc,ed substantial pay increases to civil-
service employees qnd ,those in the military and paramilitary
groups. Confident of victory, the government permitted a
radio broadcast of the elections and even allowed an
impartial count of the. votes in areas of Georgetown which
were considered PN~: territory. The initial results,
- however, were far ~rom what the party had expected. A low
turnout at the polJ,s in Georgetown had resulted in limited
support for the pa~ty.. Embarrassed by the turn of events,
the government pU1J.ed ,the election broadcast off the air;
and the army, whic~ had become increasingly politicized, was
ordered to seize a~l ballot boxes. The ballot boxes were
taken to army headquarters, where they were kept for 24
-.
hours, and where it is, widely believed they were tampered
with to produce th~ desired results. 85
In an effort to shore up its dwindling support among
urban Africans, th~ PN.C immediately took steps to ensure its
"sunday Graph:ic, July 22, 1973.
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survival. In line with this strategy, Burnham in December
1974, at a Special congress of the PNC at sophia in
Georgetown, announced the doctrine of the paramountcy of the
party. Commonly known as the Declaration of sophia, the
doctrine proposed that henceforth all institutions of the
state, including the government, would be considered arms of
the PNC and beholden to its dictates. According to Burnham:
•• the emphasis should be on mobilising the nation
in every sphere and not merely for periodic
elections and in support of specific actions and
programmes. It was also decided that the party
should assume unapologetically its paramountcy
over the government which is merely one of its
executive arms.
The comrades demanded that the country be given
practical and theoretical leadership at all levels-
political, economic, social and cultural - by the
PNC which had become the major national institution. 86
The Declaration was followed by a period of
nationalization of various industries, which met with .strong
approval by the African bureaucratic middle class who were
reaping the benefits of higher salaries, more jobs, and a
greater role in running the country. Aided by favorable
international prices for the country's major commodities,
the PNC was in a position to deliver the spoils to its
supporters in the early 1970s. State expansion continued
unabated.
The militarization of the society which followed the
Paramountcy Doctrine provided an entree for lower-class
Africans to obtain employment in the newly created National
MBurnham 1974, Ope cit., p. 11.
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service, the People's Militia, and the growing military and
police forces. African youths from the urban areas were
despatched into the interior to work on land settlement
schemes; but because they had little knowledge of farming
practices, most of the schemes quickly fell into disuse. By
1976, it was estimated that 1 in 35 of the population were
members of the military or paramilitary forces; and of this
number, 90 percent were Africans. S? For the non-African
community, these were fearful times. In addition to the
level of militarization in the society, a number of violent
cults, including the People's Temple and the House of
Israel, were permitted to operate in Guyana in return for .
their allegiance to the PNC. Indians were particularly
perturbed by the activities of the House of Israel, whose
African-American leader David Hill (alias "Rabbi
Washington"), was a fugitive from the FBI. Hill, who
claimed Christianity to be a white religion and practiced a
form of IAfrican-Judaism, preached of an impending Guyana
I
apocalyPtse in which Indians would be destroyed. Unlike the
I
i
peoPle'si Temple, the House of Israel drew its support from
African-!Guyanese, primarily those who were unemployed.
f
Burnham often used the group to disturb rallies and
demonstrations by his political opponents, to break strikes,
and to demonstrate in favor of the government.
The People's Temple operated much differently than the
nLatin American Bureau 1984, Ope cit., pp. 54-56.
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House of Israel. The cult on the whole stood apart from
Guyanese society. Most Guyanese simply did not know of its
existence. The government, however, found it useful for the
simple fact that its members were American citizens who had
agreed to settle an area which was in dispute with
Venezuela. The government held that in the event of an
invasion by Venezuela, the united states would move to
support its citizens and in turn this would benefit Guyana.
Elections were due to be held in 1978, but the PNC
introduced a referendum bill in April 1978, to legitimize
the paramountcy doctrine, which was contrary to the
provisions of the constitution. The party argued that the
intent of the bill was to end the provision in the
constitution which allowed changes of the constitution only
through a referendum, and to transfer the responsibility to
a two-thirds majority in Parliament. However, the PNC
already had a two-thirds majority in Parliament and could
enact wide-ranging legislation; and since the bill did not
state any specific amendments of the constitution, the
opposition concluded that the real intent of the referendum
was to extend the life of Parliament by side-stepping the
constitutionally mandated elections.
To stifle some of the criticism of the necessity of
the referendum bill, the PNC later suggested that if it were
to win the referendum it would turn Parliament into a
constituent assembly in order to completely revamp the
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existing constitution. The move failed to suppress
widespread opposition to the bill from the established
churches and civil and professional groups. Lawyers opposed
to the bill claimed:
1. It strikes at the root of democracy and is an
infraction of the existing constitution not
to hold elections now under that constitution.
It would be unconstitutional.
2. The holding of the Referendum in the dying
hours of the life of the present Parliament
is a cloak to conceal the real intent which
is the postponement of elections.
3. Even if a majority or a bare majority
approved of the Bill, this does not entitle
the existing government's two-thirds majority
to proceed to amend the constitution after
its life will have expired. It will be
morally and legally wrong to do so.
4. If since 1974 the Government or the Governing
Party had embarked on drawing up a new
constitution in respect of which guide lines
approved by their General Council on 27th
May, 1978 were first pUblished on 31st May,
1978, it will conceivably take the country
(only now invited to submit drafts) a long
time to work out an agreeable constitution.
5. Such elections will determine whether the
Governing party still enjoys a two-thirds
majority support of the electorate. The duty
properly belongs to the newly elected
. Parliamentarians to draw up a new
constitution.~
Just about every major group or organization called
for a boycott of the referendum. Even the African middle
class, who had traditionally supported the party, were
opposed to the proposed changes. The ensuing boycott,
~supplementary memorandum by the 108 (of 135) lawyers
opposed to the Constitution (Amendment Bill, 1978) - In answer
to certain points canvassed in support of the aforesaid Bill
and in defence of the attack made on lawyers. Pamphlet. June,
1978.
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according to the government, was an abject failure. It was
announced that 71.45 percent of the electorate had turned
out and 97.7 percent had voted in favor of the bill. Most
opposition groups which had independently monitored the
elections reported the actual turnout at 14 percent, whilst
the PPP estimate was as low as 12 percent. 89
In the wake of the referendum, the government (as
expected) decided to extend the life of Parliament for 27
months, on the basis that Parliament needed enough time to
complete the proposed constitutional changes. The new
constitution was finally promulgated in 1980. Acknowledging
its faltering support among urban Africans, the PNC took
steps to ensure its supremacy over the society without
dependence on a popular base. As the country's first
executive president,' Burnham was given virtual imperial
powers by combining the powers of the president and the
prime minister. w Besides orchestrating the election
process, the constitution made it almost impossible to
remove the executive president from office without his
consent; even in the event of criminal charges or
misconduct, the president was virtually immune:
.. the holder of the office of President shall not
be personally answerable to any court for the
performance of the functions of his office or for
any act done in the performance of those functions
and no proceedings, whether criminal or civil,
~Mirror, October 14, 1979.
90The Guardian (England), June 16, 1980.
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shall be instituted against him in his personal
capacity in respect thereof either during his term
or thereafter. 91
In addition to the dictatorial powers accorded
Burnham, the 53 elected members of the National Assembly
were augmented by 12 additional members, 10 of whom were
from the newly created regions.
Elections were held in December 1980, and once again
the PNC awarded itself a resounding victory. An observer
team led by Lord Avebury of Britain could only conclude:
We came to Guyana aware of the. serious doubts
expressed about the conduct of previous elections
there, but determined to judge these elections on
their own merit and hoping that we should be able
to say that the result was fair.
We deeply regret that, on the contrary, we were
obliged to conclude, on the basis of abundant and
clear evidence, that the election was rigged
massively and flagrantly. Fortunately, however,
the scale of the fraud made it impossible to
conceal either from the Guyanese pUblic or the
outside world. Far from legitimizing President
Burnham's assumption of his office, the events
we witnessed confirm all the fears of Guyanese
and foreign observers about the state of
democracy in that country.~
The months preceding the elections were marked by
strikes and demonstrations. Popular discontentment was at
an all-time high. Indian sugar workers and African bauxite
workers, the two major groups of the industrial working
class, were simultaneously opposing the government for the
91Constitution of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana,
1980, Article 182 (2), pp. 93-94.
92The Report of the International Team of Observers at the
Elections in Guyana. 1980. Something to Remember. In Latin
American Bureau 1984, op. cit., p. 83.
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first time. The fact that the government had lost the
support of the bauxite industry was validation of its
unpopularity.
In addition to strikes by the country's labor unions,
the government for the first time in many years was
challenged by a multiracial party, the Working People's
Alliance (WPA). Formally constituted as a political party
in 1979, the WPA was a Marxist-oriented organization led by
a group of intellectuals from the University of Guyana and
other progressive professionals. The party's multiracial
character and its independent Marxism quickly drew broad
support from the Guyanese masses (as was evidenced by the
party's well attended rallies), who were dissatisfied with
the perceived racial orientations of the established
parties.
Although professing a collective leadership, Dr.
Walter Rodney, a world-renowned scholar and a powerful and
eloquent orator, was the de facto leader of the WPA.
Rodney's wit and activist background energized the WPA. In
rapid fashion, the party's rallies attracted thousands of
Guyanese from all points of the ideological spectrum. Fed
up with the economic and political deterioration of the
country, many saw Rodney as the only person capable of
effectively challenging Burnham. By June 1980, the PNC was
on the run. The ground swell of opposition was so strong
that the general feeling in the country was that the PNC's
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days in office were numbered. There were widespread
demonstrations in all of the major populated areas. Its
hold on power threatened, the PNC responded with a campaign
of violence, which resulted in the assassination of Rodney
on Friday, June 13, 1980. The loss of Rodney was a severe
blow to the WPA, and the party has continued to lose ground
since this tragic event.
Having declared itself the victor in the 1980
elections, the PNC and Burnham continued to intimidate its
opponents. Buttressed by military and paramilitary groups,
with the press under its control and Parliament little more
than a rubber stamp, the PNC managed to weather the unrest
unleashed by the Guyanese masses. In August 1985, however,
the death of Burnham whilst undergoing what was thought to
be a routine throat operation, presented the country with
fresh possibilities. Burnham's successor, Desmond Hoyte,
initiated a number of steps to reduce the politics of
confrontation, and there was some belief that the
forthcoming elections in December 1985 would be the first
free and fair elections in the independent nation's history.
The result of the 1985 elections was a grim reminder
that little had changed with the passing of the torch from
Burnham to Hoyte. Many had forgotten that Hoyte had been in
the government since 1968, and had served in just about
every cabinet position. Speaking about the PPP at the
Annual Congress of the PNC in 1973, Hoyte had openly boasted
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that "they have been removed from office by the Guyanese
people - never to return! ,,93 Being part and parcel of the
dictatorial PNC regime, Hoyte had no intentions of
relinquishing power. The 1985 elections were said to be the
most flagrantly rigged elections in the country's history.~
criticism of the elections was widespread. The turnout in
the urban areas, the party's traditional stronghold, was
low, and this poor turn out led to a three-day delay in the
counting of the votes. When the results were announced, the
PNC had miraculously secured 42 seats, the PPP eight, the UF
two, and the WPA one.
After the elections, Hoyte became more conciliatory to
the opposition. There was some talk of power sharing. The
economy has become more open and Hoyte has sought to repair
relations with the united states. The mass media, which was
once muzzled, has been augmented by the introduction of an
independent newspaper. Political and daily life is now less
claustrophobic, and the element of'fear which was so
pervasive has been somewhat dispelled. However, the party
refuses to let the masses control the destiny of the
country. Elections should have been held in 1990, but as of
June 1992, no firm date has been set. It seems that the
~Hoyte, D. 1973. The Great Advance in Infrastructure
Development Under the PNC Government. Address by Desmond
Hoyte, Minister of Works and communications, at the 16th
Annual Delegates Congress of the PNC, p. 15.
~Catholic Standard, December 15, 1985.
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newer liberal policy of the government does not extend to
the political system.
SUMMARY
Guyana attained independence and full dominion status
on May 26, 1966. During the pre-independence era, the
distinctive form of colonial organization was a centralized
politico-economic system of plantation exploitation, with
economic structures and institutions fashioned towards
metropolitan countries. with the advent of independence, it
was felt that the old imperial influences and economic
orientation would be rearranged. Independence would ensure
freedom and the capacity of the national socioeconomic
system to operate with wider internal goals. To date, this
has not been borne out. The achievement of independence
from Great Britain has resulted in minimal change in the
country's linkages. Guyana's economy continues to be tied
to the global economic. order in virtually the same manner as
it was in the early twentieth century. The country remains
an exporter of raw materials and an importer of manufactured
and finished goods.
The quixotic attempt at "cooperative socialism" in the
1970s was an unmitigated disaster. As the economy nose-
dived, the government extended a wizened hand for assistance
from the IMF-World Bank Group. The stabilization programs
imposed by the Group were antithetical to the adoption of
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socialist policies, and it is questionable just how serious
the government was in its desire to establish "cooperative
socialism" in Guyana. The country was unlikely to achieve
socialism if it was to be built on the privatization of the
public sector and deregulation of the economy to market
forces, which the IMF-World Bank Group advocated. In
effect, the IMF-World Bank Group measures have reinforced
the country's linkages to the core and dependence on its
traditional exports of sugar, bauxite, and rice - factors
which were part of the cause of instability in the first
place. Thus, in 1989, the three commodities still accounted
for 70 percent of the country's export earnings, whilst
Britain, the United states, and Canada comprised 60 percent
of the export market. 95 Furthermore, the Group's pOlicies
have paved the way for the return of transnational
enterprises which previously dominated Guyana's economy,
including those such as Bookers and Reynolds.
The struggling economy relegated urban planning, and
physical planning in general, to the background. with so
much of the capital expenditure bUdget tied to financial
transfers, the urban and rural areas were both to some
extent neglected. However, in the early years of the post-
independence period it was blatantly obvious that
development was being targeted to urban areas where the
"World Economic Data, 1991. Santa Barbara, California:
ABC-CLIO, pp. 82-83.
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government could claim its greatest support. The argument
that the government was neglectful of its rural population
was bolstered by an examination of urban/rural differentials
concerning the provision of infrastructure and access to
public services. And, while the urban/rural divide was not
created by the post-independence regime, the data presented
indicated that inadequate steps were taken to rectify the
inequities.
One hopeful measure in reducing spatial inequalities
was the introduction of a regional system of administration;
but after 19 years and several revisions, the regional
framework has yet to fulfill its potential promise.
Although it is embodied in the constitution, regional policy
has lacked direction. Decentralization and devolution have
proven to be elusive. Regional governments have become
merely centers of administration, maintaining and providing
services within their boundaries. There is no evidence that
locals are more involved in the planning process. Indeed,
in regions where plans exist, access to planning information
is often denied. Bottom-up planning in Guyana has become a
technocratic exercise, in which those who are most affected
by the plans are excluded from the process.
Regional self-reliance absolves the central government
of its responsibility to provide resources to certain
regions, whilst it allows others to be practically ignored.
Thus, since 1966, the uneven settlement structure and the
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country's land use have remained virtually unaltered.
certainly, there is no evidence that population flows into
the interior regions have increased. Even the much-
ballyhooed settlement schemes, which were thought to be
essential for "bursting into the interior", have all but
been abandoned.
Development, what little there is, takes place on an
ad hoc basis, in which just about anything goes. Georgetown
has not escaped the tough times. The capital's
infrastructure has almost collapsed. The "Garden City" of
the Caribbean has become a festering wound. signs of
neglect are pervasive. Refuse is dumped indiscriminately,
clogging the city's drains and polluting the once-beautiful
canals. Nevertheless, Georgetown remains at the apex of the
settlement hierarchy, and it is still the only significant
population center in the entire country.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
The preceding study has been concerned with the
process of urbanization and urban growth in Guyana during a
significant portion of the nation's history. In an effort
to facilitate understanding of the Guyanese space economy,
this study employed a theoretical framework based on the
international political economy of the dependency/world-
system perspective. This perspective, associated with the
works of Frank (1966, 1967, 1978a, 1978b, 1980), Emmanuel
(1972), Rodney (1972), Amin (1974), and Wallerstein (1974,
1976, 1977, 1979, 1980, 1984), among others, and linked to
urban development by Castells (1977), posits the view that
dependent urbanization arises as a result of capitalist
penetration and expansion.
There is no formal theoretical model of
dependency/world-system theory. However, the typical
dependency/world-system position sees the peripheral economy
being shaped through its linkage with the capitalist core
economies. This linkage formed through systemic financial,
technical, and cultural penetration has produced a number of
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specific characteristics in dependent nations. The
dependent ~conomy, according to the perspective, is marked
by an over~rching reliance on foreign trade with a limited
number of trading )partners, and a concentration on a small
number of ~roducts for export.
The narrow, c~utward-looking economic orientation of
the depend~nt economy in turn produces uneven development,
whereby th9se sectors of the economy which are directly
associated with international capital appear to be more
dynamic in their levels of economic activity. It also
results in the disarticulation of the economy, with few
linkages b~tween the various sectors; for example, goods
produced f9r export are not integrated with those catering
to the dom~stic economy. And, finally, there is a high
level of s~ctoral heterogeneity which results in differing
returns frQm labor I across the industrial structure, (Duvall,
eta al., 1~81:316-317; Sylvan, eta al., 1983).
AlthQugh dependency/world-system theory is chiefly
concerned with the economic structure of dependent
countries, distort~ons in the political and social structure
are also anticipated. Foreign capitalist penetration and
dependence is expected to give rise to coercive
authoritarian regimes which are considered necessary to
mediate clqsS conflicts and to. prevent the ascendancy of the
working clqss.
This brief outline is only an explication of those
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parts of the dependency/world-system perspective that I
believe to be most useful in understanding urbanization in
peripheral economies. It is intended to serve as a general
guideline to direct our attention to important matters in
the history of urbanization in Guyana.
The preceding study acknowledges the importance of the
international political economy in determining the nature
and consequences of urbanization in Guyana, and for the most
part it has used dependency/world-system theory to explain
events in the country's urban history.
In surveying the components shaping urbanization, the
study discerns outcomes which essentially confirms the
expectations of dependency/world-system theory. Following
its incorporation into the modern world system in the
sixteenth century, Guyana has reproduced many of the
patterns of development that are expected of a dependent
peripheral economy. The dependency/ world-system theory
framework of analysis is especially strong in uncovering how
global linkages between Guyana and the core have resulted in
internal economic distortions. The study has noted the
existence of the following:
1. Trade partner concentration and a reliance on foreign
markets. Most of the country's trade is heavily dependent
on the United states, the United Kingdom, and the caricom
countries. Market concentration is highlighted by the fact
that the united Kingdom is the chief recipient of Guyana's
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sugar, the united states and Canada the chief recipients of
Guyana's bauxite, and the Caricom the chief recipient of
Guyana's rice. The country's imported goods also originate
overwhelmingly from the above four major trading partners.
2. Concentration of commodities exported: Three
commodities in the agricultural and extractive sectors
dominate the export market. In 1989, exports of sugar,
rice, and bauxite still accounted for 70 percent of total
export earnings.
3. Trade vulnerability: Guyana's dependent economy and its
incorporation into the world system has meant that the
narrow economy is subject to external events, particularly
conditions at the center. Unstable markets, price
fluctuations, unequal terms of trade, and metropolitan
economic policies dominate events in Guyana.
As a result of the above factors, Guyana, in line with
the expectations of dependency/world-systems theory,
exhibits a number of major structural distortions of its
economy. These include:
1. Uneven development across sectors: Sugar, rice, and
bauxite, despite the economic difficulties confronting these
industries, must still be considered the most "dynamic"
sectors of the economy.
2. Disarticulation: The intermediate links thought
necessary to invigorate the dynamism of the industrial
structure are still lacking. Linkages between the various
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sectors of the economy have not changed in spite of (or
perhaps because of) the adoption of capital-intensive
methods of production in the sugar and bauxite industries.
3. Heterogeneity of the return to productive factors across
sectors: with a limited number of dynamic sectors and a
dependent economy, the returns of labor across economic
sectors remain uneven.
In stressing the importance of global linkages, the
dependency/world-system perspective is particularly adept at
pinpointing geopolitical rivalries alnong competing core
nations and their impact on Guyanese urbanization throughout
the study's delineated eras of Guyanese history. Our
historical examination clearly demonstrates that
urbanization in Guyana was the product of colonial economic
and class structures. That is, settlement configuration in
Guyana since the European incursion was based upon
Holland's, France's, and particularly Great Britain's
geographical expansion, and upon the capitalist mode of
production on a world scale.
Guyana was organized for the export of primary
products, which resulted in the transfer of surplus value to
the metropolitan economies. spatial organization in Guyana
commenced with the needs of mercantile Holland. The Dutch
introduced the plantation system into Guyana, from which
they were able to extract an agricultural surplus. However,
they were not interested in urban development. Urban
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development under the Dutch was wholly absent; and since
each plantetion was directly linked to the core, there
existed little need for the integration of the space economy
at a national level.
The French were far more willing to build up the urban
hierarchy; but since they were not up to the task, it was
left to the British to fashion the country's urban centers.
It is important to note that British domination did
not bring significant changes to Guyana's internal
industrial structure or social relations. The plantation
remained the foremost medium for capital accumulation and
value transfer, and Guyana steadfastly continued to direct
its surplus to the core. However, in time, the
intensification of capitalist forces, organized around the
production and commercialization of sugar, led to the
formation of an immature urban network. The foundation and
growth of Georgetown is thus explicated by the processes of
penetration, capital accumulation, and value extraction and
transfer.
Spatial organization under British colonialism
revolved around the need to achieve an efficient and
reliable exploitation of primary products at minimal cost.
Hence, planning, infrastructure allocations, and related
investments were geographically centered on Georgetown - a
single location not only capable of port, commercial,
administrative, and political functions, but also capable of
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functioning as an economic link between the core economies
and the sources of primary production, the plantations.
Core power hegemony under the British, therefore, led
to the stimulation and growth of the port town of Georgetown
and the secondary port of New Amsterdam. Georgetown, the
capital, in particular was used not only to evacuate
expeditiously economic surplus, but also to provide a market
for the manufactured goods produced in industrial Britain.
The horizontal spread of the colonial port city as a result
was facilitated through the introduction of railways, roads,
trolley systems, and other infrastructures.
Thus far, the evidence tendered appears to be highly
supportive of the theory, and is congruent with the
theoretical predictions relating to the effects of world
capitalist penetration. Certainly, the strength of
dependency/world-system theory lies in its ability to show
how global linkages shape internal development in the
dependent state. Confirmation of a number of
dependency/world-system propositions, however, does not mean
that the approach should be embraced unequivocally. What it
does suggest is that the approach should be taken seriously
in any attempt to forge an understanding of urbanization in
peripheral capitalis~ states.
Unlike Galtung's (1971) center~peripherymodel, which
focuses its attention on interactions among governments, the
dependency/world-system framework, in addition, concentrates
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on the global interactions of nonstate actors, such as TNCs,
banks, and the IMF. These sources of external capital have
continued to perpetuate uneven development. Benefits from
foreign investment and aid redound to the "modern" sector
and to the few elite groups in the society which benefit
from the process. This is true even in cases where the
primary beneficiaries of aid appear to be those with the
most urgent needs.
By situating Guyanese urbanization in the context of
changes in the world system, this study has moved beyond
many previous investigations of cities in the developing
world, which have described urban processes within a
national setting and have steadfastly omitted the effects of
global linkages. Unfortunately, academics who have embraced
the dependency/world-system perspective have been so
enamored with dependency relations that they have conversely
failed to consider internal structures.
Whilst the dependency/world-system framework allows
one to clearly demonstrate how surplus value was extracted
from Guyana via the circulation of agricultural and mineral
commodities, it failed to adequately address the manner in
which labor was utilized and reproduced.
By concentrating on the politicoeconomic structure at
the global level, dependency/world-system theory seems to
have presented us with a reductionist argument, since it
failed to consider the importance of local forces. The
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perspective does not adequately account for local variations
in the political and social structure of the peripheral
economy. It consistently appears to underestimate the role
of the local state, as well as the power of local elites,
classes, ethnic, political, and interest groups in
determining urbanization outcomes.
It is obvious that investigations about development
and urbanization in the Third World must journey beyond the
dependency/world-system perspective. My modest attempt in
this direction entails a recognition of internal
politicosocial variables. At the level of the national
political economy, the local state does appear to have some
degree of impact on urbanization and settlement patterns.
cognizant of the previously outlined weaknesses of
dependency/world-system theory, the study endeavors to
consider not only the domestic class structure, but also the
distortions engendered by ethnic conflict in Guyana. It is
imperative to understand that penetration of capitalism into
the country was not a pain-free process. The inherent
contradictions between labor and capital did take place, but
for the most part, the class struggle has been overshadowed
by long-standing ethnic conflicts.
Whilst one might argue that dependency/world-system
theory does at least consider class relations at the global
level, ethnicity is thought to be irrelevant in matters
relating to development. Rather, it is simply believed to
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be a reaction to world capitalist penetration.
Urbanization in Guyana is contingent not only upon the
class struggle, but also ethnic/racial conflict. Throughout
the study, the historical evidence has supported the notion
that race has been a dominant factor in the internal
political economy. Racial considerations have been most
important in determining the execution of legislation, the
allocation of economic surplus, planning, and development
policies which have impacted urbanization. The local state,
although it was always in the final analysis, beholden to
the supreme authority of the colonial powers prior to
Guyana's independence, has always reflected the political
will of the dominant ethnic group. This in turn has led to
policies which seek to benefit particular group members.
Factionalism is deeply embedded in the society. For the
white planter class and the East Indians, control of the
state has meant a preoccupation with rural areas, whereas
for Africans the emphasis has been an urban one.
Therefore, to understand the role of the state in
Guyana, and how government policies, infrastructural
allocations, and planning have affected urbanization and
settlement patterns in the country, this investigation has
analyzed not only how ethnicity was impacted by capitalism,
but also how it interacted with this particular mode of
production in the domestic space economy. Its effects on
internal causation are traced by addressing decisions
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related to infrastructural allocations and planning.
The conclusion that the Guyanese social formation was
dependent on linkages to the core, and the resulting complex
of urban problems which this provoked, is at odds with the
more optimistic predictions of modernization theorists such
as Rostow (1962), Reissman (1964), Sjoberg (1965), Berliner
(1977), and Browett (1980). The expectation that
urbanization in developing countries such as Guyana would
progress along a linear continuum already travelled by
Western Europe and North America has not materialized.
Urbanization in Guyana has proceeded in the absence of
economic growth and industrialization.
Guyana today appears to conform more ·closely to the
postulates of dependent urbanization. Among the observed
contemporary characteristics of the urban structure are
urban primacy, unemployment and underemployment, a
burgeoning informal sector, intra-urban inequality, shanty
towns and squatter settlements, and retardation in rural
areas. These dependent urbanization features have also been
accompanied by a number of conditions that appear to be
common to all countries which have experienced dependent
development following their incorporation into the modern
world system. Within the economic structure, the research
has noted an overwhelming raw-material export orientation
with product elaboration in the core, low rates of GNP and
per capita incomes, a stunted manufacturing sector, a lack
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of diversification, low-productivity and low-wage labor,
excessive dependence, a deepening divergence between what is
consumed and what is produced, and the absence of an
internal dynamic and coherence. within the political and
social structure, the study has noted perceived racial and
ethnic divisions, a high degree of social segmentation,
residential separation along racial lines, profound
inequalities, instability, bureaucratism, and authoritarian
tendencies.
Whilst there appears to be nothing singular in
Guyana's dependent urbanization experience in relation to
other developing countries which have been integrated into
the world capitalist system, there is one noticeable
difference. Rural-urban migration has not occurred on the
scale so much in evidence elsewhere in the developing world.
Save for a brief spurt in the post-World War II period, the
rate of rural-urban migration in the twentieth century has
been decidedly slow, and at the present time it has almost
ground to a halt. How can dependency/world-system theory
explain this anomaly?
One possible answer is that Guyana has successfully
reduced its dependent position in the world capitalist
system. But, as we have already noted in Ch~pter V, the
country's industrial structure and its global economic
linkages have remained largely unchanged in the post-
independence era. The major change, however, has been the
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deterioration of the economy, which has led to the c7erall
neglect of the space economy. Whereas in the past a
significant proportion of rural residents moved to the more
vibrant capital city of Georgetown, they now move to urban
areas in the core or to urban places where dependent
capitalism is in ascendancy. Through emigration, large
numbers of rural inhabitants are voting with their feet by
moving directly overseas. Global cities such as Miami, New
York, and Toronto have become the prime attractors of
Guyana's rural and urban populations.
What should be learned from Guyana's attempt to alter
spatial patterns through self-reliance and cooperative
socialism? The dependency/world-system framework indicates
that the failure of the strategy can be explained in
relation to structural changes in the global economy.
Specifically, the strategy's lack of success is attributed
to the unequal nature of the terms of trade - rising prices
for imports of energy, manufactured goods, food, and
capital; falling prices for exports of agricultural and
mineral products. The theory also suggests that Guyanese
cooperative socialism merely sought a nationalist
accommodation in the world capitalist order. Dependency
relations continued in much the same manner. The same
dynamic of producing what is not consumed, and consuming
what is not produced, prevailed. Finally, the arrival of
the IMF and World Bank on the scene, armed with their open-
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door and export-led policy prescriptions, firmly sealed the
fate of Guyanese self-reliance.
Whilst the above explanations are correct, they are at
the same time inadequate. Failure of self-reliance cannot
be attributed solely to external reasons. My analysis of
the Guyanese development complex clearly points out that
endogenous forces also played an important part in the
demise of the self-reliant strategy. Ethnic conflict,
factionalism, clientelism, mismanagement, repression, .the
lack of skilled personnel, and so on, interacted with
exogenous forces to ensure failure.
Finally, this study of the Guyana experience
demonstrates that dependency/world-system theory can be a
powerful heuristic tool in organizing, understanding, and
explaining the nature of the urbanization process in a
peripheral capitalist state. The research further suggests
that when the theory is supplemented with a realist
perspective that places a premium on internal dynamics, the
dialectical relationship between external and internal
forces will ensure a more complete analysis of urbanization
in peripheral social formations.
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MAJOR GOALS/OBJECTIVES OF THE 1966-1972 DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
1. To provide as many jobs as soon as possible.
2. To increase the productivity of labor through
training.
3. To give each farmer sufficient land to maintain
himself
and his family and to assist him with improved
credit and marketing facilities, information, and
training.
4. To complete existing land development schemes, to
start new ones, and to execute the first stages of
the Mahaica/Mahaicony/Abary and Canje drainage and
irrigatiOll schemes.
5. To assist fishermen with building new trawlers and
with improving their methods.
6. To develop new crops and industries so as to
reduce dependence on sugar, rice, and bauxite and
wherever possible to substitute local goods and
foodstuffs for imports.
7. To carry out a thorough investigation and stock-
taking of the resources by means of aerial
mapping, hydroelectric power surveys, geological
surveys, and surveys of water resources.
8. To ensure that the best possible use was made of
the forests and that new forest industries were
developed.
9. To ensure the rapid development of the mineral
resources.
10. To assist with the rapid development of new
industries by providing tax concessions, advice
credit, training, etc.
11. To provide electricity for the villages and to
increase urban electricity supplies so as to meet
the needs of expanding industry.
12. To improve coastal roads, to build new roads into
the interior, and to give access to land
development schemes.
13. To cut the Berbice bar and channel so as to hasten
economic development in that area.
14. To build a modern airport at Atkinson and to
improve aviation facilities in the interior.
15. To provide complete telephone coverage of the
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country.
16. To provide equal educational opportunities for all
regardless of race, religion, or social class.
17. To provide 30,000 places in all-age schools and
10,000 places in secondary schools and to train
300 teachers annually.
18. To start construction of buildings for the
University of Guyana and to establish Technical
Institutes in Essequibo and Berbice.
19. To organize, expand, and modernize the health
services on a three-tier basis so as to provide a
country-wide network of health centers and
district hospitals and a new referral hospital in
Georgetown.
20. To improve existing pure water supplies and to
provide new supplies including supplies in the
interior.
21. To assist in the provision of houses by helping
with the development of land, the guarantee of
loans, and self-help schemes.
22. To foster the self-help and co-op movements as
main instruments of social and economic
development.
23. To provide local government for the entire
population.
24. To integrate Amerindians into the Guyanese
community through a comprehensive program of
social and economic development including the
provision of schools, health facilities, training,
community development schemes, and improvement of
interior communications.
25. To maintain law and order and the security of the
country through the expansion and training of the
police force and the establishment of an adequate
defense force. 1
IBarker 1968, Ope cit., pp. 12-14.
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MAJOR GOALS/OBJECTIVES OF THE 1980 GEORGETOWN PLAN
1. To indicate and facilitate measures needed to
raise the economic performance of the city and
standard of living of the people, especially the
low and very low-income groups by the location and
allocation of land for viable economic activities
and increasing job opportunities.
2. To improve the quality of life provided by a
suitable physical and social environment in
which all people will have equitable opportunity
to live, work, and enjoy recreation with the
utmost safety, economy, convenience, and harmony.
3. To rese~ve or provide for all land needs, with the
necessary infrastructure and facilities.
4. To ensure that built up acres within GPA are made
compact and well structured so that
transportation, pUblic utilities and costs of
journeys to work are minimized, and the
performance of various urban activities are
optimized.
5. To provide adequate housing, serviced with the
necessary infrastructural services and facilities.
6. To provide for economical, efficient, and safe
movement of vehicles and pedestrians by
integration of the land uses with the
transportation system, especially taking into
account the needs of the low-income population and
increasing fuel costs.
7. To provide employment areas with industries,
offices, etc., so that they are accessible to
worker housing; in energy efficient locations,
environmentally suitable for development. These
should be cost effective with infrastructure and
compatible with surrounding areas.
8. To develop a thriving and attractive central area
which caters for the needs of the catchment
population with a system of neighborhood centers
and markets economically viable and designed to
serve the day-to-day needs of the population.
Such neighborhood centers should be accessible to
the people and located in areas where
environmental quality and land-uses are not
515
adversely affected.
9. To provide a system of community facilities,
designed and located so as to balance convenience
to users, social equity, cost efficiency,
environmental quality, amenity and compatibility
with surrounding land uses.
10. To ensure that adequate, economical and
environmentally acceptable system of water supply,
sewerage, d~ainage, garbage collection and
disposal, electricity, and telecommunication
services are provided and located for the growing
needs of the GPA at the appropriate time and
according to appropriate standards.
11. To ensure that energy consumption is minimized by
the jUdicious location of activities and
adoption of appropriate energy saving measures
including adoption of cost-effective public and
personal transportation and pUblic utility
systems.
12. To provide a healthy environment through the
adoption of suitable environmental control and
protection measures, including legal measures and
by the jUdicious disposition of land-uses and
buildings.
13. To enhance the aesthetic values of the GPA by
jUdicious urban design and by preserving the
historical sites, monuments and buildings of
architectural value.
14. To facilitate the development of a coordinated and
unified administrative system which is provided
with sufficient technical personnel, legal, and
financial support to enable more plan preparation
and development control and to implement
development activities within GPA.'
'CHPA. 1982. Georgetown Planning Area Development Plan -
Vol. 4, pp. 15-26.
